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Translators' Words

This monograph titled *Compass on the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Theory, History and Culture* is authored by Prof. Guozhen Yang of the Department of History, Xiamen University. The monograph is a theoretical study of China's maritime development and maritime humanities and social sciences, as well as a study of China's maritime historiography. Maritime historiography, according to the author, sets its sights on the historical studies of all aspects of nature, society, and humanities in relation to the sea, and each of the relevant concepts within the scope of maritime history is elucidated therein. Professor Yang, in particular, gives a precise definition of some of the basic concepts of maritime humanities and social sciences as well as the humanistic studies in maritime sphere including maritime economies, maritime society, and maritime culture, etc., hence clearly establishing the theoretical foundation for the discipline of maritime humanities and social sciences.

The important points that Prof. Yang puts forward about China's maritime history in the book include: (1) China is a large country with both land and sea, rich in bio-diversity, and the ocean is an important environment for the Chinese nation to survive and thrive. (2) In history, the Chinese nation has developed its own maritime economy, maritime society, and maritime humanistic model. As a natural body, the ocean treats all littoral nations equally, and it is neither open nor closed to any one of them. (3) Due to the different marine environments, the ways the coastal nations adapt vary accordingly, hence maritime culture is characterized by plurality and diversity. (4) The contacts and exchanges between maritime civilizations in history are riddled with misunderstandings, exclusions, conflicts, and confrontations. Therefore, it is necessary to develop dialogues among varied maritime civilizations of varied countries, which, as a result, will develop together through mutual tolerance, seek common ground while shelving differences, and extract the idea of maritime civilization for all mankind through mutual learning and complementing each other.

The book is of great academic value: It unveils innovative expositions on the concepts and theories of maritime development, the larger marine science system, and the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences. By utilizing novel ideas and materials and through the historical and global lens, Guozhen Yang has carved out a new realm of comprehensive research in China's maritime humanities and social

sciences, hence providing cultural underpinning for the national strategy to build a stronger maritime country. This masterpiece of his shall become the foundation for the humanistic maritime research and map out the course of its development in the days to come.

The translation of this book is of great significance. The seminal work represents the highest standard of China's domestic scholarship in maritime studies, and also takes a leading position in the arena of the international maritime historiography studies. The publication of the English translation will help to make the Chinese voice heard in the international academic community on maritime issues, increase the international renown of Chinese maritime research, and strengthen China's discourse right in the global academia.

Contents

1 New Outlook for the Ocean and Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences 1

1.1 Harmony Between Man and the Ocean: New Outlook for the Ocean and Social Development in the Twenty-First Century 1

1.1.1 The Expansion of Mankind's Exploration and Exploitation of the Ocean 2

1.1.2 Hidden Worries of the Ocean Century 5

1.1.3 Towards Harmony Between Man and the Ocean 7

1.2 Basic Theoretical Research on Maritime Development 13

1.2.1 Reasons for Building Theories of Maritime Development 14

1.2.2 Macro Basic Theories of Maritime Development 16

1.2.3 Applied Basic Theories of Maritime Development 20

1.3 The Rise of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences and Discipline Construction 23

1.3.1 The Rise of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences 24

1.3.2 The Prospect of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences 30

1.3.3 Constructing China's Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences 33

1.4 The Conceptual Integration of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences 39

1.4.1 Introduction 39

1.4.2 Oceanic Regions 40

1.4.3 Maritime Economy 41

1.4.4 Maritime Society 44

1.4.5 Maritime Culture 45

1.5 Misunderstanding of and Theoretical Exploration into the Belt and Road Initiative 47

1.5.1 The BRI Is Not Meant to Rejuvenate the Land Rights 47

1.5.2 The BRI Is Not Designed to Restore the Canonization System of the Ming Dynasty 50
1.5.3 The BRI Is Not a Chinese-Style Globalization 53
References 56

2 Maritime Development and Construction of Maritime Culture 61
2.1 Defining Ocean and Maritime Development in China 61
2.1.1 The Concept of Humanistic Ocean 61
2.1.2 The Contemporary Concept of Maritime Development 65
2.1.3 China's Maritime Economy and Maritime Culture 67
2.1.4 The Development of Fujian and the Ocean 71
2.2 Maritime Culture Studies and Maritime Culture Construction 72
2.2.1 The Status Quo of Research on Chinese Maritime Culture 72
2.2.2 The Historical Contents of Chinese Maritime Culture 74
2.2.3 The Direction for the Construction of Chinese Maritime Culture 77
2.3 Research on China's Maritime History and Maritime Culture 81
2.4 Rational Thoughts on Maritime China 87
2.4.1 Proposing the Construction of Chinese Maritime Humanistic Sociology 87
2.4.2 Overall Concern with China's Maritime Rights and Interests 88
2.4.3 Land and Sea in Harmony for a Harmonious Socialist Society 92
2.4.4 Suggestions on the Enactment of *China's Law of the Sea* 94
2.5 History and Reality: MSR from the Perspective of Maritime Space 96
2.5.1 The Concept and Connotations of the Historical MSR 97
2.5.2 Sorting and Analyzing the Discussions on the Timeline of the MSR 99
2.5.3 The Location and Space Covered by the 21st-Century MSR 101
2.5.4 MSR in Maritime History 102
References 104

3 The Maritime History of China 107
3.1 China's Need for Its Own Maritime Socioeconomic History 107
3.2 Thoughts on China's Maritime Socioeconomic History 111
3.2.1 The Dissonance of Chinese Modernization and Its Mentality Toward Modernity 111
3.2.2 To Outgrow the Old Notion That Equated Maritime Economy and Maritime Society with the Capitalist Social Economy 113

3.2.3 Five Major Relationships That Must Be Addressed in China's Maritime Socioeconomic History 115
3.2.4 Ten Directions for the Study of China's Maritime Socioeconomic History 119
3.3 The Loss of Ocean: A Myth of Chinese History 120
3.4 Taxonomy of Maritime Humanities: A New Horizon of Chinese History in the Twenty-First Century 127
3.5 The Ocean Century and Maritime History 131
3.5.1 The Concept of "Ocean Century" 131
3.5.2 The Rise of Maritime History 134
3.5.3 The Outlook of China's Maritime History 137
3.6 From Ocean-Related History to the Entire Maritime History 139
3.6.1 Reflections on Theory 139
3.6.2 Practice of the Academics 142
3.6.3 Break a New Ground for Chinese Maritime History 145
References 147

4 Maritime History in the Jiaqing and Daoguang Periods 149
4.1 Hong Merchants and Supercargoes: Preliminary Exploration for Documents of the Thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou 149
4.1.1 The Modes of Letters of the Hongs 150
4.1.2 Bi-Directional Translation Between Hong Merchants and Supercargoes 153
4.1.3 Semi-official Letters from Hong Merchants to Supercargoes 158
4.1.4 Private Letters Addressed to the Supercargoes from the Hong Merchants 165
4.2 Hong Merchants and Macao: Continued Exploration for the Documents of the Canton Thirteen Hongs 170
4.2.1 Hong Merchants and the Portuguese Authorities in Macao 170
4.2.2 Hong Merchants and the Foreign Merchants Traveling Between Guangzhou and Macao 174
4.2.3 Foreign Merchants and Guangdong Government 179
4.2.4 Hong Merchants and Macao-Portuguese Merchants 183
4.3 Canton Customs and Coastal Trades During the Anti-opium Campaign: Yu Kun's Official Correspondence with Lin Zexu Collected in Britain 185
4.3.1 Reopening Inland and Coastal Trade After the Destruction of Opium at Humen 186
4.3.2 The Policy of Opening up Inland and Coastal Trade Remains Unchanged in the Wake of the Halt of the Trade with the British 189
4.3.3 Patch Up the Gap in the Historical Memory 195
4.4 Lin Zexu's Maritime View and Hong Kong 196

4.4.1 A Nascent Awareness of Marine Economy 197
4.4.2 Devout Faith in Sea Goddess Mazu 200
4.4.3 Viewing Hong Kong from a Maritime Perspective 202
4.5 Lin Zexu and Taiwan 204
4.5.1 Oneness of Fujian and Taiwan 205
4.5.2 Lin's Insights into the Turmoil in Taiwan 211
4.5.3 Correspondence with Taiwan and Penghu Scholars and Officials Stationed in Taiwan 216
4.6 The Changes of Trade Between China and the Western World During the Reign of Emperor Daoguang and Their Implications 221
4.6.1 The Changes of China-Western Trade in the Early Years of the Daoguang Reign 221
4.6.2 The Impact of the Changes in China-Western Trade Relations in the Early Years of the Daoguang Period on the Chinese Society and Economy 228
4.6.3 The Shift in Trade Order Between China and the West in the Late Daoguang Period and Its Impact on China 236
References 245

Bibliography 247

Chapter 1
New Outlook for the Ocean and Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences

1.1 Harmony Between Man and the Ocean: New Outlook for the Ocean and Social Development in the Twenty-First Century

Peace and development remain the two themes of top concern in the twenty-first century, but numerous inextricable disputes and conflicts render the world we live in far from being an ideal global village. The kaleidoscopic and panoramic world of today has aroused concerns and reflections from multiple angles. One of the hot issues is maritime development. Maritime development effects social changes through human being's direct or indirect exploration and exploitation of the ocean. Throughout history, human civilizations have emerged locally, giving rise to different styles of civilization in different regions, nations, and countries. Maritime culture, parallel to land-based culture, refers to different patterns of individual and collective ocean-related practices in the process of maritime development. As a natural entity, the ocean is fair to all littorals without discrimination, whether open or closed. Owing to different marine environments, littoral nationalities exhibit different ways of adaptation, hence the plurality and diversity of maritime cultures. Throughout history, the contacts and communications between different civilizations have been riddled with misunderstandings, repulsion, conflicts, and confrontations. Maritime civilizations are no exception. This calls for dialogues across maritime civilizations and borders, common development by fostering mutual tolerance and reserving differences, and shared vision of maritime civilization for mankind through mutual borrowing and learning.

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1.1.1 The Expansion of Mankind's Exploration and Exploitation of the Ocean

On the earth we inhabit, the ocean covers 70.8% of its surface, or an area of 361 million km^2. The water it contains is about 14 times that on land. It is the largest natural body on the earth, originally a terra incognita unfit for human habitation. With the invention of boats, ships, and other technical instruments, human beings began to go into the ocean. Their knowledge, exploration, and exploitation of the ocean advanced from the lower to the higher levels, going increasingly deeper from the surface, the body to the multi-dimensional space. From the Challenger's global investigation into the ocean in 1872 to the great discovery of marine resources in the 1960s, the compass of human understanding of the ocean extended from its surface, its body, down to the seafloor and up to the air space. With the advent of the twenty-first century, to match the rise of the strategic position of the ocean, the human society is embracing an era of "multi-dimensional ocean" for full exploration and exploitation of marine resources and space. Our new understanding of the ocean can be concluded in the following four aspects:

(1) The ocean is the second space for human subsistence and development

We used to view the ocean from land-based standpoint, enjoying marine resources as a blessing. The positive significance of the ocean to human subsistence and development seems to consist in its mere role as an artery of communication between civilizations on different continents, connecting littoral peoples as if they were neighbors. As we look back, such a view is obviously one-sided and narrow-minded. Modern marine scientists and humanities and social scientists are well aware that in the maritime regions where human beings live, their economic activities are closely connected with the marine ecological system, which develops into maritime economic ecosystem, and the ocean per se is a space for human subsistence and development.

The ocean is closely linked to human subsistence. It is essential for the survival and development of the species, and is a basic component of life-supporting system. Mankind has migrated from the land to the sea, created navigation-based maritime civilizations, and set up different marine sectors, industrial and social institutions. The ship-dwellers, or "flowing shipboard communities," such as fishermen communities, maritime commerce communities, and pirates, which are themselves space for subsistence and development, have their own organizational systems and behavioral patterns that are distinct from land-based communities. Maritime elements permeate into and have become an indispensable part of their material and spiritual lives. Long voyages at sea challenge the sailors physically, physiologically, and mentally as well. As a matter of fact, where there was no capacity for survival, there would be no onboard communities, let alone crossing or exploring the ocean. In history, maritime activities comprised only part of human activities. In coastal regions, islands, and territorial seas which were unfit for human life and navigation and lacking in maritime activities, there naturally was no maritime culture. Over a long period of time, man enjoyed huge space on land, sufficient for them to survive and thrive; maritime

communities were only in the minority. Hence, it's understandable why the mainstream mentality of the human society has long neglected the value of the ocean as a living space.

As mankind entered the twentieth century, with the rapid growth of world population, the living space on land was getting inadequate, and the ocean has become a coveted living space for mankind. The construction of land reclamation, sea airports, offshore oil and gas platforms, cities on the water, underwater habitats, underwater hotels, underwater tunnels, and underwater factories—all mirror this desire. The shortage of land resources, the deterioration of environment, and the thirst for compensation from the ocean have driven mankind to seize and divide the multidimensional ocean space. On 16th November 1994, *The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (hereinafter the *UNCLOS*) took effect, which has since changed the conventional pattern of the high seas, so that more than 30% of the ocean (1094 million km^2) on the globe now falls under the jurisdiction of coastal States. The "internal waters" (within the baseline of territorial seas), "territorial seas" (not exceeding 12 nautical miles from the baseline at which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured), and its air space, sea beds and subsoil—all enjoy the same full rights as land territories do. Other territorial seas, such as "contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, straits for international navigation, and archipelagic waters," carry different levels of rights, namely autonomous rights, exclusive rights, territorial rights, or administrative rights, respectively. These five types of waters are different from internal waters, territorial seas, and high seas, yet the coastal and archipelagic states have placed the territorial seas under de facto control irrespective of the "de jure restrictions."

(2) The ocean is the pivot of economic development

The ocean is abundant with biological and mineral resources, which are a valuable treasure for human beings to sustain and promote their livelihood. The capacity of the ocean to feed mankind is approximately 1000 times that of agricultural products around the globe. More than 80% of all proteins human beings need are from sea products. We can cultivate salt-tolerant crops by genetic modification and genetic engineering, develop seawater irrigation agriculture, and grow terrestrial plants in the sea, so as to ease the pressure of agriculture on land. Sea water can be used for industrial and municipal purposes and for extraction of chemical elements, which can be processed into various kinds of chemical products. It can even be desalted for domestic use, which has become a major source of sustainable freshwater. Various kinds of marine energy, including tide energy, wave energy, current energy, thermal energy and salinity gradient energy (or blue energy), are renewable resources dependent on sea water, amounting to a total of over three billion kilowatts. The reserves of marine oil and natural gas are estimated to be 1400 billion tons. The international seabed area, which accounts for 49% of the land surface, contains rich resources of polymetallic nodule, cobalt-rich iron / manganese (ferromanganese) crust, and hydrothermal sulfide. Gas hydrates (usually called flammable ice) are found in the seafloor and permafrost sediments along the continental margins at water depths greater than 300 m. One cubic meter of gas hydrate can release 164 cubic meters of

methane gas and 0.8 cubic meter of water, an estimated total of 20,000 trillion cubic meters. This contains an estimated volume of organic carbon twice that of the known total storage of coal, oil, and gas, which can last 1000 years for human use (Yang et al., 2003).

The ocean is fundamental to human life. Inhabiting, swimming, boating, fishing, and sightseeing are the daily activities of the coastal life. Regions where economy, society and culture are best-developed are mostly concentrated in coastal areas, around 60 km from the coast, which accommodate half of the world's population. It was once estimated that about 3600 people were migrating to the coastal areas on a daily basis. Meanwhile, the ocean is of high ecological value: the regulation and intervention of the atmosphere, the circulation of nutritious salt, waste disposal, control of organisms, living environment, food, raw materials, entertainment and other cultural forms, these are all pivotal to harmonious development.

(3) The ocean is the "inner outer-space" for strategic competition

The ocean remains a security line for all nations. The prominence of energy and economic security, and the application of high and new technology in military have bestowed maritime security and the strategic role of the ocean with new meanings. While the conventional strategy of "controlling the world by controlling the marine channels" is not outdated, the priority has gradually shifted to a multi-dimensional ocean, especially to the still unknown "inner outer-space," the 500-m-deep territorial sea. The coastal zones, bay areas and islands are garrisoned by the longshore defense troops; meanwhile, the naval forces are stationed on the sea, the submarine forces under the sea, and missile bases are built on the ocean floor, through which the basic patterns of future naval deployments can be envisaged. The major strategic nuclear forces have shifted from land to ocean, and with missile nuclear submarines and anti-submarine weapons as the main power, they can be deployed in different seas around the world, capable to carry out surprise attacks from different locations, and mitigate the threat of nuclear strikes on their own missile systems and homeland. The uninhabited islands and reefs in the ocean and underwater are ideal sites for weapons testing and military drills. Marine warfare is not limited to naval battles, but a multi-dimensional one that covers the air space above the ocean, islands, underwater and seabed, with the integrated characteristics of land, sea and air warfare concurrently.

(4) The ocean is an important platform for innovation of science and technology

The ocean is an important site in which scientific discoveries are made. The solution for major scientific issues, such as global warming, climate change, the origin of life and the origin of mankind, rests much with the progress of research on marine science. Research of this kind is called ocean mega-science, including the global ocean observing system, marine drilling programs, hydrothermal process and ecosystem, marine biodiversity, integrated administration of coastal zones, etc. Man's understanding of the ocean is still rather shallow, but its potential as a mega-science, and of economic benefits and utilizability has generated increasing interests and enormous concerns. High and new marine technology and maritime industries are springing up and holding out new hope for the development of human civilization.

The ocean is the way out for future civilization. Exploration, exploitation and protection of the ocean are the bound direction to which the human society moves forward in the twenty-first century.

1.1.2 Hidden Worries of the Ocean Century

The twenty-first century is a new era in which mankind explores the three-dimensional ocean. However, human beings still know little of the ocean. Most of them have no clue about it, and some of them have only a smattering of understanding or even misunderstandings regarding it. While we have been trying to gain insights or to rediscover the ocean, our notion of subsistence and development has not changed. In the current sociocultural and economic competition where profit-maximization is most highly valued, the negative consequences of mankind's contention for living space and plundering of resources have rendered the relationship between man and the ocean, and that between individuals and between countries in maritime activities all the more strenuous, which can be specified as follows:

(1) Enclosure movements are increasing in intensity

Human being's contention for living space in the twentieth century started with developed maritime powers and then came the third-world countries, struggling for territorial seas, so that the enclosure movements have escalated over time. Approximately 80% of the fishing areas with edible fish stocks have been divided into territorial seas under the jurisdiction of States concerned. The total catch of fish from the exclusive economic zones of coastal States amounts to more than 94%. Fishing in other States' specialized zones is very much restricted. This means some fishing vessels are forced to withdraw from the traditional fishing grounds, which will seriously impact the livelihoods of fishermen and the economy of the fishing areas. Of the global explored oil storage in the ocean, 87% lies in the exclusive economic zones of the coastal States. The main international navigation routes also go through the exclusive economic zones of one or more States. Therefore, after the *UNCLOS* took effect, all States involved adopted the attitude of fighting for every inch of sea in the matter of territorial waters. Some even broke the limits imposed by the *UNCLOS*, made various claims to expand their maritime rights and took preemptive action in the disputed waters in an attempt to get a larger share as a fait accompli. Free ocean space has been narrowed down and the living space has shrunk as a result. There have been continuous battles for island autonomy, fishery disputes, energy and control of straits, which are potential causes for war.

(2) Populations are flooding into coastal areas

Populations flooding to coastal areas have become a global trend, starting with developed States and followed by developing States. People agglomerate in the coastal areas and build clusters of big cities. While this symbolizes economic prosperity

and modernity, it does bring about a myriad of problems as well, such as insufficiency of living space, tension between man and land, excessive expansion of cities towards the ocean, and fragility of ecological environment. It even results in shortage of freshwater and leads to water scarcity, excessive pumping of underground water, which in turn could cause subsidence and saltwater intrusion. Demands for sea products grow dramatically, which stimulates overfishing and excessive exploitation of mariculture. The rising volume of industrial and domestic wastes and sewage leads to serious pollution. Urban heat island effect and rain island effect are aggravated, which increases the risk of climate change. Measures of governance fail to keep up with the change, which leads to lower quality of life, insufficient employment, stagnation of economy, social disorder, etc. That's why some scholars point out that the threats to the global maritime regions mainly arise from population concentration in the coastal regions.

(3) Inappropriate or excessive exploitation of the ocean

Inspired by the slogan of "constructing mankind's second homeland," coastal States are jumping on a bandwagon of maritime exploration, making maritime economy a new economic growth point. Some of the sea areas, however, are exploited inappropriately and excessively, always overused but under-protected, thus resulting in conflicts between ecological objectives and economic ones.

Marine fishery resource is a special kind of common property. Owing to the mobility of fish and legal ambiguity of property rights, the so-called common property actually means that it doesn't belong to anyone and that everyone can fish for free. That's why large-scale ship-making and long-term overfishing run rampant despite prohibitions. Overfishing has the most tragic consequences for the ocean, resulting in the extinction of some living resources. Marine biologists warn that such acts, if unchecked, may foreshadow a future decades later where man could fish nothing from the ocean but planktons.

The use of the ocean with disorder and without limits has ruined some marine resources and natural landscape. The scarcity of marine fish varieties has upset the balance of species structure and caused ecological disasters such as marine plague (virosis). Coastal constructions such as building dykes on the coast have altered the direction of the currents and the surroundings, which might barricade the routes of migratory fishes and destroy the ecological system. Sand and gravel are recklessly excavated, vast arrays of mangrove forest and reefs have vanished, and wetland is shrinking sharply, which has largely diminished the capacity of the ocean for regulating the climate, water storage and flood diversion, as well as for defense against windstorm torrents and safeguarding the coast. Bringing in exotic species blindly has crowded out and caused the extinction of many native species. Changing the landscape has come at the cost of aesthetic value.

(4) Marine pollution recurs despite prohibitions

Inhabitants on land take the ocean as a natural garbage pool and dump wastes and pollutants into the sea recklessly. Mankind is now placing intolerable strain on the coastal areas by dumping wastes and pollutants into the ocean, by letting the untreated

or poorly-treated industrial, agricultural and domestic sewage flow unchecked into the ocean. Following the increased exploitation, oil-leakage, the discharge of ballast water and waste water from fishery and offshore field further deteriorate the offshore environment. Severe pollution in some parts of the waters has gone beyond the ocean's capacity of thinning and self-purification. Pollution lowers the quality of sea water and causes oxygen deprivation, which directly intoxicates marine lives or causes damage to their normal physiological and biological functions. It also results in eutrophication, which causes explosive reproduction or dense agglomeration of some planktons, which then develop into red tide and suffocates a vast number of fish and shellfish.

If excessive exploitation of the ocean and aggravation of pollution remain unrestrained, the offshore may become unfit for human life, which is sounding the alarm to mankind. That's why the United Nations took "Wanted! Seas and Oceans—Dead or Alive" as its theme on the 33rd World Environment Day, on 5th June 2004.

(5) Anomalous change of marine environment

Marine disasters induced by the change of marine environment, such as catastrophic earthquakes, tsunamis, rainstorms and slides, continual coast erosion and the rise of sea level, can have great impact on the human society. El Nino has resulted in abnormal temperature rise across a vast range of seas, and as a result, a myriad of fish and seabirds living on fish die. Lately in Peru, warm water intrusions have occurred every few years, causing massive deaths of fish and fish-feeding seabirds. The rise of sea level caused by global climate change has pushed the ecosystem of the coastal regions back towards land, which has direct impact on the biodiversity of coastal areas across the world. Studies show that a rise of one meter in sea level will cause a coastal retreat by 1500 m. If the sea level reaches this level 50 years later, it is forecast that Tuvalu, an island country, will be submerged and might be the first country to suffer the nation-wide exodus. America might end up losing 360,000 km^2 of its land bit by bit, and coastal States bordering on the Atlantic, the Mississippi River and the Mexican Bay might be engulfed. Likewise, 120,000 km^2 of China's coastal areas might be submerged and 70 million people might have to be migrated inland (Yang et al., 2000).

1.1.3 Towards Harmony Between Man and the Ocean

Harmony between man and the ocean should be an ideal of maritime civilization that the 21st-century mankind pursues. It not only marks a new stage of maritime exploration, the brainchild of the reflection on the marine ecological-economic crisis; it is also a re-creation of the ancient philosophy in the Eastern world that man is an integral part of nature. The idea was put forward in the twentieth century and viewed as of universal value in *Agenda 21* adopted in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and in the *UNCLOS* that took effect on 16th November 1994. Since then, it has become a guiding principle for sustainable

maritime development, aiming to construct a new international order in the fair share of maritime interests, joint exploration and protection and peaceful exploitation of the ocean.

Harmony between man and the ocean involves the adjustment of relationship between man and the ocean and that between individuals. International communities and scholars have given much thought on this, appealed for the construction of an institutionalized working mechanism out of conscience and morality, and have drawn up alternative norms or plan Bs, which has greatly enriched the connotations of the new maritime outlook.

(1) Fair share of maritime interests

From social perspective, we propose that maritime benefits be equally shared, and that coordination in terms of social development should be maintained between maritime regions and land regions, between coastal States and landlocked States, as well as between interpersonal and intergenerational development. This concerns multiple levels of issues.

At the first level, i.e., in local maritime regions per se, such as a bay or a patch of waters as a unit, there assemble different communities, industries and individuals, who explore and exploit the ocean with different purposes and with overlapping or conflicting interests. For instance, fishery and aquaculture industry may conflict with, or even ruin maritime transportation, salt industry, seashore industrial reserves and seaside tourism, which may restrain the regional social development. We must take into account environmental, economic, social and cultural factors, make equitable allocation of the coastline, wetland, territorial seas and resources, rationalize productivity layout and ensure mutual coordination and complementarity in order to optimize the overall performance of the social system in the marine zones. Meanwhile, the activities of maritime communities with respect to production, circulation, distribution and consumption should not adversely affect other uninvolved communities.

At the second level, maritime regions within a country but under different jurisdictions may have different focal points with respect to exploitation and development strategies, which may also incur disputes and conflicts of maritime interests. Between maritime regions and inland areas, between the central and local governments, there is also the issue regarding the distribution of maritime interests, which calls for the adjustment of relationship on the basis of the principle of fair play, such as the ecological compensations for the mitigation of disparities in wealth in different regions.

At the third level, between coastal and island States, especially those that are geographically adjacent or opposite to each other, there may exist disputes and conflicts on the division of territorial seas and the attached maritime rights. This calls for equity in the delimitation of the territorial seas, continental shelf and exclusive economic zones. There also exist disputes and conflicts on maritime interests between geographically advantaged and disadvantaged States or both, and between coastal or island States and landlocked States, which requires redistribution of the actual benefits on equal basis. In accordance with the *UNCLOS*, both landlocked and

shelf-locked States are entitled to a proportion of gains from the exclusive economic zones within the neighboring littoral states. The landlocked States have the right of access to and from the sea and freedom of transit through the territory of transit countries (The *UNCLOS*, 1982: 68). All States enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zones of other countries, as well as the rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other legitimate uses of the international seas related to the rights. Coastal and island States can sign agreements or issue permits to other States, and their legal persons or natural persons should be allowed to explore and exploit the marine resources independently or jointly. Other States can pay maintenance fees to obtain permission for fishing in the territorial seas. Landlocked states should also be entitled to a fair share of surplus fish from coastal States' territorial seas (The *UNCLOS*, 1982: 49). When a coastal State's fishing capacity approximates the total amount of the living resources available in the exclusive economic zones, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the establishment of equitable arrangements on a bilateral, sub-regional or regional basis to allow for participation of developing landlocked States of the same sub-region or region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the sub-region or region, as may be appropriate in the circumstances and on terms satisfactory to all parties. Developed landlocked States and geographically disadvantaged States should be allowed to join in exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone under the jurisdiction of the developed coastal States within that region. In practice, agreements should be reached through negotiations on terms satisfactory to all parties (The *UNCLOS*, 1982: 50).

Exploitation of the high seas and seabed areas should also follow the equity principle and legal norms. The *UNCLOS* stipulates that the high seas are open to all nations. All nations share the rights of navigation, overflight, laying submarine cables and pipelines, construction of artificial islands and other facilities approved by the international law, fishing and carrying out scientific research. Not a single country can effectively claim sovereignty over any part of the high seas. The international seabed areas, including the seabed, the ocean floor and sub-soils other than the continental shelves, are common properties of the whole humankind, under the administration of the International Seabed Authority in the name of the whole world. The economic benefits from exploration and exploitation of the seas and their resources should be shared by all nations across the world, taking special care of the developing States (The *UNCLOS*, 1982: 57). According to Article 82 of the *UNCLOS*, to exploit the non-living resources of the continental shelf 200 nautical miles beyond the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, coastal States should make an annual payment of 1% of the value or volume of production at the site to the International Seabed Authority for the sixth year. The rate shall increase by 1 percent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and shall remain at 7% thereafter. The International Seabed Authority distributes the revenue among the States parties on the basis of equitable sharing criteria (The *UNCLOS*, 1982: 55), and the board of governors of the International Seabed Authority should also be so composed as to be based on equity.

At the fourth level, maritime benefits should be shared fairly across generations. Individuals of the contemporary world should take into consideration not only the equity of opportunity in terms of maritime development and demands and interests of all parties concerned, i.e., interpersonal equality, but also the future generations' rights of subsistence and maritime interests, namely intergenerational equality. As the contemporaries cannot possibly judge exactly what the future generations' needs will be, it's unlikely that we make a specific list of what to be reserved for our descendants, but we can at least morally set aside the resources and interests that are no less than what the preceding generations have saved for us. Excessive consumption will expect us to pay our descendants the rents for ecological environment, and we shall pass down this tradition across generations.

The order of the twenty-first century maritime world is still dominated by the powers, lacking in equity and justice for fair share of marine resources. It's hardly possible for the vulnerable communities and States to enjoy the benefits of maritime development equally; they are even marginalized. There arises a voice which proposes that the commonly inherited properties of mankind should cover the high seas and all territorial seas that have been divided by different States, so as to make the whole maritime space a common property to the whole humankind. But there is still a long way to go. It's been predicted that the basic pattern of the territorial division of the oceans will not change substantially in the twenty-first century. But with joint efforts, there will likely be coexistence and common prosperity or win-win competition among States with equal capabilities. Both coastal States and island States wish to become major maritime countries, but the right approach should be to dialogue rather than conflict, to deal with disputes and conflicts by means of diplomacy and law, to keep the ocean in peace and to coexist with win-win cooperation, rather than at the expense of other nations' well-being.

(2) Sustainable exploitation of marine resources

From economic perspective, we propose sustainable economic growth on the ground of protecting marine eco-environment. This involves transforming the traditional notion of materialistic consumption and development at the cost of environment, so as to explore and exploit marine resources appropriately, and maintain the virtuous cycle of marine resource ecosystem. On the whole, it is desirable that the contemporaries' needs be satisfied within the capacity of resources and environment without jeopardizing the interests of future generations.

In order to exploit marine resources sustainably, the developed maritime countries have initiated and set up the integrated management system of the ocean and coastal zones. With the support and promotion of the World Bank and the related organizations of the United Nations, many countries have started to pilot and expand it. In 1996, the United Nations Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission carried out a sampling survey and concluded that the integrated management system is a logical framework, with sufficient flexibility to satisfy most, if not all States' different needs.

The integrated management system of the ocean and coastal zones is a complex issue, which involves the adjustment of system design, development strategies and operating mechanism. On the strength of the ongoing worldwide practice, the idea of

integrating coordinative development between economy and ecology, between land and ocean, and between regions and the globe is getting clearer. Scholars in this field have concluded three key principles for sustainable maritime development: (1) the exploitation rate of the living resources should not exceed their replacement rate; (2) the volume of wastes and sewage discharged into the ocean should not exceed the capacity of the oceanic zones; (3) the population in coastal regions should not exceed what these regions and marine ecology can accommodate.

As to specific measures, coastal States are working hard to enhance their capability of exploiting the ocean with science and technology, and to maximize the efficiency of marine resource exploitation at lower costs. The measures can be listed as follows:

1. Strengthen governmental involvement into maritime development via legislation, planning, investment and administration. In other words, a scientific and appropriate plan for how to exploit the territorial seas should be drawn up and the licensing system for the paid use of territorial seas should be implemented. With the establishment of an integrated decision-making mechanism for resource environment and development, it is likely to prevent the destruction of marine resource environment at the very beginning, to make full use of various maritime industries in shallow or deep waters, each with their respective functions, and to guarantee the highly efficient use of marine resources both temporally and spatially.
2. Adopt justified means of maintenance, weigh the relationship between the volume of reproduction and capture production of the living resources, and come up with novel means of administration on fishing. For instance, fishing seasons and fishing areas can be planned, limits can be put on the size and number of fishing vessels and fishing gear, the varieties and quota of fish that are allowed to catch can be regulated by issuing fishing permits to fishermen. Closure of fishing areas, seasons of closure and fishing moratorium need to be stipulated. In the offshore areas, bottom trawl should be banned, and limits should be put on the variety of nets and the size of screens, so as to prevent excessive fishing and to protect the reproduction and breeding of some species. When other countries' fish varieties and fish schools are involved, it is advisable to establish a mechanism of cooperation among countries concerned and other international organizations.
3. Make scientific and proper use of aqua-cultural area near the beach and the shallow sea, develop an efficient low-polluted and large-scale agrarian model, and promote pollution-free breeding. For example, we can develop technology that may control diseases in marine aquaculture, and set up a series of integrated prevention system ranging from early pathogen diagnosis, segregation and elimination, daily health care of hosts, improvement of their immunity and premunition, to the sanitation and purification of breeding environment, control and treatment of pollution. All these are aimed to set up an integrated prevention and treatment system to guarantee the health of cultured organisms. And we need to explore new ways and technologies for coastal breeding, offshore breeding and even breeding in the high seas.

4. Prevent, alleviate and control the damages of pollution that human activities might inflict on marine environment, and prevent marine ecosystem degradation. Environmental protection should shift from focus on pollution prevention to the holistic management of prevention, monitoring and governance, and to the integrated management of resources and environment. These means of exploring and exploiting marine resources ensure the unified sustainability of maritime economic growth, marine ecology and social benefits, the ultimate goal of which is human subsistence and development.

(3) Harmonious coexistence of man and the ocean

Nature-wise, we propose a new type of relationship between man and nature characterized by harmony, equity and coordination, and the harmonious coexistence of man and the ocean is among the most important.

Human life is closely connected with lives of other species, and numerous factors of human being's living environment are subject to the ocean. Mankind's exploration and exploitation of the ocean can also influence its natural evolution. The connotations of harmony between man and the ocean differ in different periods of history. In the modern relationship between man and the ocean, man dominates, and hence the fundamental conception of harmonious development of man and the ocean refers to mutual adaptation and mutual support between human social system and natural marine system against the backdrop of large-scale maritime exploration. In other words, on the one hand, while exploring and exploiting the ocean, mankind should observe the ecological law of the ocean, satisfy the needs of the human society and protect the value and function of the ocean in life support and environment purification. On the other hand, we should set the ocean's natural evolution back on the right track by self-regulating our demands and behavior to mitigate the damages to natural evolution, tap into our wisdom and motivation to extricate the renewable resources (which are vital to human beings) from the arduous and slow mode of self-evolution, and facilitate the coordinative evolution of man and the ocean.

The current pervasive maritime development model is overridden with the Western knowledge-power ideology. Productivity has far surpassed that of any previous age and disharmony between man and the ocean has become far more severe and complex than any time before. Human history is a process of human beings transforming nature and themselves at the same time. When tracing back to the origin of maritime space and the resource-plundering type of civilization, we must reconsider the human development model. Man used to pride himself as master of nature and take it upon himself to conquer nature, extort resources from nature voraciously and pursue development at the cost of nature. In order to change such a unipolar pattern of development, we must first change our mindset, be kinder to the environment we depend on and put effective protection of eco-environment on a par with economic development. Protection must run in parallel with development, making sure human society adapts to the environment. Only in this way can harmonious development be achieved among man, land and ocean.

Based on the above-mentioned philosophy, countries across the world should share the responsibilities and obligations of protecting the ocean, preventing marine

resources from being destroyed and environment from degradation. As a matter of fact, many countries are already taking actions to varying degrees to build a strong and efficient social administration system as part of the institutional improvement of maritime civilization. For example, coastal States are taking measures to protect marine environment within the territorial seas, including putting a cap on the total volume of sewage released into the ocean and implementing discharge fee, as well as the management systems for coastal constructions, waste dumping, pollution incidents reporting and handling in order to prevent, reduce and control any possible marine pollution. We should treasure the coastal landscape, beach and other tourist attractions, and develop maritime culture industries, such as coastal tourism, marine fishing for pleasure, space for tourism and entertainment, which not only entertain the public, meet our needs for leisure and pleasure, but also open up new career options for fishermen and relieve the pressure of marine environment and resources. We should cherish the health and well-being of marine life, create reserves for aquatic germplasm and genetic resources, juvenile fish resources, aquatic wildlife, marine and coastal ecosystem, and rare or endangered species. We should build up circular economy and green maritime economy to strike a balance between marine environment and maritime development. These measures are all oriented towards harmonious development and coexistence of man and the ocean.

Sharing maritime benefits equally, exploiting marine resources sustainably and coexisting with the ocean harmoniously, all these are of universal value. It builds on modern maritime material culture and provides humanistic guidance on the direction of maritime material culture development, which may have increasing impact on the social development and all-round progress in the twenty-first century. The current situation however is alienated from this value. Battles for maritime benefits are increasing, and a fundamental change of the current development at the cost of environment is yet to occur, but we must not lose heart. This ocean century will ultimately be framed as a century of comprehensive maritime development and of maritime peace and health.

1.2 Basic Theoretical Research on Maritime Development

Maritime development is a topic of significant theoretical and practical value globally, strategically, and prospectively. The research objective consists in resolving various conflicts and disputes that have occurred in ocean-related human activities, so as to achieve sustainable development in the endeavor of exploration, exploitation, administration, and protection of the ocean. Maritime development research essentially falls under the rubric of humanities and social sciences, interpenetrating and overlapping with the research on the development of marine science and technology. It's an emerging, integrated, and yet marginalized field of research.

The exploration of the world's oceans and the expansion of maritime affairs have shaped the morphology and trajectory of maritime civilization. Timely summaries on them call for theoretical guidance and criteria. There's no denying that previous

theories of maritime development are basically the extended theories of development on land, which do not fit in with modern maritime exploration and expansion. This section aims to make tentative discussions about the basic theories of maritime development.

1.2.1 Reasons for Building Theories of Maritime Development

Maritime development refers to the behavior of human beings in their direct or indirect exploration and exploitation of maritime activities to influence social transition (Yang, 2005). This is a neutral concept, yet the results that are presented by the facts of maritime development can be positive or negative. If our understanding of the facts stops at the perceptual level, then maritime development naturally would not automatically emerge as a theoretical issue and become visible to researchers unless it is elevated to the heights of rational understanding through theoretical constructs.

As we entered the twenty-first century, the essence and complexity of the ocean have fostered marine science into a systemic science, including all natural sciences. Recently, social sciences are also included in it (Field et al., 2002). The complex maritime issue has posed greater demands not only to the academic world of marine science, but to that of humanities and social sciences as well. Therefore, the building of basic theories of maritime humanities and social sciences is doubtlessly of tremendous theoretical value and practical significance.

The basic theories of maritime development, which refer to the theories arguing for the value of human activities in the exploration and exploitation of the ocean, the route of development and social benefits, as well as their status and role in human civilization, may provide guidance for maritime practice.

The actual distinction between the natural ocean and the humanistic ocean offers an objective basis for the theoretical construct of maritime development. The natural ocean refers to the natural combination of water bodies (including reefs, sub-soils, and the surrounding coastal areas) and the air space, which provides the marine environment for human development. The inner elements of the natural ocean interact closely. Any local interference may evoke a global change of the region and can have tremendous impact on the makeup of the atmosphere and the trend of the global climate. The humanistic ocean refers to the behavior, lifestyle, and means of interaction of human beings that are based on the natural ocean. It is a product of the practice that mankind looks upon the oceans as his historical living space and attempts to define the world from the perspective of the ocean rather than land (Schmitt cited from Lin & Zhou, 2006: 93). The geographical distribution is subject to natural and humanistic conditions. The division of maritime space stipulated by the *UNCLOS*, including the distribution of benefits among coastal States, island States, and landlocked States, is not fully consistent with the natural situation and can be viewed as a hybrid of the natural ocean and the humanistic ocean.

The natural ocean shapes the humanistic ocean and vice versa. The exploitation of marine resources, especially seabed oil and gas, and mineral resources, depends on the progress of marine science and technology, and is simultaneously restricted by maritime politics, economy, society, cultural environment, and current international affairs. The protection of China's maritime benefits and peaceful development of the ocean depends on the enhancement of its comprehensive national strength, the breakthrough in maritime politics and diplomacy, the reinforcement from the theory of maritime development, and maritime humanistic spirit. This calls for theoretical guidance for the comprehensive and macro studies of maritime development.

Academically, the basic theory of maritime development is a branch of development theory, yet it's far from being the case in actual practice. Development theory originated from the West. In the mid-eighteenth century, the word "development" (*developpent* in French or *entwicklung* in German) was used to denote the process of social change. With the rise of the Industrial Revolution and the theory of evolution, the connotation of development has changed to progress of production and material life. After the Second World War, development studies "aimed to explain the complicated operating rules in the process of development" (Li, 2005: 18) emerged. Initially, it was focused on the issue of how developing countries emerge from underdevelopment, and later expanded to the development history of developed countries and the issue of sustainable development of the human society as a whole.

Research on development first emerged in economics, giving rise to development economics, focusing on economic growth. It put emphasis on "studies of how economically disadvantaged countries or agricultural countries can achieve industrialization and modernization, the economic takeoff and growth" (Zhang, 2001: 2), and emphatically examined how the average economic conditions and income distributions among individuals or different countries and regions can affect growth (Ray, 1998).

Later, development studies in sociology and political science followed up, each with their own research scope and research model. Development sociology is "a peripheral discipline at the intersection of development studies and sociology, or a research on development from sociological perspective" (Zhang & Ma, 2001: 21). It mainly explores through social dimensions "the fundamental characteristics of modernization," "the model of development and modernization," and "the progression of modernization" (Wu & Liu, 2002: 16). It advocates research through the approaches of social indicators, historical comparison, and policy (ibid: 395). The politics of development takes political development as its theme and discusses how developing countries achieve their democratic transformations, how to maintain social stability, how to combat political corruption, how to resolve political crisis, how to accomplish political and cultural reformation, etc. Development anthropology approaches the differences in the "social status, role, and income of different ethnic groups," and "undertakes studies from all-round perspectives of ethnic culture" (Chen, 2001: 47). "Development philosophy takes a theoretical and systematic view of development…it is based on knowledge drawn from the development of economy,

politics, culture, ecology, and humanity" (Qiu, 2001: 3), and it underlines that development must be people-oriented, committing itself to "offer the value goals and meaning for the realistic practice of social development" (ibid: 29).

Since the 1980s, researchers of development have made breakthroughs by going beyond the mere concept of growth and creating the concept of sustainable development, which has mainstreamed into the current development studies.

Research on development has undergone a gradual process from the periphery (developing countries) to the center (developed countries), from economics to politics, society, and culture, and from theoretical exploration to practical application. However, a close examination of various literature on development studies reveals that only a few scholars have dealt with the role of modern economic development on maritime development in their works. For example, O'Connell points out that, as part of the formation of Western modernity, the activities that explorers set sail overseas to find the New Continent "have merged into this modernization of the West" (O'Connell, 1976: 24). Acemoglu et al. (2005) think that the rise of Europe should be attributed to trade across the Atlantic. The traditional theory of modernity, which stresses the importance of European characteristics such as the Protestant ethic and the nation-state system, would not suffice to account for the rise of northwestern Europe during 1500 and 1850. It is necessary to take into account the exogenous nature-bestowed conditions and the endogenous non-absolutist system. But on the whole, factors of maritime development are still periphery in existing development theories. The direct consequence of this is that the framework of development studies basically stops at development on land, placing stress only on the transition from agricultural to industrial society, and fails to make theoretical preparations for the new maritime era.

Development studies in China are mostly introduced from the West. Research on the basic theories is rather weak, long predominated by translation and review. It emphasizes applied studies on China's problems in actual practice and likewise hardly takes maritime factors into account. For example, studies on sustainable development predominantly revolve around the land, so much so that "the map of the world geopolitics" (Niu, 1994: 21) leaves the ocean totally blank, and "the balance sheet of China's capacity of sustainable development" (Research Group on Strategies for Sustainable Development at Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2006: 211) does not even include the ocean.

Therefore, the existing theories on development are no longer directly applicable to the field of maritime development and should be ocean-oriented, amended, and redesigned.

1.2.2 Macro Basic Theories of Maritime Development

The basic theories of maritime development are not the development theories readily applicable to the marine sphere, but rather synthetic theories on the development of maritime civilization per se and the transition of human society from the maritime

perspective. In view of the complexity and variability of the research objective, as well as the lack of a paradigm in maritime humanities and social sciences, the basic theories of maritime development call for integration of different disciplines from different perspectives. They should adopt more targeted methods and tools, integrate various notions and thoughts, take into account different stances from different communities, build up ties and bridges to link each other, and seek for consensus on the connotations of the relevant concepts, so as to provide normative guidance to the making of maritime policies and the exploration, exploitation, administration, and protection of the ocean.

The basic theories of maritime development are composed of two parts, the macro basic theories and the applied basic theories. The macro basic theories seek to provide a rock solid foundation for maritime development, sum up from the abstract and rational height the experience in the development of maritime civilization, reexamine people's outlook on maritime development, and come up with fundamental concepts that can provide effective guidance for maritime activities.

In terms of the content, the macro basic theories involve all ocean-related knowledge accumulated from traditional and modern maritime civilizations. In this information explosion era, with rapid changes in science and technology, the progress of human knowledge has been increasingly integrated with the changes of ideas, so it is with ocean-related knowledge and maritime outlook. To consider it further, ocean-related knowledge can be classified into professional knowledge and general knowledge of the ocean. The former includes specialized knowledge in marine science and technology, and humanities and social sciences; the latter mainly refers to human perceptions toward maritime production, lifestyle and its significance. They are actually an amalgamation of beliefs and feelings held on average by social community members, which constitute their own distinct life system (Durkheim cited from Qu, 2000: 42), and part of the collective consciousness that is shaped and perfected very slowly (ibid: 248). This kind of knowledge is extremely complicated and can even be self-contradictory. The key to research on macro basic theories consists in finding out the links between the various kinds of ocean-related knowledge and integrating the conceptual connotations.

In terms of methodology, basic macro theories of maritime development call for the elevation of the experience of maritime civilization into abstract theories, and to this end, we need to trace back to the academic source and course of development theories and theories related to maritime humanities and social sciences, and identify the sources of the maritime experience for future adoption and reinvention. Or we can follow the path of epistemology, i.e., make interpretations or contextual analysis on the discourse or pedigree of related theories, recognize the parts that embody maritime elements, and carry out pilot studies before applying them to the maritime arena.

On the face of it, such theoretical studies do not have much to do with marine science and technology or maritime affairs and may seem inconsequential, but actually not the case. In practice, it's likely that the redefinition of a basic concept can help people grasp the essence of an issue through the advancement of the theory, which can change our mode of thinking and behavior, and accordingly make a breakthrough or

solve a long-standing problem. Take marine fishery (including coastal and offshore aquaculture industry) for example. In China, marine fishery is subsumed into macro-agriculture, referred to as "marine agriculture," "seawater planting and breeding," "field at sea," etc., and subject to the agriculture sector, which is illogical and unscientific. If we rebuild the theory, it can facilitate transition from the land-based to the ocean-based mode of thinking, so as to reformulate the administration and institutions. Besides, in terms of maritime activities, China has the problem of giving undue importance to immediate economic interests and placing engineering technology at priority. This may lead to negligence of natural and humanistic properties in accordance with local conditions, and result in negative environmental and social effects. If we can redefine the concepts and rebuild the theories, we can help people correct and renew their perceptions of the ocean.

Between the natural ocean and the humanistic ocean, quite a few basic concepts necessitate our rethinking. As a variety of professional knowledge about the ocean has been incorporated into academic disciplines, plus the variety of researchers' academic backgrounds, there would be a long and arduous way to go to conduct dialogues and communications between them. Firstly, it is essential to have marine science and maritime humanities cooperate with each other fully, forgo the disparities between "the two cultures," and co-build the macro system of maritime disciplines. Secondly, with the speed-up of human exploration and exploitation of the ocean and the development of science and technology, the humanistic ocean has expanded enormously, and mankind has exerted more influence on the natural ocean, which in turn counteracts on mankind; therefore it is urgent that new theories of sustainable maritime development be put forth. Thirdly, in this "mega-science" era, maritime development and marine technology are interwoven with each other. Professional knowledge of other fields and land-based technologies will inevitably spread across the maritime area. This requires that much attention be drawn to the properties of the natural ocean in the process of technological transfer and development, as well as to the special social conditions in the humanistic ocean.

Besides, virtuous maritime development calls for concerted efforts from the government, the scholarship, the industries, and the public. On the one hand, it is necessary to create a win-win-win system for the government, the scholarship, and the industries so as to achieve multi-level sustainable maritime development; on the other hand, we need to enhance the public's knowledge about the ocean and raise their awareness of maritime affairs, improve, inter alia, the public education, and pay more heed to public opinions. We can raise the citizens' maritime awareness through conventional education and public media, and hence change the situation in which the citizens' knowledge of the ocean is lagging behind the current demands.

China has not started to consider how to refine its basic theories of maritime development. Here I am making a tentative attempt to redefine the most basic concepts, including "maritime region," "maritime economy," "maritime community," and "maritime culture" from multidisciplinary perspectives (Yang, 2000). It should be constructive to start from here and make a comprehensive clarification and discussion of all related concepts in the future.

It must be noted at this point that it is urgent for China to properly define and refine the conception of "maritime country" and localize it in the theoretical study of China as a maritime country. "Maritime country" was originally used to describe the rise of the international powers in the last 500 years with the traditional concept of "maritime rights"; according to this concept, a maritime country is firmly based on maritime trade. It came into being during the Victorian Age of free trade, the era in which the British industry and economic advantage expanded freely, and the free ocean and free international market were lumped together by the notion of freedom (Schmitt cited from Lin & Zhou, 2006: 57, 58). This is a brief summary of maritime development by means of overseas plundering and expansion. "Maritime countries" are equated with the capitalist countries that emerged in modern times. As time goes by, such discourse has drawn fire and criticism from an increasing number of people with the passage of time. With the growing importance of marine resources and the implementation of the *UNCLOS,* the connotations of "maritime rights" and "maritime country" keep expanding and extending. Maritime rights are expanded to cover all forces a country may have on the ocean; "maritime country" is expanded to refer to any country that takes maritime development, from tradition to modern times, as its national policy and exerts forces outward, including countries with both land and sea. Under the new context, a maritime country may have developed by different means. The struggle for this discourse power is still fierce, as it has to do with the conflict of maritime interests between different countries.

In the traditional maritime era, during the Song and Yuan dynasties, China was both a continental and maritime country. In modern maritime era, after the reform and opening up, China has rolled out strategies to strengthen its power and restore its position as a maritime country. The road China takes is different from that of the West, but it is lacking in theoretical studies to underpin its status as a maritime country, which forms a striking contrast with its neighboring maritime country, Japan. The absence of sound theories renders it unable to refute such a fallacious claim as "China is a continental rather than maritime country." Nor can China change and eliminate the ingrained mindsets of Chinese scholars that are molded by the theories transplanted from the West as well as the concomitant prejudices about China's maritime development. This has much to do with China's maritime benefits during its development. Therefore, China must take active measures to have its voice heard, so as to ensure a correct understanding of the issue, and to enhance the soft power of China's maritime development.

While research on the macro basic theories of maritime development involves multidisciplinary integration, the most fundamental discipline it depends on is maritime history. The above-mentioned problems are to some extent attributed to the underdevelopment of Chinese maritime history. Owing to this underdevelopment, few people know that China has its own history of maritime civilization, and hence fail to find its niche in the historical context of maritime development. Owing to underdevelopment, China doesn't have the opportunity to assert its own academic discourse right so as to have its voice heard and understood by the world. Maritime history, therefore, is an indispensable part of the disciplinary system of maritime development.

1.2.3 Applied Basic Theories of Maritime Development

The applied basic theories of maritime development are the theoretical embodiment of maritime activities. Their major task lies in sorting out and analyzing maritime issues. Instead of merely copying the existing theories applied to the maritime area, we ought to adapt and modify the relevant theories in accordance with the characteristics of the ocean. These applied basic theories encompass a number of disciplines, including maritime economics, maritime management, maritime law, maritime politics, maritime sociology, maritime military science, maritime culturology, etc. These disciplines each have their own independent theoretical paradigms, adopt different models and methods to analyze the law, model, method, and working mechanism in specific areas of maritime development from different perspectives with specific cases, and provide practicable theoretical guidance to maritime activities. As the disciplines mentioned are not fully-fledged, there is still much room for improvement in the research on applied basic theories.

(1) Maritime economics

Currently, maritime economics is generally subsumed into applied economics, or to regional economics and industrial economics, emphatically dealing with the application of the basic principles of economics to maritime areas. With this strong and simple reductionism, maritime economy will be inevitably reduced to a derivative from land-based economy. As a result, the characteristics of the ocean per se cannot be effectively revealed and economic theories cannot really gain entry into the sphere of the ocean.

The current discussions on China's maritime economics largely focus on the industrial economics, mainly concerned with "industries exploring and exploiting the ocean and economic activities," and relevant "intersectional industries and manufacturing of general equipment for both the land and the sea" (Ye, 2006: 8, 9). Under such circumstances, the significance of the ocean in economic history has been ignored. There was a time when the maritime commerce was once the mainstay of maritime economy and had played an important role in modernization, but now it has faded out the field of maritime economics, and this has exposed the inappropriate structure of the discipline. To say the least of it, even if maritime economics only deals with modern maritime economics, it should not be limited to the application of theories from applied economics, resource economics, regional economics, and industrial economics, but should also include exploring the application and innovation of theories of other emerging economics like knowledge economics, spatial economics, new institutional economics, and technological economics. For instance:

Knowledge economics "adopts economic methods to study the process of generation, transformation, and application of the value of knowledge, to explore the economic attributes and commercialization of knowledge, and to determine the standards and methods of the economic value of knowledge" (Gao, 2006: 55). "Modern maritime economy is a kind of knowledge economy. The economics of maritime knowledge is then a part of maritime economics based on knowledge enhancement

and high-tech development" (Guan, 1999: 13). It's undoubtedly part and parcel of maritime economics. Therefore, concerning the studies on the economy of maritime knowledge, in addition to adopting the dominant model of knowledge economics, it is necessary to explore the applied theories concerning knowledge service and integration of production in maritime industries.

The main research objective of economic geography (or spatial economics) is the location selection of economic activities and its reasons (Fujita et al., 2001). The classic location model of economic geography and the theoretical model of urban system and industrial system modified and reformulated based on the former are both designed for land-oriented studies. To study the properties of maritime economic geography and explore the industrial deployment of maritime industries, it is obviously insufficient to adopt the land-specific location model only. It is vital to set up the location model of economic geography under maritime conditions. The findings of applied theories in this aspect can steer future scientific planning of maritime regions.

Currently, the ocean ends up on the receiving end of most of the pollution in China, but the loss thus incurred is not indicated in the GDP balance sheet. The integrity and mobility of marine ecosystem and the uncertainty of the ownership and property rights of the areas have increased the difficulty of calculation. It should be a topic of applied theoretical research to perfect the statistical caliber and determine a system of indicators for sustainable maritime development.

(2) Maritime management

Maritime management was introduced to China from developed maritime countries (especially the United States). "Maritime management refers to the administrative and non-administrative functions carried out through the whole process of command, coordination, control and implementation that take place in maritime activities (including exploration, exploitation, protection, rights and benefits, research, etc.)" (Lu, 1997: 49). This requires the State to adopt the means of policy, law, economy, and administration to achieve the control over the resource exploitation and maritime activities in the maritime regions where the national rights and benefits are involved (Armstrong & Ryner, 1980). That means taking the State as the main body of maritime management, carrying out integrated as well as regional maritime management. Maritime management can be divided into management of maritime rights and interests and that of maritime economy. The construction of maritime management system based on this theory is characteristic of the times.

Maritime management systems in different countries are related to their respective national conditions and historical tradition. After the modern maritime management theory was transplanted to China, there have arisen some contradictions with the current maritime management, which are described as "a swarm of dragons stirring up waves in the sea," a chaotic scene attributed to industry-led management. Under this circumstance, even if some pilot reforms on integrated maritime management carried out by local governments succeed, it will be hard to scale it up. Excessive emphasis on the authority of State administration is without doubt an ignorance of the fact that in Chinese history the State sovereignty has undergone a change from

obscurity to clarity. The local governments and the civilians had actually preceded the State in exploration and exploitation of the ocean, and their management tools and actions have become a legacy and still have a role to play. We should acknowledge the actual phenomenon of "Dragons stirring up waves in the sea" and find a feasible way to merge the civil and trade management into the integrated management system. This is an unavoidable theme of research on applied basic theories in maritime management.

(3) Maritime law

Similar to international law, maritime law can be traced back to the Middle Ages and even earlier, when maritime law first sprouted. It should be safe to say that maritime law has contributed to the formation of and developed with maritime legislation. With the stipulation of the *UNCLOS* in 1982, the development of maritime law has entered a new stage.

Initially, the *UNCLOS* divided the ocean into three kinds of regions, namely internal waters, territorial seas, and the high seas. It's now classified into nine categories, namely internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, straits, and archipelagic waters for international navigation, archipelagic waters, the high seas, and the international seabed areas, the legal statuses and legal systems of which differ from each other. The "International Convention on the Law of Sea" is a general term for the legal status of territorial seas and the principles, rules and systems that provide guidance for different countries when utilizing different waters. Of the nine categories, the first six are under the jurisdiction of coastal States. While landlocked States do not have their own jurisdiction over territorial seas, they do enjoy certain rights and bear corresponding obligations on the sea (Hua, 2009: 3). Therefore, whether coastal States or landlocked States, they should have their own law of the sea, but the specific circumstances and actual needs of each State are different, and hence the object of adjustment, scope of effectiveness, and content of the law may also differ.

(4) Maritime sociology

Maritime sociology is just in its infancy and has not yet formed a theoretical paradigm. To carry out relevant applied research, we can adopt the theoretical tools of development sociology, environment sociology, maritime economics, maritime management, and maritime culturology, among others.

In China, there coexist a traditional maritime community represented by fishermen, fishing villages and fisheries, and a modern maritime community represented by the burgeoning high-tech marine enterprises. From the internal perspective, the traditional maritime society has a low degree of modernization and is confronted with marginalization. Abandoning the sea for the land and changing the trades have exacerbated this crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a viable participatory development model in theory, enhance the self-development capacity of traditional maritime communities and individuals, and facilitate the positive transformation of traditional maritime society. Although the modern maritime society is in a strong position, it is mostly derived from the land, and the accumulation of maritime

culture is insufficient. In practice, it tends to follow the land-based mode of thinking, ignore the features of the maritime regions, and adopt the land-specific development strategy. For example, reclamation in the coastal industrial zones may affect the eco-environment of coastal zones and offshore waters in the long run. It calls for basic theories as to how to establish modern maritime culture and ocean-based operating mechanism according to the characteristics of maritime regions. Meanwhile, outside the maritime society, there exist problems such as accelerated expansion of coastal cities and the synchronous increase of coastal population and social problems. It is urgent to coordinate between the land and the sea and jointly build a harmonious society. Thus, it is vital to carry out research on applied basic theories.

As can be seen from above, although research on basic theories of maritime development may not have immediate effects and gain immediate economic benefits, it does meet the needs of a scientific outlook of development, of the development of maritime practice, and of building a macro disciplinary system of oceanology, so it deserves a place in the research of maritime development. Research in this field can not only provide guidance for maritime practice, but also complete the missing links in development theories, or even theories in humanities and social sciences, change people's outlook via theory development, and help build China into a major maritime country.

1.3 The Rise of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences and Discipline Construction

Maritime development refers to human behavior that influences social changes through direct or indirect exploration and exploitation of maritime activities. The process of maritime development is embodied in the process of continuous coordination and adaptation of the relationship between man and the ocean. It is also a process of continuous and recurrent coordination and adaptation between individuals, groups, regional communities, and countries in human beings' maritime activities, from competition to cooperation, from conflict to coexistence, and from disorder to order. In the late twentieth century, with the increasing pressure of inland population, resources and environment, rational exploration and exploitation, control, management and protection of the ocean have gradually moved to the front burner of social development. In the twenty-first century, mankind is exploring and exploiting the ocean in comprehensive and multi-dimensional manner. Maritime development has become a major theoretical and practical issue of global, prospective, and strategic significance.

Humans' deeper probe into the ocean has paved the way for the development of marine science and high and new technology, and spurred the rise of maritime humanities and social sciences. China's scholarship has responded positively to this new trend. Following the line of academic history, this section discusses the rise and

significance of maritime humanities and social sciences, the trend, and the significance of constructing the disciplinary system of maritime humanities and social sciences in China.

1.3.1 The Rise of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences

The humanistic exploration of the ocean has occurred since the ancient times. Ever since the establishment of humanities and social sciences in the nineteenth century, the ocean has been the research object of many disciplines and other related sub-disciplines. In the twentieth century, the major disciplines of humanities and social sciences were relatively independent and institutionalized, and developed in the directions of disciplinary differentiation and interdisciplinary integration, respectively. The former direction manifests as a broadening of the disciplines and a deepening of the research topics, while the latter denotes the interdisciplinary interaction, infiltration, and integration. The change of values on the ocean has injected strong impetus into maritime humanities and social sciences. With the elevated status of the ocean, humanities and social sciences in developed maritime countries have strengthened their research on the ocean. In response to the needs of implementing maritime development strategies, they have come up with new theories, new ideas, and new methods, expanded the field of research, conceived and created new sub-disciplines with the ocean as their research object.

After the First World War, international politics (also known as international relations, international affairs, world politics, etc.) has become a branch of political science. Political geography (or geopolitics), which explores the relationship between space and politics, is part and parcel of it. Maritime politics, which revolves around different countries' foreign-oriented political behavior, war, and diplomacy, has become an important subject dealing with international relations and international affairs. In the wake of the Second World War, with the decline of the traditional maritime system and the emergence of new threats to security, maritime politics has extended far beyond the traditional scope, from controlling maritime power to pursuing the diversification of maritime interests. There have arisen such maritime issues as fishing in transnational territorial seas, ocean shipping, exploitation and distribution of seabed resources, delimitation of territorial seas and continental shelves, marine pollution and ecological protection, academic research about the ocean, combating piracy, illegal immigration, maritime terrorist activities, illegal overflights and broadcasting, etc. These issues have played an increasingly prominent role in international affairs and have become important research topics in the field of international politics and diplomacy. In order to scramble for the high ground in marine competition, both coastal States and island States reinforce their research on maritime strategies. The boundaries between domestic politics and international politics, high-level politics, and low-level politics are increasingly blurred. Although maritime hegemonism still exists, and the possibility of armed conflicts due to

disputes over island sovereignty and marine resources cannot be ruled out, military force alone can no longer achieve the purpose of controlling and exploiting the ocean, which makes international maritime politics and foreign affairs all the more complicated and in turn promotes the institutional construction of international maritime organizations and international cooperation. The practice and demand of international maritime politics have facilitated the theoretical innovation of maritime politics and the rise of sub-disciplines.

Traditional maritime industries, including fishing, salt, port, shipping, etc., which are dependent on the ocean and coastal zones, were originally subsumed into the more general land economy in economics. After the Second World War, with in-depth maritime development, there arose a new cluster of maritime industries focusing on offshore oil exploitation. Developed maritime countries began to carry out comprehensive maritime research from an economic perspective, and the ocean-dependent economies were differentiated from the general economy and integrated into maritime economics. In December 1999, referring to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), China codified statistics of maritime economy into 15 categories, namely marine agriculture, forestry, and fishery; marine mining; marine manufacturing; marine power and seawater utilization; marine engineering and construction; marine geological exploration; marine transportation; marine insurance; marine social services; coastal tourism; marine consulting services; water sports; maritime education, culture, and art; marine scientific research and integrated technical services; and national maritime management institutions[1] (State Oceanic Administration, 1999). The research on maritime industry has induced the interdisciplinary interactions among economics, natural science and technical science, and thus giving rise to the sub-disciplines of bio-economics of fisheries, economics of fishery management, aquaculture economics, port economics, shipping economics, etc. With the aid of economic documentation of marine resource development, we can reveal the economic mechanism of rational exploration and exploitation of marine resources and protection of marine environment, and carry out ocean-related studies in resource economics, environmental economics as well as ecological economics. In order to meet the needs of appropriate division of territorial sea and layout of marine fisheries, ports, coastal industries, coastal tourism, island development, and to study the formation process, structural characteristics, and the development of maritime economy and regional system, the intersection and integration of economics and geography in marine research developed into marine economic geography. The concept of "the science of maritime economy" was put forward in the early 1980s. Thereinafter, research institutes named after "maritime economics" emerged and came up with some findings, facilitating the formation of maritime economics as a sub-discipline. However, its research object is limited to modern maritime industry

[1] State Oceanic Administration: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo haiyang hangye biaozhun: Haiyang jingji tongji fenlei yu daima [Maritime Industry Standards of the People's Republic of China: Marine Economic Statistical Classification and Codes, HY/T052-1999], stipulated on 28th December 1999 and took effect on 1st January 2000.

only, focusing on economic issues in maritime development. It has not yet systematized and classified various ocean-related economic phenomena, nor has it sorted out the whole process of evolution throughout the ancient and modern history, or constructed an integrated system of theories.

More than half of the world's population inhabit within 60 km of the coastline. The maritime social system composed of coastal zones, territorial seas, and islands is an important part of the regional social system. Traditionally, sociological studies of the ocean are focused on the maritime communities and organizations of fishermen, pirates, and maritime merchants, of the transformations of seaport settlements, cities, and industries, and of the communities of coastal and archipelagic indigenous people. In recent decades, the different levels of exploration and exploitation of the ocean, and different ecology of the maritime communities have resulted in unevenness of the social and economic development of different countries and regions, and the different social problems thus incurred have become the research topics of environmental sociology and development sociology. Environmental sociology aims at the interaction between non-sociocultural environment and human communities (Nobuko, 1999), dealing with the contradiction between maritime environment and human competition for the ownership and use of the ocean. Development sociology focuses on the changes of maritime society and the coordinated development of maritime society and terrestrial society, especially the development of disadvantaged or less developed coastal areas and islands, and examines the balance between social development and social justice. With the implementation of the *UNCLOS* and the redistribution of interests among maritime communities, ocean-related social problems have become a global issue. Sociologists have put on the agenda the innovation of theories, the development of social technologies, and the establishment of maritime sociology.

Human claims to the ocean originated in ancient Rome. Before the formation of modern international law, coastal States determined the scope of maritime power control according to their own interests and needs. However, the ocean is vast, and only a few territorial seas have actually been controlled. Therefore, for many centuries, the ocean has been taken as one of the global common properties that are not under the jurisdiction of any particular country (Keohane & Nye, 1977). In 1609, Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist, published *The Free Sea*, and in 1618, John Shelden, the British jurist, published *Closure of the Sea*, which raised the debate between the "high seas" and the "closed seas" from the perspective of law. In 1702, Cornelis van Bijnkershoek, the Dutch jurist, claimed in his *De Dominio Maris* (*On the Dominion of the Sea*) that a country's control over the sea ends where the power of weapon ends, or three nautical miles, the longest range of the cannon at that time. In 1793, *The Declaration of Independence* declared the range of the territorial seas of the United States to be three nautical miles, making it the first country in the world to officially announce the range of its territorial seas. After the Second World War, the scramble for maritime rights between coastal States and archipelagic countries in the third world has greatly impinged on the traditional principles of territorial sea division and freedom of the high seas. In 1958, the First International Conference on the *UNCLOS* approved "The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," "The Convention on the High Seas," "The Convention on

Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources on the High Seas," and "The Convention on the Continental Shelf," which set up the basic framework for the international law of the sea. Since then, the *UNCLOS* has become an important part of international law, constantly promoting the updates of theories and concepts in practice. The Third International Conference on the *UNCLOS*, held during 1973–1982, passed the *UNCLOS* after 11 sessions of consultations in nine consecutive years. Based on the traditional law of the sea, sovereignty was divided into a set of rights. Principles, rules, and systems of the territorial seas under national jurisdiction, the high seas, and the common heritage of mankind, namely the international seabed area, were established. Since the *UNCLOS* took effect, coastal and archipelagic States have formulated or modified their own maritime laws and regulations, established new maritime legal systems, interpreted, and implemented the *UNCLOS* with elasticity to safeguard and expand their own maritime rights. As a tool for managing territorial seas under national jurisdiction and dealing with international maritime disputes, new situations and problems keep arising. In order to defend their own maritime interests with rules of international law, some countries challenge the existing legal provisions and principles, move for changes, and call on the law community to actively participate in and discuss the issue, which catalyzed the rise of maritime law as a discipline.

Traditionally, maritime management refers to the management of maritime communities, regions, administrations, and industries. With the rise of management as a discipline in the eighteenth century, maritime management was subsumed into the scope of sectoral management. In the first half of the twentieth century, in response to the rise of maritime development, developed maritime countries set up the system of maritime industry management, put forward the theories and research methods of maritime management, and developed into a sub-discipline. Since the 1960s, with human needs of achieving economic growth by exploiting the ocean, and with conflicts of interests, resource depletion, and environmental degradation arising in maritime exploitation, the institutionalization of maritime management has undergone dramatic changes. From the sporadic local and decentralized management of maritime activities to the coordinated and integrated management of the local, national, and international communities' maritime rights, oceanic and coastal environment, resources and human activities, all these spurred the rapid growth of maritime management. The scope of maritime management has been expanded. Management problems existing in natural and social processes, and in the process of maritime exploration and exploitation in coastal zones, jurisdictional seas, and the high seas are all covered in the integrated maritime management. Whether in domestic management or international management, the user relationship system within the internal system of ocean management, as well as the social system in the external environmental system, involves complex interrelations. This requires the participation of research from the humanities and social sciences to provide dynamic socio-cultural information. In the 1970s, the theory of maritime management shifted from the stage dominated by structuralism and cybernetics to the stage influenced by the general systems theory. "In the 1980s, the general systems theory has changed from its first generation, whose concept and principle were derived from

natural science, biology in particular, to a new stage. At this point, social sciences (including sociology) have had considerable impact" (Vallega cited from Yang & Liu, 1999: 79). Currently, the science of maritime management depends more on social sciences and social technologies such as sociology, economics, and law.

Human behavior and lifestyle in maritime activities have shaped maritime humanities distinct from those of land societies, which have fostered maritime literature and art, deity worship, folk customs, and even unique humanistic spirits. They are deposited in documents, relics, and words-of-mouth and have accumulated into a written or unwritten maritime history. The marine eco-environment and maritime activities in different regions indicate the plurality and diversity of maritime humanities, which are of much concern to philosophy, literature, history, anthropology, ethnology, folklore, religion, etc.

Studying the ocean from the perspective of humanities looks into ontology and logic, memory and imagination of mankind's maritime outlook. The concept of the ocean involves the base point of his worldview. On the one hand, the traditional worldview built on agricultural civilization and nomadic civilization is land based. People meditate on the origin of the world on the solid land. On the other hand, the flowing ocean is infinite and mysterious in time, but limited in space. It is determined by the shore, with land representing the form of the world. The worldview built on maritime civilization is ocean based. It is not the land that determines the sea, but the sea that determines the land, and the sea has become the means of subsistence. The maritime world contains the cultural code of living off the sea. In Homer's epic, Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter to worship the sea and sowed the seeds of the land in the sea; for Odyssey, the home on land was a place of betrayal and murder, while the sea was the homeland of heroes.

To some extent, the capacity of land civilization for taking in maritime civilization on all continents determines its destiny in the world history. While the great navigation facilitated the expansion of Iberia, Portugal and Spain declined successively just because their ambition for the expansion of land had consumed their maritime power. The key to the victory of the Netherlands and Britain was that they abandoned the traditional concept of territory and fought for the ocean; as a result, the coasts and commercial ports became the boundaries of the empires. In the final analysis, it was the transformation and innovation of the maritime outlook that made all this happen. Likewise, the decline of ancient civilizations in modern Asia, Africa, and America was attributed to their neglect of the ocean, loss of the ocean, and eventually loss of the land.

As a form of culture, maritime development coexists with agrarian and nomadic cultures. The contact, conflict, and integration among the three have catalyzed the globalization of the world and formed a vast scroll of the world history of land-ocean interactions. "Coastal States and regions, whether in the West or the East, have the possibility of producing and developing maritime economy and maritime community, with maritime civilizations molded out of their own social environment and cultural traditions" (Yang, 1996a). There are various types of maritime culture, preliminary or advanced in form, open and progressive or closed and conservative in types, which require specific and dialectical historical analysis. It is one-sided to simply define

the land as closed and the ocean as open. However, taking a dichotomous land-ocean view of the world to interpret history could slip into Occidentalism. Hegel divides the geographical basis of human civilization into three forms in his *Philosophy of History*: dry highlands, vast grasslands, and plains; plain basins; and coastal areas connected with the sea. In the first two categories, "ordinary land and ordinary plain basins bind human beings to the soil and involve them in infinite dependence," while in the coastal area connected with the sea, "the sea hoists mankind beyond the limited circle of thought and action." "The sea invites human beings to engage in conquest and plunder, and also encourages them to pursue profits and engage in commerce" (Hegel cited from Wang, 1956: 135). The coastal area Hegel mentioned refers specifically to the southern coast of Europe, and the connotation of maritime development refers specifically to the maritime trade and overseas colonization in this area, rather than a generalization of the overall maritime world history. Such a view mistakes maritime development for the exclusive rights of the West and shapes the discourse of cultural hegemony that dominates the discussion of maritime history. According to this argument, countries in the East and Asia belong to the continent and river civilization. Although they have the ocean with them, their cultures have not been affected, and they are not entitled to participate in the historical creation of the maritime world. The ancient maritime history is the history of expansion of the Mediterranean civilization, whereas the modern maritime history is the history of the Atlantic civilized powers relying on maritime forces, first to control the ocean and then to control the land. The cultures of non-Western maritime countries are viewed as barbaric, primitive, and heterogeneous.

After the Second World War, the existing paradigm of humanities was challenged. Interdisciplinary and anti-disciplinary research on culture prevailed. Humanities have entered the "experimental era." Maritime humanities have also gone through a period of self-reflection about the theoretical construction of the cultural and historical West-centralism. Their academic norms show the collusion of knowledge and power, which have been widely questioned by the post-colonial critics. The methodological shift from transcendental research to ethnographic fieldwork made it possible to dig out the forms and materials of maritime culture that were previously ignored. With the rise of comparative history, the theory of world system has been revised, outgrowing the Europe-centered model. Maritime history has been expanded into a history in which coastal States and archipelagic countries interact with the ocean and shape maritime economies, maritime communities, and maritime cultures. In order to compete for maritime rights, coastal States and archipelagic countries have rediscovered their historical marine resources and reconstructed their own maritime history. The "Mediterranean Sea" in Asia and America has been rediscovered. There have emerged new thematic areas including regional maritime history, history of maritime affairs, marine immigration history, maritime economic history, maritime cultural history, maritime historical and humanistic geography, maritime archaeology, and history of marine science and technology. Research on the plurality and diversity of maritime history has become an international trend, and there arise academic groups such as the "International Association for Maritime History" and the "International Association for Maritime Economic History." We should outgrow the land-based

mode of thinking, switch from marine history to the overall maritime history, regard the ocean as the living space, and bring to the foreground the maritime historical studies that straddle natural, social, and cultural fields pertaining to the ocean. Similar trends have also emerged in maritime studies of linguistics, literature, anthropology, etc.

1.3.2 The Prospect of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences

From the involvement of humanities and social sciences in the study of maritime issues to the rise of maritime humanities and social sciences, this is an objective historical process. However, so far, humanities and social sciences worldwide have not discussed the academic norms and prospects of maritime humanities and social sciences, let alone reached any consensus. Many scholars in this field don't even have a clue about maritime humanities and social sciences. Such a situation is understandable, as humanities and social sciences are in essence human sciences that were developed when land was regarded as the sole and exclusive living space for mankind. Maritime factors were generally ignored when designing disciplines; even if they were taken into account, the ocean was still deemed subordinate to the land and the land held sway over the ocean. It is only in the last 50 years that the ocean has been recognized as the second space for human subsistence and development. Moreover, at that time, maritime development required high investment and hi-tech, hence the maritime economy was rather delimited and immature, mankind's dependence on the ocean was not that high, the progress of ocean civilization did not have a strong enough impact on the humanities and social sciences, and the land-based view of the ocean had not yet been widely challenged. Maritime humanities and social sciences were still stuck in a peripheral position, still less enter the mainstream of humanities and social sciences.

Yang (2000) puts forward the concept of "maritime humanities and social sciences" to elaborate on the academic norms and prospects of maritime humanities and social sciences. This concept is not opposite or equivalent to humanities and social sciences, but a counterpart to "marine science" under the scope of natural sciences. It refers to the pluralistic integration of humanities and social sciences in the study of maritime issues, which constitute a scientific system, that is, a subsystem under humanities and social sciences. The sub-disciplines under this subsystem are rooted in the original disciplines, which have not changed the attributes of the original but are horizontally correlated with each other. Understanding the significance of maritime humanities and social sciences from this perspective and pointing out its direction will help resolve the indifference among the scholars of humanities and social sciences, enhance their maritime awareness, and open up new fields for academic application.

The concept of "maritime humanities and social sciences" is put forward based on the insights into the academic history. With the rise of maritime humanities and social sciences, many scholars have realized that maritime development is not a simple extension of land-based development, because maritime civilization itself takes on a relatively independent subsystem. This should help us realize the limitations and incapability of the land-based mode of thinking and the theoretical methods and academic norms of the traditional disciplines. However, considering the nature-society-economy complexity of maritime issues and marginalization caused by ignorance of the traditional disciplines, we need to cross disciplinary boundaries to find a more integrated solution. Although scholars in this field have not made any theoretical arguments yet, they have applied it in their research, which reflects the trend of hybridization and integration among various branches of maritime humanities and social sciences. In the past 50 years, the international community has organized a number of comprehensive collaborative studies in maritime humanities and social sciences, adopted theoretical methods of marine science and other natural sciences, as well as of humanities and social sciences, and sorted out the logic and order of maritime humanities and social phenomena they face, so as to achieve theoretical innovations and provide a basis for institutional innovation in practice. Based on this, we can observe such a trend: The sub-disciplines pertinent to the ocean in humanities and social sciences are developing through interconnection, infiltration, and integration and may eventually integrate the ocean-related sub-disciplines in natural sciences and technological science into "marine science," resulting in an interconnected system of "maritime humanities and social sciences." This is held to be an international trend of academic development in the twenty-first century.

The concept of "maritime humanities and social sciences" was put forward in answer to the call of maritime development as it entered a new phase. In the twenty-first century, human society has heralded an era of "three-dimensional ocean" in the all-round exploration and exploitation of marine resources and space (Yang, 2005). The ocean has become a hot spot for development, which is closely related to international and domestic politics, economy, society, science and technology, culture, diplomacy, military affairs, as well as people's daily life. In the meantime, there remain quite a few humanistic and social problems that need to be solved urgently. With the expansion of the scope of territorial seas under national jurisdiction and maritime practices, the transformation of traditional maritime industries, and the emergence of new maritime industries and maritime communities, the authorities and practitioners are now required to have professional knowledge of maritime politics, economy, law, history, and culture. This provides an unprecedented historical opportunity for the development of maritime humanities and social sciences.

First of all, each discipline under the category of humanities and social sciences has its own knowledge structure, mode of thinking, and conceptual system. While they may face the same oceans and maritime affairs, their horizons of observation and research are different, so are their academic goals. Besides, the span of each discipline's academic history is different. While some disciplines have formed their academic norms and have their own explanatory discourse, others don't. They are transplanted from other disciplines, and the connotations of the concepts have

changed. Owing to the researchers' different academic backgrounds and experiences, their understanding of the concepts may differ. Therefore, in order to meet the needs of modern maritime development, it is necessary that the original knowledge structure, the research model, and the specialties keep pace with the times. We should establish the academic norms of maritime humanities and social sciences, and spur the theorization and systematization of the innovative research results.

Secondly, comprehensive research on modern maritime issues shows that the problem of "interdisciplinary integration" lies in the current unbalanced situation: the failure of related disciplines to provide well-tailored theoretical and empirical results, the lack of talents with professional expertise on the ocean-related disciplines, the poor communication between different disciplines, and the outdated and distorted views about maritime development—all these affect the quality of the research. Therefore, strengthening the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences is the indispensable choice to break through the bottleneck.

Some people claim that discipline construction may lead to rigidity, closure and stylization, and ruin its academic vitality. So it follows that humanities and social sciences related to maritime issues do not need to worry about where they belong. While it is reasonable that new discoveries and new theories always overthrow the old paradigm, and that it is easy to make breakthroughs where the boundaries of disciplines are blurred, this is all about deconstruction. After deconstruction, we need to rebuild it, that is, we should incorporate knowledge accrued from new discoveries and solutions into the discipline, transform the paradigm, standardize and typify the otherwise atypical content, and rearrange the order, so as to systematize the knowledge. Adhering to the old disciplinary boundaries will only hinder academic development; going to the anti-disciplinary extreme will lead to academic disorder. As a system of division of labor and inheritance of knowledge production, discipline construction cannot be neglected. Therefore, it is advisable that we should not only embrace interdisciplinary integration and hybridization, but also have an acute awareness of creating new disciplines.

As a matter of fact, the initial sub-disciplines of maritime humanities and social sciences should have belonged in applied studies. Then, they would bring about basic theoretical research and lead to new branches only later. It is obviously unwise to ignore the discipline construction of maritime humanities and social sciences.

It will be a long and arduous process from the ocean-related research of humanities and social sciences to the rise of maritime humanities and social sciences, and to the construction of the "maritime humanities and social sciences" system. However, researchers' initiative may accelerate this process. There is always a way out as long as we've got ideas. Given more understanding, tolerance, and support, the ideal of constructing the disciplinary system of "maritime humanities and social sciences" may well come true.

1.3.3 Constructing China's Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences

China borders the Pacific Ocean in the east and the south, and with Eurasia to its west and its north. It is not only a big continental country in East Asia, but also a major maritime country along the west Pacific. China's development goes in two directions: land oriented and ocean oriented. In the thousands of years of history of Chinese civilization, the maritime development of the eastern oceanic regions (including the coastal zones and land of the islands, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the waters in the east of Taiwan province) can be taken as a subsystem of the social, economic, and cultural system.

Yang (1998) outlined three basic dimensions of China's maritime development: "The first is geographical, which refers to the ecological environment and marine resources in China's oceanic regions and exclusive economic zones; the second is social, which refers to China's maritime forces, including political, economic, and military forces to explore, exploit, manage, and control the ocean, that is, the strength of the central government and the local civilians in managing the ocean; the third is cultural, which refers to the operating mechanism and development model of China's maritime civilization" (Yang, 1999). Geography is the natural element, strength (including potential) social, and culture (including material and spirit) humanistic. These three elements, now uniting and dividing, now waxing and waning, interact with one another and form a systematic and dynamic process of change.

After the Ming and Qing dynasties backed off from the ocean and missed the historical opportunity of transition to modern times, China's maritime development had long dwelt on the local and folk levels in the coastal areas, which hence led to the invasions of western marine forces, the deprivation of the status as a maritime country, and the lagging behind of China in the development of maritime humanities and social sciences. The humanistic elements in maritime development have been ignored, lacking in generalization and enhancement, and making it impossible for them to rise to the mainstream culture. Knowledge accrued from the historical maritime activities cannot be expanded to the national level. It has even slipped the minds of the intellectual elite, hence the denial that China has any maritime culture.

Since the 1980s, China's maritime industry and maritime economy have grown rapidly. The status as a major maritime country has been restored, and its interactions with the maritime world are getting increasingly frequent. The suppressed power of maritime development in history is now released and has accumulated into a driving force. However, in the field of humanities and sociology in China, research on maritime issues is still carried out under traditional disciplines, and in a peripheral position outside the mainstream. It has not formulated a key research theme that can facilitate the discipline construction, and there remains a big gap with the developed maritime countries. Although maritime research in some disciplines shows signs of subdivision, they have not yet differentiated into relatively independent branches. For example, maritime politics is not separated from international politics (international relations) and political geography (geopolitics), and maritime law is not separated

from international law. While some emerging and peripheral disciplines do have their own rudiments and frameworks, such as maritime economics, maritime management, maritime history, maritime archaeology, maritime historical and humanistic geography, etc., they are not mature and systematic, and therefore cannot be taken as an organic major in university education and academic research system. In some disciplines, such as maritime sociology, maritime literature, and deity worship, maritime issues have not become the central topic. Although some scholars have conducted related studies, in other disciplines they are left almost in blank. The interaction, infiltration, and integration between various disciplines have just begun. The once heated research on maritime culture fell silent owing to lack of disciplinary norms and indifference among the mainstream scholarship. The liberal arts established in ocean universities are basically a transplant from traditional disciplines, which fail to give full play to the advantages of the integration of liberal arts, science, and engineering disciplines, and fail to foster talents in maritime humanities and social sciences. What with limited resources invested in the maritime research, what with a lack of team work and overall planning to combine the strengths, China's scholarly community of humanities and sociology cannot make world-class breakthroughs on major research topics of maritime humanities and social sciences that are related to national or international interests, falling far behind with the demands of a major maritime country.

Changes in the global maritime pattern have posed both unprecedented opportunities and challenges for China to become a major maritime country. "Developing the ocean is a strategic mission to promote China's economic and social development."[2] In accordance with the provisions of the *UNCLOS* and its own provisions, China embraces 12 nautical miles of territorial seas, 24 nautical miles of contiguous zones, and 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, covering an area of 3 million km^2, amounting to 1/3 of the land territory. It also shares maritime rights in the high seas and international seabed areas. "Maritime rights are rights formed or derived from the extension of a country's territory to the sea. They belong to national sovereignty. China's exercise of maritime rights has significant political, economic, security and cultural interests. Safeguarding the sovereignty of Taiwan and its affiliated islands, islands on the South China Sea and the territorial seas reflects China's political interests of reunification. The development of marine science and technology and maritime economy is a new source of growth for China's sustainable economic development. Development of maritime trade and fishery provides great economic benefits for the globalization of resource supply and allocation. The so-called "China Threat Theory" advocates curbing China's rise, with the main conspiracy of preventing China from moving east toward the ocean. Only by fostering its own capacity to control the waters under its jurisdiction and its adjacent waters and move to the ocean can China break the containment and safeguard its national security. China needs to develop its marine science and maritime humanities

[2] Hu Jintao: *Zai zhongyang renkou ziyuan huanjing gongzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua* [A speech at the colloquia of Central Commission on population, resources and environment]. *People's Daily*, 5th April 2004.

and social sciences, synthesize the ocean-related theories and important statements once scattered in different disciplines into a disciplinary system, endow them with new meanings and practical needs, and create new ideas and new judgments that are interconnected and closely linked. This will elevate China's traditional maritime civilization from the civil and regional level to the national level, which has great cultural interests."[3]

Returning to the ocean is a major trend in China's reform and opening up, as well as its progressive integration into the world economy. Returning to the ocean means that China is determined to become a developed maritime country and occupy its rightful position in the world. This inevitably leads to conflicts of interest with hegemonic maritime countries and emerging maritime countries. It is not only an issue on the political agenda, but also an unshirkable responsibility of the scholars of humanities and social sciences to carve out a new path of development that upholds sovereignty, avoids conflicts, shares interests, keeps harmony between man and the sea, and sensibly resolves disputes over maritime boundaries and island sovereignty with neighboring countries. Let's take a look at the humanities and social science circles of Japan, China's maritime neighbor. In recent years, a so-called new thinking, "Japan's maritime civilization view," has prevailed, which caters to the western maritime hegemony theory that maritime civilization is exclusive to capitalism, breeds a Japanese nationalistic mindset of "leaving Asia to enter Europe," and advocates a new claim on the maritime history of East Asia (Kawakatsu, 1997). It advocates that Japan does not belong to Asia, but is a maritime country on par with Asia, blotting out the symbiotic relationship between China and Japan in the Asian maritime world, and denying the historical fact that China is also a maritime country (Shiraishi, 2000). It labels Japan as the cradle and leader of Asian maritime civilization from a historical and cultural perspective and conjures up a confrontation between mainland Asia (China) and maritime Asia (Japan). It puts Japan's expansion of maritime power in disguise, with the attempt to provide theoretical support for forming the so-called ocean alliance and preventing China's rise (Kawakatsu, 2001). Putting aside Japan's attempt to cross out the history of China's maritime development and counter the trend of diversified and plural marine civilization development today, this kind of "academic research" would suffice to show the important role of the humanities and social sciences in dealing with maritime issues given Japan's success in having highlighted Japan's maritime status, promoted its national maritime interests, and caused a sensation in the international community. Different countries, social groups, and even individual scholars have different views on maritime history, which is a normal response to international maritime competition. What makes it terrible for a country is that it gets kicked out of the competition because of its academic research lagging behind, its voice unheard, its argument on maritime issues in lack of sufficient historical evidence to win the understanding and support of the international community.

Maritime development in the twenty-first century requires the establishment of an integrated management system of the ocean and the coastal zones, a maritime

[3] Yang Guozhen: *Rang quanmin guanzhu zhongguo haiyang quanyi* [Have the public to show their concern to China's maritime rights]. *CPPCC Daily*, 19th April 2004, p. B1.

legal system, a maritime monitoring and law enforcement system, and a maritime security mechanism. It also calls for a fair, sound, equitable, and stable international environment, harmonious interactions between major maritime countries based on peace and cooperation, and the use of political, economic, diplomatic, and legal means to deal with maritime affairs. This requires not only talents who are expert in economy, technology, management, and military of maritime affairs, but also talents who are proficient in maritime politics, diplomacy, law, and history. Only in this way can China sort out the historical and current practice of its maritime civilization, promote its maritime humanistic spirit, enhance its maritime strengths, scale up maritime development, deal with maritime affairs, safeguard and expand its maritime interests, fulfill its international maritime obligations, and portray China as a responsible major maritime country. At present, China is only a developing maritime country. It is a long-term and arduous task to cultivate its maritime talents in all aspects, especially interdisciplinary talents who are familiar with maritime affairs. The construction of maritime humanities and social sciences is not only a strategic consideration in advance, but also a natural response to the lack of interdisciplinary talents.

Therefore, it is essential to build China's maritime humanities and social sciences, and improve the whole nation's maritime awareness and humanism of the maritime communities. The contemporary maritime development has become increasingly dependent on high and new technology, and it is necessary to prevent and counter the trend of science and humanities divorcing from each other. In particular, from the perspective of humanities, we should investigate and mete out value judgments on the positive and negative social impacts of modern marine environment, maritime management system, the progress of marine science and technology, point out the right direction for shaping modern maritime civilization, establish a scientific concept of development, and advocate fair share of maritime interests, sustainable use of marine resources, and harmonious coexistence between man and the ocean (Yang, 2005). Avoiding bias in formulating and adjusting maritime strategies and specific maritime policies and measures are of practical significance. The construction of maritime humanities and social sciences system is, so to speak, the responsibility of China as a maritime country.

From the perspective of discipline construction, maritime humanities and social sciences constitute an integrated system that is interconnected and closely linked. It focuses on the innovation of the concepts based on reality and history, and demonstrates a macro, dialectical, integrated, and innovative mode of thinking. Theoretically, it calls for the concerted efforts to define and refine the concepts pertaining to maritime development by the disciplines including humanities and social science, natural sciences, technical sciences, and engineering sciences. Eventually, the subdisciplines from the said fields could be combined into new, integrated disciplinary systems.

In the twenty-first century, China's maritime exploration would advance by leaps and bounds. The tasks of demarcating marine boundaries with neighboring countries, resolving island sovereignty disputes, protecting marine security and marine eco-environment, and safeguarding maritime rights and interests have been brought

further to the foreground. It is also my original intention to call for more attention, strategic management, and better protection to the ocean when I initiated the establishment of "China's maritime humanities and social sciences."[4] Even now, I still firmly believe that this is a goal that China's community of humanities and social sciences should pursue. To this end, I propose that a long-term and overall plan be formulated, carefully designed, and steadily carried forward.

First of all, we should reexamine China's current research of humanities and social sciences on maritime issues, and shift from the land-based to ocean-based approach in terms of guiding ideology, research topics, core concepts, research methods, and the order of research. "That is to consider academic norms from the perspective of discipline construction of humanities and social sciences, and find the common ground for interdisciplinary dialogues and communications between related disciplines" (Yang, 2000), Without reaching consensus on the fundamental concepts and macro theoretical framework, various maritime sub-disciplines cannot be integrated into a system. It would take a long time and a natural process of academic accumulation to build a system of maritime humanities and social sciences. Internationally, it is still in the experimental stage and has not yet formed an established paradigm, which leaves China's community of humanities and social sciences more room for free thinking and innovation. In due course, it is likely for the system to be unique and stand in the forefront of the world, to enrich the content of the world's maritime civilization, and to conduct dialogues and exchanges with Western maritime civilization on equal footing. Therefore, it is necessary to build a research platform for maritime humanities and social sciences upon which qualified personnel would be convened, converged, and cultivated to build the talent pool for each sub-discipline, and to lay the foundation to foster leadership in the disciplines and eventually create a system of maritime humanities and social sciences characteristic of Chinese hallmark, Chinese style, and Chinese panache.

Secondly, to build a system of maritime humanities and social sciences, we should first strengthen the construction of sub-disciplines such as maritime politics, maritime economics, maritime sociology, maritime law, maritime management, and maritime history. In response to the urgent need of specialized talents in maritime humanities in China, some universities, provincial academies of social sciences, and academic groups on the east coast have carried out research on the above-mentioned maritime humanities and social sciences, set up related courses or research programs for master's degree and doctoral degree. On the strength of many years of experience in teaching and academic research, Xiamen University was the first to set up a second-tier discipline of maritime history under the first-tier discipline of history in 2004 and has enrolled graduate students since 2005. The Ocean University of China has established the Marine Development Research Institute, a key liberal arts research base of the Ministry of Education, and national philosophy and social science innovation base of "985 Project" for maritime development research. This represents a new

[4] Zhao Yang*: Quanguo zhengxieweiyuan Yang Guozhen changyi: Jianli Zhongguo haiyang renwen shehui kexu*e [CPPCC member Yang Guozhen advocates the construction of maritime humanities and sociology]. *China Ocean News*, 4th March 1997, p. 2.

stage in the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences. Among them, there are both basic and applied disciplines, which were first established in developed maritime countries. It is essential to grasp the cutting-edge theories, concepts, and methods used in the international research and learn from those countries about their achievements and experience in discipline construction. Meanwhile, we should expend greater efforts to localize, inspect, and innovate the theories in combination with China's own achievements and experience in maritime practice so as to enrich and enhance the construction of the disciplines.

Thirdly, the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences calls for substantial support from the government and the community of humanities and social sciences. Both national and provincial ministries in charge of social science research planning should pump more funds into the research and encourage scholars to cooperate in tackling major maritime issues facing China and the world, so that they can research on the major topics, carry out basic theoretical research with applied approach, and facilitate disciplinary integration with joint efforts. Journals of humanities and social sciences should support the research of maritime humanities and social sciences by providing more room for relevant publications, and hold discussions on the frontiers of the research topics. We need to reexamine China's maritime civilization as a unique evolution process, sort out its historical and realistic maritime practices, carry forward its maritime humanistic spirit, and facilitate the implementation of its national maritime development strategies, the enhancement of its maritime strength, the progression of maritime exploration, and the handling of its maritime affairs.

On the whole, the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences in China is still in its infancy and is still weak and peripheral, but it shows great promise. In recent years, "maritime social science research" has been included in the Maritime Code of the People's Republic of China. The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Justice, and the State Oceanic Administration have shown enormous concern and increased their investment to the research projects of maritime humanities and social sciences. The State Oceanic Administration and the Ministry of Education have jointly set up "The Academy of Ocean of China," a national research center for the intersection and integration of maritime social sciences and natural sciences. The party committee and the government of Guangdong Province have incorporated the "construction of maritime humanities and social sciences" in its resolve to develop maritime economy. With discipline construction in mind, we should support maritime humanities and social sciences and fuel its growth toward maturity. In time, the community of Chinese humanities and social sciences will surely contribute greatly to the effort to build China into a major maritime country.

1.4 The Conceptual Integration of Maritime Humanities and Social Sciences

1.4.1 Introduction

Conceptual defining and refining actually refers to the modification and adaptation of the connotations of the same terms used in different disciplines, so as to borrow concepts from other disciplines or to modify the concepts to suit multidisciplinary and pluralistic purposes. This is an indispensable approach in natural science to construct a new discipline, so it is with humanities and social sciences.

Mankind's exploration and exploitation of the ocean started at a very early age, but it was not until the "Great Geographical Discovery" at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that it began to have tremendous impact on the advancement of the human society. The breakthroughs in marine transportation have facilitated connections between the world market and globality, brought about revolution in commerce, price and industry, and social transition from tradition to modernity. With the rapid development of the industrial society, the end of the twentieth century witnessed the severe challenges from population explosion, shortage of resources, and environmental pollution. Maritime exploration based on high-tech will hopefully create a new world of sustainable development and exert enormous impact on the progression of the human society. Against this backdrop, humanities and social sciences have revealed a trend of stepping up more efforts to study maritime civilizations, which, as a result, has incubated many new sub-disciplines, such as maritime politics, maritime economics, maritime sociology, maritime law, maritime management, maritime tourism, maritime military science, maritime history, maritime archaeology, maritime literature, maritime ethnology, maritime culture, maritime folklore, and maritime religion. This will help us reexamine maritime civilization from the modern perspective and standpoint.

All these sub-disciplines take the ocean as the research object and tap into humanistic information and resources from different perspectives, so they are inherently interactive and complementary, and will surely lead to intersection and infiltration. If we arrange them in a sequence and synthesize them on the strength of the academic accumulation, they will surely develop into a subsystem of humanities and social sciences. Yang (1996b) refers to this system as "maritime humanities and social sciences." The sub-disciplines under this subsystem are rooted in their original disciplines and haven't changed their original attributes, but they are horizontally interwoven with each other through interdisciplinary dialogues and communications. It is likely for them to develop new academic norms, and hence innovation of knowledge, keeping pace with the sub-disciplines under natural sciences, such as marine chemistry, marine biology, marine physics, marine hydrology, marine meteorology, marine geology, marine geography, marine shipbuilding, and marine engineering. Together they constitute the maritime science. Dialogues between disciplines are not monologues; they must necessitate the efforts to define and refine some of the concepts, which are a sine qua non for the rise of new disciplines.

The pluralistic integration of maritime humanities and social sciences is still in its infancy, and even more so in China. As different disciplines have their own knowledge structure, mode of thinking, and conceptual system, the definitions of the same concept may vary, so much so that non-negligible contradictions have occurred. The development of marine sciences and the practice of marine exploration, the acceleration of interactions between land and ocean, and the occurrence of new factors in maritime civilization, all these call for new generalizations and new academic norms. It is of both theoretical and practical values with respect to exploration of the ocean and formulation and implementation of the sociocultural policies in maritime economy. While the establishment of academic norms takes time, it calls for immediate efforts now. In the following sections, I will make a tentative proposal on how to define and refine several basic concepts that are widely used by scholars of today.

1.4.2 Oceanic Regions

Oceanic region is a kind of regional system. Regional systems analysis is an important research method adopted by many disciplines. There are different classification standards for different academic concerns and research objectives. So it is with the division of oceanic regions.

The concept of oceanic region is derived from physical geography. Land and ocean are the two regions of nature, whose ecological environments are distinct from each other. Viewed from the surface, the sea water is flowing and the oceans are interlinked, but the three-dimensional spatial structure and ecosystem of the atmosphere, sea surface, and seabed, which are rich and colorful, constitute an oceanic region in the sense of oceanography. The water body can be divided into shallow waters and oceanic area horizontally; vertically, it can be divided into upper zone (within 200 m deep from the sea surface), middle zone (200–1000 m deep), deep-sea zone (1000–4000 m deep), and abyssal zone (below 4000 m deep). The seabed includes coastal zone, shallow zone, deep zone, and abyssal zone. The vertical and horizontal interconnection of the territorial sea can also be divided into different zones according to natural or social attributes.

The concept of oceanic region in humanities emphasizes the "man-earth relation system," that is, the relationship between human activities and marine environment. There are two kinds of ocean-related human activities: direct and indirect. Direct activities refer to the exploration and exploitation of marine resources in the ocean, and indirect activities refer to the exploration and exploitation of marine resources carried out on land. Therefore, oceanic region does not only refer to the oceanic zone and territorial seas, but also includes part of the land area.

The "man-earth relation system" of the oceanic region consists of different subsystems, such as political, economic, military, social, legal, linguistic, literary, ethnic, and religious. Their "boundaries" overlap and are not completely consistent as a result of the diversity of human social life. It can be a territorial water in the sense of oceanography; it can also be an artificially defined oceanic region according to

natural conditions and different purposes. A large oceanic region can cross continents and national boundaries, such as "the Asia Pacific region" and "the North Atlantic region," while a small one may refer to a local island county, or even a "marine aquaculture area." In any case, they all have some kind of joint interests or interdependent connections, including clashes and conflicts.

The division of oceanic regions may vary with different criteria, but it is not without rules to follow. All oceanic regions can be classified into territorial seas, islands, and coastal areas. Territorial seas refer to marine water bodies and the seabed. Islands refer to the land in the sea (including reefs emerging during tidal retreat). The land area of the coastal zone refers to the area extending from the coastline to the land, that is, the coastal area. For example, China's oceanic regions comprise the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Pacific Ocean east of Taiwan, coastal provinces and cities, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Hainan, and their subordinate islands. The land area of the coastal zone is limited by the extension of the coastline to the land for some meters or kilometers, while the large area includes cities and counties with coastlines or island coastlines (Jiang, 1990) or coastal provinces. For another example, the Pacific region, including the Pacific territorial seas, island countries (regions), and coastal States, is also composed of three parts: territorial seas, islands, and coastal land area, but the coastal land area is defined as countries and regions with coastlines or island coastlines.

It can thus be seen that the division of maritime, political, economic, military, cultural regions, etc., has its own academic principles and norms, but it is not without common ground, that is, the regional space is composed of three parts: territorial seas, island, and coastline land area, which is the basis for interdisciplinary intersection and integration.

1.4.3 Maritime Economy

Maritime economy has become a household term in recent years. The groundbreaking progress in modern marine science and technology has showcased the prospect of the all-round exploration and exploitation of marine resources and maritime space, and of the ocean becoming "mankind's second homeland." There has occurred a sea change of economic focus from land to ocean. Therefore, how to develop maritime economy has become a topic of universal concern to countries all over the world.

First of all, maritime economy is a concept of economics. It's a concept of maritime exploration and exploitation in oceanography, introduced to economics and added with economic interpretations. As maritime economics is not full-fledged, the economic community has not yet come up with a clear definition for maritime economy. In China, the study of maritime economy started in the 1980s (Zhang, 1982, 1984, 1986; Zhang & Jiang, 1986), and the object of research was contemporary China's maritime economy, but the scholars didn't lump it together with the traditional marine economy in the past. The widely accepted definition interprets

maritime economy as the total value based on maritime industry. Maritime industries include the first, second, and third sectors, or traditional maritime industry, emerging maritime industry, and high-tech maritime industry. This definition is acknowledged by the oceanographic community as well. The problem of this definition, however, is that it equalizes maritime economy with maritime industry, which is limited to production, precluding circulation, distribution, and consumption. Besides, it takes maritime development as an extension of development on land, paying less attention to the extension of maritime economy to land, without mentioning interactions between land and ocean. Therefore, some insightful scholars consider such an interpretation to be too narrow and propose the inclusion of maritime commerce, export of labor service, overseas investment, and the export-oriented economy, customs tariffs, overseas Chinese remittances in coastal areas and even landlocked areas, which indirectly utilize marine resources and space. In practice, the elements of maritime economy are not separated from social economy and have not developed into an independent field, so they are still listed under the categories of agriculture, industry, transportation, and foreign trade, respectively, hence still in lack of established norms of classification or statistical indicators.

Maritime economy is also a historical concept. The "Great Geographical Discovery" at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries connected the world into one via the oceans, which eventually led to the formation of the capitalistic world system. Plundering on the sea, maritime commerce and trade, and overseas colonization were the major means of primitive accumulation of capitalism. Maritime commerce facilitated the transformation of the British economy, which took the lead in entering the modern times and rendered Britain a "world factory." Western historians first defined maritime economy as marine shipping and maritime commerce, and equalized it with the ocean-based capitalist market economy later. With the progression of research on maritime history, researchers have come to realize that maritime economy is a dynamic historical concept. Its origin is pluralistic, and there is no fixed model in the course of development, but it does exist at different levels and belongs to different forms of social economy. Initially, it was a geographical division of labor as opposed to land-based economy, that is, the traditional maritime economy characterized as "profits from fish and salt and convenience of shipping." Modern maritime economy takes maritime commerce and overseas colonization as its major contents. Future maritime economy should take exploring the three-dimensional marine resources as the key, with high-tech as its drive, and transform from the demand-and-use type to the protection-and-proliferation type.

As a concept of culturology, maritime economy underscores the change of thinking incurred by maritime economic activities such as marine shipping. In other words, maritime economy is characterized by mobility, commercialism, and openness. As a concept in politics, military science, and law, maritime economy in essence refers to the benefits of maritime economy, including existing and potential ones. Other disciplines also have their own definitions for maritime economy from different perspectives and out of different objectives.

In the world history, the advent of maritime economy was no later than agricultural economy. The ancient forms of maritime economy, i.e., offshore fishing and

shipping, already existed in the "Mediterranean Sea" of Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The first worldwide maritime era occurred at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when maritime economy transformed from the traditional to the modern times, marked by the rise of maritime commerce, overseas colonization, and plundering. The second maritime era witnessed its advent at the turn of the twenty-first century, in which maritime economy has become a major part of knowledge economy, marked by the exploration of marine resources and maritime space with high and new technology. Taking this high and macro ground, we can define the concept as follows: Maritime economy is a model of economic structure, economic benefits, economic form, and economic mechanism in mankind's direct or indirect exploration and exploitation of marine resources and maritime space in the coastal zones, islands, and the ocean (offshore waters and the high seas).

There are three implications in this definition: (1) Maritime economy covers different periods of time in different countries and regions. All economic activities involving direct or indirect exploration and exploitation of marine resources and maritime space in the coastal zones, islands, and the ocean are covered in maritime economy. This precludes the non-maritime economic elements of coastal and island economies, which, even though situated in the marine environment, as long as they have nothing to do with the ocean, cannot be counted as maritime economy. It transcends the time and space in that it can be traced back to the ancient times. We can make comparison between one's own region and country with foreign countries, observe the continuity of tradition and transformation, and leave room for research on future development and changes. (2) As a research object, maritime economy not only takes place in the ocean but also extends to the land; the former is direct, and the latter indirect. Including both of them in the research scope helps shape a new mode of thinking, tap new materials, and re-locate the concept of maritime economy. (3) The research objective of maritime economy, be it historical or realistic, should reveal its economic structure, benefits, form, and mechanism. Economic structure refers to the internal structure of maritime economy and its components, the internal and external relationships it has established, etc. Economic benefits include not only the tangible economic benefits and output value achieved in production, operation and management and the way they are distributed and reproduced, but also intangible assets including the property rights of maritime knowledge, and the awareness of oceanic territories, etc. It includes both the current capacity of maritime economy in some period and the potential economic capacity for exploration and exploitation. Economic form involves static analysis in a certain period, while operating mechanism involves dynamic analysis. This objective is not unique to maritime economics, but applicable to other disciplines as well.

To look at China's contemporary maritime economy from this perspective, it is obviously biased to take it for maritime industry only. There is still a lot of research to be done as to which elements should be added to meet the reality. For example, the import and export trade in maritime commerce and ports is subsumed into maritime economy, but research on how to separate it from the import and export trade at dry ports and airports has to be put high on the agenda. Another question is whether coastal economy is or which part of maritime economy should be attributed to land

economy. Recent publications on maritime economy or coastal economy basically adopt self-supporting standards, with overlapping and confusing contents, which also need to be comprehensively studied and sorted out. To this end, China should not only have its own policies in maritime development, maritime industry, and marine technology, but also a more inclusive maritime economic policy.

1.4.4 Maritime Society

Maritime society is defined as a combination of relationships between man and the ocean and between individuals in their direct or indirect maritime activities, including social organizations and structures at different levels, such as maritime communities, maritime regional societies, and maritime countries. This is an application of the concepts of sociology to maritime activities bestowed with new meanings. Quite a few sub-disciplines of humanities involve themselves in studies of maritime social organizations, or adopt the concepts from maritime sociology, but their connotations are yet to be elucidated.

The grassroots organizations of maritime society include communities that work and live on the sea, such as fishermen, crew members, sailors, merchants, pirates, navy, marine scientific researchers, and personnel in maritime industry and marine engineering. Also included are the land-based coastal rural areas, port towns, fishing villages, clans and folk associations, institutions for processing, warehousing, transportation of and research on marine resources or products, and departments of maritime management and service. These are also various organizations of maritime forces and land and island supporting forces. It differs significantly from the land society in that it is a "shipboard society" composed of various communities. They all have their own organizational systems and behavior patterns, with the characteristics of small societies.

Areas where maritime communities gather, such as harbors, islands, and territorial seas with traditional activities, constitute a maritime regional society. In a regional society, various maritime organizations are interconnected, interactive, and complementary, forming a maritime social system, composed of coastal departments, industries and groups of production, circulation, management, monitoring, services, protection, and defense. There are contradictions and conflicts between different systems, but they still coexist in the same region. A maritime regional society generally includes coastal zones, islands, and territorial seas. Its scope can be large or small, which are either consistent with or different from administrative regions, such as Southeast Fujian, Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao, the lower Yangtze River Delta, and the Rim of the Bohai Gulf. The communities of maritime regions, who live on the coastal land, do not purely live off the sea, but with higher dependency on it. In case anything happens at sea, it may have great impact on their economy and society. Compared with the agricultural society on land, the maritime regional society is mainly characterized by the mobility of its population and the openness of its society. The maritime regional society has not come into being naturally. Coastal

zones, islands, and territorial seas with marine geographical environment but without activities of maritime communities for a certain period of time cannot be counted as a maritime regional society.

Maritime countries generally refer to coastal States or island countries. But this definition is not accurate. Viewed from long-distance and long-term perspective, coastal States or island countries in marine environments, despite their different starting time in exploration and exploitation of the ocean and different levels of maritime development, will sooner or later face the ocean, move to the ocean and contact and interact with civilizations of the outside world. Therefore, from macro perspective, they should all be regarded as maritime countries. Yet in some specific sense in terms of research, maritime countries are the result of maritime development over a historical period, so they are not identical to coastal States or island countries. A maritime country generally comes into being after its economic power grows in maritime regional societies and has had due impact on the whole country's social economy. The main indicators are the goals of maritime development taken as its national policies, and an economic, social, and cultural operating system open to the ocean. For example, Britain, a modern maritime country, was once the most powerful maritime country in the world, but in ancient times, it had been a rather closed island country. In the early Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties, China could be regarded as a maritime country, but later, the government retreated from the sea, hence China lost its status as a maritime country. It was not until the 1980s that maritime development was adopted as a basic national policy, and China has been ranked once again as one of the maritime countries.

At present, research on maritime society in China is far from sufficient, or virtually non-existent. Conflicts of interest in maritime society are gradually emerging and cannot be underestimated. Research in this area should be strongly encouraged and promoted, so as to contribute to the stability and development of maritime society.

1.4.5 Maritime Culture

The concept of maritime culture is shaped by Western scholars based on generalizing the historical experience in the development of Western maritime economy. Its connotations include "civilization of industry and commerce," "contractual civilization," and "accumulative civilization of experience accumulation." The progress of research on international maritime history demonstrates that it's not universally applicable, and hence interpretations vary. Its remarkable contribution consists in revealing the plurality and diversity of maritime cultures.

Similar to the uncertainty of the concept of culture per se, maritime culture is in lack of a clear-cut definition in humanities and social sciences. Although there are hundreds of definitions for culture, its logical starting point lies in the relationship between man and nature, so culture means personalization of nature. Maritime culture is shaped and developed gradually when the ocean becomes the stage for human

activities and the natural power of the ocean becomes a factor of productivity. It can also be referred to as a type of maritime humanity.

As a humanistic type, maritime culture is corresponding to various types of humanities in the land area.

First of all, the premise of maritime culture is direct or indirect maritime activities, and the most fundamental, permanent, and prevalent activity is navigation. In terms of technical culture, shipbuilding and navigation are paramount. There's no point talking about maritime culture without mentioning navigation.

Next, maritime culture takes on different development models in different coastal or island States. There is no simple good or bad. The degree and speed of development are determined by whether they have seized the opportunity for development and adopted proper cultural strategies. As a natural body, the ocean is equal to all coastal States. There is no difference of openness or closedness. Self-sufficiency and closure are not the nature of maritime culture.

Furthermore, maritime culture stems from mankind's cultural adaptation to marine environment in their migration from land to ocean. While it is not opposite to land-based culture, it's not a natural extension of land-based culture to the ocean, either. They are compatible and interactive. Besides, maritime culture has undergone an elevation from maritime regional culture to national culture, and finally world culture.

Maritime culturology should integrate the knowledge and findings of different ocean-related disciplines, but it's evidently improper to define it as "a comprehensive science crossing the boundaries of philosophy, sociology, nature, and technology, though culturology, in its broadest sense, may include social sciences, natural sciences, and technological sciences" (Ding, 1998), as this exaggerates the nature and function of culturology. Personally, I agree to the idea that maritime culturology is, "on the whole or in the main belongs to the scope of humanities and social sciences." "As a discipline of basic theories, it's mainly a discipline of humanities, as its research object is culture. Both the research methodology and the theoretical system belong in the scope of humanities, even the part that intersects and overlaps with natural marine sciences is basically within the scope of humanities" (Qu, 1999).

As a discipline of maritime humanities and social sciences, maritime culturology should set up its own framework from the academic stance and perspective of culturology with its own characteristics. Then, it can start from here and find its intersection with other disciplines of maritime humanities and social sciences, with obvious difference from and interaction with other disciplines, so as not to lose itself in the big jigsaw.

More and more scholars acknowledge the existence of maritime culture in China, but their understanding varies in terms of the connotations and essence of China's maritime culture (Guangdong Research Association of Yan and Huang Cultures, 1997; Yang, 1996a, 1999). The reason for China's lagging behind in maritime culture lies in the fact that scholars just repeat what Hegel says in his *Philosophy of History* and are in lack of in-depth studies of their own. It's normal that researchers from different disciplines may have different perceptions of China's maritime culture, and this is the very premise for us to define and refine a concept. If we categorize China's maritime culture as a kind of maritime humanities and deal with the problems that

may arise in the process of defining and refining, it might be easier to find a more appropriate approach to formulate a theory.

Defining and refining a concept needs to go through a process of intersection, infiltration, and integration. We hereby simply point to a direction for thinking, i.e., to think about academic norms from the height of the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences. It's hoped that we can extend from the maritime disciplines to relevant ones, and find the common ground for dialogues and communications between the disciplines. This is by no means to belittle the research with diversity and from multidisciplinary perspectives; on the contrary, it's likely to foster higher-level multifarious research. But there is still a long way to go. Much remains to be done, from maritime humanistic research to the construction of maritime humanities and social sciences system.

1.5 Misunderstanding of and Theoretical Exploration into the Belt and Road Initiative

"The Belt and Road Initiative" (hereinafter the BRI) is an international initiative rich with deep historical heritage and cultural charm. It is still a new thing for the world and has attracted worldwide attention from all walks of life at home and abroad. The BRI advocated by China has been misinterpreted and misunderstood to some extent. Therefore, it is necessary for China to build its own discourse system. The BRI is a product of great theoretical innovation and a contribution of Chinese ideas and values to global development. Improvement of research and discussions about this major theoretical issue are in urgent need, but it is by no means easy to build a solid BRI theoretical system, nor can it be accomplished by a single section in this monograph. Therefore, this section intends to reveal the misunderstandings towards the BRI from all walks of life, call for the enhancement of maritime awareness, conveyance of China's ideal of sharing the blessing of peace, and its proposal for building a community of shared future for mankind. It is hoped to arouse wide academic concern and discussion, and consolidate the theoretical exploration and practical application of the BRI.

1.5.1 The BRI Is Not Meant to Rejuvenate the Land Rights

With the proposal of the BRI, there arose a claim of "rejuvenating the land rights" in some Chinese media. Some people believe that "history is likely to prove that high-speed rail will surpass the Grand Canal and the Silk Road, and become the ultimate nightmare of maritime countries," and that "the rejuvenation of land rights is the historical destiny of the rise of China" (Zhao, 2014). With the launch of the "China-Europe freight train" and the "Asia-Europe train," some people began to sing

high praise for the high-speed train, asserting that "after the era of ship-centered maritime power and the era of aircraft-centered airspace power, the world is now embracing the era of high-speed-train-centered land power" (Wang, 2017). In the online media, in particular, there is no end of comments about "rejuvenating the land rights." Some people think that "China has never been a major maritime country. It has always been a major continental country."[5] Some people think that the BRI is put forward just to be "tailored for the integration of Eurasia and Africa and the return of the land power era."[6] Many people are puzzled by this argument: Is the BRI designed to rejuvenate China's land rights? Will returning to the "land power era" help realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation?

The so-called land power and sea power are the core concepts of the modern Western geopolitical theory. Since the era of the Great Navigation, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, and other European countries have moved towards the sea one after another. The colonial expansion of the West and the corresponding competition for sea power have promoted the rise of the Western World's maritime powers. Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) puts forward the "theory of sea power" in his book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, claiming that "sea power includes everything that can make a nation great by virtue of or through the sea." Mackinder (1904) advocates the "heartland theory" in his article "The Geographical Pivot of History," claiming that whoever ruled Eastern Europe would control the heartland, whoever ruled the heartland would control the world island, and whoever ruled the world island would control the world. The theoretical pivot of "sea power" and "land power" is the binary opposition between the sea and the land. Later, concepts like "heartland" and "marginal land," "core zone" and "marginal zone," "West" and "East," and other analytical frameworks emerge, which led the world powers to scramble for hegemony, and shaped the model of traditional geopolitical theory. This model represents the dichotomy between land and sea, the core and the periphery. Such statements sound antagonistic and expansionary and have had great impact on the international geopolitical pattern.

In the context of "sea power" and "land power" theory, the world was artificially classified as "maritime countries" against "heartland countries." Examining the origin and nature of the Western discourse system of maritime vs. continental countries from the dimensions of historical background and cognitive path may help in reinterpreting the Western view of "sea power" (Yang, 2012). This is also true of the Western view of "land power." In Mackinder's classic definition, heartland countries refer to the "Euro-Asiatic land powers which had hitherto threatened her very existence." "While the maritime peoples of Western Europe have covered the ocean with their fleets, settled the outer continents, and in varying degrees made tributary the oceanic margins of Asia, Russia has organized the Cossacks, and, emerging

[5] Gong Chen: *Xin sichouzhilu yu luquan fuxing* [The new silk road and rejuvenation of land power], *Grassroots Net*, 13th February 2016. http://www.caogen.com/blog/infor_detailaspx?Page=1&articleId=76588.

[6] Qianlong Zai Yuan: *Luquan vs. haiquan, jiujing lusishuishou? Cong yidaiyilu de weida zhanlüe shuoqi* [Land power vs. sea power, which on earth will win? Talking about the strategy of the BRI], The WeChat Official account of *Qianlong Shuo*, 17th May 2017.

from her northern forests, has policed the steppe by setting her own nomads to meet the Tartar nomads. The Tudor century, which saw the expansion of Western Europe over the sea, also saw Russian power carried from Moscow through Siberia. The eastward swoop of the horsemen across Asia was an event almost as pregnant with political consequences as was the rounding of the Cape…. The seaward and the landward expansion of Europe should, in a sense, continue the ancient opposition between Roman and Greek" (Mackinder, 1904). Therefore, the nature of the "heartland theory" lies in the competition for hegemony over both the land and the sea. With the progression of history and the continuous renovation of geopolitical theory, the "sea powers" represented by the United States and the "land powers" represented by the Soviet Union and its allies have been looked upon as the standard patterns for international political research.

Yang points out that "China is a continental country as well as a maritime country" (1996b) and that "Chinese civilization takes agricultural civilization as the main body, and includes both nomadic civilization and maritime civilization, forming a pluralistic and integrated community of civilization" (Yang, 2016). China has never fallen in line with the Western definition of "sea powers" or "land powers." However, when the concepts of "sea power" and "land power" were introduced into China in the early twentieth century, some scholars interpreted China as an agriculture-based country and positioned it as a "land power." For long, the claim that "China is a land-power country" has become prerequisite knowledge on which the scholarship builds its discourse. Some scholars have rephrased "China is a continental country" as "China is a land power country," ignoring the expansionary nature of the concept "land power country" in Western discourse. It not only fails to comply with historical facts, but also deviates from the standpoint and undertaking of China's contemporary peaceful development.

China's proposal of the ocean-oriented "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" and more momentum to the construction of a major maritime country is based not only on the historical development of China's maritime civilization, but also on a realistic consideration of the complex situation of the international ocean. Compared with "the Silk Road Economic Belt," "the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" has aroused much more concern and faces more doubts and challenges, because the ocean involves broader interests and benefits, as well as conflicts of interest. Historical facts indicate that without the sea, even if it was a land power, it would only be a weak one. If China does not make progress towards the sea and develop its own maritime power, it may not hold its position as an influential country in the world. In today's world, looking seaward has become a general consensus and a proactive approach of major countries. Maritime competition will become more intense, which reminds us that China must respond positively to the challenges from the ocean, take the initiative towards the ocean, and actively enhance its maritime strength. The twenty-first century is an ocean century, and the ocean has become an important strategic space. If China blindly reclaims its land power and retreats from the ocean, it may only repeat the same mistakes of the past when China fell behind and suffered from aggressions, and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation will remain elusive. It is for this reason that President Xi Jinping emphasizes that we Chinese should turn our eyes towards

the ocean, know more about the ocean, and manage the ocean with vision. "We must integrate the domestic and international situations, come up with the overall planning of land and ocean, pursue a development path of enriching the country by the ocean, strengthening the country by the ocean, harmonizing the relationship between man and the ocean, and developing win-win partnership. We must facilitate the construction of a major maritime country with peace, development, and cooperation on a win-win basis."[7] The construction of the BRI calls for the support of comprehensive national strength, inter alia, the substantial development of China's naval strength to protect, escort, and meet head-on the threats and challenges from the oceans. Emphasizing the importance of maritime development does not mean that China can ignore the development of the vast inland areas. Rather, it denotes that China should not only move east toward the ocean, but also develop the west, establish the links between land and ocean, and achieve balanced development between the east and the west by mutual aids. This utterly differs from the dichotomous relationship between land and ocean as described in the Western geopolitical theory.

China's proposal of the BRI is neither to rejuvenate its land power nor to compete for maritime power. The ocean and land belong to the same earth, and together they constitute an ecosystem. They shouldn't be taken as two diametrically opposed stages or two worlds. It is necessary to overcome the limitations of Western geopolitical theory of the binary opposition between land and sea, and regard them as an interconnected and interactive organic whole.

1.5.2 The BRI Is Not Designed to Restore the Canonization System of the Ming Dynasty

There are different voices from the international community on the BRI. Upon his visit to Japan in February 2017, James Mattis, the then US Secretary of Defense, claimed that China seemed to attempt to restore the canonization system practiced in the Ming dynasty.[8] Some overseas media have cast doubts on the BRI, and even presumed that China aims to expand its regional influence and challenge the existing international order.

To clarify this, we need first to sort out the relationship between the "canonization system," the "Silk Road," and the BRI. They are interrelated in the sense that they all inherit and practice "harmony," one of the core values in Chinese culture. But there are substantial differences in essence. The Silk Road is a historical symbol borrowed and adapted by the BRI. Instead of a mere copy of the history, this concept

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[7] Xi Jinping: *Jinyibu guanxin haiyang, renshi haiyuang, jinglüe haiyang, tuidong haiyang qiangguo jianshe, buduan qude xin chengjiu* [Show further concern to the ocean, know more about the ocean and manage the ocean better, to make new achievements in the construction of a major maritime country]. *People's Daily,* 1st August 2013, p. 1.

[8] Rimei: *Mei xinren fangzhang cheng zhongguo zheng huifu* "*mingwangchao cefeng tizhi*" [Japanese media: The newly elected US defence minister claims that China is restoring the canonization system practiced in the Ming dynasty], *Xinhua Net*, 9th February 2017.

means to inherit and carry forward the interconnected, open, and inclusive spirit of the Silk Road. The canonization system was one of the means of China-foreign exchanges in the Ming dynasty, and it's definitely not the historical background of the BRI. The reason why some people would associate the canonization system with the BRI may be that countries along the Silk Road used to be tributaries within the canonization system. They suspect that China's proposal of the BRI is an attempt to revive the canonization system, and they mistake the "suzerain-vassal relationship" under the canonization system for the relationship between the "suzerain State" and the "affiliated State," which is a distortion and misinterpretation of the BRI. The reasons can be listed as follows.

First, the canonization system of the Ming dynasty does not equate to a relationship between "suzerain State" and "subsidiary State." The canonization system and tributary system of the Ming dynasty are two sides of the same coin, that is, the canonized reward from the "heavenly dynasty" on the one side and the tributes from the "four barbarians (other countries than China)" on the other side, which was once believed to be the "international order" with China as the center, "uniting the world as a family, and keeping the world in harmony." This thought comes from the traditional "worldview" and "Hua-Yi view (Chinese civilization vs. foreign ones)." "The land under heaven" referred to the world, and China was considered center of the world. "*Siyi* (barbarian countries at four corners)," that is, the surrounding and overseas countries, were on the edge of the world, and their cultures fell behind China. Therefore, China adopted the philosophy of "harmony without uniformity" and "peace under heaven" to deal with the relationship between China and the world, and canonized the countries that were willing to be enlightened, while "*siyi*" paid tributes to denote their alignment with the Chinese orthodoxy. Although the other countries accepted the canonization, they did not regard themselves as vassals by any means. Through the canonization by the Ming government, they could not only cement their rules over their countries, but also improve their political status in the region. More importantly, paying tributes could bring huge economic benefits to themselves. For example, for Manraga (Malacca), "in the seventh year of Yongle (1409), the Ming emperor ordered Zheng He the eunuch and others to grant the leader two silver seals, crowns, and robes, to have a stele made and inscribed with the text of canonization, and since then the country was named Manraga. From then on Siam dared not invade it any more. Its king, called The Blessed, took his son and wife to Beijing to thank the emperor and pay him tributes. In return, the court also awarded him a ship to return home and defend his homeland" (Ma, 2005: 37). In the eighteenth year of Yongle (1420), a hymn to the accompaniment of a dance at the tribute ceremony formulated in the Ming dynasty sings: "All surrounding countries have submitted themselves to the will of the Sovereign, and they have come to worship the Mighty Ming. Myriads of nations and states are aligned with the Chinese orthodoxy, they are now gathered at the court to glorify His Majesty. The palace stairs are lined with dukes and peers, who all sing in unison the praise of the order and peace" (Zhang et al., 2013: 1569). The hymn vividly describes the Ming's policy of appeasing foreign countries and the pomp and ceremony of "partaking of the Pax Sinica" with the world.

Second, the BRI absorbs the notion of "harmony" and totally abandons the suzerain-vassal relationship of the canonization system. The canonization system emphasized the order of "China with foreign nationalities," with China at the center. In the fourteenth year of Yongle (1416), the State of Cochin (now southwest India) was canonized. The inscription made by Zhu Di, the third Emperor of the Ming dynasty, says, "I will visit the world, pacify and govern the nationalities outside China, treat each other on equal footing, make manifest the ways of the ancient Sage Emperors, and conform to the will of the heaven and the earth"[9] (Yang et al., 1962: 1970). The "suzerain-vassal relationship" under the canonization system goes against the diplomatic principles, i.e., "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" pursued by the contemporary Chinese government, and is totally discarded by the BRI, but the BRI does inherit the philosophy of "harmony" in the canonization system, which is the core concept of Chinese culture. Zheng He's seven voyages to the Western seas at the beginning of the Ming dynasty were a major contribution of China to the Maritime Silk Road. Zheng He rested not with the power of his ships and artillery, nor the conferment system of the Ming dynasty, but with peace and friendship. "We should not bully the minority and the weak, and may all share the blessings of peace" (Zheng & Zheng, 1980: 99). Sent as an imperial envoy to the Western seas, "Zheng He commanded tens of thousands of officers and troops, led a fleet of 100 mega ships loaded with treasures as gifts to all." He did not launch any war of conquest, but "publicized morality and showed benevolence to people from afar." The few battles only happened mainly to maintain "the peace of the seas," and "when encountering the barbarian kings, we would capture them alive if they offend us, and would wipe them out if they dare to pillage us with force" (Gong, 2012: 53). Zheng He's voyages were only meant to display the country's maritime might. Instead of colonizing the land, he promoted the prosperity of trade between China and overseas countries and established a maritime order in which Asian and African countries shared the blessing of peace.

Third, the BRI is not centered on China. It's aimed to build a new type of international relations with win-win cooperation as the core principle. As a major channel for ancient East-West world exchanges, the Silk Road did not have a unique core. Instead, it was a civilization exchange system jointly created and maintained by countries and regions along the line. For example, the Maritime Silk Road "views the seaports in Asia as the nodes, free navigation trade as the pillar, and economic and cultural exchanges as the mainstream. It embraces different forms of maritime culture and forms a peaceful and harmonious maritime order" (Yang, 2017: 3). Today, "the BRI adheres to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and sharing. It is not closed, but open and inclusive; it is not a solo by China, but a chorus of countries along the line. The construction of the BRI is not meant to replace the existing regional cooperation mechanisms and initiatives, but to facilitate the countries along the line

[9] Yang Shiqi et al.: *Ming Taizong shilu* [The Authentic Records of Emperor Taizong of the Ming Dynasty] (Vol. 183). Dingmao day of the twelfth month of the fourteenth year of the Yongle Reign, Taiwan Institute of Historical and Linguistic Research of "Academia Sinica," photocopied from the microfilmed proofread copy of the red lined manuscript of Beijing Library in 1962.

to achieve interconnection of development strategies and complementary advantages on the existing basis."[10] Countries joining the BRI respect each other and treat each other as equals, adhere to the partnership of "dialogues rather than confrontation, partnership rather than alliance," and take cultural exchanges and mutual learning as a bridge to enhance the friendship between people of all countries.

1.5.3 The BRI Is Not a Chinese-Style Globalization

Owing to the extensive influence of the Western discourse system, some capitalist countries tend to look at the BRI from competitive angles. In July 2017, Michael Clauss, German ambassador to China, said bluntly in an exclusive interview with *Finance Times Chinese*: "While we do support China's 'Belt and Road' initiative in principle, it sounds like a Chinese path to globalization."[11] So, is the BRI a "Chinese-style globalization"?

Globalization is initially the process of Europe-centered expansion of the capitalist mode of production to the whole world. In the middle and late twentieth century, various trends of globalization were depicted by the scholarship. Among them, Immanuel Wallerstein, an American scholar, puts forward the "world-system theory," which criticizes the Euro-centric view, and advocates a global view of history. He proposes that the world system be taken as an analytical unit of holism rather than an independent nation-state, and points out that the relationship between the central area and the peripheral area of the modern world structure lies in space-sharing. However, the premise of Wallerstein's hypothesis of the modern world system is to distinguish Western Europe from other regions by the capitalist mode of production and distinguish modernity from tradition, which is again manifested in the Euro-centric view of history (Wallerstein, 2011). The globalization led by Western countries is single-centered, which is problematic in many ways. This idea of globalization centered on the United States and Europe is now facing crisis. "Deglobalization" is becoming all the rage. Major events such as Brexit have posed unprecedented challenges to globalization.

The BRI proposed by China is not a Chinese-style globalization.

First, the BRI can be taken as a correction of the current Western-dominant globalization, in which Western countries exploit non-Western countries under the cloak of globalization, plunder their resources, and seize most of the global economic benefits. It is capitalist colonial expansion in essence. The notion of "deglobalization" shows that there are problems in Western-dominant globalization. The order of Western output is disintegrating, and the globalized society is undergoing great

[10] Xi Jinping: A keynote speech delivered at the opening ceremony of Boao Forum for Asia 2015. *People's Daily*, 29th March 2015, p. 1.

[11] Ke Muxian: *"Yidaiyilu" shi zhongguoshi quanqiuhua* [The Belt and Road Initiative is a Chinese-style globalization]. *Financial Times Chinese*, 3rd July 2017. http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001073197?full=y.

changes and adjustments. "China's opening up to the outside world is not a one-man show. It welcomes all countries to participate; it is not to seek spheres of influence, but to support the common development of all countries; it is not to build its own rear garden, but to build a garden of flowers shared by all countries."[12] The BRI put forward by China adheres to the principle of fairness and justice, and aims to eliminate the disadvantages of current globalization, to enable globalization to benefit more countries and regions, and to enable all countries in the world to catch the express of globalization.

Second, the BRI is the channel for China to integrate into globalization, rather than to start afresh. Globalization is an indisputable fact and China is an active participant in and major beneficiary from it. Meanwhile, China will become a firm supporter and an important builder in facilitating the progression of globalization. The BRI upholds the notion of open and inclusive globalization. It not only seeks for active participation of countries along the route such as Southeast Asia, South Asia, and West Asia, but also welcomes European countries and the United States to participate in this grand event. "The core connotation of China's initiative of jointly building the Belt and Road is to facilitate the construction of the infrastructure and connectivity of countries concerned, enhance the coordination of economic policies and the interconnection of development strategies among different countries, and facilitate coordinated and joint development so as to achieve common prosperity."[13] Through infrastructure construction, the BRI has achieved connectivity in such areas as policies, facilities, trade, financing, people, and minds. It is injecting a new and powerful catalyst for globalization and heralding a newer and brighter era.

Third, the BRI provides a Chinese solution for global governance. It embraces the Silk Road spirit, with "peaceful cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, mutual benefits, and win-win results" as the basic tenets, integrates it into the global governance system, creates a new mode of cooperation characterized by "extensive consultation, joint contribution, shared benefits," and builds a community with a shared future for mankind with mutual political trust, economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness. The world is so big and there are so many problems to be solved. How to implement global governance? Chinese President Xi Jinping advocates "working together to build a new partnership by win-win cooperation and building a community with a shared future for mankind,"[14] which has provided a

[12] Xi Jinping: A keynote speech at the 2016 opening ceremony of B20. *People's Daily*, 4th September 2016, p. 1.

[13] Xi Jinping: *Zhuazhu shijie jingji zhuanxing jiyu, mouqiu yatai gengda fazhan* [Grasp the opportunity of world economic transition, pursue greater advancement of the Asia Pacific area] (A keynote speech at the Summit meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). *People's Daily*, 11th November 2017, p. 2.

[14] Xi Jinping: *Xieshou goujian hezuo gongying xin huoban, tongxin dazao renlei mingyun gongtongti* (a speech during general debates at the UN Assembly) [Build new cooperative and win-win partnership and construct a community with a shared future for mankind with joint hands and of one heart]. *People's Daily*, 29th September 2015, p. 2.

Chinese blueprint for global governance. In February 2017, the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind was first written into the United Nations resolution[15] and included in the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council in November 2017.[16] This act reflects the support of the international community for China's initiative and highlights its important contributions to global governance. China is both an exponent and practitioner of the notion of a community with a shared future for mankind. The BRI and the concept of "building a community with a shared future for mankind" mutually reinforce each other. "Within the framework of international cooperation in the construction of the 'Belt and Road,' all countries adhere to the principles of mutual consultation, joint construction and sharing, work together to meet the challenges facing the world economy, create new opportunities for development, seek new incentive for development, expand new space for development, realize complementary advantages, mutual benefits, and win-win results, and continue to progress toward a community with a shared future for mankind."[17] The BRI has injected fresh Chinese impetus into global governance. China strives to build a new pattern of all-round opening up, to play an active role in global governance, to add more Chinese elements into the formulation of international rules, and to lead the development of the global governance system towards a more equitable and rational direction.

The BRI is a new concept, but it is embedded with profound cultural heritage. With the aid of the historical symbol of the "Silk Road," which is well known to countries along the route, it serves as an important emotional bond to expand international exchanges and cooperation. It expresses and spreads the ideal of a community with a shared future for mankind, and puts forward a Chinese blueprint for global governance. The BRI highlights the charm of Chinese traditional culture. It's hoped to fully tap into the historical and cultural resources, spread Chinese culture across the world, add more Chinese expressions and elements to the world discourse system, and enhance China's confidence in its own cultures.

Confidence stems from the depth of history. China boasts of a profound tradition of maritime culture. It is urgent to enhance research on Chinese maritime history, tap into the Chinese maritime historical and cultural resources, breed excellent cultural genes of its maritime civilization, and inherit the essence of its maritime culture. With the awakening of maritime awareness, in the international circle of history, maritime history is defined as the core discipline of future global history research (Heidbrink et al., 2016). More and more scholars recognize that "maritime history has become a 'prominent science' in history" (Xia, 2015), and hold that "through maritime history,

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[15] Editorial: "*Goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti*" *shouci xieru lianheguo jueyi* [The Initiative of "Building a community of shared future for mankind" is written into UN Resolutions. *People's Daily* (overseas edition), 13th February 2017, p. 1.

[16] Editorial: "*Goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti*" *shouci xieru lianheguo jueyi* [The Initiative of "Building a community of shared future for mankind" is written into UN Resolutions. *People's Daily*, 13th November 2017, p. 21.

[17] Xi Jinping: *Xi Jinping zai yidaiyilu guojihezuo gaofengluntan yuanzhuo fenghui shang de kaimuci* [An opening speech delivered at the Leaders Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation]. *Guangming Daily*, 16th May 2017, p. 3.

a cognitive framework of the world history can be constructed" (Kang, 2010). In recent years, China has put forward the initiatives of "building a major maritime country" and "the Belt and Road." China's maritime issues have aroused much concern, and studies of Chinese maritime history have also shifted from the periphery to the mainstream. The publication of "Special Studies on China's Maritime Civilization" in 2016 "marks that the study of Chinese history of maritime civilization has entered a new stage" (Fan, 2017: 573). In China's new journey of socialism, more talented historians are required to take an active part in promoting the theoretical and academic innovation in the discipline of history. First, we should integrate the existing academic resources worldwide, enhance mutual academic exchanges and cooperation, make full use of our complementary advantages, and strive to build a research team of Chinese maritime history with international influence. We should also do more empirical research in the previously weak field, explore more deeply into the disciplinary attributes and connotations of Chinese maritime history, and modify the system and structure of Chinese history. Second, we should accelerate theoretical innovation and develop China's own theoretical system of maritime history. Third, we should participate actively in high-level international academic conferences on maritime history, publish the latest research results in top international academic journals, publicize the theories and methods of Chinese maritime history among the international academic community, and enhance China's influence on the international academic stage.

However, to eliminate misunderstandings, China should do more than respond positively to the many doubts raised by the Western academia about the BRI. It needs also to demonstrate the rationality and innovation of the BRI, and enhance its theoretical research and construction of the discourse system. Meanwhile, we should give full play to the positive role of news and online media, enhance the publicity of the consensus and lead it onto the right track, spread the voice of China on the international stage, and let the world rediscover the BRI.

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Chapter 2
Maritime Development and Construction of Maritime Culture

2.1 Defining Ocean and Maritime Development in China

The question of how China should orient itself towards the sea has become a topic of public debate. The debate involves the understanding of the ocean, maritime economy, and maritime culture, reflecting the conflicts between different ideas and different ways of thinking. Therefore, it is necessary to begin by defining some ocean-related concepts so that an effective discussion may ensue.

2.1.1 The Concept of Humanistic Ocean

The ocean encompasses the natural and humanistic ocean. As the object of natural science research, the ocean is not just the sea surface that meets the eye, but also the geographic space and ecosystem that consist of ocean waters, islands, ocean subsoil, the surrounding coastal zones, and the airspace above. Moreover, the islands surrounded by sea water, the polar regions of the North and South Poles, the continental coastal zone where land and water meet, the atmosphere where air and sea meet, and the "community of life" within the ocean waters are all considered to be part of the ocean. The natural ocean is the basis of the land surface ecosystem and the environmental conditions for human subsistence and development. As the research object of humanities and social sciences, the ocean is the second space for human subsistence and development. It not only refers to the sea, but also includes the adjacent lands, and since modern times this concept has also incorporated the airspace above, forming a three-dimensional space. The ocean in the humanistic sense, i.e., the patterns of human behavior, production, lifestyle, and interaction based on the natural ocean, intersects with the land and the airspace. Its space is divided and owned by humans. Its value is redistributed and its properties are determined through human activities.

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The concept of maritime space for human activities includes marine areas and maritime countries. Marine area refers to the area where human beings explore and exploit the ocean directly or indirectly. Marine area is still an immaturely defined unit of regional analysis in social sciences. Different studies adopt different methods when defining maritime economic zones, maritime cultural zones, and marine military zones, but they have one thing in common, that is, their scope is not limited to the sea only, but includes the islands in the sea and the surrounding coastal zones as well. The coastal zone is the area where the sea and land meet. With the dual properties of land and sea, the economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the coastal zones are tied to, associated with, or ascribed to the sea, hence, an inseparable part of the sea. There is no uniform standard for dividing the land boundaries of marine areas, and generally when conducting comprehensive analysis, the factors of administrative divisions will be taken into due account. For example, the land portion of the contemporary U.S. maritime economic region refers to the coastal postal areas and administrative divisions (county boundaries) that extend from the coast or the Great Lakes to the land. In addition, a country's marine area is not limited to the coastal zones, islands, territorial seas, contiguous zones, continental shelves, and exclusive economic zones within its sovereign jurisdiction. It also extends to the outer seas, overseas countries, and regions covered by its maritime activities, forming a political, economic, and cultural network of internal and external interactions.

In contemporary Chinese marine statistics, "coastal zone" refers to the counties (cities and districts) with coastlines within the administrative divisions of the coastal provinces (cities and districts). The key parts, from history to reality, can be summarized into six words: "two bays," "two corners," and "two shores." The "two bays" refer to the Beibu Gulf and the Bohai Bay. The Beibu Gulf is bounded by Guangxi, western Guangdong, and the present-day coastal areas of Vietnam and Hainan Island. The Bohai Bay is enclosed by Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei province, Liaodong Peninsula, and Shandong Peninsula. The former is the starting point of the South China Sea route, and the latter is an important juncture of the sea route connecting ancient China with the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese islands. After the opening of the South China Sea offshore route, the Beibu Gulf was marginalized because it was not an international shipping route. The Bohai Gulf was adjacent to the developed agricultural areas of the Central Plains. The maritime activities of the civilians faced more oppressions as Chinese dynasties exerted a stronger political influence there. It was not until the modern days that the northern coastal regions started to see more development. In contemporary times, the "two bays" have shown the trend of rapid development with the establishment of the Beibu Gulf Economic Development Zone and the Tianjin Binhai New Area.

The "Two Corners" refer to the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta. The Pearl River Delta refers to the lower Pearl River Delta area, centered in Guangzhou. This area has been the leader of China's maritime development since it replaced Xuwen and Hepu as the transportation center of the South China Sea; the Yangtze River Delta refers to the lower Yangtze River Delta area, centered in Shanghai, which saw its rise in modern times. Nowadays, the Pearl River Delta has further integrated economically with Hong Kong and Macao. The Yangtze River Delta has

also accelerated its regional economic integration, making it the most developed region in China's maritime development and the hub of China's economy.

The "two sides" refer to both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The Taiwan Straits is a channel which connects the North and South China Sea. Quanzhou, with a large number of foreign merchants, became the first major port in the East in the Southern Song and Yuan dynasties. In the late Ming dynasty, the central government allowed merchants to trade abroad from Yuegang port (in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province), and Chinese sea merchants, mainly Hokkien (Minnan) people, took control of the trade network in East and Southeast Asia, and extended the Minnan economic zone to Taiwan Island. During the Qing dynasty, Taiwan became a part of Fujian. Now, although the two sides of the Taiwan Straits are still not reunified and currently cannot join forces to strive towards the ocean, the "Economic Zone on the West Coast of the Strait" is under construction. With the coastal zone of Fujian as the leader, this will lay foundation for the construction of the Strait Economic Zone in the future. Since the reform and opening up, the Chinese government has set up many special economic zones, open coastal port cities, economic and technological development zones, international trade and shipping centers, bonded zones, and Taiwan investment zones to develop the export-oriented economy. On the strength of its seafront location, China could tap into its marine resources and space for production activities, resulting in the landward transfer and spread of the capital, talents, technology, commodities, ideas, and notions from the coast. These have played a vital role in the transformation of China's socioeconomic structure and fueled the rise of the central and western regions. The strong consciousness and practice of reform and opening up have made these formerly marginalized areas located at the edge of the continent look toward the ocean for development and become an integral part of it.

However, there has been no discussion among China's social science community on how large the land portion is in its marine region. Few studies have consciously used the "coastal zone" as a boundary, mostly referring to coastal areas, including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and provincial administrative divisions along the coast, which tend to be too general in scope. Some scholars have suggested that China's marine areas include coastal zones and islands, but argued that despite the large population living in the coastal areas, they should be considered as marginal areas of the mainland rather than part of the ocean. In addition, the current demarcation of China's administrative or economic regions does not take into account the ocean within China's sovereignty and jurisdiction; the analysis of ocean regions remains theoretical, without corresponding zoning plans, so in actual practice the management still leaves something to be desired. The regional concept of the "New East" has been proposed but not much discussed.

Linked to the marine areas is the concept of maritime States. Generally speaking, States with maritime zones and with policies and practices that steer their efforts towards the sea are maritime States. Island and archipelagic States may be maritime States, and coastal States with land and sea may be both landlocked and maritime States. The maritime States status depends on whether or not they take the sea as the space for their historical existence. As for the choice of national development path, be it land oriented or ocean oriented, or both, it is a dynamic historical process.

Different national conditions would entail specific historical analysis rather than a broad generalization. For example, in the sixteenth century, when Britain was still a sheep herding nation, the island was regarded as a piece of land surrounded by the sea and separated from the mainland. This sense of isolation was essentially derived from the continental point of view. But when the British turned towards the sea and metamorphosized into the daughter of the sea, the island was then viewed as part of the sea rather than a lonely part of the continent out on the sea (Schmitt, 1942, cited from Lin & Zhou, 2006).

Some people claim that China has never been a maritime nation. This is a misinterpretation of the concept of nationhood in Chinese history. The concept of China as a sovereign nation-state was formed in modern times. In ancient times, there were many kingdoms in coastal areas, such as Wu, Yue, Yan, and Qi in the pre-Qin period, Nan Yue, Dongou, and Min Yue in the Qin and Han dynasties, Dong Wu and Liaodong in the Three Kingdoms period, and Min and Southern Han in the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period, all of which were built on the strength of their seafront locations and, like the coastal city-states of ancient Greece, they had policies and practices that supported and encouraged development towards the sea. Therefore, they could be considered as "maritime States." After the coastal areas were incorporated into the dynastic system, and with the succession of the unified dynasties, history witnessed China's coastal territories waxing and waning, its maritime policies tightening and slacking, and its local maritime developments rising and falling. The historical continuity secured China's niche in the Asian maritime world. Much akin to ancient Persia and India, largely land based, but also with due attention to their seas, China had been both a continental and a maritime country.

As the Southern Song dynasty settled for its control in the southeast of China, its sea-oriented economy became evident. The Ming dynasty was caught between the threats of the barbarian hordes in the north and the Japanese pirates in the south, and the arrival of the Western maritime forces only worsened its political security anxiety. After the Opium War between China and Britain in Daoguang's reign in the Qing dynasty, the threats mainly came from the direction of the ocean, and Qing government was faced with a geopolitical dilemma between land and sea. Therefore, it is obviously inappropriate to impose the modern Western discourse of maritime power or the modern concept of State in international relations on ancient China. In modern times, China's interests of sovereignty, security, and development in the sea highly overlapped with that of the coastal zones, such as the direction and legal issues of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, the joint development of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea, the Taiwan question, the Diaoyu Islands and the islands in the South China Sea, the historical rights to traditional fishing grounds, and the safety of marine transportation. The exploration and exploitation of the sea, the development of maritime economy, and the defense for the ocean-related rights and interests are not only regional issues, but also global issues. China has proposed the strategy of strengthening the national strength with the ocean, acceded to the *UNCLOS*, and assumed the rights and obligations of a maritime State. This should endow China with the distinctive features of a maritime country.

It can be seen that the kind of "ocean theory" which separates the ocean space and land space and views them dichotomously does not align with the modern concept of the ocean, nor can it correctly solve the ocean-related problems that humans are confronted with. Specifically, to say that the ocean is the second space for human subsistence and development doesn't mean that the ocean will replace the land in this regard, but that the role of the ocean for the sustainable development of human society becomes increasingly important, and the hope of human civilization lies in the ocean. The land is where human beings start their ventures to the ocean and build the corresponding social support systems and where the fruits of the maritime development are garnered. Therefore, only when land and sea are developed concertedly can the development of humankind be sustainable.

2.1.2 The Contemporary Concept of Maritime Development

Contemporary maritime development issues are mainly about the construction of maritime economy, maritime politics (including military), maritime culture, and maritime society. Maritime economy and maritime culture are the foundation and top priority of construction.

Maritime culture is also a semantically divergent concept. It generally connotes the spiritual and cultural pursuit of human beings towards the ocean, but in a broader sense, it extends to the material and institutional cultures created by human beings through maritime development. People tend to take its broad sense, defining maritime culture as the aggregation of material and spiritual wealth created as a result of maritime activities. The definition is extended from land to ocean with its emphasis on the commonality of culture through a broader perspective rather than the angle that regards the concept as an abstract deduction from the evolution of maritime culture itself, and fails to see its specificity. We are now discussing maritime culture in the context of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which proposed to "promote the development and prosperity of socialist culture," with the aim of ramping up cultural construction to better meet people's spiritual needs, enrich their spiritual world, strengthen their spiritual power, promote all-round human development, so much so that the role of maritime spiritual culture could come to the foreground. From the spiritual culture level, maritime culture mainly refers to maritime values, maritime consciousness, maritime mindset, maritime mentality, maritime literature and art, maritime beliefs, maritime folklore, and so on. As for marine science and technology, they are the creative achievements of material culture and the first productive force to promote the development of maritime economy, which can be discussed in the scope of economic construction. Maritime education, which is a social issue, can be subsumed into the study of social construction.

The origin of maritime culture is as old as agrarian culture and nomadic culture, and it has developed from low to high levels. The general trend of the evolution goes like this: After the history, by virtue of its breadth and depth, has gradually faded its closed, conservative and backward elements, its essence and excellence are

absorbed by the nations or States; it then crosses the boundaries between land and sea, emerges as the national and even international culture, and contributes immensely to the development of human spiritual civilization. The value of maritime culture lies in its influence on a nation's notion of the outside world. To develop maritime culture means to make more contacts with other peoples, and on this basis to absorb advanced overseas experience, swim with the tide of the world, and seize opportunities for development. The advanced contemporary maritime culture is developed through reflections and corrections of the defects and shortcomings of traditional and modern maritime culture, and through the efforts to overcome the opposition between scientism and humanism. The sublimation of maritime values is ecological civilization; the sublimation of marine consciousness is the harmonious and scientific development of man and the ocean; and the sublimation of maritime spirit is exploration, openness, communication, tolerance, and participation in world development. All these are applicable to all areas of human development, so some scholars abroad have expanded the interpretation of maritime culture, using "the ocean" to denote the "open society," the "earth society," and even the "virtual world."

Maritime economy and maritime culture interact closely with each other. Maritime economy is the starting point of maritime culture. Primitive fishing and drifting were the starting point of human maritime life, which whipped up human curiosity and exploration of the mysterious sea, hence the emergence of maritime myths and maritime beliefs. The development of maritime economy has promoted the transformation of maritime culture, and maritime commerce has become the medium to connect all continents in the age of navigation, which has changed the general mentality of human beings; modern marine resources exploitation has bred the cultural concept of the ocean as the second space for human subsistence and development. The progress of marine science and technology as the first productive force has changed the basis of subsistence of maritime economy and society, and fundamentally influenced maritime culture, which is the endogenous factor of maritime economic development. Maritime values determine the behavior of human beings when they face the ocean, go to the ocean, exploit the ocean, develop the ocean, and protect the ocean, and the maritime way of thinking guides the direction of maritime economic development, avoiding indiscriminate fishing after the model of the land-based development and the recurrence of the problems that used to happen on the land. Maritime culture provides external environmental conditions for the operation of maritime economy. The social atmosphere of maritime culture brings added values such as brands, symbols, and trends to sea products; maritime culture spreads maritime economic information and shapes the concept of consumption, which is conducive to cultivating the market of related maritime industries. The rise of maritime culture industry is the new trend of contemporary maritime development.

2.1.3 China's Maritime Economy and Maritime Culture

China's maritime economy and maritime culture have long been restricted at the regional and civil level, and without the summarization and promotion from the elites, it has remained in a marginal position in traditional scholarship, resulting in the neglect of the sea in the minds of the citizens and the general lack of concern for the ocean among the inland people. When the notion of maritime power was first introduced into China from the West, the Chinese people felt indignant at the loss of maritime power and the opening of the country's gates by force. They adopted a critical attitude toward the tradition, did not and could not think calmly about China's maritime economy and maritime culture in history, which also resulted in the indifference of the modern social science community to the ocean. In some sense, the study of maritime economy and maritime culture is a subject that has been activated by the reform and opening up in the past 30 years.

The study of China's maritime economy involves the communities of economics, oceanography, and history, each with their different focuses.

When historians discuss the history of China's maritime economy, the major concerns are the history of coastal regional economy, the history of China-foreign relations, the history of overseas trade, the history of seaports, the history of shipbuilding, the history of shipping, and the history of migration. The major focus is to investigate the historical changes of the maritime commercial economy, such as the vicissitudes of the ports in Guangzhou, Quanzhou, Ningbo, etc., the production and distribution of ceramics, silk, tea, etc., during the era of the "Maritime Silk Road," the commercial competition between Chinese maritime merchants in the East Asian seas during the period of Zheng He's seven voyages to the Western seas and that of Zheng Chenggong, modern shipping merchants, shipping enterprises and marine shipping, overseas Chinese and modern enterprises in overseas countries, etc. They also look into the role of the ocean-induced "commercial revolution" in China's transition from traditional to modern times, as well as the historical relationship with the export-oriented economy of the modern coastal zone. The comprehensive and holistic study of the sea is still in its infancy and remains peripheral in the study of history.

Economists and oceanographers are concerned with practical issues, namely the exploration and exploitation of marine resources, port resources, island resources, coastal tourism resources, the structure and layout of maritime industries, the division of maritime economic zones, marine environmental protection, and the sustainable development of maritime economy. Most scholars have positioned maritime economy as marine resource economy, maritime industry economy, or maritime regional economy, rather than an integrated economic system. Theoretical studies are lacking, especially in terms of the maritime commercial economy (domestic and international maritime trade, maritime migration economy, overseas labor, etc.), which, though existent in reality, is however excluded. This leads to the loss of continuity between these studies and the historical maritime economy, which may not only negatively affect a long-term comparative analysis on it but also downplay the

role and contribution of maritime economy in the contemporary social economy. As China's modern maritime economy is coexistent with new maritime industries and traditional maritime industries and the new maritime industries are simple aggregates, some scholars subsume maritime economics within agricultural economics in its broad sense, which is not conceptually and theoretically distinguished from the sectoral economics characteristic of land-based thinking. As some scholars point out, the categorization of maritime economy is not just an issue of perception in maritime economics; more importantly, it is also an issue of ideology or superstructure. Classifying maritime economy as a sectoral economy ignores the intrinsic relevance and complexity of maritime economy. And this bias of theoretical research will hinder the sublimation of practical work in the future when maritime economy is further developed (He, 2002).

The study of Chinese maritime culture encompasses such fields as literature and art, history, folklore, and religion, but none of them has yet risen to the level of thematic areas, and there is no communication and dialogue of any kind between different disciplines of Chinese maritime culture studies. In the 1980s, there arose a "maritime culture fever" among the local government officials in coastal areas and literary and historical scholars, whose enthusiastic involvement in it was simply remarkable. In the twenty-first century, maritime culture research institutes have been established in many ocean universities, maritime culture research associations have been set up in coastal provinces, and various ocean-related festivals and forums have been organized, with a view to carrying forward the construction of maritime culture and maritime culture research to a deeper extent. Thanks to the scholars' contribution to the study of maritime culture in China, a good amount of resources have been uncovered, a host of intangible maritime cultural heritages sorted out and preserved, and a knowledge base hence provided for the inheritance and promotion of maritime culture. However, no breakthrough has yet been made in the theoretical study of maritime culture or in the excavation and extraction of the essence and characteristics of Chinese maritime culture.

In terms of theoretical research on maritime culture, most analyses on the definition, connotation, denotation, essence, characteristics, research objects, and operating rules of maritime culture strike one as long on generalities about culture in its broad sense and extremely short on the study of the maritime culture as a subdiscipline of culture. For example, the history of maritime culture as a branch of cultural studies should have the standard and structure of an independent discipline, but some researchers either equate the history of maritime culture with the history of oceanography, marine science and technology, maritime economic history and overseas transportation, or simply take it as an offshoot of these disciplines. In terms of research methods, although the integration of multiple disciplines is emphasized, the specific research results are still not integrated, and it is difficult to find out the intersection points. In the absence of a global understanding of world maritime culture and the absence of a comprehensive study, we can only give an overview on the existing literature. Or, following the Western framework of splitting the world into the Occidental and Oriental worlds, maritime culture is divided into two systems: Occidental maritime culture and Oriental maritime culture, where Chinese maritime culture is

positioned as typical of the Oriental maritime culture; or, in opposition to Eurocentrism, the world's maritime culture is subcategorized into five systems: South Pacific maritime culture, ancient Mediterranean maritime culture, ancient northern Indian maritime culture, North Atlantic maritime culture, and Chinese maritime culture. Chinese maritime culture is taken as one of the independent systems, or from China-centric point of view, China (Fujian) is taken as the cradle of the world's maritime civilization. However, these views are not accepted by the mainstream scholarship, and Chinese maritime culture is still neglected in the discussions about the origin and formation of Chinese civilization and the modernization of China.

In the study of Chinese maritime culture, some important issues in history have been touched upon, and views differ widely, such as in the origin and development of Chinese maritime culture. It is generally believed that the ancient Dongyi and Baiyue, who lived in the coastal areas, were maritime peoples. "China's maritime culture, which sprouted in the Neolithic period, was represented by the Hemudu culture on the coast of Zhejiang and the Longshan culture on the shores of the Yellow Sea, the former was inherited by the Dongyi and the latter Baiyue" (Xu, 1999: 42). "Chinese maritime culture was jointly created and developed by the ancestors of the Dongyi tribe on the Shandong Peninsula and the ancestors of the Baiyue tribe on the southeast coast." Among the major sources for the origin and formation of Chinese maritime civilization are such as the Hemudu culture of Zhejiang Province, the culture of the Miaodao Islands in the Bohai Sea, one of the Dongyi group in the Qingdao area around Jiaozhou Bay, and even in the Shandong Peninsula (Li, 2005). There is also an argument that "the maritime element in the Neolithic cultures of the southeast coast seems to be more distinct than in the cultures of the same period in Shandong and the lower reaches of the Yangtze River" (Li, 1990: 15–16). As for where exactly Chinese maritime culture originated, the answer varies from Lingnan, Fujian, Zhejiang to the Yellow Sea area. The formation of the Han people has gone through a process from confrontation to integration between the eastern maritime people and the western agricultural people (Yi and Xia) and between the north and south maritime group and the agricultural group (Yue and Han). Did it cause a disruption in the maritime culture after the Han people became the majority ethnic group in the coastal area? One opinion is that maritime cultures of the Dongyi and Baiyue had been assimilated by the agrarian culture; therefore, the maritime development in the coastal areas was an extension of agriculture and was essentially a maritime agrarian culture. Another opinion holds that maritime culture of the Han people owed its origin to the eastward transmission of the Arab-Persian maritime culture from West Asia, and was characterized by the development of maritime trade. Still, another opinion is that maritime cultures of the Dongyi and Baiyue were continued following their incorporation into the social culture and folk culture of the coastal areas, and with the continuous maritime activities such as shipbuilding, seafaring trade and migrations, an economic and cultural circle took shape along the coast of China, giving rise to a small tradition of its own in the maritime contact with foreign cultures. The agricultural population constituted the bulk of the Han Chinese, but this did not make them intolerant of some of the Han people in coastal areas who adopted an amphibious lifestyle in order to adapt to the marine environment.

Zheng He's voyages raised the curtain on the Great Age of Navigation and was a concentrated demonstration of traditional Chinese maritime culture. However, Zheng He's voyages eventually stopped and did not leave significant impact on the course of world history. One view puts it down to the loss of vitality of maritime culture development as a result of the suppression from political power representing the mentality of the land-based development; another view is that Zheng He's voyages did not support the overseas trade of the people; on the contrary, he suppressed Chinese emigrating overseas, which was in itself a counteraction to the overseas exploration of the Chinese people during the Song and Yuan dynasties (Zhuang, 2005). Still another view claims that China had no maritime culture, and Zheng He's voyages were short of institutional support, lasting economic power and the support of maritime civilization (Ye, 2007: 252–253). Did the Chinese maritime culture fall apart after Zheng He? Did it degenerate from a world maritime culture to a regional maritime culture in East Asia? Or did it struggle to connect with the maritime world and transform into modern times due to the rise of private maritime trade and overseas migration? Was there an endogenous factor behind China's return to the sea after the Opium War? There are many different views on all of the above questions. So far little attention has been paid to issues like the origin and development of China's maritime spiritual culture, and few all-around in-depth discussions have been held with regard to ancient maritime myths and legends, beliefs in sea gods like "Xu Fu culture" and "Mazu culture."

There is also a multiplicity of perspectives on the study of the characteristics of Chinese maritime culture. Some people draw conclusions from the perspective of marine agriculture, believing that ancient Chinese was characterized by "farming the sea as fields," with marine fishing and aquaculture as the basic features (Song, 1995). Some people summarize it from the angle of regional culture, which mainly refers to the culture of the southeastern coastal area including China's Taiwan and Hong Kong, Australia, and many other overseas areas populated by Chinese. These perceptions are one-sided. In fact, after the Song dynasty, marine fisheries and aquaculture were not the principal means of livelihood. The ancient term "farming the sea as fields" refers broadly to various means of marine livelihood using boats as production tools, and is synonymous with "living off the sea" and "depending on the sea for business." "The sea as the field" or "the boat as the field" involves shipbuilding, salt production, shipping, maritime trade, smuggling of prohibited goods, fishing, mariculture, as well as piracy (Yu, 2004). Chinese maritime culture, though with its regional characteristics, is also a social culture and part of the Chinese national culture. Chinese maritime culture has remained at the level of folk culture, and in most cases, its main body is the maritime activity group, which contains a lot of "local knowledge." It is a system riddled with internal contradictions and ambiguities. It plays its role mainly through the collective consciousness.

As can be seen from above, it is worthwhile to explore in depth how to make a realistic evaluation of China's maritime economy and maritime culture. In the construction of contemporary maritime economy and maritime culture, we need to delve deeper and come up with an authoritative discourse in order to strengthen China's voice in this regard.

2.1.4 The Development of Fujian and the Ocean

Historically, the ocean had a lot to do with the development of Fujian. Nestled between the mountains and the sea, Fujian was seen as a land with little promise as it was cut off from the inland by layers of geographic barriers. Coastal ancestors lived by the sea, and they believed that one's life was "three-tenth of destiny, seven-tenth of hard work." They faced the music, braved the odds, and through successive efforts carved out a new world on the sea. They made Taiwan and the South Seas as their "hinterland," and went further towards the ocean. The coastal areas of southeast Fujian became vibrant economically and socially, and boosted the economic and social development of the mountainous areas in northwest Fujian. Retreating from the ocean brought great harm to the development of Fujian. The radiation of Fujian's maritime culture to Taiwan, Hainan, and other islands and the coast around the China Sea was crucial to the formation of the Chinese maritime culture circle, and even today it still sustains its vitality and influence. The world-renowned figures from Fujian, such as Zheng Chenggong, Lin Zexu, Yan Fu, Chen Jiageng, Gu Hongming, and Lin Yutang, are all related to Fujian's maritime culture. An in-depth study of Fujian's maritime culture is of great significance to the construction of a large maritime economy and the promotion of Chinese maritime culture.

The study of Fujian's maritime culture began in the 1920s and revived in the 1980s and 1990s, mainly from the perspectives of archaeology (Tanshi Mountain site, the ancient city of Dongye, ancient coastal shipwrecks, etc.), history (history of overseas transportation, history of China-foreign relations, history of maritime economy, history of Fujian-Taiwan relations, history of overseas Chinese, history of Fujian-Vietnamese ethnic group, history of Fujian state, and studies of Li Zhi, Zheng Chenggong, Shi Lang, Lin Zexu, Yan Fu, Shen Baozhen, etc.), language and literature (Minnan [Southeast Fujian] dialect, Fujian and Taiwan literature, Southeast Asian Chinese literature, etc.), music and art (Nanyin, Liyuan opera, Gaojia opera, Puxian opera, tea art, architectural styles, etc.), economy (maritime economy, special zone studies, etc.), local culture (Southern Fujian culture, Hakka culture, Puxian culture, Fuzhou culture, Min-Yue culture, etc.), religious beliefs (Fujian-Taiwanese Buddhism, Taoism, Manichaeism, Islam, Catholicism, etc.), folk beliefs such as Mazu, Wu Zhenren, and Lady Lin Shui), and folklore (Minnan folklore, overseas Chinese folklore, fishermen's boat-dwelling, etc.). Considerable achievements have been made in these fields. However, it cannot be denied that many studies are discrete and lacking in overall and comprehensive research. Now we are here to hold the first Fujian Ocean Culture Symposium. This is to stand on a new historical starting point to redesign and deepen the research on Fujian's maritime culture.

First of all, to avoid broad and empty talks on Fujian's maritime culture, it seems necessary to extract a couple of thematic areas to bring everyone together to discuss about it given the actual situation of Fujian's marine regions. Hopefully, some researchers will take up the arduous tasks of reviewing and categorizing the academic history of previous research results so as to look for controversial issues, list out different academic views and arguments, from which we can select the topics

of academic value and practical significance and to produce high-level papers. For example, what is Fujian maritime culture? What is the relationship between Fujian maritime culture and other regional cultures such as Minnan (south Fujian) culture? Is there any relationship between the weakness of Fujian's maritime culture and the fact that it has never led to major social changes although maritime development has historically contributed to the economic growth and social progress in Fujian's coastal areas?

Second, Fujian maritime culture is an integral part of Chinese maritime culture. The studies focused exclusively on the former often lead scholars to believe that the maritime cultural phenomena of Fujian have its own unique origin and development, hence intentionally or unintentionally elevating its status. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the connections and exchanges with maritime culture research associations in coastal provinces and cities, and to cross the provincial boundaries to explore the Chinese maritime culture through joint efforts. What are the correlations and differences between Fujian's maritime culture and that of other provinces? What is the position of each in Chinese maritime culture? Which parts of maritime culture originated in Fujian have been upgraded to the national level? By answering these questions, we must first dig out some solid arguments before we could achieve any progress in the comparative study.

Third, more research efforts should be dedicated to summarizing the achievements of contemporary Fujian maritime culture, such as the new experience of "Fuzhou on the Sea," which will propel the construction of modern maritime culture in Fujian and conduce to the construction of the economic zone on the west coast of the Taiwan Straits.

2.2 Maritime Culture Studies and Maritime Culture Construction

The burgeoning and blossoming of Chinese maritime industry inevitably calls for the construction and promotion of maritime culture, which is also a key part of the construction effort of Chinese socialist culture. However, maritime culture has neither grown into a specialized area of study among Chinese scholarship nor appealed to Chinese people as a hot issue. Therefore, it is still a glorious and arduous task to build and promote it.

2.2.1 The Status Quo of Research on Chinese Maritime Culture

In China today, the discussions around the topics pertaining to maritime culture, which are confined to the coastal intelligentsia, the sphere of media, and maritime

circles, are divided in opinions and lacking in rationality. As for what maritime culture is, interpretations may vary and there is still no agreed definition about it. Some argue from a broader perspective: Maritime culture revolves around the sea from which it has acquired its spiritual, behavioral, material, and cultural connotations; or maritime culture is a kind of cultural form whereby mankind conquers and lives off the sea; it encompasses all ocean-related human activities and mainly covers three aspects, i.e., maritime economy, maritime society, and maritime culture in a more restrictive sense. Some view it from a narrower angle, asserting that maritime culture emerges from maritime activities as a kind of spiritual creation, including intellectual, moral, national, educational, and artistic achievements. Some would analyze it as a type of culture, believing that maritime culture is a cultural entity as contrasted with continental culture; the former is commercial whereas the latter is agrarian. The former is also said to be a water culture whereas the latter is classified as a mountain culture. Still some claim it to be a kind of regional culture; it is coastal and offshore whereas the continental culture is landlocked. The scope of the research on maritime culture as well as its attributes as a field of study may vary as per how it is defined. Therefore, if seen in broad terms, it is multidisciplinary, straddling philosophy, society, nature, and technology; in an intermediate sense, it is part of the theoretical foundation of social science; in a narrow one, it is an offshoot of culturology.

There is no consensus on the definition of maritime culture, which is all too common as it has been approached from different perspectives. But much discussion with little agreement often signifies paucity of in-depth research in this area. In particular, it is perhaps not wrong to use maritime culture to encompass all the past knowledge, specific and general, about ocean, running the gamut from natural science and technology to social studies. However, this all-encompassing structure is merely an ideal mode, which is largely infeasible in actual practice and virtually nil even in those developed maritime powers with rich maritime legacy. The characteristics of maritime culture entail the discussion of its traits and essence. Most of the previous discussions just scratch the surface. Some people find it open, expansive, and inclusive, some find it open, ambitious, generous, and courageous, still some find it outgoing, open-minded, risk-taking, pro-commercial, and multi-cultural. *An Introduction to Maritime culture* by Qu (1999) summarizes the characteristics in six aspects: intrinsic sea-relatedness; intercultural correlations and interactions; pro-commercial and profit-driven values; historical openness and expansiveness; democracy and legality regarding social behavior and political morphology; aesthetic naturalness and sublimity. While these descriptions do make some sense here, they could neither be justified nor substantiated by evidence. Common sense indicates that these complimentary words may gloss over the negative aspects of maritime culture in the least; they fail to uncover the whole picture of it.

When it comes to how to interpret Chinese maritime culture, opinions differ even more widely. There are those who deny the existence of maritime culture in China. They think that maritime culture is an advanced form of civilization created by the West, while China only has loess culture. Although no one openly supported this view in domestic forums on maritime culture, they took it to task, more often than not, out

of patriotic passion or their political stance rather than based on their insights into the historical facts. The angles by which Chinese maritime culture is approached and the ways in which they are presented also vary. Typical views are listed as follows:

(1) Ancient Chinese maritime culture is a kind of marine agriculture whereas Western maritime culture is mercantile by nature, both of which are the basic models of the world maritime culture. As for the question "why on earth is 'marine agriculture' called a maritime culture rather than an agricultural culture," there are hitherto no convincing arguments regarding it. The old saying "farming the sea as crop fields" (Yu, 2004) is merely a metaphor that ancient farmers used to liken farming to such maritime activities as fishing, shipping, and trade; therefore, it is a misreading and an unreliable conclusion to incorporate coastal aquaculture into the basic definition of maritime culture. By the same token, it is just a conceptualized and stylized reasoning within the stereotyped narrative framework of East-West differences to regard both Chinese and Western maritime cultures as the basic models of the world maritime culture.
(2) Chinese maritime culture is a regional culture, which mainly refers to the special culture at the southeast coast of China, and in the meantime does not exclude the culture of those living in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, as well as multiple Chinese diasporas. However, as a kind of regional culture, maritime culture exists in the maritime zone including coastal areas, islands, and seas. It is not limited to the southeast coastal areas, but goes beyond the current provincial and national boundaries, forming a maritime culture circle with neighboring countries. The seas surrounding China can be hailed as the "Asian Mediterranean," where relevant parties are each other's travel destinations and peripheral areas. It is therefore inappropriate to restrict China's maritime culture to a certain area. Some scholars go so far as to select materials to their advantage and even label a certain region (such as Lingnan or Fujian) as the cradle of Chinese maritime culture or claim that some place (e.g., Canton, Quanzhou, or Ningbo) is the starting point of the Maritime Silk Road (hereinafter called MSR). This behavior simply fails to meet the rigorous standard of academic research.

In a word, the extant research findings about Chinese maritime culture would not suffice to facilitate dialogues with the developed maritime countries on equal footing, or to forcefully challenge the hegemonic discourse over maritime culture held in the hands of the predominant capitalist powers.

2.2.2 The Historical Contents of Chinese Maritime Culture

Maritime culture is a global cultural phenomenon. Viewed from the social progress of mankind, the development, be it on land or at sea, was an effort to carve out more living space. Continental culture and maritime culture originated almost at the same time and developed independently over a long period of history, making them, as it were, two subsystems. Both subsystems, as a unity of opposites in the history of

social development, may come off as insular, exclusive, and conservative on the one hand, and strike as open, inclusive, and innovative, on the other hand. The interactions between the two testify to the role of mankind in the course of world development.

According to Bagby (1959), culture is a factor that recurs in a pattern in history. Then, what exactly is this recurring factor? As for this question, to my knowledge, there isn't yet any notable answer from specialized studies. Culture, in its broad sense, may unfold in three dimensions: material, institutional, and spiritual. I hereby approach it only from the spiritual dimension, which mainly includes the following major factors:

(1) Maritime values. Maritime values, as mankind's knowledge of the ocean, will shape such human activities as looking out to the sea, engaging with the sea, exploring and exploiting the sea. The goal of getting to know the sea is to find out its values and significance for human subsistence, and to propel social development. Initially, mankind discovered the economic values of the ocean through fishing, the transportation values from navigation, so much so that this day has seen a multi-dimensional development, exploitation, and protection of the ocean in terms of its spacial, material, political, safety, consumptive, biological, and aesthetic values.

(2) Maritime way of thinking. The nature of the maritime living space is fluid, which determines the mobility of the production and life of the seafaring people, who, as a result, would manage the world from the standpoint of the ocean rather than the land (Schmitt cited from Lin & Zhou, 2006), and hence form their ocean-centered worldview, i.e., the land is defined by the ocean, and the ocean is the mode in which the world exists. From the traditional maritime age to the Age of Exploration, mankind expanded their living space both on land and at sea. The leap from rafting trips to oceangoing voyages allowed people to communicate across oceans. As Braudel (1949) pointed out, in the beginning, for a long time, man had not conquered the Mediterranean. Then ships gradually gained mastery over this body of water, strengthened their mutual links, and gradually established the Mediterranean as a whole to bring man and history closely together. Mankind, in this process, enhanced their perception of the ocean, and the maritime way of thinking can be taken to mean openness, communication, and freedom.

(3) Maritime character. The differences between land and ocean in terms of production and lifestyle are the makings of maritime character. The shipboard people made up the bulk of the maritime society. The mobility and uncertainty of maritime life honed their flexibility to tackle crises, their courage to take risks, their nonconformity, their passion for competition, their inclination to cherish opportunity, and honor good Samaritans and esprit de corps against odds. Likewise, the frequency and diversity of their interactions with the outside world forged their gravitation towards openness, freedom, and their receptiveness to new ideas and changes. These worthy qualities born out of survival instinct were then shared by the collective, emulated, and inherited by people, sublimated

into the spiritual power of shipboard society, and seeped into the production and lifestyle of all maritime communities.

There are commonalities between Chinese traditional maritime culture and Western ones, both of which had their origin in the coast and bay areas where land and water met. They all started from fishing and rafting, developed their maritime economies, and maintained contacts with outsiders by means of navigation as a major form of culture.

China has a rich history in its traditional marine fishery culture. By the Ming and Qing dynasties, the development of traditional fishing grounds had reached maturity in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, forming the concept of marine boundaries, fishing time limits and rules, and creating such rituals as the opening ceremony of fishery. As for the old practice of following the natural law of the ocean and not overfishing to drain the supply of fish, it is essentially reflective of the primitive environmental awareness.

Traditional Chinese nautical culture was second to none worldwide. As early as 7000 years ago, canoes were used to drift from island to island. Sailboats were built around 3000 years ago. About 2000 years ago, the compass and the water-tight bulkhead had been applied in navigation, and the giant ships of China sailed from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea and the coast of East Africa, outrivaling Persian and Arabian ships in global shipping business. About 600 years ago, Admiral Zheng He's voyages to the Western Seas were unequaled in scale and technology. In the age of sail, China's status as a major maritime country in the world had never been shaken. Mazu is called the "guardian goddess of seafarers," and Mazu culture, viewed as the epitome of Chinese nautical culture, has become a global cultural phenomenon and spread to the places at home and abroad accessible to ships.

Maritime trade, on the strength of the highly developed maritime culture, had become the backbone of maritime economy in the Song and Yuan dynasties, and had played a dominant role in the international trade between the China Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Ming dynasty retreated from the sea, and pushed for sea ban, which was partially lifted in 1567, allowing the people of Zhangzhou and Quanzhou to depart from Yuegang port for the Western and Eastern seas to rake in profits; the ban was also lifted in Canton where trade fairs were held to attract merchants from across the world and Cantonese were allowed to go overseas to trade, hence feeding the boom of the private trade. The spinoff of maritime commerce was overseas emigration, making Hokkien and Canton the largest ancestral homes of the Chinese diaspora. At the dawn of the Qing dynasty, Zheng Chenggong, a pro-Ming general held sway at the sea, implementing the policy of "enriching the country by connecting the oceans" and remained at the helm of the East-West trade. While the Qing court recoiled from the ocean, the private maritime trade was still in the ascendant and became predominant in the East Asian Seas Region east of Malacca. The realization that one must put to sea to strike it rich prevailed among the Chinese in the trading port areas along the southeast coast.

Maritime military power is a form of manifestation of the traditional Chinese maritime culture. As early as the Spring and Autumn Period, the naval warfare was a supplement to the land warfare. The Yuan dynasty's invasion expeditions to Japan, Champa, and Java indicated the drive to seek supremacy at sea. In the early Qing dynasty, as a commander of a navy of up to 20 military settlements and a fleet of 5000 warships strong of varied sizes, Zheng Chenggong exercised strict control over the China Sea, enforced sea bans for several times, imposed economic sanctions on the Spanish colonists in Manila and the Dutch colonists in Taiwan, and eventually expelled the latter out of Taiwan in an expedition across the Taiwan Straits in 1661.

However, as the traditional agrarian way of existence and life was the order of the day, it deeply influenced how the people of that time thought and acted. Chinese dynasties tended to focus inwards, put agriculture first, and see the offshore ventures as merely an additional effort to showcase the culture par excellence and sustain the supremacy of the reigning houses, hence maritime economy was often belittled, delimited, and even banned, and those engaged in maritime activities unreached by the jurisdiction of the land were often vilified as pirates, rebels, and scoundrels. This strikes a sharp contrast with the Western maritime culture as regards the vision of development. At the core of the traditional Western maritime culture lies the view that the land comes second to the sea, and "whoever controls the ocean controls the world." Maritime ventures and trades were government-backed enterprises with wide social involvement, and seeking maritime hegemony had become a national policy. The core values inherent in the traditional Chinese maritime culture are the precedence of the land over the sea; as a result, the maritime merchants, without the support of the government, became "Empire-forsaken merchants." Although there was no lack of Chinese rulers in history who had the whims to seek the sea power, this is nothing but an episode of the history. When the West went all out to develop maritime economy, established its hegemony at the sea, it was the time when its institutional structure and outward momentum tipped the scales in the favor of the West, which marked a turning point in the world history at which China had turned its power inward, leaving all the oceans of the world to Western adventurers (Stavrianos, 1999). As of the modern times, China further surrendered its sea power to the West armed with advanced warships and cannons. As a result, the achievements in the development of maritime culture had been marginalized and had for a long time stopped at the regional and civil level, and failed to be refined and spread as an elite culture. The collective psyche of the traditional Chinese maritime populations is more often imbued with pathos.

2.2.3 The Direction for the Construction of Chinese Maritime Culture

As for the social development of mankind, the ocean century is the century of its comprehensive reorientation towards the ocean. The CPC has laid out the vision of

making China great again on the strength of the ocean and to this end formulated the strategies and policies for elevating China from a maritime State into a major maritime country. At a new historical starting point, the construction of maritime culture is to promote the culture of the sea, providing spiritual and intellectual support for the construction of a major maritime country. That is to say, we will bring out the best in our traditional maritime culture and follow the lead of the advanced culture to establish a distinctively national and, in the meantime, world-class maritime culture system.

As Friedrich Engels (cited from The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, 1995: 284) pointed out, each age has its ideology; therefore, the ideology of our time is nothing but an outcome of history. It takes on utterly different forms in different times, and in the meantime, with disparate contents. The ancient continental culture was dominated by the agrarian culture and supplemented by the nomadic culture, and their interplay gave rise to a highly developed ancient civilization. Maritime culture, initially bound to the regional seas, was not yet able to significantly shape the course of world history. In the Age of Exploration, maritime culture served as a harbinger of intercontinental communication, facilitated the circulation of the ideas of openness and marketization, exhibited more creativity and initiative compared with the agro-culture, and pointed to the right direction as an advanced culture, which was then further translated into the transformation of society, a big surge in productive forces, and the replacement of feudalism by capitalism. Speaking of maritime culture in and of itself, the culture of navigation, adventures, and commerce rather than that of fishery and isolation prevailed as the mainstream form of culture and demonstrated its superiority.

Coupled with industrialization, maritime culture, in the global maritime era today, has undergone a technological revolution in its effort to deal with the ocean, extending its reach from the surface of the sea downward to the bottom and upward to the airspace and beyond. The exploitation of marine resources has given rise to the cultural concept of the second living space of human beings; as the primary productive force, the progress of marine science and technology has changed the foundation of the existence and life in the society of maritime economy, thus fundamentally impacting maritime culture. On the one hand, awareness has been raised about the competition for the control and management of marine space and marine resources, and also about environmental protection and sustainable exploitation. The *UNCLOS* has provided exemplary practices pertaining to the sea and has shown the right direction of the advanced maritime culture. On the other hand, the openness and innovation of the sea go beyond itself; the sea is hereby used to denote the open society, the information society, and the earth society, and maritime culture has become the common spiritual wealth shared by all.

Cultural character is neither superior nor inferior. But there is the dichotomy between essence and dross in the culture per se. This dichotomy is also outstanding in maritime culture. The extension of mobility is openness and freedom, but it also brings expansion and anarchy. Adventures, if taken further, will translate into innovation and ambition, but will, in the meantime, cause devastation and aggression. As the modern Western culture went side by side with the industrialization, and marine

factors were absorbed and amplified by the society, the endeavor to find new sea routes and open up global maritime trade marketplaces gradually escalated to the action of using maritime military capabilities to seek hegemony and seize the overseas colonies and resources, which reflected the path of resurgence of the modern powers, where both the best and the worst of maritime culture were fully tapped, and where openness, ambition, freedom, and civilization became one with expansion, robbery, oppression, and barbarity. Likewise, the modern maritime culture, born out of the Western tradition, greatly unleashed the productive forces, and in the meantime brought about ecological problems and the tension in cultural relations. Modern maritime culture does not mean it is an advanced culture. By the same token, those non-Western maritime cultures, though belittled as barbaric and backward, are not without merit, and perhaps imbued with even more civilized and excellent qualities.

China is a huge developing maritime country with both traditional and modern maritime cultures. To become a maritime power doesn't mean to follow the beaten track of Western powers, and the construction of maritime culture allows no wholesale borrowing from the West.

Under the guidance of the advanced culture, we ought to gain insights into the dynamics of the modern maritime culture, put forward new ideas and theories, and bring out the best in them to make out the trajectory of maritime culture. There is a worldwide consensus now on the development of maritime economy, the elements of which are yet to be updated to meet social demands. Meanwhile, the rising maritime industries have become the mainstream of development, and traditional maritime industries are expanding in the midst of transformation. The interactions between maritime economy and maritime culture are gaining momentum, and cultural elements have merged into the economic system to form the maritime corporate culture. The social ambience of maritime culture has brought added values such as brands, icons, and fashion; besides, maritime culture has spread information, shaped the consumer's mindset, and nurtured relevant maritime markets. This day has witnessed the expansion of global maritime affairs, the continuous rebuilding of the maritime order, the escalation from maritime military strength to comprehensive maritime strength, as well as the promotion of the institutional change as regards how to control and manage the sea, thereby leading to the institutional change of maritime culture. Such maritime cultural elements as harmony, environmental protection, and sustainable exploitation have been incorporated into the institutional system, feeding into it the people-oriented spirit. In face of the general trend of the world maritime culture, we should explore in depth the methods and ways of how to import and absorb, and how to facilitate the sinicization of the advanced thoughts and theories of the modern maritime culture for our own good.

On the strength of the essence of the traditional local maritime culture, one must establish an accurate understanding of the Chinese traditional maritime culture. China's traditional maritime culture had suffered serious oppression from traditional agriculture, leaving the former in a state of distortion and even subordination, yet the endeavor to explore the ocean and the innovative spirit remained untarnished. Admiral Zheng He's famous voyages could be considered a reverse form of the tribute trade, spreading the ideal that "the minority and the weak are not to be bullied as all

share the blessing of peace and plenty." Though this might mirror the mindset of the Ming sovereign when he fancied himself "lord of the world" to pacify neighboring countries, one could extract from its core such cultural elements as the harmony of the sea and the world, which can be used as a reference for the theory as to how to build a harmonious society. General Zheng Chenggong made the sea his home and attempted to empower the country by connecting the seas. Although it is the only example recorded in history that a political entity of the Chinese mainland completely shifted its focus to engage in maritime trade (de Vienna, 1986), the historical foundation he laid for today's maritime power strategy is indelible. Taiwan has become the core interest of modern-day China, and Zheng Chenggong, in his time, took the sea as his base looking out to the mainland, resolutely reclaimed it despite the dissenting voices such as "why bother duking it out with the barbarians" or "this is unwise and disloyal, life or death" (Zhang, 1986: 20), and his feat of securing for Chinese this pivotal portal to the open seas is beyond praise. Maritime customs and beliefs reflect the feelings, resolve, mentality, and spiritual pursuit of the coastal people, and also help strengthen the whole nation's awareness to love and care for the sea. This is where huge efforts are needed to retrieve historical and folk resources; to uncover the valuables of maritime culture legacy; to extract the finer part of Chinese traditional maritime culture; and to sort out and put into modern tongue the ideas, thoughts, rules of conduct, and moral codes, making them, though unheeded by history yet rich with wisdom, endure in people's minds as shared values. The excavation of historical resources shall hinge heavily on the collection and reorganization of ancient texts and the study of maritime history; likewise, the excavation of civil resources must focus on the investigation and reorganization of local maritime customs and even nominate some of them for the UNESCO intangible cultural heritage list to offer better protection. It is on this basis that the very essence of the traditional maritime culture is combined with the spiritual and cultural outcomes from actual maritime practices, innovations are made, basic ideas are proposed that fall in line with the development of marine enterprises and abound in strategic values, and cohesion is harnessed to herald and boost the advancement of society. As an integral part of the novel structure of the global maritime culture, the fruits of its innovations of national distinctiveness are enjoyed throughout the world.

The competitiveness of maritime culture mirrors the soft power of a country over its seas. The productivity of maritime culture is reflected in the effect of maritime culture on maritime management, in the productive capacity of the maritime corporate culture and maritime cultural enterprises, and if at the individual level, in the productivity of one's awareness and knowledge about the ocean. Its communicability is exemplified in the application of publication, television, and film production, entertainment shows as well as varied media and means, while its permeability is embodied in the new spiritual and cultural values. The power of consumption consists in how maritime culture is received by people and whether human mind can transcend the emotional level and change its neglect of the ocean. The competitiveness is just many of the abilities rolled into one.

There are two major weak links besetting the competitiveness of China's maritime culture: (1) Modern maritime culture is imported as a part of Western marine science

and technology, which is often characterized by the pursuit of immediate profit and the cult of modern technology. The employees are likely to get stuck in the old rut of continental thinking due to the relatively shorter history of their engagement with the offshore business and the dearth of legacy regarding maritime culture. (2) Social transformation has had a tremendous impact on the traditional maritime culture, and the traditional maritime way of life is in danger of extinction. The problem is prominent as to how to survive and thrive by giving full play to its original features. It seems that problems should be discovered and solved in these two aspects.

It is our belief that the furtherance of the construction of socialist maritime culture and the momentum given to the socialist culture will conduce massively to the wealth and rejuvenation of China.

2.3 Research on China's Maritime History and Maritime Culture

With the advent of the twenty-first century, China's maritime industry has embraced an unprecedented promising opportunity for development. It's obvious that exploitation of marine resources and development of maritime economy are of great benefits to the sustainable development of social economy. To enhance its comprehensive national power, China needs to control and capitalize on the ocean, relieve the pressure from the land, and expand the nation's space of resources and security, which constitutes an important link in the chain. There's no denying that driven by the demand of social economy and national security, China has now placed much emphasis on marine science and technology, and considerable achievements have been made in this field. Nevertheless, a review of the current situation of China's maritime development indicates that, notwithstanding the development of maritime economy and marine technology, the assorted disciplines of humanities and social sciences have not kept pace with the social demand. Not much concern has been shown to maritime development by the scholarship, and hence insufficient support in terms of theory and humanism. In the general preface to the book series of "Ocean and China," Yang (1998) comments that.

The prevalent poor maritime awareness among the public could be put down to the long-held social values biased towards land as opposed to the ocean, and to the underdevelopment of maritime humanities and social sciences. Studies on modern maritime China have made strides in some areas of humanities and social sciences. Yet it is still lacking in the across-the-board revitalization of research on maritime politics, maritime economics, maritime sociology, maritime law, maritime administration, maritime tourism, maritime military science, maritime history, maritime archeology, maritime literature, maritime ethnography, maritime culture, maritime folklore, maritime religion, etc., let alone a pluralistic and integrated academic system.

China's moving towards the ocean calls for self-awareness of the historical and cultural traditions of maritime China, and knowledge about its source and course, strengths and weaknesses, so as to get onto the right track for future development and to attain an autonomous status in response to new historic challenges. Otherwise, there would be no informed action in maritime development. This involves keeping pace with the times by redoubling the efforts to establish China's maritime humanities and social sciences.

Research on maritime history and maritime culture serves as both the foundation and the pillar for the academic status of maritime humanities and social sciences in China. Maritime history covers research on everything historical in terms of nature, society, and humanity within the ocean domain. Theoretically, it includes the history of natural transition of marine ecology, the history of maritime exploration, and the history of maritime-related social and human development. Maritime culture is a mode of maritime activities of human beings as a group or as individuals throughout the history of maritime development. As mentioned earlier, culture is a factor that recurs in a pattern in history. Therefore, maritime culture is a major component of maritime history. Human history per se is a kind of cultural phenomenon. To understand maritime culture in depth, we first need to understand the progression of China's maritime history as well as its continuity and variability as a traditional culture. Likewise, research on the history of maritime social development should be viewed as the major component of maritime culture. Maritime history and maritime culture are, so to speak, inseparably interwoven, overlapping with and permeating into each other.

Academic research, in the final analysis, is to establish procedures and rules for the research object. Nothing can be accomplished without norms or standards. While the object of research is the same, different disciplines have different procedures and rules in maritime research. In terms of academic practice, the research focus of maritime history consists in the history of social and human development in maritime exploration, which should be subsumed within history in essence. The research focus of maritime culture, on the other hand, consists in the cultural phenomena arising out of the maritime world, including the basic theories of maritime culture and applied studies on maritime culture and social development, which should be subsumed under culturology in essence. They differ in procedures and rules, and should not be equated with each other. The research objective of the interface between maritime history and maritime culture, i.e., the history of maritime culture, is the ways human groups or individuals behave in maritime activities and the diachronic achievements they've made, which involve the rules and procedures of both history and culturology, interconnected with and yet different from maritime history and maritime culture.

Research on maritime history and maritime culture is far from being a brand new area and relevant studies can be traced back to a century ago. Why then have they not yet been ranked as the second-tier disciplines in China?

To my understanding, the main reason can be attributed to the restraint from the land-dominant cultural system. The research paradigm and academic norms of Chinese history and culturology have long been biased towards continental culture and taken human activities on land as the norm. If we take the sea as appendage to

the land, examine and generalize the historical and cultural phenomena of maritime development within the land-based social division pattern and disciplinary framework, we will inevitably distort the reality of maritime development and ignore the particularity of maritime economy, maritime society, and maritime space. The research on transportation in the South China Sea in the early twentieth century, by virtue of its prominent achievements, could have risen as the discipline of maritime history; however, it eventually ended up being integrated into the history of relationships between China and foreign countries. History of navigation, which overlaps or interconnects with science or engineering, was integrated into the history of science and technology under the category of science and engineering. The part of maritime history pertinent to maritime politics, military science, and sociology has also been integrated into related disciplines, respectively. While this may not have precluded research on maritime humanities and social sciences, it did create some institutional barriers to maritime development. The maritime history as a system had been severed, and its research topics excluded due to its failure to meet the above-mentioned procedures and rules, a lot of the uncategorized maritime-related materials left unattended, unpublicized, or completely lost. The hegemony of land-based culture was omnipresent. Descriptions or interpretations of maritime-related events followed the thinking mode and discourse system of land-based culture. For instance, marine fishery was referred to as "blue agriculture," and marine breeding as "marine planting or herding," etc., without considering its inappropriacy. This naturally resulted in under-evaluation and ignorance of the civilizations in maritime development in Chinese history and culture system. They had long been confined to the civil and regional level, absent from the mainstream society and academia, and marginalized. Some people went so far as to assert that China only has loess culture rather than maritime culture. Even among the scholars who acknowledged the existence of maritime culture in Chinese history, most could not overcome this traditional mindset and they came up with differing ideas about the concept, contents, theories, and methods. As for the scholars who have been involved in the field of Chinese maritime history, they were often found to simply modify the old research paradigm. The discussions held around maritime culture in the late twentieth century were confined to the circle of coastal history and literature scholars, and were never a hot topic in history or culture. Owing to inadequate theories and expertise, seminal papers and works were scanty, which could not shake the land-based research paradigms and norms, propel academic breakthroughs, or help raise the maritime culture from the regional to the national level.

To carry it further, maritime awareness has not yet been sublimated to the national level and the neglect of the ocean in the public mind has yet to be reversed fundamentally. China still cannot enter into a dialogue on equal footing with other maritime powers in terms of maritime culture. This stands in stark contrast to the goal of building a strong maritime nation. In order to turn this embarrassing situation around, it's essential to put on the agenda the theoretical and academic innovation in the research of Chinese maritime history and maritime culture.

Yang (1996) examines Chinese maritime history and maritime culture from the standpoint and perspective of history, and proposes to tap into the historically accumulated resources of maritime humanities and society from the following dimensions:

(1) Research on the history of exploration in coastal regions, including cognition and exploitation of coastal geography, harbors, currents, tides, and climates, agricultural and non-agricultural exploration of low-lying land, the rise and fall of harbors and port cities, etc.
(2) Research on the history of development of the island belt, including the discovery and exploitation of islands, agricultural and non-agricultural development, etc.
(3) Research on the history of maritime territory exploration, including knowledge about and exploitation of marine fishery, sea salt manufacturing, marine transportation, marine meteorology, seabed resources, etc.
(4) Research on the history of maritime trade, including offshore and open sea trade, domestic and overseas trade, trades and interactions between countries and regions within the maritime economic circle, commodity circulation and management, etc.
(5) Research on the history of immigration by sea, including migrations within the Chinese territory by sea route and overseas migration, the return and feedback of overseas immigrants, etc.
(6) Research on the historical changes of maritime social organizations, including the communities of fishing villages, maritime commerce, pirates, immigrants and other organizations of blood-ties, geo-relations, business connections, and deities related to maritime activities, as well as governmental organizations such as coast defense, navy, harbor service, and customs office.
(7) Research on the development and change of maritime communities, including the socioeconomic shift of coastal areas and islands from land to ocean, growth of export-oriented economy, urbanization of rural areas, etc.
(8) Research on the history of marine science and technology, including the evolution of fishing gear, fishing methods, technology of shipbuilding and navigation, natural disaster prevention, technological evolution in exploiting seawater and seabed resources, etc.
(9) Research on the changes of maritime policies, including the formulation or abolition of national and local maritime policies and laws, the influence of policy changes on maritime social economy, etc.
(10) Research on the history of maritime thoughts and culture, including maritime awareness, notion of maritime rights, notion of immigration, maritime customs and beliefs, knowledge of overseas countries, etc.

Yang (2001) further advocates that the 20th-century research on Chinese history needs to rediscover its own maritime history, so as to make adjustments to the research paradigms, academic orientation, and ways of thinking.

China's research on maritime humanities should shake off the yoke of the land-biased pattern, evolve its own theories and system with deep insights into the nature

of the oceans and distinctive characteristics, and set up its own platform and academic norms.

Research on China's maritime humanities has gradually shifted its focus from specialized history to joint and integrative research, from studies on maritime China to the regional and comparative studies on the maritime world. This has opened up a new research area and has won its place in the maritime world history (Yang, 2001).

For this purpose, we pooled the resources and expertise of the History Department of Xiamen University and had an 8-volume book series of "Ocean and China" published at Jiang Xi Universities and Colleges Press during 1998–1999. The series include *Fujian in the Ocean: Exploring Fujian's History of Maritime Development*, *Households at Sea: Marine Fishery Economy and Fishing Village Society*, *Moving Towards Maritime Trade Zone: Behaviors of Southeast China's Businessmen in the Modern World Market Interaction*, *Emperors' Treasury in south China: The Trade between China and the West in the Early Qing Dynasty under Guangzhou System*, *Noisy Markets at Sea: The Rise and Fall of harbor Cities in South East Fujian and Maritime Humanities*, *The Myth of Ocean: Tradition and Transformation of China's Maritime Outlook*, and *The Network of Land and Island: The Rise of Ports in Taiwan.* Hereinafter I took on the project called "Ocean China and the World Research Program" and compiled the research results into a 12-volume book series "Research Scheme on Maritime China and the World," and they were all published at Jiangxi Universities and Colleges Press by 2005. This series showcases the results of following studies, such as those on marine ecological environment and economic development, vicissitudes of social economy and culture in the oceanic region of southeast China, seas around Shandong Province and the Bohai Gulf; those on maritime policies, maritime administration, ocean disasters, smuggling and anti-smuggling; those on the archeology of wrecked ships and beliefs in sea gods; those on the West route immigration, sociocultural studies on Singaporean Chinese; and those on the disputes of the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries. The first four books of this series, published in 2003, are respectively: *Ocean and Land in the East: Marine Environment and Economic Development in Southeast China, Shipwrecks Around China: Ancient Clippers, Marine Technology and Cargoes*, *Deities in the Ocean: Chinese Beliefs in Deities and Social Economy*, and *Rebuilding Homes Overseas: Studies on the Social Culture of the Singaporean Chinese.*

The objectives of our research are listed as follows:

(1) To deepen the exploration into Chinese maritime history and culture, based on the interactions between maritime China and the maritime world;
(2) To break through the notion, mindset, and blind spot which ignore maritime development by documenting with exhaustive historical materials from different perspectives and from different areas that the ocean is the great channel for communication between China and the world and an important space for living and development, that the ocean carries with it major national interests for the development, stability, and security of Chinese economy and society, that the maritime territory was obtained through painstaking efforts of exploration and management by generations of ancestors, that maritime culture is a component of

Chinese culture, and that Chinese maritime development is a result of historical continuity.

(3) To break the limits of countries and ethnicities as well as the traditional disciplinary structure, so as to facilitate the penetration and integration of the theories and methods of multiple disciplines, and to promote the establishment of maritime history as a discipline and the related PhD programs.

(4) To sort out the historical experience and lessons gained from the interactions between Chinese maritime development and the maritime world, so as to provide implications for current and future practices.

The key to achieving the above-mentioned goals is to transform the land-based notion to the ocean-based notion in terms of guiding principles, themes of research, concepts, methodology, sequence of research, and to view the ocean as a civilization form and an indispensable part of civilization, rather than simply a regional or industrial concept. Researchers need to make rational generalization out of the instances of maritime history and maritime culture, so as to form a paradigm which distinguishes itself from research on land-based history and culture; in other words, what should be pursued is innovation at the very source. This paradigm cannot be built up overnight; rather, it calls for long and deep thinking, reasoning, criticizing, testifying, and rectifying before we can finally make it. What we are doing at the moment is no more than a tentative attempt. Different topics may lead towards different horizons and involve different theories and methods. Researchers can choose different theories and methods, and different materials, including official and private literature, relics, and legacies, even oral history, as these may contribute to the formulation of the discipline from different dimensions.

Personally I am delighted to see a number of universities in China, with Ocean University of China taking the lead, have stepped up efforts to promote maritime humanities and marine science by setting up institutions of maritime culture. They set about constructing the discipline of Chinese maritime culture and have gained some preliminary results and experience. Their research paradigm differs from ours in academic stance and disciplinary structure. For example, in the framework of maritime culture, maritime history is categorized into the history of maritime culture. It remains an unsettled issue as to where maritime culture should belong in terms of disciplines and specialized field, which can't be settled simply by several rounds of academic discussions, yet they are undoubtedly forward-looking in their efforts. It promises a bright future if we gather talents, delve into the research that conforms to the laws of an emerging discipline, and find out the breakthrough point for disciplinary integration. The ultimate formation of Chinese maritime culturology will surely catalyze the development of Chinese maritime history. The interface between Chinese maritime culture and Chinese maritime history, namely the history of Chinese maritime culture, will bear rich fruits via interdisciplinary dialogues, communications, and convergence.

The collaboration and integration of the two academic teams, i.e., Chinese maritime history and maritime culture, will bring about an irreversible trend for development. The foundation of Chinese maritime culture association meets the

aspiration of all individuals and communities who show their concern for and devote themselves to the grand undertaking of maritime culture research. It will serve the function to enhance unity, coordination, and agglomeration, and contribute to the academic vitality and the promotion of research standards. An academic community of maritime humanities and social sciences who would follow closely maritime culture and its development will definitely play a crucial role in the future.

2.4 Rational Thoughts on Maritime China

2.4.1 Proposing the Construction of Chinese Maritime Humanistic Sociology

The ocean is an essential environment where human beings live. The depth of human beings' perception, exploration, and exploitation of the ocean mirrors the degree of socioeconomic development and progress of civilization. The "Great Geographical Discoveries" at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries put in motion the thriving maritime trade, facilitated the formation of the world market system, and steered the human society into the modern times. The maritime industrial revolution which was started from the late twentieth century has transformed the ocean into "marine pasture" and "habitat for mankind." The issue as to how to embrace the ocean with new outlook and new measures has become a global focus in the academic circle.

China is a continental country in East Asia and a maritime country on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean. It contains rich elements characteristic of maritime countries: Maritime development is a tradition in the coastal region, maritime humanity is an organic component of Chinese social humanities and the driving force for China to move towards the ocean. However, owing to the highly-civilized agriculture and its predominance, as well as the rigid sea ban policies adopted by the governments of the Ming and Qing dynasties, the fruits of maritime development had been confined to the local and civil level, lots of them missing or "forgotten," resulting in the neglect of the ocean in the public mind. In China's contemporary humanities and social sciences, maritime research, which is taken as an appendage, has yet to form a comprehensive system of maritime history, literature, economics, sociology, anthropology, culturology, and religion. The public's weak maritime awareness and poorly-developed maritime humanities have restrained and hindered China's progression towards the big ocean.

Pressures from overpopulation, resources, and environment remind us of the urgency of China's maritime development. Conscientious efforts are called for to sort out the traditions and current situations of Chinese maritime humanities. The construction of Chinese maritime sociology has far-reaching practical implications:

(1) The characteristics of Chinese maritime humanities are different from those of Western humanities. While introducing and drawing on the sophisticated

marine technology from the Western world, adaptive factors should be taken in from the tradition, the continuity between tradition and transformation should be maintained, and the route of China-specific maritime development should be followed.

(2) Sophisticated maritime sociology is not only the basic infrastructure for enhancing national maritime awareness, but also an indicator of civilization in maritime countries. It is of great social benefits to the exploration of maritime economy, the protection of maritime territory and maritime rights, and the harmonious development of both maritime and continental social economy.

(3) The construction of maritime sociology can also help conduct a dialogue between Chinese and Western civilizations, eliminate the prejudice of taking China as a landlocked country, reduce misunderstandings and avoid conflicts, and facilitate economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.

According to the national economic layout, the development of the following places will bring Chinese economy into a new era characterized by distinctive maritime social economy. They are respectively the Yangtze River Delta and the Economic Belt along the River with Shanghai taking the lead, the southeast coastal economic region consisting mainly of the Pearl River Delta and southeast Fujian, the Bohai Economic Rim consisting mainly of Liaodong Peninsula, Shandong Peninsula, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei. This heralds the opportunity of development for China's maritime sociology. For this purpose, it's imperative to have an overall national plan and provide a focused support, so as to lay a preliminary foundation for the institutionalization of maritime sociology in China. Research institutes of Chinese maritime sociology can be based in Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen, and Guangzhou, PhD programs can be set up in qualified universities, and development fund can be established for the discipline. This will foster cross-century talents, meet the social demands, capture the zeitgeist, make due contributions to China's maritime cause and humanities and social sciences, arouse the whole nation's maritime awareness, and protect its maritime rights.

2.4.2 Overall Concern with China's Maritime Rights and Interests

As an important part of the national development strategy, strengthening China through maritime development is a prerequisite for the across-the-board construction of a moderately prosperous society and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. History has assigned the Chinese people the important task of paying full attention to China's maritime rights and interests and revving up the modernization of China's maritime development.

The new landscape of the worldwide maritime competition cautions that enough concern should be given to the ocean and its administration. Currently, China is faced with severe situations in defense of its maritime rights and interests.

First and foremost, the territorialization of jurisdictional seas has become an international trend. The great discovery of marine resources in the twentieth century is taken as a way out for sustainable development of human civilization. Coastal countries are expanding to the open seas for more living space and making various proclamations. The *UNCLOS*, which took effect on 19th September 1994, established the national jurisdictional system of territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves. More than 30% of the global ocean space, approximately 109.4 million km^2, was zoned as jurisdictional seas under coastal countries, which has brought enormous change to the geographical pattern of the world's oceans. As we entered the twenty-first century, competition for strategic marine position and resources has become increasingly fierce. More and more countries have adjusted their proclamations for maritime rights and promoted sea territorialization. To expand their jurisdictional seas and seize the islets in the ocean, some countries factitiously set sovereignty landmarks or migrated their citizens to islets that are uninhabitable or could not sustain the economy. Some built the so-called investigation companies, invested lavishly, and collected data to expand their continental shelves, and others set up military bases in the high seas. Segmentation of the ocean and redefining territories among different countries have become one of the hot issues in international relations.

On 11 May 1994, the standing committee of China's National People's Congress ratified the *UNCLOS*, which became effective three months after submission to the United Nations Secretariat. According to the *UNCLOS* and China's proclamation, under China's jurisdiction, there should be an area of 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, 24 nautical miles of contiguous zones, 229 nautical miles of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves, spanning a total area of 3.90 million km^2, amounting to 1/3 of the land territory. China has full sovereignty over the territorial waters, seabed and sediments, full control over security, customs and finance in the contiguous zone, and immigration and sanitation, and full sovereign rights on exploring and exploiting the natural resources, including jurisdictional rights over the construction of marine facilities, research of marine science, and protection of marine environment. In addition, China is entitled to navigation on the high seas and to sharing the resources in the international seabed areas. But so far China has not responded fully to the global trend of territorializing the jurisdictional waters, nor has it determined the policy of boundary demarcation, announced the borderline of the proclaimed jurisdictional waters, or agglomerated its national maritime power in controlling and administering all of its jurisdictional seas.

Second, "the blue enclosure movement" is closing in on China's jurisdictional seas. Of China's jurisdictional seas as specified by the *UNCLOS,* about half of them, or an area of 1.29 million km^2, has been claimed by eight countries to be their territories and rendered as disputed areas, amounting to 9 times of China's disputed land area. Several hundred thousand square kilometers of the area have been exploited by other countries, including marine oil-gas exploration and exploitation among others. 1209 wells have been drilled, at least 299 oil and gas structures and 129 oil and gas fields have been discovered. Foreign investment and technology have been employed for predatory exploitation. China's historically owned traditional

fishing grounds have been carved up and nibbled away, and it's not unusual to see China's fishing boats being driven away, wrecked, or detained. Ships from other countries were cruising into China Sea without permission to do the so-called marine investigations and academic research, and some even attempted to spy on China's coastal intelligence. Foreign countries have long coveted Diaoyu Island, Huangyan Island, Zhongsha and Xisha Islands, and occupied 44 islands and reefs within these areas. Intrusion has not stopped even after *The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea* was signed among the Asean countries in November 2002. Commemorations such as the so-called the 22nd Anniversary of Nansha Liberation, the 25th Anniversary of the Establishment of the City of Kalayaan, and recreational sports such as the so-called international challenges on the sea were held to create momentum for claiming the unauthorized sovereignty in this area. Military control and marine investigations have been escalated on the occupied reefs and waters; an increasing number of aircraft and ships were patrolling and spying around. In the East China Sea, the Japanese government charged an annual "rent" of 22.56 million yen for the civil use of Diaoyu Island and islets in the northern and southern area, continuing to defy the *Memorandum of Understanding* reached by China and Japan earlier in history. China's proclamation of "set aside the dispute, explore together" has not been acknowledged by the neighboring countries. Unfortunately, China is not fully equipped yet to explore and exploit the ocean, nor is it capable enough to provide enough service to marine activities and defend the ocean. China is not powerful enough in maritime law enforcement and safeguarding its legal rights. It has not exercised substantial jurisdiction rights in the distant seas and is confronted with great pressure in defending its jurisdictional seas.

Maritime rights are derived from the expansion of one country's territory to the ocean. They fall into the scope of national sovereignty. Exercising maritime rights matters most to China's politics, economy, security, and culture. It represents China's political interest in reunification to maintain its sovereignty over Taiwan and its adjacent islands and the islands in the South China Sea. It takes marine technology and maritime economy as the new growth point for its sustainable economic development. Maritime trade and deep-sea fishing contribute to the globalization of resource allocation and bring great economic benefits. Mongers of "China threat," however, advocate containing the rise of China, aiming to stop China from extending eastward to the ocean. China cannot hope to break through the barricade and defend its national security unless it builds up its fundamental capacity of managing the jurisdictional seas and contiguous zones and venturing out towards the ocean.

China should also develop its marine science, maritime humanities and social sciences, build a disciplinary system with added new meanings and practical requirements by improving the ocean-related theories and important statements that were previously scattered in different disciplines, and put forward interconnected and closely related new thoughts and new theses so as to bring the maritime civilization from the regional and civil level to the national level. This will be of tremendous cultural benefits.

For China to develop into a strong nation, it is essential to establish close connections with the ocean. It must interact with the world via the ocean, integrate into the

world economic system, create historic opportunities for China's Western Development to go global, and boost the modernization of the landlocked area. To develop itself, the landlocked area must also draw its attention to the ocean. In other words, while striving for development, China should not just focus on the land and neglect the ocean!

Frankly speaking, some Chinese officials and the general public still have scanty knowledge about the ocean, and they have not reached consensus on the importance and urgency of maritime development. The media are still keen on propagating the "Pax Manjurica" during the reigns of Emperors Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong. This in turn reflects the pervasive mentality of indifference towards the ocean. However, in this new era when the world is undergoing fierce marine competition both in breadth and in depth, if this distorted social mindset is not corrected, maritime development strategies will be hard to carry out, jurisdictional seas cannot be safeguarded, and the efforts for opening up policy and peaceful rise cannot be guaranteed. China is ranked 10th in terms of the total area of jurisdictional seas, yet the area per capita is ranked 122nd, which means every inch of the islands and the seas is to be highly treasured and cherished. Forsaking a tiny islet that could serve as a borderline base point means giving up an area of 200 nautical miles of jurisdictional seas. Retreating from the ocean will definitely impair the essential interests of the whole nation.

In this sense, the change of the mindset is even more important than specific policy-making. Without awakening the public's maritime awareness, there would be no self-consciousness of maritime development; without the courage and initiative of defending the maritime rights and interests, there would be no position for China to stand as a major maritime country. Only with the public's overall concern for China's maritime rights and interests can they take root and play an active role in the maritime life. While developing marine science, we need to remedy the passive situation where maritime studies have been neglected in the circle of humanities and social sciences, give momentum to the disciplinary construction of maritime humanities and social sciences, and cultivate a broader range of expertise in maritime politics, maritime economics, maritime military science, maritime diplomacy, maritime law, maritime administration, maritime history, and culture. The government must find the right route for maritime development that fits China's current situation. Researchers must explore new theories, new concepts, new problems, and new situations derived from marine territorialization, so as to provide consultations and suggestions for the government's decision-making, provide accurate information to the public, and create an atmosphere in which the whole nation show their concern for maritime rights and interests. Only by this can Chinese people be united, work together for maritime development, and make a difference in defending and exploiting the ocean; only by this can China take the high ground in the fierce competition for the ocean, and achieve its goal of building a strong maritime country and a moderately prosperous society.

2.4.3 Land and Sea in Harmony for a Harmonious Socialist Society

The twenty-first century is an ocean century. The exploration, exploitation, administration, and protection of marine space, resources, and environment have become an issue of major concern for the development of the human society. As both a continental and maritime country, China is confronted with unprecedented challenges and opportunities in building itself into a strong maritime country with advanced marine science and technology, well-developed maritime economy, and comprehensive national strength.

As mentioned earlier, since the entry into force of the *UNCLOS*, about 30% of the world's oceans have been zoned as jurisdictional seas under coastal countries, in which China is entitled to a jurisdictional area of around 3 million km^2. This greatly expands China's living space and increases the nation's maritime rights and interests. Meanwhile, China has yet to settle the boundary disputes with eight neighboring countries around China Sea in terms of maritime rights in the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. It would be a long-term and arduous task as to how to explore, exploit, administer, and defend its maritime territory.

China's peaceful development calls for a peaceful international environment. Currently, China is faced with complicated situations with neighboring maritime countries and under enormous pressure in political, military, and economic terms. America, as a hegemony of maritime rights in its own right, stigmatizes China as an "offensive threat," deploys more marine forces to the Pacific Ocean, and, on the pretext of security alliance with Japan, attempts to set up the so-called first island chain and second island chain to hold China back. Right wingers in Japan keep challenging China on the latter's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Island and the oil-field exploration issues of the East China Sea. They extend the scope of "situations in areas surrounding Japan (SIASJ)" to China's Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Some of them dream of being held under the auspices of the United States. They set up the so-called Federal of the west Pacific Ocean, and together with "The Kuroshio Alliance" and Taiwan authorities controlled by the Taiwan separatists, keep provoking the mainland by challenging the principle of "both the mainland and Taiwan belong to China (one China only)." Ch'en Shui-pian, former leader of Taiwan, announced the decision to terminate the "unification committee" and the "guiding principles for unification," with the attempt to tamper with the constitution to gain the so-called Taiwan legal independence, which ruined peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. Non-traditional security issues have been on the rise, international marine terrorism and piracy run rampant in the South China Sea and across the Straits of Malacca. All this threatens the security of China's foreign trade route and energy transportation corridor.

The coastal region in east China is the heartland of the nation's social economy. The strength of economic development in the east lies in the ocean, so it is with its weakness. China has grown into a big country in terms of shipbuilding, marine

fishery, marine transportation, and maritime trade. China's socioeconomic development depends increasingly on the ocean. However, as the population is moving to the coastal areas, gathering into three city clusters, namely the Rim of the Bohai Gulf, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta, some of the local governments have failed to properly deal with the relationship between land-based development and maritime development. Some would pursue economic growth at the expense of the ocean. Ports and development zones are densely built, dykes are built to reclaim land from the sea, expansion of urban areas toward the ocean has rendered the eco-environment more fragile, which has caused a myriad of problems to the coastal areas, including tensions between man and land, abnormal climates, etc. Improper or excessive exploitation of the ocean has resulted in conflicts between environmental and economic goals. Illegal fishery has caused exhaustion of traditional fishery resources; reckless excavation of sand and rocks has destroyed vast areas of mangrove forests and coral reefs; coastal wetland has shrunk sharply, so it has been with the capacity of climate regulation, water storage and flood diversion, resistance against storm surge, and defense for the coast. Pollutants on land are discharged to the sea, water quality offshore is deteriorating, and the Bohai Sea is becoming a dead sea. Ocean disasters caused by deterioration of marine environment, such as disastrous earthquakes, tsunami, rainstorms, landslides, persistent coastal erosion, and the rise of sea level, have had significant adverse impacts on the coastal society. Some coastal cities are suffering from subsidence; sea water in the Pearl River Delta is flowing backward; and typhoons are attacking the southeast coast frequently, which bring heavy rainstorms to central China, resulting in floods and dam bursts of reservoirs.

The facts show that China should seize the key strategic opportunity and come up with a sound strategic system which is not biased towards the land against the ocean. It must take marine challenges seriously and avert ocean-related threats of all kinds. The peaceful rise of China depends, to a great extent, on whether China can defend its maritime interests, which are vital to the nation's well-being, and whether China can strike a balance between land and ocean for sustainable development. China should seek peace and win-win benefits with its own strength, settle the territorial disputes with neighboring countries, participate fully in the international competition and cooperation in the fields of maritime politics, military affairs, economy, and culture. As a major maritime country, China is obliged to do its part to develop a sound and fair international maritime order. A harmonious China calls for harmonious development of both land and ocean. Under the guidance of the scientific outlook on development, China needs to reflect on the mania for mega-cities which concentrates on land development, and for cross-sea bridges to peninsularize the islands. China must take into account the distinctive features of the ocean when planning for maritime exploration and have land-based economy and maritime economy interact with and complement each other, so as to facilitate the eastern part of China to take the lead in socialist modernization and to make contributions to the construction of a harmonious and moderately prosperous society.

2.4.4 *Suggestions on the Enactment of* China's Law of the Sea

With the advent of the twenty-first century, China's comprehensive national strength has increased and security around the country has been strengthened. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao announced the enactment of maritime development strategy at the 16th CPC National Congress. The State Council set the goal of building a strong maritime country in the "Outline of China's National Development Plan for Maritime Economy" and placed much stress on the status and importance of the ocean in China. Maritime industry is now embracing the unprecedented opportunity for development. China has drawn worldwide attention to its capacity of shipbuilding and marine transportation, the cargo flow rate, maritime industry, exploration of marine resources such as oil and gas, marine exploration and scientific research, application of marine high technology, maritime administration and law enactment, maritime control and deterrence capability, and the capability of marine environmental protection.

Marine space and resources are the strong foundation and the major way out for the modernization of Chinese social economy and sustainable development. They are of vital interests to the rise and rejuvenation of the nation. As mentioned earlier, according to the *UNCLOS*, 30% of the world's ocean was zoned as jurisdictional seas for the coastal countries, and China's jurisdictional waters, including the territorial seas, the contiguous zones, the exclusive economic zones, and the continental shelves, cover an area of 3 million km^2. This means China could exercise jurisdiction over a total area of territorial waters that amounts to one-third of its land territory. The expansion of ocean territory has changed the old pattern of maritime power and provides new space for the nation's subsistence and development. However, owing to the policy of containment and suppression imposed by some maritime hegemonies since the cold war, and under the influence of China's long-held land-oriented development, China is weak in its comprehensive maritime strength, making it unable to fully exercise its jurisdiction over its maritime areas, and leading to recurrent detriments to its maritime rights and interests. When China rises out of peace and shows its concern for the ocean from a strategic perspective, the maritime hegemonies have tried by all means to create obstacles, claiming that China essentially represents "continental Asia" with the ill intent to deny China's legal rights on the ocean, sowing discord between China and its neighboring countries, and spreading lies to mislead the world media, all of which has caused pernicious consequences. It is therefore our mission ordained by history and times to confirm China's status as a legal maritime country.

It is a historical fact that China is both a major continental and maritime country. Yet, owing to its loss of maritime power in the modern times, it was not until China won its independence that its maritime laws and regulations system started to get on the right track. Since China ratified the *UNCLOS* in 1996, remarkable progress has been made in maritime legislation. After the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress enacted "Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone," it has consecutively passed the "Law on

the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People's Republic of China," and the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas," and revised the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Mineral Resources," the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Marine Environment Protection," the "Fisheries Law of the People's Republic of China," and the "Island Protection Law." China's State Council has also stipulated a series of assorted regulations, including "Decree on Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research," "Measures on Maritime Administrative Punishments," "Provisions on the Administration of the Protection and Utilization of Islands with No Residents," "Interim Provisions on the Administration of Dumping Sites," and "Provisions on the Protection of Submarine Cable Pipelines." However, these laws and provisions are lacking in globalism and integrity and are not powerful enough to provide legal support for the increasing maritime affairs and maritime rights and interests. Therefore, it is of tremendous and far-reaching significance and urgency to enact the basic maritime law, or Law of the Sea, to establish China's lawful status as a maritime country, to make it the will of the nation to announce the policies of building China into a major maritime country, and hence to defend and maintain the nation's marine space and resources.

With the extension and deepening of maritime exploration, maritime economy and defense for maritime rights and interests, China's actions revolving around the exploration, exploitation, management, control, and protection of the ocean have gone far beyond the scope of maritime industries and coastal regions. Interactions between land and ocean and their harmonious development have become the key to building a harmonious society and innovative country. The government must take a comprehensive outlook on scientific development, enhance its maritime awareness while planning for inland development, carry out maritime planning, and perfect the pertinent institutions and mechanisms. There should be a general rule for the basic principles and legal systems of maritime law, which runs through the whole maritime legal system and links up with pertinent legislation, so as to settle possible inconsistency of subsidiary laws and fill the loopholes in the maritime law. Therefore, enacting the law of sea is an internal demand of China's current maritime legal system.

In today's world, coastal countries are turning their focus of development to the ocean. Competition revolving around marine space and resources is getting increasingly complex and fierce. The order of international maritime laws is being reshaped. As for China's jurisdictional seas, there have been disputes on the boundaries and island sovereignty on the one hand, and there are also international cooperations in the exploration and exploitation of marine resources on the other hand. While China has its own interests to protect be it on the high seas or in the international seabed areas, it also sees it as its unshirkable responsibility to establish a sound and fair new maritime order of the world. Among those maritime countries that are setting up their laws of sea, China should follow the trend and take active participation and stand up for its national interests as well as for the interests of mankind across the world. It should localize the international maritime rules and build its own image as a country of responsibility, dispel doubts and foster trust, maintain peace and stability of the oceans of Asia and the world, and seize the opportunity to develop itself.

Since its reform and opening up, China has amassed rich experience and formulated pertinent laws and regulations with regard to exploration and maintenance of marine resources, exploitation and protection of its islands. It has redefined the functions of the ocean, the ownership administration of the jurisdictional seas, the compensation systems for the use of the seas, the integrated management of coastal regions and the seas, marine ecological protection, defense for maritime rights and interests, marine public service, management of marine assets, as well as cooperation and exchange of international maritime enterprises. These efforts have laid a solid foundation for the legislation of the basic maritime law, and the time is getting ripe for the formulation of a comprehensive maritime law, and now is the right time to act, rev up the preliminary groundwork for the enactment of China's basic laws of the ocean, and put it on the agenda of legislation.

China's maritime development is a major component of its peaceful development and a major force in the peaceful development of Asian oceans as well as world oceans. I firmly hold that the enactment of the law of sea meets the needs of the whole nation and its people, which, with its advent in the near future, will positively contribute to the construction of a major maritime country.

2.5 History and Reality: MSR from the Perspective of Maritime Space

"Maritime space" in its broad sense refers to the co-existence of humanities and nature on the ocean, which contains not only the objective natural entity—the ocean, but also the code of conduct of human beings who are the subjective constructors—human activities. That is, maritime space comprises of two inseparable parts: the natural ocean space and the humanistic ocean space. Meanwhile, maritime space is also the second space for human subsistence and development, a field for human beings to develop their mode of production and behavioral patterns, and to interact on the base of the ocean, or a place for human beings to construct maritime culture and engage in maritime activities. It is also a space that coexists with that of the continental civilization composed of the nomadic world and the agrarian world. Given the rampant use of the term "Maritime Silk Road (MSR)," combing and analyzing its history and reality from the perspective of "maritime space" can facilitate fundamental understanding and a comprehensive theoretical support for related academic topics. It can also help us to make the most of some not so relevant texts and materials within the realm of maritime history to avoid misreadings and hence conduce to future research work.

2.5.1 The Concept and Connotations of the Historical MSR

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century MSR during his visits respectively to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. The initiative, once proposed, not only garnered positive responses from countries and regions along the route, but also promoted local costal governments at all levels to roll out corresponding strategic guidelines to cope with the new opening up era that was to come.

Since the construction of the 21st-century MSR got off the ground at the national level, its frequency of citation in the academic field has been in the ascendant. A search of the term "maritime Silk Road" in the "Knowledge Network" shows that as many as 3377 studies were published from the 1980s to 2013; the number climbed to 4180 in 2014, hitting a high of 8280 in 2015, and dropping to 4907 in 2016. The sum of articles in these three years is nearly five times that of the past three decades, of which historical studies account for about 9.8%. The abundance of current results also reflects a wide divergence on a number of questions pertaining to the research on the MSR, which is still mired in chaos. Under such a premise, it is particularly important to effectively organize and summarize the connotations inherent in the concept of MSR in history.

As a topic for academic research, the MSR came into being around the beginning of the twentieth century and thrived in the 1980s and 1990s, stretching over a span of 100 years. The first and most widely recognized term of the MSR is actually broader in scope than that of the "Silk Road," referring to "the ancient Chinese maritime trade route from coastal towns to present-day Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa and Europe via the sea" (Zhou & Ding, 2006: 719). It is also another name for the ancient Chinese maritime trade route to various countries in the East and West (Tianjin International Trade Association, 1991: 227).

As a matter of fact, the traditional "Silk Road" had three trade routes with different environments: Desert, grassland and sea, and the MSR are one of them. It was the traditional regional sea route before the discovery of the MSR, that is, the so-called Old World sea route. Generally speaking, there were two maritime routes: One was the East China Sea route, which started from the eastern coastal ports of China and went directly to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan; the other was the South China Sea route, which started from the southeastern and southern ports of China and went through the coastal countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia to the coastal countries of West Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the west coast of the Indian Ocean. It should be noted that some scholars believe that there was a separate "South China Sea Maritime Route" that existed in parallel with the "Silk Road on land" and that the two coexisted without interfering with each other, but this view is not shared by the mainstream academia. Since the 1980s, the concept of MSR has been expanded from the so-called wooden sailing ship era to a global maritime route, including the maritime route between the old and new continents, i.e., the Pacific route from Yuegang port to the American continent via "Little Luzon" (i.e., present-day Manila in the Philippines). The connotation of

this concept has gradually been expanded from a trade route to a channel for the exchanges among civilizations.

To shed light on the relationship between the two concepts, "China" and MSR, we must first understand the historical position of the MSR. Recently, some scholars have combined these two concepts for various purposes, proposing in their studies the so-called Chinese MSR, a strongly China-centered concept, as an alternative to the MSR (Chen, 2016). However, it is important to recognize that the MSR was a sea route between the East and the West, and therefore, the accuracy of the term "Chinese MSR" is open to question. Literally, the term "Chinese MSR" can be interpreted at least from the following two perspectives: First, it refers to the Chinese section of the MSR; second, it can be understood as the MSR operated or dominated by China. In terms of historical research, both interpretations are in fact imprecise and highly lopsided. In a way, the use of the expression "Chinese MSR" instead of MSR is a self-promotion and self-appreciation, which seems to deliberately play up the historical contribution of "China" to the MSR, and as a result downplays the historical role of other countries along the MSR. This is a misunderstanding of historical facts.

In addition, a host of researchers are still jumping on the bandwagon to gather evidence around such MSR-related issues as China's platform, the starting point, the hub, and the gateway. In the wake of the competition for the title of the starting port of MSR among Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Mingzhou (Ningbo), a slew of eastern coastal cities is now vying to forge a link between their development strategies and the traditional "Maritime Silk Road," tapping into the possible historical connections in order to seek more preferential policies. At present, Qingdao, Rizhao, Lianyungang, Fuzhou, Shantou, and other cities have articulated the goal to become the strategic hub cities of the 21st-Century MSR in the days to come, while Yantai, Zhoushan, Wenzhou, Putian, Xiamen, Zhangzhou, and Haikou are also aiming to become important nodes or pivot cities. Besides, some modern port cities such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian, which have emerged only recently, have also joined the ranks as the extension areas of the historical sites, while Penglai[1] (Niu, 2014) and Beihai (Zhao, 2002) are still working hard for recognition as the starting point of the MSR.

While the exploitation of the ocean continues to go in full swing along the coastline, there still exist the misinterpretation and misuse of the concept of MSR and "MSR cities" with some confusing shipping, trade, migration, material, and cultural exchanges among China's coastal ports or between land and sea as part of the MSR. Specifically, some articles put MSR in the title, but it is difficult to find any relevant content in the text (Yuan, 2015), while others, under the banner of holding forums on MSR, just give an account of the historical situation of the local coast areas, which is utterly confusing (He & Chen, 2014). In some cases, collections of papers labeled MSR (Chen & Xiao, 2015) only include articles pertaining to maritime history or the history of overseas transportation, which is simply wide of the mark. In addition, some inland towns that supplied export goods, such as Changsha in Hunan, Jingdezhen in Jiangxi, Ganzhou in Jiangxi, Meizhou in Guangdong, and Liancheng

[1] Niu (2014: 4).

in west Fujian. Even cities which used to be the destinations of the tributes that arrived by sea, such as Kaifeng in Henan (Gong, 2008) and Luoyang, have been mistaken for the starting points or pivot points of the MSR. It can thus be seen that breaking up the historical topic of the entire Chinese section of the MSR into smaller, regional ones does not facilitate a deeper and more precise understanding of the essence of the MSR, at least in terms of actual research findings.

2.5.2 Sorting and Analyzing the Discussions on the Timeline of the MSR

After the domestic academic community broadened the definition of MSR, ideas mushroomed in the academic community on its time span. Some think MSR dates back to the first appearance of silk and has continued down to the present day. That stretches over a span of 25 centuries, covering almost the total world history. Some consider it more appropriate to subsume it within the extent of ancient Chinese history, that is, from the Zhou dynasty until the Opium War, while others contend that the lower end of the timeline should be extended to the year 1949, including the whole modern Chinese history. At present, although arguments vary and each is backed and followed by its own supporters, the classic and golden period of the MSR, spanning from the Han dynasty to Zheng He's voyages to the Western seas, is widely recognized and accepted by all parties.

According to one view, to extend the upper end of the MSR to remote antiquity is a complement to and development of the current research object of the MSR, which can be counted as an academic innovation. The study of the maritime rafting and cultural diffusion of the ancient Southern China-Austronesian family can enrich the connotation of the MSR. Another view holds that this is nothing more than a conceptual transfer, confusing the study of the MSR with maritime-related research. In fact, the "trade" and "immigration" that had occurred before the dawning of civilized societies are not related to the post-civilization "East-West dialogue" and should not be subsumed into the scope of MSR.

As for the ending time of the MSR, there is still a lot of controversy among the scholarship, and the fundamental disagreement lies in the criteria that place the nature of the era at the core.

One view holds that since the Age of Exploration in the late ninth century, the colonists of the Western world had stormed into Maritime Asia and had tremendous impact on the traditional Asian maritime system by committing pillages and mongering wars. Maritime Asia was rendered into a battleground for the maritime powers to pursue hegemony. Objectively speaking, the MSR was integrated into the worldwide maritime trade market and became an integral part of the capitalist maritime world. The MSR of this period, in terms of its basic attributes, was no longer the road for the interchange and integration among traditional civilizations, but a thoroughfare for Western colonists to slaughter and colonize. Peaceful and

friendly trade thus gave way to commodity dumping and violent plunder. The MSR had lost its former glory and halo. Hence, from the angle of historical research, to mark the finale of "Zheng He's Voyages to Western Seas" in the Ming dynasty as the end date seems to better showcase the original spirit of the MSR.

Another view suggests that the decline of the MSR and its replacement by Western colonial commercial activities should also fall within the timeline, that is, from the middle of the Ming dynasty until the early Qing dynasty (before 1840). They argue that during this period of time, the traditional nature of the MSR continued to exist while Western colonists used it to expand Chinese market with navigation and trade activities. After the Opium War in 1844, the Western invaders deprived China of its tariff autonomy and seized control of its customs office by means of unequal treaties, and also took away the navigational rights and controlled the ocean voyages along the route of the MSR, which fundamentally changed the nature of sea routes. Before the Opium War, what was imported into China from overseas was mainly expensive luxury goods while after the Opium War, Western industrial products were imported into China on a large scale, bringing a sea change to the daily life of Chinese people; before the Opium War, the majority of Chinese diaspora were mostly merchants who generally enjoyed high status in the new settlements while after the Opium War, most of them were sold overseas as hard labor and slaves (Gong, 2014; Situ, 2015). It can thus be concluded that even if the definition of the MSR is expanded, its lower end should not break through to the outbreak of the Opium War (1840). It would be rather unreasonable to regard the social changes wrought by the invasions of the Western powers in modern times as part of the exchanges and integration of the two civilizations and to subsume them in the study of the MSR.

In addition, there is still a view that with the "Great Exploration," Europeans no longer stuck to the traditional Indian Ocean sea routes, but more often took to the Atlantic Ocean and entered Asia via the Pacific Ocean introducing commodities to the pre-industrial countries, and thus extended the MSR as never before and sent huge shock waves to the entire world civilization.[2] For this reason, the study of the MSR should not be limited to ancient times, but should include modern and even contemporary periods. Of course, this argument seems to be superficially self-contained, but in fact it does not stand up to close scrutiny, and its basic assertions are too partial and essentially disconnected from contemporary research, so it is not universally acknowledged by researchers and hence should not be used as a historical symbol that we borrow nowadays.

[2] Matsuura Akira: Maritime Silk Road in the age of steamships at Beijing Forum 2015. The Harmony of Civilizations and Prosperity for All—Different Paths with Common Responsibilities: Constructing a Road for Peace: Historical Responsibility and Multiple Memory, p. 10.

2.5.3 The Location and Space Covered by the 21st-Century MSR

As its name suggests, the BRI has two main themes, namely constructing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century MSR, which are closely related and yet differ significantly from each other. To be specific, "the Belt" is short for continental development, while "the Road" for maritime development; they are blended into a unified concept, connoting the inseparability of land and ocean and the importance of integrating them into one. They are interdependent on and supportive of each other and are integrated into an inseparable unity, which symbolizes the core ideology of peaceful development and win-win cooperation. According to statistics, until 2017, China per se included, the BRI covered more than 65 countries and regions along the route, among which 10 countries from Southeast Asia, five from South Asia, one from West Asia, and one from North Africa belong to the 21st-century MSR.

The countries in Southeast Asia are the first priorities in the future construction of the 21st-century MSR, as they are geographically closest and most closely related to China (Huang & Jia, 2015). They enjoy the privileges of large room for further development, promising prospect and exponential economic growth, boasting of seaport cities like Singapore, Manila and Jakarta. And yet one thing not to be ignored is that most of the countries in this area are low income, bearing the double pressure of large bulk of economy and heavy burden of population. This, to some extent, can be viewed as both a challenge and an opportunity. Since the implementation of the BRI more than three years ago, China and Southeast Asian countries have achieved positive and remarkable progress in mutual cooperation under the 21st-century MSR framework.

According to relevant data, in recent years, about 1/3 of the world's bulk shipping, 2/3 of oil shipping, and 1/2 of container freight shipping around the world come and go via the Indian Ocean. In terms of geography, it's the only route that connects East Asia and Southeast Asia with the Middle East, Africa, West Europe, as well as America, and it's a golden line connecting the global trade at the waters. It is true that the countries in South Asia facing the Indian Ocean and located in the middle section of the 21st-century MSR enjoy natural advantages. Yet it should be noted that these countries are seriously in shortage of infrastructure, and this has actually been a common problem that plagues the developing countries along the route of the 21st-century MSR. Hence, improving the infrastructure of the countries along and around the road is a prerequisite for mutual development and cooperation. The actualization of the proposed regional cooperation between Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor will add momentum to and provide a solid basis for resolving the major difficulties.

Located at the westernmost part of the 21st-century MSR, West Asian and North African countries, which make up the League of Arab States, are the major partners to implement the BRI. In June 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed that China would develop a "1-2-3 cooperation pattern" with the League of Arab States, taking energy

cooperation as the main axis, infrastructure construction and facilitation of trade and investment as the two wings, and the three high and new technologies, i.e., aeronautical and space technologies, new energy, and nuclear energy, as the breakthrough (cited from Gao, 2015). Remarkable achievements have been made in this regard. In the next phase, further steps will be taken and efforts will be made to establish deeper cooperation with Arab States, by virtue of the increasing maturity of the top-level system design, the full vigor of pragmatic cooperation, and the wide variety in cultural exchanges.

As can be seen from above, as of now, the location and space included in the construction of the 21st-century MSR are basically a reference to the historical symbols borrowed from the dawn of the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties, respectively, when the MSR was at its prime. In the future construction, the 21st-century MSR will surely be extended and expanded further into the global maritime world, so that China can share prosperity with the entire world.

2.5.4 MSR in Maritime History

With the above discussion, we can now get a panorama of the past and present of the MSR, throw light on the source and course of its historical development, and better understand the basic concept of the 21st-century MSR, which can be taken as a key to unlocking the controversy related to maritime history.

If we make an objective analysis from a broader perspective of concerns and in the far-reaching historical dimension, it's not difficult for us to recognize the underlying motivations for proposing and implementing the BRI. Its more profound significance lies in the effort to embrace and enrich the ancient Continental Silk Road and MSR. It can be deemed as "grounded in and yet transcending the history, integrating modern China's wisdom and innovation" (Zhu, 2017). It has brought to the world the two longest cultural corridors and economic arteries from the depth of history.

Success in constructing the Belt and Road development pattern is not a matter for China alone; it also benefits all countries and regions along the route. The principles of joint consultation, joint construction, and shared benefits among all countries and regions will serve as a good guarantee for implementation of the BRI. Besides, the core ideal of the BRI is to merge Chinese Dream with dreams of different nations, so as to build mutual strategic interconnections between them. Considering the historical roots and the present concern, bringing cultural bonds to full play and bridging the gap between the countries will no doubt guarantee smooth and harmonious exchanges among the general public.

The 21st-century MSR involves a large number of countries and regions, which differ in many ways. It involves a long and arduous journey for them to break through the geographic, ethnic, political, and economic boundaries and resonate with each other at the cultural level. That's where historians may fit in. What we're working on now and for a long time to come is not to rebuild an international trade route that once existed in history. Rather, by way of meticulous academic research, we are intended

to sort out the historical facts and summarize the achievements that have been made, with a view to achieving theoretical sublimation and serving practical purposes. The current predicament, however, is that there is an urgent need of research resources and research talents specializing in the historical studies of each of the individual countries along the route. This is where great efforts need to be exerted in the future.

To grasp the gist of the BRI, instead of holding dear the traditional binary dichotomy of "sea vs. land," we should take a holistic view, transforming the stereotyped image of China as a continental country into a new one, i.e., "China is both a continental and maritime country." The issue of maritime power and land power derived from the "sea vs. land" dichotomy was a discursive construct of the 19th- and 20th-century Western expansion (Yang, 2012). The claim that China is now "rebuilding its land rights" or "seeking maritime hegemony" is sheer misinterpretation and misjudgment of the BRI. However, some individuals and institutions still hold the outdated belief that the sea comes second to the land. They mistake the BRI for such a strategy and hence appeal for return of the land power and reconstruction of the continent. This view is biased and deviates from the policy-makers' original aspiration, so it is questionable.

To study the MSR from the perspective of maritime history, it's essential to frame a discourse of it own. In previous studies, based on the concept of MSR, there occurred some newly coined terms like "ceramic road" and "tea road." The question of whether they should be taken as academic innovation or academic interference has befuddled scholars of more than one generation. The different expressions used for the same concept within the same temporal and spatial context reveal the excessively rigid adherence of some scholars to historical discourse and their insufficient concern for the present, hence losing the track of the primary purpose to get a grasp of actual reality. If researchers resort to the classics to make their point and to justify themselves, the concepts are likely to miss their connotations intended by the advocates, and in consequence deviate from the original research purpose. Looking forward, the MSR can be viewed as a pioneering undertaking, whose concept can work as a time recorder, helping people to look into its future trend. In this regard, it does not stop as a concept of maritime space, but also works as a construct of the temporal dimension of the sea, which can provide reference for future development.

Research on Maritime history is "oriented towards the maritime-related nature, humanity and society, based on the vision of the ocean. In terms of its contents, it should include the history of natural changes of the ocean, of human exploration and exploitation of the ocean, and of social and humanistic development of the ocean. Besides, the research objective of maritime history entails placing the maritime world in the world historical system and structure rather than simply dealing with navigation history, marine history, and history of maritime geo-relationship. Together, it should be an interface with the indispensable presence of plurality and diversity in history" (Yang, 2003). For this reason, whether judging from spatial or temporal perspective, the MSR should be subsumed into maritime history as a major component. The MSR provides a dimension from which to observe the history. With its particular temporal and spatial features, the perspective to be taken calls for a combination of history and reality.

Therefore, if we take maritime history as the main body and the MSR as a research field, then the research goal should focus more on realistic concerns based on historical materials and theoretical support. Only in this way can maritime history get onto the right track of its own MSR.

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Chapter 3
The Maritime History of China

3.1 China's Need for Its Own Maritime Socioeconomic History

In the past decade, China's economic historians have become increasingly concerned with the socioeconomic history of coastal regions and the history of maritime industry sectors, churning out a large number of voluminous works. The depth and breadth of these works have surpassed that of any previous period, making valuable contributions to the study of the historical lessons of China's transformation from tradition to modernity when China faces seaward and goes global.

However, limiting China's maritime development to the socioeconomic history of coastal regions, to the history of maritime industry sectors, or to the history of foreign relations has obvious defects: first, it fails to carry out multi-level and all-round academic efforts to achieve a three-dimensional dynamic argument; second, it is a China-centered one-dimensional perspective and lacks the vision of comparative world history, which leads to the lack of a clear position on maritime social economy in China's overall economic history and hence an absence of systematic disciplinary structure.

It is acknowledged worldwide that China is both a continental country in East Asia and a maritime country on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean, with a long history of ocean exploration and exploitation. However, whether China has a history of maritime socioeconomic development has long been a question of ambiguity.

China has become a grand inland-centered and unified country from early on, and the coastal areas were never treated as maritime regions, but only as subordinate to various traditional agricultural areas. The development of coastal areas, including islands, was basically a transplantation of the inland socioeconomic model. Successive dynastic rulers rarely had an active and aggressive national maritime policy, so much so that some scholars have exaggerated this propensity by putting the land before the sea as "yellow civilization" (agricultural civilization) and classified China into this category. The Western scholarship has traditionally taken the "geographic

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discovery" at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as a sign of emergence of maritime social economy, and has long equated maritime social economy with Western capitalist economy, and the history of world maritime social economy with the "history of European expansion."

After the Second World War, with the new scientific and technological revolution, changes in the world economic landscape, especially the rise of the Asia-Pacific economic region, have led the international academic community to rethink in depth the socioeconomic history of the world's oceans. The old framework that equates the world's maritime socioeconomic history with the "history of European expansion" was broken through, and a new and diversified concept was put forward. The maritime socioeconomic history of the Eastern maritime countries was given due attention. The "Maritime Silk Road," the "South China Sea Economic Circle," the "East Asia and Southeast Asia Sea Trade Circle," and other research topics have placed China within the vision of the world maritime socioeconomic history. This revolutionary shift in the world's maritime socioeconomic history has posed a serious challenge to the community of Chinese economic history.

Since the Reform and Opening up in contemporary China, the eastern coastal region rose first. The Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out that one of the main tasks of economic construction in the next fifteen years was to "guide the coordinated development of regional economies, form a number of regional economies with their own characteristics, and rationalize the distribution of the national economy." The report called for actions to accelerate the development of the Yangtze River Delta (with Shanghai as the "leader"), the Pearl River Delta, and southeast coastal area of Fujian Province as the main economic zone of the southeast coast, and the Liaodong Peninsula, Shandong Peninsula, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as the main economic circles around the Bohai Sea. These regions, with distinctive maritime social and economic characteristics, would lead China's economy to grow rapidly at steady pace. More and more people are aware that an important factor in the rise of East China is the unleashing of China's socioeconomic and historical potential of the ocean. The call of the times to enter the great ocean and move into the new century is also expecting a positive response from the community of Chinese economic history.

Under such circumstances, we need to adjust the disciplinary structure and research framework, which are the source and driving force of academic development. The establishment of a sub-discipline of Chinese maritime socioeconomic history is an important direction and goal for the development of Chinese economic history as a discipline in the future. Here, I would like to share my thoughts in this regard:

(1) What makes Chinese maritime socioeconomic history a sub-discipline is its link to the pluralistic economic structure of traditional and modern Chinese society. Archaeological and historical studies prove that the maritime culture in the east was once one of the sources of ancient Chinese civilization. In the era of traditional Chinese society, there has been a small tradition in the coastal areas, which, though waxing and waning, has never been severed from and has always

been subordinate to the predominant agricultural civilization. The shift of the regional economic center from north to south and from west to east has also provided an inherent initiating force for the maritime social economy. The sea ban policies of the Ming and Qing dynasties failed to stifle the momentum of China's development toward the sea. Under the impact and attraction of foreign maritime forces, some local areas and seas of the southeast coast have seen the early emergence of a fusion of maritime economy and maritime social organizations. The East-West trade network was formed and was connected to the world market, colliding and competing with Western maritime powers. Overseas migrant societies were also formed and interacted closely with Chinese coastal societies. While offshore fisheries declined under the sea ban policy, ocean-going fisheries and offshore aquaculture quietly emerged. Maritime social organizations (such as foreign companies, guilds, maritime merchant clubhouses, pirate groups, as well as diaspora communities and fishing village societies) developed. Coastal folks' maritime mentality grew and in some places it became the leading social and economic values. However, this development remained at the civil and local level, with spontaneous and regional characteristics, so much so that China eventually lost its competitive edge in the international maritime competition. After the Opium War, China gradually became a subordinate to the Western maritime social economy. Although the modern maritime social components were mainly introduced from the West, there were still some fields and industries that were slowly modernizing without external intervention. The Chinese model of maritime socioeconomic development has been distorted in the modern era, but the continuity of its traditions and changes is still clear and distinct.

These basic facts show that China, an Eastern maritime country, like the Western maritime countries, has experienced the evolutionary process of maritime social economy from its primary to advanced forms, from local breeding to a national force influencing the overall national social economy. This makes it possible and operative to regard it as a relatively independent subsystem and a sub-discipline of the Chinese economic history so as to study the exploration and exploitation of the sea, the various forms of social organizations, and their changes and interactions with maritime economic activities.

(2) The research tasks of Chinese maritime socioeconomic history include examining the Chinese maritime economic activities taking place in China's coastal regions, islands and maritime territories, and related outer seas and overseas regions, elaborating on the specific forms of various economic relations and social organizations in the changes of this economic movement, and revealing the regularity of the regional economic movement of maritime society. To be more specific:

The regions studied in China's maritime socioeconomic history are different from the administrative regions and natural geographical regions. They not only refer to China's local coastal areas, islands and territorial waters, but also include the outer seas, overseas countries and regions where Chinese people carry out maritime economic activities, which shows that the ocean is a mobile territory

and resource. Its concept is a counterpart to the economic circle in economics. This differs distinctly from other categories of research on Chinese regional socioeconomic history.

The research content of Chinese maritime socioeconomic history covers all or part of the existing specialized histories, including the socioeconomic history in coastal regions, history of sea frontiers, overseas transportation history, navigation history, seaport history, overseas trade history, overseas migration history, marine fishery history, marine science and technology history, customs history, sea defense history, and other specialized histories. It intersects with the history of China-foreign relations, maritime history, overseas Chinese history, and other specialized histories. It derives from various related specialized histories, but is by no means a simple patchwork. It is a self-contained and integrated system. The research needs not only to represent the viewpoint of Chinese economic history, but also the vision and academic concern of world maritime socioeconomic history, so that the study can be comprehensive, systematic, and global. In this sense, it is safe to say that it originates from all related specialized histories, but is far more complicated and comprehensive than any of the related individual specialized histories.

(3) The characteristic of the research structure of Chinese maritime socioeconomic history lies in the "interdisciplinary integration." "Interdisciplinary integration" is a strong international academic trend in the study of contemporary humanities and social sciences. It has been the catalyst for many emerging disciplines, marginal disciplines, and inter-disciplines. To develop and establish the subdiscipline of Chinese maritime socioeconomic history, it is far from enough to rely on the synthesis of the existing research results of all related specialized histories. There must be a new vision, new materials, and a solid accumulation of scholarship, and there is still a great deal of pioneering work to be done. The civil and overseas coastal materials need also to be collected and sorted out. It is still a brand-new topic to graft the research methods and tools of oceanography, maritime economics, and maritime sociology on Chinese economic history. In the process of exploration, we need to introduce the concepts and research models of Europe, the United States, and Japan on diversified maritime history. We need to absorb and digest them, so as to develop theories and methods that are appropriate to China's reality.

(4) Chinese maritime socioeconomic history is an objective existence. Previous generations of scholars have worked diligently in different aspects and fields of it, but due to the limitations of the times, they have not been able to approach it as an independent discipline. The new pioneering work is built on the cumulative academic achievements, and a high-caliber academic team is already in place. As long as we can reach consensus on the construction of the discipline and strengthen communication and collaboration, we believe that we will be able to achieve impressive results in the next decade. The development of Chinese maritime socioeconomic history is bound to enrich the content of Chinese economic history and promote the development of Chinese economic history.

3.2 Thoughts on China's Maritime Socioeconomic History

Since the reform and opening up, the eastern region of China, i.e., the coastal region, has risen to become the locomotive that steers China's rapid economic development. The driving force behind the rise of the east is an outward-looking economy with industry and maritime trade as the main axes. The real drive for this economic miracle is the reform and opening up policy of the Central Government, inter alia, the opening up to the sea, which mirrors the central government's decision to unleash the historical potential of the coastal areas in their sea-oriented undertakings. This tremendous social change has led the Chinese to reflect in depth on the transformation, which in turn has kicked off the reform in the studies of history and economics and the revival of political science, culture, sociology, anthropology, folklore, etc. All of them attempt to approach the epoch-provoking theme from different perspectives: reinterpreting China's historical heritage and tradition. What should be inherited and what should be abandoned in the process of social transformation? In more than a decade of reflection and exploration, the Chinese social science communities have likewise undergone profound and tremendous changes and made numerous breakthroughs. But it is still far behind the progress of the times and social change.

One of the questions worth rethinking is: What role should China as a major maritime country play on the western Pacific coast in the Asia-Pacific economic region in the twenty-first century? How should history, especially socioeconomic history respond to the revitalization of China?

3.2.1 The Dissonance of Chinese Modernization and Its Mentality Toward Modernity

The coastal areas and the seas to which they belong have long been ignored as a maritime region in academic studies. The so-called history of development of the maritime frontiers is only the history of expansion and extension of the agricultural culture of the central landlocked region. Maritime undertakings such as navigation and trade only occupy a place in the field of specialized history. In general history they tend to be categorized into the economic sector or foreign relations. The interactions between social economic activities on the sea and socioeconomic development on land have often been ignored. The long-term "absence" of maritime factors in traditional Chinese scholarship has caused bias in the construction of the new history, and hence unable to fundamentally reverse the tendency to put the land before the sea. Although some foresighted scholars have done a lot in this respect and spoken vociferously about it, there have been few respondents, let alone consensus.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the phrase "China is both a continental and a maritime country" was repeatedly mentioned in books and the media, but the lack of maritime awareness was also commonly witnessed, as can be seen as follows:

New discoveries in archaeology have shown that the development of ancient civilizations in China was diversified. Civilizations originated from both north and south of the Yangtze River, within and without the Great Wall, are as numerous as "stars in the sky," among which is the "maritime culture" nurtured by the coastal areas and islands, and people must treat all of them with due respect. The progress made in the fields of socioeconomic history of coastal regions, maritime history, overseas transportation history, overseas migration history, and customs history has, to a certain extent, outlined the fact of China's continuity of development toward the sea and provided a basis for reintegration of other disciplines. Unfortunately, its impact on the academic circle and social mentalities of the general public is weak and puny. In the new round of discussions between cultural and social scholars on the North-South issue in China, the Northerners and the Southerners, the maritime factor is rarely put under close observation. Even among scholars who acknowledge that China has its own traditional maritime culture, some interpret the maritime component as "maritime agricultural culture," while others propose to create a new theory of "coastal science," confining the vision of the ocean to the coast.

The idea that the sea is the "water desert" in China's historical development is deeply ingrained. It is widely believed that maritime culture exists only in the West, and that maritime culture is synonymous with Western capitalist industrial civilization. Some trendy scholars are still harping on the old tune of antagonism between Chinese tradition and modern civilization, which has spawned various "new theories" in the study of modern Chinese history. The idea that "modernization comes only after colonization" still has a market.

After the Second World War, especially after the rise of the "Four Little Dragons" in Asia and the end of the Cold War, the importance of the ocean to the development of human society has become increasingly evident. With the growing maritime awareness, the study of diversification and diversity in maritime history has become an international trend. Japanese scholars were early to perceive the relationship between the opening up of China's coast and the traditional trade circle in the Asian seas. They showed much concern to the history and development of this maritime region, and predicted that the global economic hot spot in the twenty-first century lies in China's maritime region, i.e., the "China Economic Circle" or the "South China Economic Circle," which includes China's coastal areas, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The Western scholarship has also responded with a research project on the "South China Sea." In China, the economics and oceanography communities have likewise responded, but the history community is lacking in the elan and passion. The terms "maritime economy" and "maritime society" have rarely been mentioned in history, especially in socioeconomic history treatises.

3.2.2 To Outgrow the Old Notion That Equated Maritime Economy and Maritime Society with the Capitalist Social Economy

The ocean is a source of nourishment for human society and civilization, and all coastal countries and regions are influenced by it. But the great influence of the ocean on the development of human society began in the 1590s with the "Great Age of Navigation." The European coastal countries of Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, England, France, etc., achieved their primitive accumulation and developed into capitalist economy successively by means of colonial expansion and pillage on the sea. Industrialization and international maritime trade contributed to the economic take-off of Western Europe. The Western scholarship thus asserted with arrogance that Western Europe was the center of the world, while other countries and regions were on its periphery. The history of the modern world is nothing but the history of European colonial expansion. Maritime economy is the colonial predatory capitalist economy, and the maritime society is none other than the capitalist society open to the sea.

The course of history broke the myth of the Western European centrism. With the rise of comparative history, the theory of the world system has been revised, the pluralistic development of world civilizations has been acknowledged; and it has been recognized that civilizations in all parts of the world have undergone dynamic processes of generation, diffusion, and interaction in different ways, rather than just a linear flow from the center of Western Europe to the periphery. From this perspective, maritime culture is no longer just the exclusive product of Western capitalism, and maritime economy and maritime society need no longer to adopt just one model of capitalism. The transition from tradition to modernity is no longer restricted to the single path of classical capitalism.

Since time immemorial Chinese civilization has interacted with cultures of the Pacific Rim. During the Zhou, Qin, Han, and Tang dynasties, the Central Eurasian Steppe (from northeast China to Hungary in Europe) served as the main artery for inter-complementary cultural exchanges between East and West, and the South China Sea route also emerged quietly. The traditional sea area of East Asia (from Japan and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north to the Southeast Asian countries in the south) dominated by China and the traditional sea area of West Asia dominated by the Arabs interacted and developed into the "Maritime Silk Road." In fact, China had its own traditional maritime economy and maritime society long before Western Europe did, and completed its modern transformation step by step. To find out whether there have been maritime economy and maritime society in China's history, we must first define the concepts so as to determine their connotations.

Maritime economy refers to the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of marine resources. In different historical periods, due to the development of productive forces and changes in production relations, the connotation of maritime economy constantly evolved from lower to higher levels. In short, at the lower level it is only a division of labor with land-based economy in geographical space. As a

counterpart of land-based economy on the sea, maritime economy gradually grows into five major plates of maritime industry, namely marine fisheries, sea salt production, marine transportation (shipbuilding and marine transportation), maritime trade, and maritime migration. Then it enters the intermediate level with the expansion of maritime space (from offshore to distant oceans) and the acceleration of interaction with coastal economy, which provides labor, capital, technology, commodities, and markets for direct maritime economic activities. Then comes the higher level. With breakthroughs in marine science and technology, maritime economic development has taken a three-dimensional shape. The structure of maritime industry has undergone revolutionary changes. Scientific and technological innovations have increasingly been applied in traditional industries. New maritime industries emerged (marine minerals, marine medicine, marine biological engineering, marine chemical industry, seawater desalination, etc.). Marine ranches, maritime communities (underwater cities, etc.), maritime tourism, marine environmental protection, and other sectors have also been developed. The human use of the ocean has shifted from exploiting the ocean only to protecting it. All market economies with the ocean as the stage are also included in maritime economy. This is the higher level of maritime economy.

Maritime society refers to the aggregate of social organizations, behavior regulations, ideology and lifestyles in the ocean, i.e., the social and cultural combination interacting with maritime economy. Initially, maritime societies were groups of people specialized in maritime activities along the coast and in the sea, and later they developed into grassroots organizations of the civil society, and then into local and even national social agglomerations. The behavior patterns of maritime societies are significantly different from those of land-based societies (agrarian or nomadic societies). Their policies, management styles and values are all very different. Maritime societies have different scales in line with the rise and fall of maritime economy. At the very beginning it was simply a group of people living in coastal areas and islands. Then it became a combination of "fishing village society," "sea merchant society," "pirate society," and "sea migrant society" in some sea area, and developed further into an open ocean-oriented social system, forming into "maritime regions" (coastal areas, islands, and sea areas with maritime development as the social driving force) and the "maritime State" (a coastal State or island State where maritime development is the national policy).

The concepts of maritime economy and maritime society are multi-layered and constantly changing, and thus there is no fixed pattern. All coastal countries and regions of the ocean, whether in the West or the East, have the possibility of generating and developing maritime economy and maritime society, and all have maritime civilizations shaped by their own social environment and cultural traditions. Such an understanding is closer to the real history and accords with the in-depth understanding of the world's pluralism and diversity.

Outgrowing the bias that equates maritime economy and maritime society with capitalist social economy helps to unravel the questions that have long plagued us in confronting our own maritime socioeconomic history.

3.2.3 *Five Major Relationships That Must Be Addressed in China's Maritime Socioeconomic History*

Doing research on China's maritime socioeconomic history is, from the disciplinary perspective, an integral part of the construction of a new history with diversified and multi-style research paradigm, which enriches and deepens the study of socioeconomic history.

I have once made the following statement pertaining to the mission of the study of China's maritime socioeconomic history: "From the standpoint of Chinese socioeconomic history, with the approach of 'interdisciplinary integration,' we will examine the special socioeconomic structure of China's coastal regions, coastal islands and related maritime regions, and overseas areas, and elaborate on the historical changes of this special socioeconomic structure and the specific forms of various economic relations and social organizations, revealing the regularity of the economic movement of the maritime social region." It's necessary to clarify at this point that when venturing into this research field, we need to correctly understand and deal with the following relations and determine the coordinates for observation.

(1) The relationship between China's social economy and its maritime social economy

The Chinese social economy is an organic compound of Chinese socioeconomic structure and its operation, production mode and lifestyle. Due to the interaction between natural geography and social environment, the trend of China's socioeconomic integration has gone through two significant stages: The first one came when the surrounding nomadic society and maritime society converged to the traditional agricultural society with the Yellow River Basin as the center; the second happened when the land-based society in the central and western regions moved toward the maritime society in the eastern coastal region (with Shanghai as the center). Under this general trend, the interaction and integration of various economies and societies have also given rise to various transitional forms with various regional flavors, playing either the leading or supporting role on the stage of Chinese history. The Chinese maritime social economy is a fundamental component of the Chinese social economy. In traditional times it was controlled and suppressed by the strong agricultural social economy, and remained at the civil and local level, with limited radiation to the land-based economy and society. And in times when agricultural economy declined, it often demonstrated its vitality and complemented the Chinese social economy. It is a "minor tradition" ("sub-tradition") under the "major tradition" of agricultural social economy. The existence of this "minor tradition" has provided driving force for the fundamental transformation of the general trend of China's socioeconomic development, and has continuously increased its economic and social energy toward modernization. Therefore, the relationship between China's social economy and its maritime social economy is the relationship between the whole and the part, and that between the general system and the subsystem. Therefore, it is wrong to take it for an "alien force" independent of China's social and economic system, that is, not to

recognize maritime social economy as a basic component of China's social economy. It is also wrong to take the maritime social economy for a "separating force" within China's social economy, that is, to exaggerate the incompatibility between maritime social economy and the agrarian social economy and the nomadic social economy.

(2) The relationship between China's maritime social economy and coastal agricultural social economy

The coastal area is the land facing the ocean, which is both the advance base to the ocean and the edge of the outreach and radiation of the central agricultural social economy, so it has the dual characters of land and ocean. Before the Qin and Han dynasties, the social economy of the coastal barbarians, Dongyi people and Baiyue people, was ocean-oriented; after the Qin and Han dynasties, with the transplantation of strong agricultural social economy of the central region of the Yellow River Basin, Dongyi people and Baiyue people were integrated into the traditional Han agricultural society, which excluded, hindered, or restricted the development of maritime social economy in the coastal region; after the Song dynasty, the national economic center moved southward, the basic feature of which was the shift of the nation's economic center from the northern agricultural region (with the Central Plains as the core) to the southern agricultural region (with Jiangnan[1] as the core). It was not a victory of maritime social economy over the agricultural one. The large-scale early exploration of Taiwan, Hainan, and other islands was also promoted by the agricultural socioeconomic model with the mainland coastal agricultural migrants as the main body of the explorers. It is indisputable that the land-based nature overrides the maritime nature of the coastal socioeconomic tradition, but we should see that the coastal agricultural social economy is not a simple transplantation of the inland agricultural socioeconomic model, but the result of confrontation and conflict with maritime social economy. In the course of this historical movement, the northern coast was strongly influenced by its integration into the traditional society and economy, and its maritime feature remained lackluster until the late nineteenth century, after the rise of the Beiyang (referring to the Qing dynasty name for the coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong) economy, when it regained its vitality. The southern coast was less integrated by traditional society and economy, and maintained more maritime color, which provided internal motives for China to transit from traditional to modern economy. Compared with the "orthodox" agricultural society and economy in the north, the coastal agricultural society and economy in the south were more open and commercial, which was driven by the interest-oriented maritime economy. This has made it a base for China to develop toward the sea. The coastal area is the "transition zone" where maritime society and economy meet, clash, and integrate with the agricultural society and economy. The prosperity of maritime economy and society drives the expansion of the export-oriented tendency of the coastal agriculture and handicraft industry as well as the introduction of overseas products, technology, and

[1] Jiangnan used to be a province of China in the Ming dynasty, which covered Jiangsu, Shanghai, Anhui, the north part of Zhejiang, Wuyuan County of Jiangxi, and Yingshan County of Hubei.

culture. If social unrest cuts off coastal areas from overseas markets, it can destabilize agricultural economies and societies. Likewise, the stability and turbulence of agricultural economy and society have profound impact on maritime economic and social activities. The relationship between maritime social economy and coastal agricultural social economy should be regarded as the reconciliation of a pair of fundamental contradictions within the development of the ocean region. Only by fully grasping the ups and downs, ins and outs of them can we truly understand the development path and characteristics of China's maritime social economy.

(3) The relationship between China's maritime economy and traditional market economy

From a long-term and long-distance perspective, maritime economy is self-sufficient and closed on the one hand, and open and commercial on the other hand, dominated by the latter. The development of maritime economy involves the continuous expansion of commerciality and openness. Maritime economy connects the domestic market with the overseas market, with the latter as the mainstay. There is no doubt that modern maritime economy is a market economy with the ocean as the stage. The social economy of ancient China was based on agriculture, with traditional agriculture playing the dominant role, and the scale and total amount of the commodity economy were small. However, the imbalance in the social and economic development of various regions was also manifested in the allocation of commodity economy, especially between the south and the north, and between the coastal and the inland regions. The regional socioeconomic imbalance hindered the formation of a unified national market. The market mechanism was underdeveloped, and the capital market, technology market, and labor market were lagging far behind the commodity market. However, we cannot deny the existence of the traditional market economy. The traditional market economy was the lower stage of the market economy, which was stagnant in the field of commodity circulation, characterized by short-haul and long-haul transports of commodities, and was regional and segmented in nature but adaptable to the demand for commodities in social life. With the initial mechanism of coordinating regional division of labor and exchange, it formed a certain market network. It was not capitalist market economy, but it complemented the extensive and massive small-scale peasant economy. If we can understand it in the above manner, then the traditional Chinese maritime social economy was a part of the traditional market economy, and was a link between the traditional market economy and the overseas market. The degree of radiation and influence of the traditional maritime social economy on the mainland social economy depends on the location and level of development of the traditional market economy in the mainland, which in turn constrains the speed of transition of the traditional maritime social economy to a modern one. Since China's market economy had been underdeveloped for a long time, the transformation of China's maritime social economy from tradition to modernity was arduous and tortuous, and was a far cry from the Western maritime social economy model. The study of China's maritime socioeconomic history must be combined with the study of the traditional market economy.

(4) The relationship between China's maritime social economy and overseas regions

Overseas regions generally refer to the countries and outer sea areas that communicate with China's maritime social economy by sea, and they constitute an interactive maritime economic circle with China's maritime development areas. The maritime communication between overseas regions and China is an economic, social, and cultural exchange or collision between different countries and regions, which belongs to the category of international relations. However, under certain circumstances, it is also an organic component of China's maritime social economy, and belongs to the category of China's social and economic relations. For example, it is far from enough to explain them from the level of international relations. We need also to study the following factors: Chinese expatriate communities as a stronghold or intermediary for China's overseas activities; the economic and social activities of overseas immigrants in the place of residence as Chinese expatriates and their feedback on China's social economy; the various relationships between China's transportation, economic, and trade activities in overseas areas and the local social economy, including production, circulation, and management; the "pull" of overseas maritime forces on China's social economy, the impact on China's maritime undertakings, coastal industrial structure and social changes. These are all factors that promote or constrain China's maritime social and economic development. Before the "Anshi Rebellion (referring to the rebellion led by An Lushan and Shi Siming in the Tang dynasty to fight for imperium)," the relationship between the Chinese dynasty and the East Asian maritime countries was mainly political, but after the "Anshi Rebellion," it obviously shifted to be economic. Therefore, under certain spatial and temporal conditions, some specific overseas regions are the "extra-territorial" part of China's maritime society and economy, and it is necessary to have a "big ocean" outlook and vision to overcome the bias of separating Chinese history from foreign history in order to have a holistic view.

(5) The relationship between China's maritime socioeconomic and maritime policy

In general, the existence of maritime socioeconomic forces is the basis for the development of national (or regional) maritime policy, and the degree of openness of maritime policy depends on the degree of growth of maritime socioeconomic forces. Maritime policies regulate maritime economic behavior and social behavior, which in turn are immensely counterproductive. The actual operation of the decision-making system and implementation system of maritime policy making is an important element in the study of China's maritime socioeconomic history. However, we must see that the response of policy to changes is often negative. The interaction between China's maritime policy and maritime socioeconomic realities over the ages had been a contradictory movement from non-adaptation to adaptation and back to non-adaptation, where non-adaptation dominated. The opening or closing of maritime policy was not the same as the opening or closing of maritime social economy. The sea ban policy of the Ming dynasty was a regressive maritime policy, but the maritime social economy of the southeast coast emerged in an illegal and private manner during the sea ban period; the ban on overseas immigration in the early Qing dynasty harshly penalized those who stayed abroad for a long time or overstayed, but the number of Chinese immigrants in Malacca rose sharply. These are obvious

counter-examples. It is obviously biased to look only at the open or closed tendency of maritime policies without looking at the specific responses of maritime social economy. In the study of China's maritime socioeconomic history, it is necessary to understand the dialectical relationship between maritime policies and maritime social economy, switch the focus from maritime policy evolution to the actual effects of maritime policy implementation, so as to delve deeper into maritime socioeconomic changes (concerning normal or distorted development).

In other words, the Chinese maritime socioeconomic history is neither a simple investigation of the historical changes in the maritime sector and industry, nor an investigation of foreign economic relations. It is not a simple synthesis of the two either. It is a subsystem of China's socioeconomic history. We should put it in the maritime economic sphere of different time and space, considering the internal and external push and pull forces so as to conduct a holistic historical investigation of the economic and social changes in China's maritime development regions. The creativity of this perspective lies in looking beyond China and adopting the research method of "interdisciplinary integration." Only in this way can a substantial breakthrough be achieved on the basis of the existing foundation.

3.2.4 Ten Directions for the Study of China's Maritime Socioeconomic History

Looking out to the ocean, we can see that the connotation of China's maritime socioeconomic history is rich and colorful. I have advocated exploring the historically accumulated maritime humanistic and social resources from 10 research directions, as detailed in Sect. 2.3 of Chapter 2.

These maritime humanistic and social resources are hidden in various official texts, archives, local histories, private writings, notes and novels, and folk literature. They are scattered in the archives and documents of countries and regions related to the maritime economic circle. If we put our efforts into combing these sources, using these new materials, discovering problems and solving them, we can gradually establish and improve the structure of China's maritime social and economic history.

The need for a new structure in China's maritime socioeconomic history does not mean to deny or belittle the research results of previous generations of scholars at home and abroad. Due to the limitations of the times, previous works were mostly focused on the progress of individual research, and thus lacking in multi-perspective, all-round integration. Some research efforts were caught in cumbersome textual criticism, or focused on just one field, so that there was not an overall concept of "China's maritime socioeconomic history." But their research is indispensable. The concept of "China's maritime socioeconomic history" is developed from existing achievements such as "overseas transportation history," "maritime trade history," "history of foreign economic relations," "maritime China," "maritime development history," "maritime migration history," and "maritime fishery history." Only after

the intersection, infiltration, and integration can we achieve a qualitative leap, give meaning to this emerging discipline, and this may be more in line with the call to learn from the past when China strives toward the ocean and modernization.

Grounded in reality and facing history, the research on Chinese maritime social and economic history should rightfully focus on the arduous journey of transition from tradition to modernity, i.e., the positive and negative lessons of maritime socioeconomic changes since the Ming and Qing dynasties. This field of Chinese socioeconomic history calls for a new generation of scholars who stay committed to historical truth and work tirelessly to pursue scholarship. I sincerely hope that more young scholars will devote themselves to this endeavor.

3.3 The Loss of Ocean: A Myth of Chinese History

With increasing pressure from population, natural resources, and environmental problems, China has shown unprecedented concerns over the past, present, and future of its oceans.

What are China's oceans? There are several layers of meaning here: first, the geographical ocean. It refers to the ecological environment and marine resources in China's marine areas and exclusive maritime economic zones; second, the social ocean. It refers to China's maritime power, including the political, economic, and military power to explore, exploit, manage, and control the ocean, i.e., the strength of the central government and the civil society to manage the ocean; third, the cultural ocean. It refers to China's operational mechanism and development model to create maritime civilization. Chinese people used to know little of the source and course of these three, and have not reached consensus.

Compared with the nineteenth century, China's oceans have outgrown from the previous dependence on and are no longer under the control of Western maritime powers. The ocean has played an increasingly significant role in economic development and social progress. Communities of natural and social sciences have developed into a new stage in terms of accumulated knowledge about China's oceans. In terms of historical studies, achievements abound ranging from the earliest research on the transportation in the South China Sea in the early twentieth century down to the historical studies of today, including the history of sea frontiers, the socioeconomic maritime history, the history of overseas transportation, the history of navigation, the history of overseas trade, the history of marine fisheries, the history of customs, the history of coastal defense, the history of maritime affairs, the history of China-foreign relations, the history of Chinese and overseas Chinese, the history of international students, the history of marine science and technology, among other branches of specialized history. A lot of achievements have been made. Unfortunately, these efforts are far from enough to confirm the maritime status in Chinese history. These studies still lack the potency and power of social thought. They have not even changed

the mindset of the historians who still embrace the land-based agricultural civilization. In terms of academic mentality, we have not yet walked out of the myth of the loss of the ocean, so to speak.

Traditional Chinese historical texts convey little information about China's oceans, and what has been recorded was the part of ocean that had been absorbed by agricultural civilization and entrenched in traditional mindsets. The ocean had no place in the traditional elite culture and mainstream culture, so a great deal of maritime humanities information was lost from historical memory and only some fragments of memory remained. The past dynasties were indifferent to the sea, especially since the Ming dynasty which ordered to retreat from the sea and implemented a strict sea ban policy. Engaging in maritime activities was considered "collusion with foreign countries," emigrating abroad was taken as betrayal of the State, and staying overdue abroad was labeled as "treacherous" or "abandoned." Official maritime activities, after Zheng He's voyages to the Western seas, were regarded as unhelpful to the State and abolished. In order to stop future generations of emperors from thinking of exploring the sea, Zheng He's sailing archives were burned. The social practice of maritime civilization was rejected and transformed into a circulation outside the system. This political background had witnessed the loss of a large number of materials of maritime history and furthered maritime disorientation in traditional history.

From the perspective of agricultural civilization, maritime activities, marine fishery, and maritime trade were economically insignificant. Especially after the private maritime trade flourished, the coastal socioeconomic order was impacted, and some of the sea pirates and Japanese pirates merged, which reinforced people's prejudice against the maritime society as a dissident force. In *Readings of the Essentials of the History of Land*, Gu Zuyu, a historian in the Qing dynasty, depicts this mentality vividly in a dialogue with the guest:

The guest said: "…Japanese barbarians scourge our China. Is it because of the ocean?" He said: "The pirates are not all Japanese. There are also Quanlang[2] people from coastal areas of Fujian who used to stray on the sea and ended up being outlaws in league with Japanese pirates" (Gu, 2005).

For another example, in the Ming dynasty, there were many overseas immigrants in the expatriate countries who were selected as tribute envoys to China. They played the role of a bridge between China and foreign lands, but in the eyes of traditional historians, these "Chinese barbarians" served as "spies." As Yan Congjian writes in *The Record of Different Regions around China* (1993).

The envoys sent by the barbarian countries around China were mostly not natives. They were the unworthy Chinese who changed their names and stole official positions, and were then sent as an agent of espionage in the capital of China. They did not just do business here, but pried into every aspect of China, including the vicissitudes

[2] "Quanlang" originally refers to the Quanzhou barbarians who participated in the Lu Xun uprising in the Eastern Jin dynasty. They were also known as "yachtsmen," but here it refers to the merchants and pirates who wandered the seas in the Ming dynasty. A "Quanlang" was not regarded as a revered maritime hero, but a "rebel" who undermined the stability of the country.

of Chinese dynasties, and the information on whether there was a good agricultural harvest, whether there were sufficient armaments and whether the northern tribes were strong, etc. They poked around and reported to foreign countries. If foreign countries had any intention to invade China, these people were responsible for it. (Yan, 1574).

Their deeds have become a distorted "intentional memory" that fills the history books and reinforces the national indifference to the ocean.

With the development of modern history, fragments of Chinese maritime history have been rediscovered from civil documents, relics and customs, and overseas documents, which have provided information to reinterpret traditional historical texts. Many of them have been deciphered, so we know that the sea was also an element of Chinese civilization, and that the long-standing maritime activities were a subtradition under the great Chinese tradition. The ancient China Sea region was an area with maritime civilization that was comparable with the European Mediterranean and Indian Ocean maritime civilization. Mr. Ling Chunsheng called it "the Asian Mediterranean." It was recognized worldwide that maritime transportation during the Han, Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties was among the most advanced in the world. During the global maritime era, that is, after the "Great Geographic Discoveries," China's maritime activities were not as feeble as traditional historical texts suggest. China's official retreat from the sea in the mid-Ming period to its return to the sea in the late Qing dynasty was not a simple reaction to external stimuli, but also a result of its own internal factors. However, many of our Chinese historical texts are still devoid of the concepts of maritime regions, maritime economy, maritime society, and maritime culture, and they merely describe the achievements of China's maritime development as those of agriculture, handicraft economy, regarding maritime development as the diffusion of traditional agricultural civilization from the center to the periphery. In recent years, the number of books on maritime humanities has increased (Yan, 1574), and the argument that China does not have a maritime culture is not openly advocated any more. However, it can be seen from several Chinese maritime theories that the traditional mindset of emphasizing land over sea still holds much sway.

The first claim is that traditional Chinese maritime culture is essentially maritime agricultural culture. "Luotian,"[3] a farming method of exploiting the sea, emerged early on the coast of South China. There is no doubt that Luotian was a kind of maritime agriculture. However, it is misleading to consider it as the dominant form of maritime development in China, and even more misleading to take it as the essential feature that distinguishes Chinese maritime culture from Western maritime commercial culture.

Maritime culture, as the cultural adaptation of man to maritime environment, is manifested in the direct and indirect exploration and exploitation of marine biological resources (such as marine fish, marine medicine), marine space resources (including

[3] "Luotian" refers to a farming field with a wooden frame and a layer of soil and aquatic plants. It was floating on the surface of water in a swamp. Cereals were grown on it, and the framed field went up and down with water without being flooded.

seaports, sea enclosures, seaside industries, marine transportation, maritime trade, marine oil and gas, coastal tourism, submarine tunnels, fiber optic cables, maritime cities, marine defense), seawater resources (sea salt, seawater desalination, etc.), marine energy resources (tidal energy, wind energy, current energy, wave energy), marine mineral resources, and other maritime activities, as well as the various follow-on maritime social organizations and systems, including production, service, management, defense, science and technology, and other organizations and systems carried out in the land areas and islands. Traditionally, the most basic, persistent, and universal forms were marine transportation, marine fishing, and maritime trade.

The development model of the Chinese maritime tradition has been summarized vividly as "farming the sea as a field." Maritime agro-cultural theorists argue that "the core of the phrase is 'the sea as a field,' i.e., the sea is seen as an extension of land-based farmland, and the value of farmland is simply emphasized in the sea itself" (Ni & Song, 1997b: 1361). In fact, using the sea as a field is an image of the coastal life depicted by intellectuals and officials in the South during the Ming and Qing dynasties to capture the maritime livelihood. However, this broad brush depiction was not done by the maritime communities themselves but by those who view the ocean from the land and liken the sea to farmland. Moreover, "field" here does not mean agriculture, but marine transportation, marine fishing, and maritime trade, such as "the sea is the field, the coastal people fish and share crops for a living"; "fishing is the business, the sea is their field"; "the boat is the house, the sea is the field and foreign trade is the livelihood." That is, the livelihood of coastal people depends on the sea, just as the livelihood of farmers rests with the fields. Maritime agriculture is a local adaptation to the coastal environment by coastal farmers, and is the result of the influence of maritime development on coastal agriculture. If we interpret "field" as agriculture or think that maritime activities such as maritime transportation, maritime fishing, and maritime trade are derived from maritime agriculture, we will inevitably misplace the subjects of maritime activities and misinterpret the message of maritime humanities. Although today our country has included the development of maritime economy in its sustainable development strategy, institutionally, there is a lack of clear indicators and sectoral divisions of maritime economy. People still use the land-based language to describe maritime economy, treating marine fisheries as part of agriculture and describing artificial aquaculture as "agro-pastoralism," which is indicative of the deep-seated trend of making unhistorical claims without being challenged by scholars.

The second claim is that "historically, the relationship between the Chinese and the sea has always been a political one. Going to the sea was just for politics or taken as the seaward emanation of the personal grace and power of the emperor" (Ni & Song, 1997a: 41). Sailing was neither unofficial nor profit-driven. It is even asserted that "the Chinese who sailed in ancient times were definitely not the Chinese who lived off the sea" (Ni & Song, 1997b: 1593).

The starting point and foothold of Chinese dynasties in dealing with overseas countries was the establishment of a "Chinese and foreign order" with China at its center, supplemented by a system of "tribute trade" that had much more political significance than economic benefits, and thus the Chinese were not able to develop

a national policy and ruling ideology sufficient to underpin a maritime civilization. However, it would be inconsistent with historical facts to assume that ancient Chinese voyages were altogether official and not at all profit-driven in nature.

Private seafaring activities for economic purposes have endured throughout the history of China. The coastal "Dan people" who were "boat-based, and making a living by fishing" were a group of people who lived totally on maritime activities. They might have been originated from the ancient sea people. There were about one million of them in Guangdong alone during the Qing dynasty. They had no connection with the land and were definitely Chinese people who lived off the sea. Since the Tang and Song dynasties, professional mariners and fishermen had braved the waves for years also out of economic motives. Not all sea merchants and shipowners "returned to the farm after getting rich at sea." Many of them died of old age on the sea. During the sea ban period in the Ming and Qing dynasties, "the coastal people were chasing profits like wild ducks, with nothing but profits in their eyes," and "they rode the waves to seek profit in the remote and barbaric places" (Li, 2012). After the opening of Yuegang port in the late Ming dynasty, a slogan went around among the mariners: "Want to be rich? Go to Burias (an island in the Philippines)."[4] Many people emigrated overseas with the motive to strike it rich. Even after the Opium War, economic factors were an important reason for emigration. The return of overseas Chinese capital, technology, and talent had been an auxiliary force in promoting China's modernization. The subjects of traditional Chinese maritime activities were fishermen, Dan people, sea merchants, seafarers, and pirates. The development of shipping routes and islands was initiated by them. If we look only at the political operation of the imperial court and limit our vision to the official feudal tributary relationship, we may neglect the existence of these social groups.

The third claim is that traditional China had no notion of sea power, and it was not until the introduction of the sea power theory put forward by Alfred Thayer Mahan, a US Navy captain, in the late Qing dynasty that an awakening consciousness of sea power occurred.

Mahan's theory of sea power claims that a nation's control over the sea includes not only the control of all or part of the sea through maritime military power, but also the control of commerce and marine shipping in times of peace. Taking into account these two elements, the first wave of Chinese awareness of maritime power started not in the late Qing dynasty, but made its debut in the *Compass for Crossing the Sea* published in the sixteenth year of Jiajing period (1537) in the Ming dynasty. According to a contemporary's reading note, this book was authored by Wu Pu, a native of Zhao'an County, Zhangzhou, Fujian Province. "The first volume of this book tells about the distances between China and those countries overseas, and if one starts the voyage from Liujia River at Taicang, he would sail certain distance to a certain island, and here islands are used as indicators of geographical distance. …Every time when he arrives at a country, he would say: this country is the counterpart of a certain place in China, and a protectorate could be set up to manage it. This southbound navigation

[4] Zhang Xie: *Dongxiyang Kao*: *Maoliwu* [*Examination of East-West Seas (Vol. 5): Burias*]. In the Ming dynasty (publishing year unspecified).

goes on and on until it reaches beyond Yunnan and stops at Hormuz. …If one sails northward also from Liujia River, and islands are still used as indicators of distance, he would likewise suggest establishing protectorates in all the counterpart countries along the route, and the voyage stops at the end of Yalu River." "The second volume of this book is about two things, one of which is about the nature of the barbarians, who are said to be happy to make acquaintance but tend to lose temper if they are defied. The author suggests opening the Department of Maritime Affairs in each of the two places, Lingshan and Chengshan, to regulate maritime trade, and says that this would be beneficial to China."[5] The very idea of setting up the protectorate to govern the vast areas south to the Persian Gulf in West Asia, north to the end of the Yalu River in Northeast Asia can be taken to mean the intention to deploy military forces at sea; the proposal to open the Department of Maritime Affairs to manage maritime trade is meant to control the maritime commerce and shipping industry. Unfortunately, these ideas of sea power could not and were not adopted by the Ming court which imposed a ban on the sea. As a result, the book was lost and had had little impact in China, and even this matter was forgotten!

The rediscovery of maritime power in China took place after the Opium War and was demonstrated in Wei Yuan's *Atlas and Description of the Countries Beyond the Seas*, which was also much earlier than Mahan. Unfortunately, it had also been consigned to oblivion for decades. By the end of the Qing dynasty, when Mahan's theory of sea power was introduced, the Chinese discovered the theory of maritime power for the third time, but its social effects were still limited.

The strange discover-forget-rediscover-reforget circle of the Chinese doctrine of maritime power is also a demonstration of maritime disorientation in Chinese history. Those who study modern Chinese history can easily be trapped in this strange circle if they cannot trace its origin.

The dominant view in the study of China's transformation from tradition to modernity holds that China is a "post-exogenous" country. Since the 1970s, the role of indigenous factors in social change has also received increasing attention. However, when looking at China's indigenous factors, the focus has been placed only on the continental China and the agricultural China, but little on the maritime China, hence the understanding of the tradition in China is often flawed by the neglect of its maritime aspects. This in turn has led to the misconception that China's modern maritime civilization could only be imported from the West, and that it embraces no continuity with the local tradition.

Over the past 20 years of reform and opening up, the eastern region has become the locomotive driving China's exponential economic development. Among them, the coastal region, consisting of counties and cities on the coastline (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), accounted for 38.1% of the country's industrial output and over 90% of the country's export trade according to the 1986 statistics. What is the connection of this regional economic growth with history? The reality has rekindled the long-lost maritime tradition in our history. Historians should focus on

[5] Dong Gu: *Bili zacun* [*Anecdotes in the Wild*] (Vol. 2). See *Yanyi zhilin* [*Records of the County of Yan*] (Vol. 39). Publishing house unspecified, 1579 (in the Ming dynasty).

rediscovering China's own maritime history to provide historical reference for the revitalization of its maritime civilization in the new century.

To find a way out of our previous disorientation about the ocean and to make the history no longer silent, we must take China's marine areas—coastline, islands, and territorial seas—as the main body of research, apply the interdisciplinary method to sort out the historical development of China's maritime economy, maritime society, and maritime culture, and summarize the experience and lessons of success and failure. This is undoubtedly a daunting but innovative task in the study of history.

The difficulty lies, first of all, in rediscovering China's memory of maritime history. There are only a few fragmentary memories of Chinese maritime history left, including unconscious memories and conscious ones, the former comprising the ruins of harbors and marine settlements, shipwrecks under the sea, etc., the latter consisting of nautical records, account books, deeds, letters and other maritime commercial instruments, maritime legends and religious beliefs, and so on. Other conscious memories also include the indirect records about the ocean from the anthologies, notebooks, diaries, inscriptions, local histories that are authored by coastal scholars, as well as the official maritime archives that are scattered in various marine areas at home and abroad where Chinese people were involved in maritime activities. In addition, there are also foreigners' accounts and foreign language archives which can help with retrieving the memories. Only by putting together these historical fragments can we hope to recapture the historical scenes (though complete re-creation is not possible).

Second, it is necessary to have a multi-dimensional vision, absorb the knowledge and academic achievements accrued from different fields of marine science and maritime humanities, and actualize interdisciplinary integration. In fact, the research of many branches of maritime humanities is still in its infancy, varying in depth and breadth, which cannot provide ready-made and accurate answers for integration.

Third, we must have the spirit of dedication and have to resist the temptations and distractions of the then prevailing fashion and the academic frivolity, which are difficult for us to do. But being difficult does not mean it is impossible. It is very likely to make a breakthrough at some point with more dedication. This is a field seldom trodden by previous generations of scholars; therefore, it is an academic arena abundant with opportunities and challenges. Based on this belief, in recent years, I have assigned my doctoral students to spend three or four years working on one topic each, laying the foundations and piloting the research for a trial. Some of the results were published by Jiangxi Universities and Colleges Press as "The Ocean and China Series," starting from the International Year of the Ocean in 1998. I can't say this book has reached the highest level, but I think it will more or less give people some inspirations. I believe that the unremitting efforts of several generations of scholars will promote people's understanding of China's maritime history to a new height, facilitate the implementation of China's maritime development strategy, and help China gain its rightful place in the international maritime competition.

3.4 Taxonomy of Maritime Humanities: A New Horizon of Chinese History in the Twenty-First Century

The first half of the twenty-first century will witness China's transformation into a modern society. Faced with the wave of economic globalization that began in the Western world, with what kind of "cultural awareness" will the Chinese nation integrate into the mainstream of international society while retaining its own identity and achieve its great rejuvenation? What is the direction of the adaptive change in the human environment, which is heavily burdened with tradition? Opportunities pop up side by side with challenges, and there are many different international and national observations and predictions. The creation of history stems from a historical awareness of national traditions, and how far we look into history means how far we will go in reality. The challenges of the times, therefore, will breathe new life into the development of Chinese history community, who are bound to reflect on the traditional modes of research in the twenty-first century, to examine the blind spots and gaps in its vision, to explore new topics that the times demand, and to achieve new understandings and make new interpretations.

The historical issue most directly related to the requirements of the new era is why China lost the opportunity to develop toward the world during the first wave of globalization set off by the so-called Great Geographical Discoveries at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. And why did China gradually fall behind and even suffer foreign assaults? Is it possible for China to avoid repeating the disastrous history in the twenty-first century?

On 2nd March 2001, the eve of the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the *U.S. International Herald Tribune* published a byline article, arguing that "China's leaders have several possible options to choose from as far as the country's future is concerned. The direction they choose will change the entire world." The possible options include retreating to a less integrated China, maintaining the status quo, i.e., a limited open China, and integrating the global Chinese communities into a virtual Greater China through new electronic communication technologies such as the Internet. The author is optimistic about the third option, noting that "this virtual integration of Greater China has a historical origin and a future that has not yet been perceived but may be imminent." "By choosing this third path, Beijing will fundamentally change the way the world thinks and acts in an integrated economy." The "historical origin" mentioned here refers to the tradition of China's maritime development, a Chinese social network accumulated by generations of Chinese maritime migrants. It is a maritime civilization that has long been ignored and suppressed by the dominant values of traditional agricultural society.

Fei (1989) put forward incisively the theory of "the pluralistic unity of the Chinese nation," which has been widely accepted in the history academia. However, the research model of Chinese history is limited to acknowledging and discussing the binary conflicts and interactions between agrarian and nomadic civilizations, and has not yet transcended the land-based view of history. Scholarship on China's oceans has

always played a subordinate part within the framework of agricultural civilization. In the eyes of those land-based people, the ocean is merely viewed as a frontier of the radiation and extension of the agricultural civilization of the Central Plains. Maritime economy is insignificant in terms of its economic volume, the people near the sea are "disadvantaged" in terms of social structure, and the oceanic spirit of adventure is "alienated" in terms of social values. This is almost a unanimous view of the mainstream social elite and the inland people. Therefore, just as the traditional scholars belittled maritime studies, modern historians have failed to overcome this historical inertia.

By bringing the territorial seas and the exclusive economic zones, which are equivalent to one-third of the land area, into the research scope of Chinese history, we will find the missing links in the chain of knowledge and cognitive biases. For example, the Chinese history texts we teach tend to regard marine fisheries as the agricultural sector, equating maritime economy with coastal economy, and maritime culture with the regional culture of the southeast coast including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. So much so that some people think that the Chinese people, even with their heads pillowed on sea waves, would still dream of fields and gardens, or that Chinese maritime culture is essentially part of maritime agro-culture. This can be said to be a manifestation of the "terrestrialization" of maritime history.

Such a situation must be corrected, and Chinese history in the twenty-first century needs to "rediscover" its own maritime history, so as to make adjustments to its research models, research topics, and ways of thinking.

The rediscovery of Chinese maritime history is a return to the maritime nature of the research that used to be attached to land history. While this research builds on previous scholarship, it is more than a simple aggregation of the latter. Instead, it represents a critical reflection and re-evaluation of the key concepts, highlighting the need to transform academic mindsets and to reconsider and reposition the objects of research.

Chinese maritime history is the one chronicling how Chinese people ventured from land to ocean, how they understood, explored, and exploited the marine resources, and how they adjusted the relationships between themselves and between them and the sea, and thus created a material and spiritual civilization of the ocean. Venturing from the land to the sea refers to the fact that human beings were born on the land, and seafaring activities were developed later. It also means that the territory of maritime activities is not confined to the sea areas alone; it also includes the land areas of the coastal zone and the land in the sea, i.e., islands. All the Chinese or foreign maritime countries are no exception. The coastal land area within China's sovereignty today covers 250 counties and cities in 12 coastal provinces (districts and cities), as well as Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese mainland coastline is more than 18,000 km. The land area of the coastal zone could reach up to 270,000 km^2 if calculated using the standard in the Ming and Qing dynasties (the coastal area extends 15 km from the coastline), and the area could be larger if calculated taking into account the area of counties and cities with coastlines. China has more than 6500 islands that are upwards of 500 km^2 including Taiwan and Hainan. These land and sea areas are linked into a man-land system of maritime characteristics. It was a subsystem of the

Chinese social history with agricultural society as the mainstay. From the perspective of social anthropological humanities, it can be called a maritime humanistic type.

Maritime humanities are the counterpart of land-based humanities. The main venue for agricultural humanities is the farmland, for nomadic humanities the grassland, and for maritime humanities, the sea. Human exertion toward different directions leads to different forms of civilization. The internal structure of maritime humanities is oceanic by nature. The oceanic nature here refers not only to the natural properties as understood by human beings, but also to the social properties of the production and life style created by humans through their interactions with the sea. Its essential characteristic is living off the sea. With shipbuilding, ports, supplies of goods, etc., inseparable from the land, maritime humanity has a land-based nature, but it is secondary after all.

The operating mechanism of maritime humanities lies in its mobility. Maritime activities are constantly changing as the sea extends in all directions, and ships are mobile homes for those living off the sea. The places on the land where they disembark also keep changing. Viewed from the standpoint of the ocean, these people are masters of the sea rather than "stragglers" abandoned by the land. Mobility is accompanied by the aggressiveness of competition and adventure, the sadness of wandering without roots, and the openness and individualism that encourage them to contact the outside world. If they lose mobility, they lose the momentum of development.

The core social value of maritime humanities is its profitability. The purpose of chasing after the fish swarming around was to sell the catch; the purpose of sailing was for higher profits. For economic benefits, these sea people would risk their necks and flout moral principles, worship those who could rake in huge profits as their idols, be they sea merchants or pirates. Loss of profitability meant loss of the meaning of existence.

The main body that creates maritime humanities refers to the social groups directly engaged in maritime activities, including various official and civil maritime forces. The "shipboard society," a combination of various social groups, had its own organizational system and behavior, and had the characteristics of a small society, which is significantly different from the land society. The coastal land-based social groups that occasionally or indirectly engaged in maritime activities were also involved in the creation of maritime humanities, but the situation is a bit more complicated. As for those who were both land-based and sea-based, some of them abandoned the land and went to the sea, such as the coastal farmers, poor people, and intellectuals who had been transformed into sea migrants, retaining a strong land-based nature and a strong attachment to their native land. At the same time, they put an oceanic spin on these emotional attachments. They identify with people from their homeland and with the latter they built the shipboard community, and replacing the rural protector god with the sea guardian deity. Some others abandoned the sea and moved to the land, such as fishermen-turned farmers who lived on the land, and "agro-pastoralized" maritime activities, engaged in aquaculture while retaining their maritime nature.

The said characteristics that define maritime humanities are primarily concerned with the subjects who create maritime humanistic civilizations. As for terrestriality, it is obviously the result of the interactions between maritime and terrestrial humanities,

therefore it must and can be interpreted in the context of the interrelationship between maritime and agricultural humanities.

Agricultural humanities, nomadic humanities, and maritime humanities were the three most basic types of humanities in traditional China. However, there were also many transitional or mixed forms that existed in between these three types, reflecting their interactive and complementary nature. The societies in these transitional or mixed forms range from the semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral, the semi-agricultural and semi-maritime, the predominantly pastoral and partly agricultural, the predominantly agricultural and partly pastoral, to the predominantly agricultural and partly maritime, or vice versa. But taking Chinese history as a whole, the three major humanities were the different sources of Chinese civilizations, which eventually converged into a pluralistic civilization with agricultural humanities at the core. However, the nomadic and maritime humanities, which were not in the mainstream, did not vanish into thin air. Instead, the unbalanced political, economic, and cultural development provided space and time for each to develop independently. To define traditional Chinese society as agricultural society is obviously incomplete. We should not ignore the maritime society just because they have been marginalized by the mainstream society, nor should we wear the glasses tinted with agricultural humanities and take it for "an alien force." From the overall perspective of world history, the grasslands and the sea were the stage of encounter and clash between Chinese and Western civilizations, and the big channel of exchange between heterogeneous civilizations. The nomadic or maritime humanities acted as the pioneer and intermediary for the outreach of Chinese traditional agricultural civilization. They are not negligible. In particular, almost every era of Chinese history was replete with the activities of social groups of the maritime humanities, such as fishermen, Dan people, ship workers, sailors, sea merchants, pirates, etc. Just the scope of the ocean and the number of people working in it exceed those of many maritime countries! Moreover, their existence has historical continuity, which is not found in many maritime countries. Their real history cannot simply be represented by stories of the officers capturing pirates.

With the growing maritime awareness among Chinese, it behooves us to draw attention to the historical destiny of China's maritime humanities in order to meet the needs of reality and the disciplinary construction. There is every reason to believe this field deserves to be recognized as one of the major objectives of the development of Chinese history in the twenty-first century. Despite the fact that much of our historical scholarship has been "terrestrialized" over the past century, we have still amassed a wealth of knowledge and potential in this field, and now is the time for a fresh start.

(1) The historical research of Chinese maritime humanities will gradually be unshackled from the chains of terrestrialization, and develop a theory and system with its own characteristics by returning to the essence of the sea, and establish its own research platform and academic norms.
(2) The historical study of China's maritime humanities will gradually develop from the study of specialized history to the common and comprehensive study

of various branches of history, expanding the scope of regional and comparative study from the Chinese seas to the world's oceans, opening up new horizons in the historical study of maritime China and the maritime world, and taking its place in the world's maritime history.

(3) The in-depth exploration of the historical study of Chinese and world maritime humanities would facilitate the integration of different types of humanities, ultimately leading to the convergence of these different histories into a never-before-seen narrative of Chinese and world history.

By focusing on the maritime aspects of Chinese history, we have the opportunity to broaden and deepen the nation's studies of history and to contribute to the broader and deeper development of Chinese humanities and social sciences. This also has the potential to enhance the dialogue and exchange between Eastern and Western civilizations, fostering mutual understanding and cooperation. I suppose this is not as surreal as "a created myth" or "a tale told by an idiot."

3.5 The Ocean Century and Maritime History

3.5.1 The Concept of "Ocean Century"

In May 2001, the Assembly of States Parties of the United Nations document proclaimed that "The twenty-first century is an Ocean Century." In other words, maritime development is the major issue of human development in the twenty-first century. Yet we are still in need of a comprehensive explanation for why the maritime issue is considered characteristic of this century. To my understanding, we can examine the roles that the ocean plays in the development of the human society in this new century in the following four aspects.

(1) The ocean is the second space for human subsistence and development

We used to view the ocean from the land-based standpoint, taking marine resources as a blessing. The positive significance of the ocean to human subsistence and development seemed to consist in its function as the main artery for the exchange of civilizations between different continents, which connected different peoples like neighbors. As we look back, such a view is obviously one-sided and narrow-minded. Researchers of modern marine science and humanities and social sciences are well aware that in the marine areas where human beings live, their economic activities are combined with the marine ecosystem and developed into maritime economic ecosystem, and the ocean per se is the space for human subsistence and development.

The nature of the ocean is closely related to human subsistence. The ocean takes in 4/5 of the surface heat radiated from the sun, regulates the geographic heat distribution in the atmosphere, working as a natural air-conditioner. It takes in carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and emits 70–80% of oxygen into the atmosphere, which keeps the gas composition in balance, serving as the lung of the earth. It evaporates an

annual volume of 446,000 km^3 of fresh water, which takes the shape of wind and rain, one-tenth of which falls to the land, serving as the "mother of land lives." The ocean is thus essential to human subsistence and development, and is the fundamental component of the supporting system for human life.

In the wake of World War II, with the inadequacy of living space on land owing to the rapid growth of the world population, the ocean space has become a basic necessity for human subsistence. Deterioration of eco-environment on land and shortage of resources have driven human beings to discover marine resources and carve up the ocean space. One coastal country after another modified their proclamations for maritime rights and launched the "ocean enclosure movement." On 16th November 1994, the *UNCLOS* took effect, which changed the conventional pattern that the high seas lie beyond the territorial waters, so that more than 30% of the oceans on the globe were included under the jurisdiction of the littoral countries. These countries also exercise jurisdiction over the internal waters, territorial seas and air space, sea beds, and subsoil. Other jurisdictional waters, such as contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, straits for international navigation, and archipelagic waters, carry different levels of rights, namely, exclusive rights, jurisdictional rights, or administrative rights, respectively. These five types of maritime areas are not only different from internal and territorial waters, but also from the high seas, yet the coastal countries and archipelagic states have put under their de facto territorial control the maritime areas that are subject to specified legal systems. This has brought about unprecedented changes to the territory of the world ocean. The division and administration of the ocean has become a major issue to be settled by international communities.

(2) The ocean is the pivot of economic development

There are an abundance of biological and mineral resources in the ocean, which are precious wealth to sustain mankind's development. The ocean's capacity of providing food for human being is more than 1000 times that of agricultural products around the globe. More than 80% of all proteins that mankind needs come from sea products. We can cultivate salt-tolerant crops by genetic modification and genetic engineering, develop seawater irrigation agriculture, and grow terrestrial plants in the sea, so as to ease the pressure of agriculture on land. Sea water can be used for industry and utilities and for extraction of various chemical elements to be processed into different kinds of chemical products. It can even be desalted into domestic water, which has become a major means of developing sustainable fresh water. Various kinds of marine energy, including tide energy, wave energy, current energy, ocean thermal energy, and salinity gradient energy, are renewable resources dependent on sea water, amounting to a total volume of over 3 billion kilowatts. The reserves of marine oil and natural gas are predicted to be 1400 billion ton. The international seabed area, which accounts for 49% of the land surface area of the earth, contains rich resources of polymetallic nodule, cobalt-rich iron / manganese (ferromanganese) crust, and hydrothermal sulfide. In the 300-m-deep ocean floor near the continent and the permafrost zones there reserves gas hydrate (commonly called flammable ice), an energy resource estimated to be more than twice that of the total known storage of coal, oil, and gas, which can last 1000 years for human use.

The ocean is the fundamental basis for human life. The regions where economy, society, and culture are best-developed are concentrated in the coastal areas, around 60 km from the coast, which accommodate half of the world's population. More than 70% of the total value of the international trade derives from marine shipping. One-third of the world's tourism revenue comes from the ocean. It is estimated that around 3600 people are moving to the coastal areas on a daily basis. According to the estimation in *Agenda 21*, by 2020, the population inhabiting the coastal areas would reach 75% across the world.

The ocean has high ecological value. According to the report of The Independent World Commission on the Oceans in *Ocean: Our Future*, the global eco-value of the ocean is assessed at 46.122 trillion US dollars, which means each square kilometer of the ocean can provide an annual average eco-service value of $57,700 for mankind. And as per the report by the UN General Secretary on ocean affairs in 1999, the eco-value provided by the marine and coastal ecosystem amounted to 21 trillion US dollars, in contrast to mere 12 trillion US dollars of the eco-value of the land.

Today the natural value of the ocean as exploited by mankind and the value produced by human labor invested into the oceans as well as the value of the artificial water bodies are by far much lower than that of the land. The contribution of maritime industry took up only 4% of the global GDP in 2001, and 10–20% in developed countries. So there is still great potential for exploration, and maritime economy will become the new pillar of the international economic development.

(3) The ocean is the inner outer-space for strategic competition

The prominence of energy and economic security and the application of high and new technology in military have given new connotations to the security and strategic status of the ocean. While the conventional strategic thinking of "controlling the world by controlling the marine channels" is not outdated, the focus of competition has gradually shifted to the multi-dimensional ocean, especially to the still unknown "inner outer-space"—the 500-m-deep-sea area. There are defense troops deployed in the coastal zones, bay areas and islands, navies on the sea, submarine forces under the sea, and missiles in the seafloor bases. Together they constitute the future basic pattern of navy deployment. The main strength of the strategic nuclear force has shifted from the land to the ocean, with missile nuclear submarines and anti-submarine weapons as the major players, deployed in different seas around the world.

(4) The ocean is an important platform for innovation of science and technology

Major issues of science await to be dealt with, such as global warming, climate changes, the origin of life, and the origin of mankind. They depend much on the progress of research on marine science. There has arisen the research of ocean mega-science, including the Global Ocean Observing System, ocean drilling programs, submarine hydrothermal circula and its ecosystem, marine biodiversity, integrated administration of coastal zones, etc. Human knowledge about the ocean is far from sufficient, but its potential as a mega-science, and for economic benefits and utilizability has aroused much concern. High and new marine technologies and

maritime industries are budding and bringing new hope for the development of human civilization.

"The ocean is the way out for future civilization." The exploration, exploitation, and protection of the ocean are bound to be the main objective of human society in its pursuit of advances and leaps in the twenty-first century.

3.5.2 The Rise of Maritime History

The emergence of ocean century results from the evolution of the world history. Yet, if we reflect on the history of mankind moving from land to sea, we can detect the blind spots that exist in the arguments of history.

For long, the dominating system and structure of the world history has been land-based, and Europe-centered. Since the second half of the twentieth century, the system has drawn wide criticism and doubts, giving rise to some novel theories about the world system. Modern research of history has broken the shackle of the Europe-centered theory and has taken a global vision, but the mainstream ideology and narration are still continent-centered. The ancient world was split into two parts, farming and nomadism, hence the ancient world history deals with the interrelationship between the agrarian world and the nomadic world, their internal interactions, impacts and conflicts, and the historical progression from primitiveness, segregation, and separation to integration. Modern world history, on the other hand, is concerned with the conquest of the industrial world over the agricultural and nomadic worlds. People are aware of the impact that the ocean has had on the world civilization. For example, the Mediterranean world provided an essential geographical stage for the classical civilizations of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, and smoothed the path for the commercialization of the slavery economy. The "Great Geographical Discovery" kicked off the global commercial revolution and overseas colonial expansion, resulting in the formation of the world market and the era of capitalism. All this should be attributed to the ocean, which has become the main artery connecting different continental civilizations and facilitating the integration of all continental civilizations.

China as an ancient Eastern country was world famous for its brilliant agricultural civilizations, whose traditional culture has long been vividly depicted as "loess culture." Progress in modern research shows that the traditional Chinese culture did not manifest itself as mere unidirectional dispersion of agriculture from Central China to the periphery in all directions, but as mutual interactions and inspirations among multiple source cultures, and thus it earned recognition as being pluralistic yet holistic in terms of its historical system and structure. But in all the literature and textbooks of Chinese history, ancient China is still portrayed as a binary structure of the agrarian world and the nomadic world, respectively. While scholars do notice the ocean and mention the well-developed navigation of ancient China, the Maritime Silk Road, and the glory of Zheng He's voyages to the Western seas, they

are considered no more than the interactions between China's agricultural world and overseas politics, economy, and culture, and the seaward extension of agriculture.

It is true that man belongs to land animals, therefore land is the major carrier of human civilization, and the development of land-based civilization is the mainstream of the world history. And it's also correct to consider the unity of opposites, that of farming and nomadism, as fundamental in the development of civilization. The question then arises: Since man has moved from land to ocean, is the ocean simply a channel for the interaction between land-based civilizations, or is it a space for human subsistence and development? Does there exist a maritime world apart from the two?

Progress in archeology and anthropology indicates that human activities at sea are as old as those on land. Maritime civilization has its own unique source and course of development. Historians find that not only the history of the Mediterranean areas developed synchronously with the ships navigating in the Mediterranean Sea and the history of the seamen; Asia and America also had their own "mediterranean seas" serving as the cradle of the sea people. Before the "Great Discovery," maritime civilizations had communicated with each other across the continents. Using the ocean as the communication channel for civilizations of different continents can be ascribed to previous contacts and interactions between different maritime civilizations. If these historical facts are acknowledged, we should then take the maritime world as another type of living space for human subsistence and development, and consider it as another form of civilization.

The once predominant discourse of maritime history resulted from the developed Western maritime countries' expansion of maritime power. The ancient maritime history is none other than the expansion history of the Mediterranean civilization, the modern maritime history is no more than the history of how the Atlantic powers conquered the ocean and then the land across the world via marine force. The countries in Asia were deemed as part of continent and hence it belonged to river civilizations. While these countries did have maritime activities, the ocean didn't exert much influence on their cultures, therefore they were not entitled to the creation of the maritime world history. Non-Western maritime cultures were described as "barbarous, primitive, and heterogeneous." After the Second World War, the decolonization of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the struggle for the 200-nautical-mile maritime power have restored their positions as the creators of maritime culture. This calls for a reversal of the reversed maritime history. The developed maritime countries have also changed their perception of the ocean, with their maritime culture pattern conversed from plundering at sea to exploration of marine resources and protection of marine environment, which also requires a novel interpretation of maritime history. This is the background for the rise of maritime history.

Maritime history refers to any ocean-related historical research on nature, society, and humanity related to the ocean from the maritime perspective. Theoretically, this includes the history of natural ecological change and the history of human exploration and exploitation of the ocean and the humanistic development of maritime society. It differs from the traditional ocean-related specialized histories in that the former is a holistic ocean-based historical research, and that it takes the communities practicing

maritime activities as protagonists in history, looks at land from the perspective of the ocean, and explores interactions between man and the ocean and interactions between the maritime world and the agrarian and nomadic worlds. Its academic objective is focused on the status of the maritime world in the system and structure of the world history, rather than the more specialized history of navigation, of territorial waters, and of marine geo-relations. This is the indispensable perspective from which we recognize the plurality and diversity of history. Taking the perspective of the ocean entails changing the unidirectional linear mode of thinking that maritime development is the mere extension of land-based development. To my understanding, the maritime world carries with it the following multi-level implications:

(1) The maritime world is a space in which human beings practice maritime activities and culture creations

Mankind has been exploring and exploiting the ocean and has built up various maritime sectors, industries and social systems. Maritime activities include direct and indirect exploration and exploitation of the sea, where ships are the major carriers. Ships connect all the coastal areas from start points to end points on land (including islands in the ocean), which then shapes the social network in coastal areas. Thus the spatial structure of the maritime world, is, so to speak, composed of coastal regions, islands, and territorial waters. We used to believe that only when mankind went overseas from their old residences to the newfound land could it be viewed as opening up a new living space, and ignore the fact that maritime activities per se are a kind of living space. As a matter of fact, should there be no capacity to survive at sea, it is out of the question for mankind to cross the ocean and to explore and exploit sea waters and seabed resources.

(2) The maritime world refers to the maritime humanistic world

Maritime culture is the result of the "humanization" of the natural oceans by those living in the coastal zones and seafaring communities. In coastal regions, islands, and territorial waters that are unfit for human life and navigation and are lacking in maritime activities, there is naturally no maritime culture. Different marine environments and maritime cultures under different ethnic groups vary in styles and characteristics, as well as in levels of development. But they do share some common characteristics, i.e., they all belong to the drifting and flowing shipboard communities, such as fishermen community, maritime commerce community, and vikings, etc. Their organizational systems and behavioral patterns differ widely from social organizations on land. Long voyages at sea challenge the sailors physically, physiologically, and mentally as well. Maritime elements permeate into and become an indispensable part of their material and spiritual lives. People who live in coastal regions and engage in indirect maritime activities are the backup force for the shipboard communities, forging linkage with the society on board, whose production mode and lifestyle are tied to the ocean, and whose behavioral patterns are deeply influenced by the ocean.

(3) The maritime world is a subsystem within the larger system of human society, and just like the agrarian and nomadic worlds, it has also experienced a historical

process of changing from the primitive, isolated, and decentralized state to the united and integrated

As mankind's understanding of the oceans continues to deepen, its capability to explore and exploit the oceans further improves, the scope of maritime activities extends gradually from the near sea to the farther and deeper blue, the maritime worlds also evolve from low-level to high-level forms, from regional to global, and from the exterior depth-wise to the three-dimensional. Maritime civilization does not represent an advanced form of civilization as opposed to or superior to the land-based civilization. The oceanic world is not a secluded social humanitarian system and has always kept its interrelationship with the terrestrial world. The sea world has attracted successive generations of people going from land to sea, and the civilization fruits they brought from land merged in and catalyzed the creation of a novel maritime civilization; likewise, the civilization fruits reaped from the ocean also fed back to the land, leading to the renovation of the land civilization. If this understanding makes sense, the ocean did not just provide the venue for the cross-continental interactions in the system and structure of the world history (including Chinese history), but also played a role in the dialogues, communications, and interactions with the agrarian and nomadic worlds.

As can be seen from the above, the issue of maritime history consists in inquiring about its status in the system of the world history. It behooves historians to first rediscover the historical resources of the maritime world, observe the development and evolution of the maritime world, recognize its status and place it in the rightful position after weighing up different perspectives pertaining to land and sea. In this sense, maritime history can be taken as a method or a channel via which to explore the history of the whole human society, and this is fundamentally different from the discourse of cultural hegemony which claims that the ocean stands for the Western world, modernity, advancement, and openness, while land stands for the Eastern world, tradition, backwardness, and conservativeness.

3.5.3 The Outlook of China's Maritime History

China is both a continental country in East Asia and a maritime country on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean. Therefore the development history of China points to two directions, i.e., land-oriented and ocean-oriented. In the course of its formation, China was not merely a conglomerate of agricultural ethnic groups, but a pluralistic nation composed of nomadic and maritime ethnic groups as well. In the ancient times, the coastal regions of China were connected by seas to Southeast Asia and West Asia, hence forming an interactional network of maritime economy and culture. In the Song and Yuan dynasties, China grew into a major maritime country. After Zheng He's voyages, the Ming dynasty backed off from the ocean for a time, but toward the end of Ming, with Yuegang Port opened, China retained its leading position in the maritime trade network of East Asia. General Zheng Chenggong expanded China's trade to

Japan and the West Ocean, recaptured Taiwan and barricaded the Netherlands' marine force from forging eastward. In the Qing dynasty, China missed the opportunity of social transformation by virtue of the ocean, but the maritime tradition in the coastal areas retained its indomitable vitality and China had never severed its interactions with overseas immigrants, resources, and culture. With its reform and opening-up policy, modern China should inherit its tradition and maintain the continuity of its maritime history by building itself into a major maritime country, and achieve its goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.

China's research on maritime history calls for rebuilding a subsystem of the maritime world in terms of academics and practice, so as to sort out, pass on, and tap into the precious historic legacy. This will remedy the neglect of the ocean in historical research, enrich the content and enhance the system of Chinese history, and facilitate the theoretical innovation of the history academics. In the meantime, it will also provide historical grounds and theoretical support for China's implementation of maritime development strategies and defense for its maritime rights and interests, and draw on history to guide the practice, helping Chinese people to correct the traditional notion of putting land before ocean and persist on the China-specific route of maritime development.

The modern maritime hegemonic discourse, which takes the ocean as the exclusive rights of capitalism, precludes China from the privilege of maritime rights and interests, and has stopped at nothing to distort the history, denying the fact that China is a maritime country. In recent years, some Japanese scholars advocated the so-called Maritime Japan and The Federation of the Ocean, posing Japan as the dominant power of "maritime Asia" and disparaging China as the defender of "continental Asia," with the attempt to fabricate evidence of maritime history for the conspiracy of expanding Japan's maritime power to China's territory. All these have revealed Japan's conspiracies of deterring China from moving toward and exploiting the ocean from the historical and cultural dimensions. China is obliged to hold dialogues on equal footing with maritime countries at issue, smooth out differences and disputes and have its maritime rights and interests acknowledged by the world. The basic premise is to refute the views that attempt to tamper with history and confuse right and wrong, and to come up with China's own evidence about the maritime history. This will generate a powerful impetus for the development of China's maritime history. It is believed that in the twenty-first century, China's maritime history will draw increasing attention, and will stand on the academic forefront of Chinese historical studies.

3.6 From Ocean-Related History to the Entire Maritime History

The rise of research on China's overseas transportation synchronized with the advent of China's one-hundred-year "new history." From the research on the transportation of the South China Sea during the 1920s to 1930s, to the research on the Maritime Silk Road during the 1980s to 1990s, the efforts of generations of scholars have yielded fruitful results. They have also carved out other ocean-related specialized history studies, which were much acclaimed by the scholarship worldwide. However, in the system and textbooks of Chinese history, the ancient society is still held to be dichotomous in structure with the agricultural world versus the nomadic one. In this land-based structure of history and discourse system, everything related to China's maritime development is interpreted as the seaward extension of agricultural civilization. Examples as such include but are not limited to the following:

- Marine fishing was an extension of land-based agriculture to marine agriculture: those who live off the sea have cultivated oyster fields, blood clam fields, and tide-irrigated fields, the names of which are all suffixed with "fields," which vividly reflects the features of a "big" agriculture.
- There were very rare "private books" for sailing on different oceans. This kind of sailing manuals, as treasured private books, could only be possessed by a single family production unit.
- Business ships going overseas were mostly joint-ventured; every businessman on board had his own cabinet. Although economically independent, it did not differ much from the small-scale agricultural mode of production.
- Canal transport by sea routes between the south and the north was taken as an alternative to the canal transport on land; "the maritime silk road" was taken as an alternative to "the continental silk road."
- Seawalls, tide locks, coast guard buildings were all meant to defend life and properties of the agricultural areas, with no substantial difference from the Great Wall in the northern hinterland.
- China's ancient maritime culture was essentially a marine agriculture.

There are many such claims but with few being challenged. If stuck in this paradigm of thinking, even those who acknowledge the existence of ancient maritime culture in ancient China tend to draw the pessimistic conclusion that "it has irreversibly been assimilated by the landlocked farming agriculture." But do these arguments really conform to the historical facts of China's maritime development?

3.6.1 Reflections on Theory

Since the "Great Geographical Discovery" around the end of the fifteenth century, the human society has steered its development from land to ocean, leading to the rise

of the West, which has generated tremendous concern about maritime history among the Western scholars. According to the world history system that was built on Eurocentrism after the nineteenth century, the ocean represented the West, modernity, sophistication, and openness, while land represented the East, tradition, backwardness, and conservativeness, and this hegemonic discourse has since dominated the main research area of maritime history. This theory of maritime history was premised on the notion that maritime culture was an advanced form of culture in that it represented the development of capitalism. According to this logic, as China had never entered the stage of capitalist society, even if it boasted of well-developed navigation in ancient times, it was not likely to create any maritime culture.

The progress of research on modern Western history indicates that maritime culture is not inherently tied up with capitalism. It's a myth fabricated by the West in its expansion of maritime power that rendered maritime culture a label and patent of capitalism. Stripped of the myth around it, maritime culture is just a type of humanity dependent on the ocean and coastal regions as contrasted with land-based culture. It has undergone the evolution from preliminary to advanced forms, varying between open and progressive, or closed and conservative modes. All littoral countries or island countries have their own maritime cultures in terms of their maritime group activities. The ocean is the space for human subsistence and development. We should not depict the ancient historical structure and system as an agrarian-nomadic dichotomy with complete disregard for the maritime world. Maritime history should no longer be taken as the mere expansion history of Western maritime rights, but rather includes the historical research on everything about nature, society, and humanities that are related to the ocean. Theoretically, it includes the history of ecological evolution, the history of human exploration and exploitation of the ocean, and the development of maritime humanities.

From the perspective of the ocean, China's maritime development can be viewed as one of the objectives of the development of its history. The humanity of maritime society is a type of Chinese social humanities. It is derived from the ocean and has its own origin and law of development. Ancient China was a pluralistic country, with agriculture playing the dominant role. The humanities of maritime society were marginalized and confined at the regional and folk level. Having failed to represent the main direction for China's historical development in the past doesn't mean the complete loss of the possibility of China's option for seaward development in the future. The tradition of maritime development and the marine areas can be traced back to the same origin, both of which were characterized by strong vitality and continuity. Such a historical connection makes it possible for China to adopt the reform and open-up strategies for development, going east toward the ocean and interacting with the world. This line of maritime development moves from the periphery to the center, with the east coast taking the lead, promoting the exploration of the west and revitalization of the old industrial bases in east and central China. China's rise in peace is a result of choice and interactions among various possibilities.

If we view the transition of the structure of history in the long term, it is necessary to study maritime development as a subsystem of social development, and to renew the way of thinking and research methods.

(1) Set up the ocean-based mentality of thinking in research

"Ocean-based" in this sense means to view this issue from the perspective of maritime activity groups, rather than look at the ocean from land and impose the land-based research pattern of history and culture onto that of maritime history and culture.

First, we need to dispel the myth which mistakes maritime development for an extension of agriculture to the ocean. The ancient littoral people's navigation at sea was not an act of the agricultural ethnic groups, nor were the ships and boats creations of the agricultural groups. They had much closer connection with the first island chain and second island chain that enclosed China's coastal seas than with the landlocked continent. When these people came to the coastal areas, they brought with them advanced agricultural civilizations, and set up agrarian communities and habitats. Yet this was not a simple replication of the northern agricultural social pattern, but rather new creations as a result of adapting to the new environment. Meanwhile, they acculturated the aborigines, absorbed the maritime traditions of the ancient littoral residents, and hence featured the dual characteristics of land and ocean. Some of them lived off the sea, and formed maritime communities; others were amphibians, developed into transitional or mixed humanity types, namely, the semi-agricultural and semi-maritime, the predominantly agricultural and partly maritime, or vice versa.

This is an example of how maritime civilization interacted with and influenced agricultural civilization. When Hegel claimed that the Chinese people didn't have an active relationship with the sea, he probably referred to those agriculture-based Chinese. When he said that navigation didn't have influence on their culture, he actually meant that it didn't have deep influence on the Chinese core and elite culture. That being the case, we can't simply criticize Hegel for denying China's maritime culture. But at least this overgeneralized claim is one-sided. When we say that the ancient Chinese notion of the ocean was agricultural in nature and oriented toward land-based society, it doesn't mean that China's maritime communities were also agricultural by nature.

Second, it's vital to fully tap into the resources of maritime history, especially the cultural relics of shipwrecks found at home and overseas, as well as the settlement ruins and relics of maritime communities and maritime immigrants, to provide evidence of continuity of the maritime history. Meanwhile, it is necessary to re-collect and examine the ocean-related information in the existing literature of history and make sure they are accurately interpreted. Very little of the collective memory of maritime communities has been preserved by means of text. Roadmaps, logbooks, nautical charts, contracts, account books, and letters were rare and fragmentary. The ocean-related information embraced by the mainstream society and elite culture was basically recorded by the officials and literati, narrated with the discourse of agricultural civilization, not without prejudice and misinterpretations. It takes screening and sifting to bring out the truth.

(2) Adopt the approach of "interdisciplinary integration"

The maritime issue involves the complexity of nature, society, and economy, so it is necessary to adopt an integrated methodology that crosses disciplinary boundaries.

In studying history, we can resort to the concepts of other ocean-related subjects, find the interface and connections between the concepts of history and other related disciplines, which in turn facilitate the research of history. For example, in the history research discourse on littoral regions which takes land as the core and the ocean as subsidiary, we can make full use of the concepts in oceanography by drawing a line between marine areas in studies of regional history, which takes territorial waters as the center, including the islands and coastal areas (cities and counties with coastal lines). By virtue of the concepts of maritime economics, we can differentiate the economies that are grounded on the ocean, adopt the concepts of the ocean directly or indirectly from other economic sectors such as agriculture, industry, commerce, and transportation, etc., and restructure the system of maritime economy. By virtue of the concepts of sociology, we can restructure maritime communities, integrating the ocean-related social groups and organizations. By virtue of the concepts of religious studies and culturology, we can restructure maritime cultural system. This may better meet the needs of the historical studies of oceanic regions. Research on the history of maritime economy, of maritime communities, and of maritime thoughts and cultures may also involve the defining and refining of the concepts from different disciplines. As we all know, different research objectives and research topics may call for different approaches to interdisciplinary integration. Only after long-term practice and repeated modifications, and after finding out the conceptual connotations that conform with the entire maritime history, will the studies finally be accepted by the history community and incorporated in the academic norms of history. Therefore, the success of interdisciplinary integration is dependent on the test of time and trial and error does matter in this regard.

3.6.2 Practice of the Academics

Since the 1990s, we have come up with a series of publications on maritime history, starting with maritime social economics and extending it to maritime sociocultural history, most of them derived from doctoral dissertations, twenty of which were collected into the series of *Ocean and China* and the series of *Maritime China and the World* and published in Jiangxi Colleges and Universities Press, during 1998 and 2005. More than a decade's academic practices of ours have revolved around the following research fields:

(1) Research on maritime regional history

This research area encompasses integrated/comprehensive studies or case studies of eco-environment, economy, society, and culture of maritime regions. Among my own publications, *Water and Land in the East: Marine Environment and Economic Development in Southeast China* (2003) takes the East China Sea and both sides of the cross-strait zone as a maritime region, and explores the historical interactions between eco-environment and economic development; *Fujian at Sea: Tracing Fujian Maritime History* (1998) traces back for the humanistic information about Fujian's

maritime development and focuses on the issues and cases of Fujian's maritime region and the change of navigation routes, modes of maritime development, navigation and immigrants' activities, and inland involvement in maritime development. *Foshan's Economic Development and Social Transitions in the Ming and Qing Dynasties* (1994) by Luo Yixing explores the development process of Foshan, a city located on the coast of the South China Sea, and examines how it has developed from a small rural town into a regional city center with the rise of maritime economy and impetus of markets worldwide. *The Advantages of Beiyang* by Yang Qiang takes the area of the ancient Bohai Sea and Huanghai Sea as its objective, maps out the development line of the traditional maritime economy and its influence on the society and culture of this area. *Shandong at Sea* (2004) by Zhang Caixia emphatically analyzes the functions of maritime factors in the transition of social economy in Shandong coastal areas in the modern times.

(2) Research on the history of maritime economy

This line of research includes specialized studies on the long-term or dynastic histories of maritime industry, coastal zone development, island development, and maritime trade. *Households at Sea* (1998) by Ouyang Zongshu discusses the natural environment of China's marine fishery and background for exploration, the discovery of fishing grounds, the development of marine fishery, the rise of marine fish breeding and deep-sea fishing, the trend of modern fishery and its sustainability. *The Exploitation of Coastal Marshland in the Ming and Qing Dynasties* (1996) by Liu Miao investigates the historical transition of China's coastal line, exploration and exploitation of the wetland and marshland, the ways to explore coastal agriculture and salt industry, and the similarities and differences in the development of marshlands between the north and the south. *Noisy Sea Products Market: The Rise and Fall of Port Markets in Southeast Fujian and Maritime Humanities* (1999) by Lan Daju reveals the rise and fall of port markets in southeast Fujian and analyzes the dual characteristics of the markets from the perspective of humanistic interactions between land and ocean and that between the state and the community. *The Network of Taiwan and Its Affiliated Islands: The Rise of Seaports in Taiwan* (1999) by Lü Shumei starts with the rise of Taiwan's seaports and sorts out the exploration history of Taiwan and its affiliated islands. *Moving Towards the Maritime Trade Zone* (1998) by Chen Dongyou explores the market interaction between the inner-layer trade area (inland) and mid-layer trade area, and that between the mid-layer and outer-layer (overseas). *Official Treasuries in the South* (1999) by Zhang Xiaoning discusses the China-Western trade under the Canton System (i.e., the system restricting foreign trade to the port of Guangzhou), and points out that while this conservative system restrained and distorted China's natural maritime economic development, the contacts of maritime economies between China and the West in Guangzhou markets had actually pushed forward the economy of Guangdong and other areas to different degrees.

(3) Research on the history of maritime communities

Studies in this area involve communities of fishermen and businessmen, the social organization and administration of maritime immigrants communities. Ouyang

(1998) explores the transition of coastal fishery villages, administration of fishery affairs, and the minority groups in maritime communities, etc. Chen Dongyou's *Moving Towards the Maritime Trade Zone* (2019 version) explores the behaviors of southeast China's businessmen in the interaction with the modern world markets. *Smugglers at Sea* (2008) by Lian Xinhao inquires into the gangs of modern smugglers and anti-smuggling activities carried out by the customs offices. *China's Littoral Society and Overseas Immigrants in the Ming and Qing Dynasties* (1997) by Yang Guozhen, Zheng Fuhong, and Sun Qian sorts out the source and course of overseas immigrant organizations based on blood ties and locality, and secret communities in the Ming and Qing dynasties. We also explore the relationship between overseas immigrants and the relatives of overseas Chinese residents living in littoral areas, modern economic organizations, modern educational institutions, and the social structure of the hometowns of overseas Chinese. *Immigrants by the Route of Japan* (1998) by Zeng Shaocong reveals the background and process of immigrants to China's Taiwan Island and the Philippines in the Ming and Qing dynasties, the establishment of immigrant communities, focusing on comparison between the two different development lines of immigrants at home and overseas, and their different functions. *Immigrants by the Route of the West* (2006) by Lin Derong takes as its research object the immigrants via the route to the West, and analyzes the different experiences of the immigrants from Fujian and Guangdong in Dutch East India colonized and British Malaysia. *Rebuilding Homes Overseas* (2003) by Zeng Ling studies the social culture of the Singaporean Chinese, asserting that the traditional folk culture originated from the fatherland in Fujian and Guangdong is the fundamental cultural resource from which the overseas Chinese rebuilt their social structure, and developed local-specific patterns along the vein of a new social culture. *Moving to the East and the West* (2004) by Liu Zhenggang takes as example immigrants from Fujian and Guangdong to Taiwan and Sichuan and makes a comparative study of marine immigrant communities and inland immigrant communities.

(4) Research on the history of maritime thoughts and culture

The Myth of Ocean (1999) by Huang Shunli examines the tradition and transition of China's maritime outlook, analyzes the advent, formation, and characteristics of the ancient maritime outlook, in particular the latter's variation with the alternation between bans and openings of maritime trade in the Ming and Qing dynasties, as well as its historical transition from tradition to modernity under the dual internal and external pressures after the Opium War. Wang Rongguo's *Maritime Deities* (2003) starts the research on China's maritime culture with the illusory world, sets up a temporal and spatial structure of the family pedigree of and faith in deities, explores sea god beliefs held by different communities including marine fishermen, marine businessmen, maritime immigrants, the regional characteristics of this sea deity faith, and different aspirations of the religious groups, as well as the alternating roles of maritime deities and land deities in the interactions between land and ocean.

(5) Research on maritime archeology

Maritime archeology is an applied research on the history of maritime humanities. It's a new area of archeology and history. *Wreckage Around China Seas* (2003) by Wu Chunming documents the findings of maritime archeology that corroborates the literature of history. He makes a diachronic comparison of the mechanical structures and affiliated parts of different wrecked ships, re-presents the shape and structure of clippers in ancient China and the evolution of ship-making and navigation, maps out the network of navigation routes of Chinese ships based on the spatial distribution of wrecked ship ruins, and traces the systems of hinterland production, entrepôt of port cities, and overseas circulation by virtue of the remains of the cargoes.

(6) Research on maritime politics and figures

A Lonely Figure at Sea (2006) by Cui Laiting combines the study of maritime society with that of character analysis, explores the observations and thoughts of Ye Xianggao (Grand secretary during Emperor Zhu Xu's imperial time in the Ming dynasty) on maritime affairs, and elucidates how the interests of some maritime communities can be embodied in the central political system by examining the relationship between Ye Xianggao and the maritime community. *Waves and Tides in the South China Sea* (2005) by Li Jinming revolves around the disputes of the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries, and depicts the trend of maritime politics after the great discovery of marine resources.

(7) Research on the history of ocean disasters

Natural Marine Disasters (2005) by Yu Yunquan sorts out and analyzes systematically the different types of ocean disasters and their destruction and impact on coastal social economy, as well as measures of prevention and relief.

These tentative works have made strenuous efforts to develop a holistic framework of China's maritime history, change the imbalanced attention paid to ocean-related research, i.e., weighing the south over the north, and weighing economy over society, eliminate some blind spots, and fill some gaps. But these just represent periodical achievements and preliminary creation of the research platform. Owing to insufficiency of the authors' academic background, knowledge structure, theoretical attainments, and fit-in abilities, these works inevitably carry with them the deficiencies of the outdated thinking patterns. Therefore, there remains much room for improvement in terms of research areas, topics, concepts, and methods, and continuous exploration and innovation await to be done.

3.6.3 Break a New Ground for Chinese Maritime History

The above reflections on academic theories and practices are all meant to pave the way for younger generations to carry on the good work of their predecessors and leading scholars and come up with novel ideas of Chinese maritime history. Our preliminary conclusions are:

(1) China is both a continental country of East Asia and a maritime country on the west coast of the Pacific Ocean. It has developed all the way from both land and ocean. The alternations and interactions between these two directions have run through millennia of Chinese history of civilization. However, China's traditional official history is a land-based political history of successive dynasties that were centered on the Central Plains. With such a traditional notion of history and vision of humanity, maritime culture has long been relegated to a subordinate position.

(2) The rise of maritime communities came before the formation of the country. In the same vein, the mutual contacts among maritime communities took place earlier than those between countries. In the prehistoric era when there was no written record, the ethnic groups around China Seas had already launched their adventures and begun continuous contacts and communications with one another by boats and canoes, which developed into an interactive circle of cultures and languages. In ancient times, eastern tribes and Baiyue nationalities in the peripheral continent of today's China had close ties of consanguinity with tribes on the islands of the west Pacific.

(3) During its formation, China as a country was far more than just a community of agrarian population, but a pluralistic entity including the elements of maritime ethnic groups. The agrarian population moved to the coastal areas, and merged with eastern tribes and Yue nationality. Some of them maintained the land-based lifestyle (i.e., urban-rural social groups) or maritime lifestyle (social groups living on waters), others were amphibians, including fishermen, boatmen, businessmen, and other maritime communities. The coastal areas where ancient Chinese maritime communities inhabited were located around China Seas including the coastal areas of today's Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan and the Asean countries, and extended to the Indian Ocean and to the east of the Pacific Ocean. As for the communities that had mutual contacts at sea, including maritime communities in East Asia and West Asia, their interactions with the primitive culture and language circle around China Seas have maintained continuity. From the maritime business trade network and the scattered network of maritime immigrants to modern China's international business network, there remains a historical inheritance across time and space.

(4) Going outward to the ocean and going inward to the land are the two major orientations for regional maritime development. As a nation, China's maritime development was long restricted in the marginalized disadvantaged position of alternating between maritime orientation and land orientation. Every step moving from the periphery to the center was taken with tremendous hardship. As a cross-national region around China Seas, however, China's maritime development has played a leading role and has had tremendous influence on the coastal areas and neighboring countries. Only by going beyond the limits of China's geography and administration, taking the territorial waters as the center, and viewing China from the maritime perspective can we get the whole picture of its maritime development.

(5) Ever since the era of the great navigation, China's modernization in maritime development has been through ups and downs, influenced both by restraint or facilitation of the West, and by its own inertia or potential. China's onetime loss of the position as a maritime country cannot deny the historical fact that it has been both a continental and a maritime country.

Of course, there is still a long way to go to change the thinking mode of maritime hegemony and to come up with new arguments about China's maritime history. Its prospect lies in the following: The current studies of ocean-related specialized history should restart with the goal of constructing a holistic history, break down the disciplinary boundaries, correct the imbalance in research, synthesize current studies into more integrated topics, formulate major thematic research areas of history, and break the new ground. Together we'll make it for a better future.

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Chapter 4
Maritime History in the Jiaqing and Daoguang Periods

4.1 Hong Merchants and Supercargoes: Preliminary Exploration for Documents of the Thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou

Hong merchants and supercargoes played pivotal roles in China-British trade during the Qing dynasty before the Opium War. On the British side, their interactions and negotiations have been recorded in the archives of the Canton Management Committee or the Select Committee of the East India Company (hereinafter called the EIC), now deposited in the India Office Library and Records. On the Chinese side, the archives of the thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou are completely lost, only sporadically yet vaguely mentioned in some official documents.

Over a century's business operations of the thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou had churned out a vast array of business documents. According to the scope of their activities, the documents can roughly be divided into: (1) the sales ledgers generated during the imports and exports undertaken by varied foreign trading houses or Hongs; (2) records and deeds documenting the assets and personnel changes regarding varied houses; (3) correspondence and business documents to and fro among the Hongs; (4) documents submitted via the Hongs to Canton Customs or Guangdong government, including shippers' declarations and duties, grantees, and foreigners' petitions; and (5) official papers, relayed by the Hongs, including the instructions and replies issued by Canton Customs or Guangdong government, or the mails addressed to the supercargoes of the EIC regarding businesses and related matters among the Hongs. Due to the vicissitudes of the thirteen Hongs as well as the ravages of the two Opium Wars, most of the original documents were burned or lost, except a small portion, left over from the Wu family of Jardine Matheson, which is now held in the public and private collections in the United States. More than five decades ago, in order to write the book *Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton*, Mr. Liang Jiabin, scion of Thian Po Trading House, searched in vain for the surviving documents in Guangzhou. But thanks to the Select Committee of the East India Company in Guangdong and

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the Portuguese Macao authorities, their collection of the originals or copies of the documents that fall into the fifth category as mentioned above could still shed some light.

The extant commonly-seen letters, sent from the thirteen Hongs to the supercargoes of the EIC, have been recorded in *A Collection of Letter Writings, Appeals and Ordinances* proofread by Xu Dishan. Two incomplete original handcopies of these letters are now kept in Bodleian Library of Oxford University, UK. The Torre do Tombo in Lisbon, Portugal houses the correspondence written in Chinese between the Guangdong government and the Portuguese Macao authorities, among which there are several hitherto unpublished letters to the EIC supercargoes from the Hongs.

Between April and October 1994, I was invited as a visiting scholar to Oxford University, where I had access to the Public Record Office in London and found a large volume of the same kind of handwritten copy subsumed in the catalogue "English Merchants in China (East India Company), 1795–1809" (F.O. 233/189). By examining the hand-copy, there is no Chinese title for it, and its contents, written vertically with ink brush, comprise official documents of the Qing government and letters from the Hongs to the supercargoes at Canton. Among the documents, the earliest is the one entitled "Regulations on the Prevention of Foreign Ships" submitted to the throne by Li Siyao, the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, and other officials on the twenty-fifth day of the tenth month in the twenty-fourth year in the Qianlong reign (1759); the latest is a letter dated the twelfth month of the thirteenth year in the Jiaqing reign (January–February 1809), bearing "the joint signature of the thirteen Hongs," which is obviously one of the archived duplicates that had been hand-copied from original Chinese documents or letters by EIC-employed Chinese compradors.[1]

The bulk of the documents dated between the reigns of Emperor Qianlong and Emperor Jiaqing can now be found in Chinese historical archives, but the letters from the Hongs to the supercargoes, though only 32 are extant, respectively, dated 1801, 1802 and 1808, including five repeated ones in the above-mentioned *A Collection of Letter Writings, Appeals and Ordinances*, are highly valued in that their rare rediscovery may help shed light on how the correspondence was done and some historical facts about the interactions between the Hong merchants and the supercargoes. Introductions and preliminary studies are necessary since there is as yet no scholarly research in this area.

4.1.1 The Modes of Letters of the Hongs

The Qing government had laid down strict rules on the official documents, all of which had fixed modes. As a semi-official business group, the Hongs used the form

[1] The British Public Record Office in London misplaced the order of the page numbers when sorting out the catalogues, which mistook the last page for the first and vice versa. Besides, the earliest year in which the collection was made should be 1759 rather than 1795.

of "letters" to correspond with the supercargoes. The extant letters addressed to the supercargoes from the Hong merchants basically fall into two types.

(1) Semi-official letters

These are letters forwarded to the supercargoes to convey the instructions of Canton Customs, the competent body in charge of foreign trade, or the local governments. They were enclosed in the front with the official "decrees" or "approvals" for the supercargoes to handle. Here below is a letter, dated the twenty-second day of the fourth month in the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (3rd June 1801), addressed to the then Supercargo Richard Hall from eight Hong merchants including Puankhequa[2]:

> We have longingly remembered Sir Supercargo since we parted a short while ago. We wish you and your staff every success and satisfaction in your undertakings. According to the decree issued today by His Lordship Superintendent of Canton Customs, we have been instructed to notify you that the cruiser Raleigh should return home strictly as per the schedule, and overstaying is not allowed. Enclosed are the manuscripts of the decree for your reference. We kindly ask you to comply with the edict, urge the ship to set sail for home, and inform us of the departure date in your response letter so that we could reply to our superior. As the decree brooks no delay, we pray that you would act as instructed. This is hereby notified and may you and other gentlemen be well and good.
>
> The twenty-second day of the fourth month.

The original letter, which runs in vertical columns, is converted to a horizontal text here. And the signatures are aligned horizontally as per the original, with the middle two taking the lead, followed by the names above and below them, i.e., Puankequa, Mowqua, Puiqua, Yanqua, Chunqua, Pongqua, Gnewqua, and Conseequa. The recipient is the then supercargo in charge of the EIC's operations in Guangdong as well as his cohort of gentlemen or Misters. The senders modestly called themselves "juniors," and the content in a negotiable tone was consistent with their status as official agents and intermediaries. The response letter from the supercargo to Canton Customs or the local government, known as "*bing*" (a term that connotes respect for the superior), was enclosed with his correspondence or "*han*" (a formal term for letter) to the Hong merchants, who then reported it to Canton Customs or relevant government agencies.

After receiving the letter from the supercargo, the Hong merchants usually needed to respond, informing the former of the latest goings-on of the issues concerned. For example, the following is a letter, dated the twenty-fourth day of the fifth month (4th July),[3] sent from Puankequa and Mowqua to Richard Hall[4]:

> On the twenty-second day of this month (2nd July), we received your letter dated the ninth day (19th June) from Macao, learning that Cruiser Raleigh had set sail on the eighth day (18th

[2] Foreign Office File (hereinafter shortened to F.O.), F.O. 233/189, p. 215.

[3] In this chapter, in order to be faithful to the original, three different types of calendar systems have been adopted to refer to the ancient times. This annotated one refers to the Chinese lunar calendar, while in the bracket immediately behind is the counterpart in the Western calendar, written in the British format; in the third type, the time is referred to with the name of the emperor who was then in reign, e.g., the twenty-second day of the fourth month in the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (3rd June 1801).

[4] F.O. 233/189, p. 212.

June). We also learned that the typhoon on the second day (12th June) had caused damages to the ship, which would have to postpone its departure until the repairs were completed. On the evening of the twenty-second day (2nd July), another letter from the comprador arrived, informing that the ship had already sailed out on the twenty-eighth day of the sixth month. We would report this to His Lordship at the Customs. The response is hereby given and we send our best regards to you and your staff.

The twenty-fourth day of the fifth month (Note: the year unspecified).

Puankequa and Mowqua were the then heads of Hong merchants association, therefore some semi-official letters bearing their names would suffice, not necessarily requiring the signatures of all the Hong merchants. Although the content of these semi-official letters is mostly a brief summary of the official documents, they provide us with detailed records to get a picture of the specific dates of the receipts and responses of the documents to and fro between the Hongs and supercargoes, as well as the processing of these documents.

(2) Private correspondence

This contains letters to inform the supercargoes about the Hong affairs, the requests to handle certain affairs or response as regards the processing of the requests, as well as those generated during social events. For example, here below is a letter from Conseequa to Supercargo William Roberts dated twenty-third day of the tenth month in the thirteenth year in the Jiaqing reign (10th December 1808)[5]:

To whom it may concern:

I have a relative who is trading in Luzon. This time, he took a (American) ship to Canton. But when the ship entered Chinese waters of Luwan, the warship of your country fired a warning shot, ordered the ship to lower the sails and move over to its side. Then the American shipowner was summoned aboard the warship, after which the ship along with several other vessels were towed away to Nam Van of Macao, and over 200 chests of taels were transported thereupon to the warship. However, about 50 to 60 thousand dollars of the taels was under my name and my relative's taels amounted to 10 to 20 thousand dollars and a chest of gold also belonged to him. On the twenty third day of this month, my relative called on me in Canton, telling me that he could just give a rough ballpark figure of his taels at the moment, and I would let you know exactly how much it is in another letter after further investigation. I hope you could explain this nicely to the general and ask His Honor to do his best to keep intact the chests of my taels and my relative's, the tops of which are printed with the name of Tang. As you know, I have stayed on good terms with your company and staff, there have been hitherto no mistakes in any dealings between us, and we have had mutual care for each other without any animosity. I believe that the general will by no means confiscate my taels within Chinese territory. What is worse, I currently owe a huge debt to your company, and please be reminded that any slip-up for me may increase the risk of default. As for others' losses, I am not in a position to intervene. If you are in any doubt about what I have told you, I am willing to swear a blood oath. I will let you know the exact figures for other items when I see you and renew information by further correspondence. I hope you can get the message across to the general, my prayer is that His Honor would return all the taels back to me!

This is hereby notified, and greetings to all.

Addressed to British Supercargo Mr. Roberts

[5] F.O. 233/189, p. 189.

humbly yours

Conseequa

Twenty-third day of the tenth month of the thirteenth year in the Jiaqing reign

Private letters, which fall into the category of private correspondence between the Hong merchants and the supercargoes rather than that of official documents, are sometimes of higher historical value as they may contain stuff that cannot be found in official documents, or that are personal comments on certain documents.

The documents exchanged between the Hong merchants and the supercargoes are in the form of "letters," denoting their equal status in relationship. As traders and sureties for EIC's merchant ships, Hong merchants were not vested with the authority to bind foreign merchants, but they assumed corresponding obligations. In the eyes of the government, Hong merchants acted as agents of foreign businessmen and should be held accountable for the wrongful acts of the latter. And the supercargoes of the EIC regarded them as the mandarin's merchants, who had monopoly over the imports and exports of merchant ships respectively, making the dealings easier and smoother compared to those in other places. They sought maximum profits through the agencies of the Hong merchants, and also, in return, assisted the latter to protect their own interests where necessary. Hong merchants profited from the foreign trade, but they also faced huge risks as they had to maintain a balance between the government and the supercargoes. Even the slightest indiscretion could place themselves in dire straits, and even lead to their bankruptcy, costing them their lives and wealth. By virtue of these surviving documents of the Guangzhou Cohongs, we may be able to disclose the tip of the iceberg of the relationship between Hong merchants and supercargoes.

4.1.2 Bi-Directional Translation Between Hong Merchants and Supercargoes

To date, there has been no systematic record in the official documents of the Qing dynasty regarding the names of the Hongs or merchants, and there is also a lack of specific data pertaining to their waxing and waning over the years. Previous scholars wrapped their heads around the changes of the Canton Cohongs largely based on the records of the Canton Hongs in the EIC's archives, where the letters, dated back to the early years of Jiaqing period from the Hong merchants in Guangdong to the supercargoes of the EIC stationed in Canton, were discovered, which could provide corroboration or correction to the extant original Chinese data.

According to the Canton records of the EIC, in the trade quarter of 1800 (the dates of the account books begin on 2nd March 1800 and end on 5th May 1801), the EIC supercargoes entered into contracts with eight Hong firms, i.e., Puankhequa, Mowqua, Puiqua, Yanqua, Chunqua, Pongqua, Gnewqua, and Conseequa. The letter, dated the twenty-second of the fourth month in the sixth year in the Jiaqing reign (3rd June 1901), was addressed to the supercargo from all the Hong firms, bearing

the said 8 signatures.[6] In the trade season of 1801 (the account books dated from 6th May 1801 to 20th May 1802), the said eight Hongs continued the contract with the supercargo, only that Puiqua changed into Howqua. A letter of Howqua to Supercargo Richard Hall dated the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (14th August 1801) says: "Dear sir, my second elder brother Puiqua passed away on 13th June due to the aggravation of his illness caused by heat stroke. As I was busy with the funeral at that time, I didn't have time to inform you about it. Now after this is almost done, and as your humble friend, I would like to write this letter to let you know what has happened. The Hong's business will proceed as usual as per the modus operandi of my late brother, so there is no need to worry."[7] The letter dated the first day of the ninth month of the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (8th October 1801) is the one addressed to Supercargo Richard Hall bearing the signatures of all the Hong merchants, namely Puankequa, Mowqua, Howqua, Yanqua, Chunqua, Pongqua, Gnewqua, and Conseequa.[8] At the end of the trade season of 1802 (the account books start and end from 21st May 1802 to 31st January 1803), the supercargoes entered into a winter tea contract in the eighth year of the Jiaqing reign (1803) with the Hong firms, which were still the eight ones mentioned above, only that Puiqua of Yihe Hong still inherited his elder brother's trading name, called Puiqua.

Thus, thanks to the discovery of the above-mentioned letters from Hong merchants to supercargoes, we can confirm that in the four trading seasons of 1803, the number of Hong firms remained invariably eight. They are hereby described as follows:

(1) Puankhequa

This is a trading name that Pan Zhixiang (style name Youdu), a merchant from Tongwen Hong, inherited from his father, Pan Zhencheng.

Pan Zhencheng (1714–1788), who was born in Tong'an County, Quanzhou Prefecture, Fujian Province, lodged in Panyu County, Guangdong Province. In his early years, he "relocated from Fujian to Guangdong, then he traveled to Luzon three times; as a result, he became proficient in foreign languages and took up residence in Guangdong Province, where he worked as a manager in a Hong firm surnamed Chen."[9] After Mr. Chen returned to his hometown with honor, Pan Zhencheng founded Tongwen Hong in the eighteenth year of the Qianlong reign, and died on the third day of the twelfth month in the fifty second year of the Qianlong reign (10th January 1788). He had served as the head of the Hong merchants association for several years before his death.

Pan Zhixiang (1755–1820) was the fourth son of Pan Zhencheng, also known by his style name as Pan Youdu. After his father passed away, he succeeded as the boss of the Tongwen Hong, and served as the head of the Hong merchants association in the first year of the Jiaqing reign. At the beginning of the thirteenth year of the

[6] F.O. 233/189, p. 215.

[7] F.O. 233/189, p. 203.

[8] *Nengjingtang Panshi zupu: Pan Qiguan zhuan (The Genealogy of Pan Clan at Nengjing Hall: Biography of Puankhequa).*

[9] See Footnote 8.

Jiaqing reign (1808), he called a temporary halt to the business. He made a comeback in the twentieth year of the Jiaqing reign (1815), and changed the trading name to "Tongfu." He died in the twenty-fifth year of the Jiaqing reign (1820).

(2) Mowqua

This was the trading name used by Lu Guanheng of Guangli Hong.

Lu Guanheng (?–1812) was a native of Xinhui County, Guangdong Province. In the fifty-seventh year of the Qianlong reign (1792), Lu established Guangli Hong, and he became the head of the Hong merchants association in the second year of the Jiaqing reign (1797). He died in the winter of the seventeenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1812), and his son Lu Dirong (style name Wen Jin) took over as the new boss of the Hong firm.

(3) Puiqua

This was the trading name used by Wu Bingjun of Yihe Hong, also known as Puiqua.

Yihe Hong was founded by Wu Guoying, the father of Wu Bingjun, in the forty-ninth year of the Qianlong reign (1784). Wu Guoying (1731–1800) originally came from Anhai, Jinjiang County, Quanzhou Prefecture, Fujian Province. His ancestors relocated to Guangdong Province and domiciled in Nanhai County, Guangdong Province in the early Qianlong reign. According to Liang Jiabin's study, he borrowed a character from the pet name of his third son Bingjian and called his firm Howqua.

Wu Bingjun (?–1801) was the second son of Wu Guoying, who succeeded his father as the head of the Hong firm in the fifty-eighth year of the Qianlong reign (1793), and passed away because of an illness in the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801) at the age of 35. In the wake of his death, his younger brother Wu Bingjian (1765–1843) took the helm, and inherited his father's trading name Howqua and his brother's Puiqua. In the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), he served as the head of the Hong merchants association.

(4) Yanqua

This was the trading name used by Ye Shanglin of Yicheng Hong.

Ye Shanglin (1753–1809), courtesy name Yunxu, was originally from Zhao'an County, Zhangzhou Prefecture, Fujian Province. In the fifty-seventh year of the Qianlong reign (1792), Ye founded Yicheng Hong, halted the business in the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign (1804), and died of an illness a few years later.[10]

(5) Chunqua

It was the trading name used by Liu Dezhang of Dongsheng Hong.

Liu Dezhang (?–1825), a native of Anhui province, founded Dongsheng Hong in the fifty-ninth year of the Qianlong reign (1794). In the fifth year of the Daoguang reign (1825), he died of an illness and was inherited by his son Liu Chengshu.

[10] Ye Guanqian: *Yeshi jiapu* [*The Ye'Clan Genealogy*]. Stereotype edition, 1924, pp. 133–134.

(6) Pongqua

It was the trading name used by Ni Bingfa of Dacheng Hong. Pongqua is translated as "Binguan" in the *Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton*, as "Pengguan" in H. B. Morse's *The Chronicles of The East India Company Trading to China* (Chinese translation), both of which were incorrect.

Ni Bingfa (?–1810), a native of Nanhai County, Guangdong Province, founded Dacheng Hong in the fifty-seventh year of the Qianlong reign (1792). In the fifth year of the Jiaqing reign (1800), he bought the title of Provincial Administration Commissioner. In the fifteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1810), he went bankrupt and died from ill heath in prison.

(7) Gnewqua

This was the trading name used by Zheng Chongqian of Huilong Hong. In the aforementioned two books, Gnewqua is translated as "Qianguan," and in the annotation of the names at the end of the book entitled *History of Chinese Medicine* co-authored by Wang Jimin and Wu Liande, his name is incorrectly translated as "Nihua."

Zheng Chongqian (?–1813) was born in Nanhai County, Guangdong Province. Huilong Hong was founded by his father Zheng Shangqian in the fifty-eighth year of the Qianlong reign (1793). In the sixtieth year of the Qianlong reign (1795), Zheng Shangqian died of an illness, and Zheng Chongqian took over the firm. In the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign (1804), Zheng bought the title of Department Vice Magistrate in the name of Zheng Zhimao, and made an additional payment to earn the title of Supervisor. He had translated and published Dr. Alexander Pearson's *On Vaccination in China*. In the fifteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801), he went bankrupt and was thrown behind bars, and the following year saw him exiled and sentenced to hard labor in Xinjiang, where he died in the eighteenth year (1813).

(8) Conseequa

This is the trading name used by Pan Changyao of Liquan Hong.

Pan Changyao, a native of Tong'an County, Fujian Province, lodged in Nanhai County, Guangdong Province, and was a member of Puankhequa's clan. In the first year of the Jiaqing reign (1796), he founded Liquan Hong, and passed away in the seventh month of the third year of the Daoguang reign (1823), after which Liquan Hong closed down due to trading losses, and his family property was confiscated.

In the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), among the 10 foreign Hongs recorded in the Canton records of the EIC, Pan Zhixiang withdrew from Tongwen Hong and suspended the firm's business. Yicheng Hong ended its operation in the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign (1804). As a result, six Hongs were kept open, and the four new ones were Exchin, Manhop, Poonequa, and Lyqua.

Exchin, i.e., Xicheng Hong, was founded by Li Yanyu (?–1815), a native of Shunde County, Guangdong Province, in the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign (1804). Manhop refers to Fulong Hong, and the trading name may have been derived from the Cantonese-English translation of Guan Xiang's old trading "Wanfu," a partner of Deng Zhaoxiang, the boss of Fulong Hong. Manhop and Exchin were created

in the same year. Poonequa was a trading name used by Mai Kunting, the boss of Tongtai Hong. Poonequa, which was founded in the ninth year of Jiaqing (1804), is translated as "Pengnianguan" in the Chinese version of *The Chronicles of The East India Company Trading to China.* Lyqua was the trading name used by Zhou Xinzhao, a Hong merchant, who founded his company in the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign (1804), and the name of the company, which is still unknown, is mistaken as Wancheng Hong in the Chinese version of *Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton* and *The Chronicles of The East India Company Trading to China.*

However, in the same year, the letters from Hong merchants to the supercargo, apart from the one bearing the signature "humbly yours Conseequa," were either affixed with the signature "humbly yours, the Thirteen Hongs" or "seals of the Thirteen Hongs." As the seals were not transcribed in the transcripts, we can no longer know the specific names of the Hongs, but judging by the said signatures, it can be confirmed that there were 13 Hong firms in that year. As for the missing three Hongs, Liang Jiabin points out in the *Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton* that his ancestor Liang Jingguo (1761–1837) was "obliged to engage in foreign trade out of friendship in the year of Wuchen," and thus founded Tianbao Hong under the trading name Ingqua. "The year of Wuchen" was the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808). It can be seen that Chen Guodong's claim of "the thirteen Hongs" in *The Bankruptcy of Chinese Businessmen (1760–1843)* (1990 edition of the Institute for Economic Research of "Academia Sinica" in Taiwan) is not groundless.

There is a clear record of the changes of membership in the Canton Select Committee of the Supercargoes in the EIC archives. There are extant letters from Hong merchants to supercargoes in the early years of the Jiaqing reign, which can help us trace back to the Chinese translations used by supercargoes in those years.

According to the Canton archives of the EIC, those who sat on the Select Committee during the trade season of 1801 prior to 18th January 1802 included Richard Hall as the chairman, Samuel Peach and James Drummond as members; on 18th January 1802, after Richard Hall resigned and returned to his country to recuperate from an illness, the membership was changed to James Drummond as the chairman, Samuel Peach and George Sparks as members. In the trading season of 1808, sitting on the committee was Chairman John William Roberts as well as four members, who were respectively Thomas Charles Pattle, William Bramston, John Fullarton Elphinstone, and William Baring.

Of the letters written to the supercargoes by the Hong merchants dated the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801), seven are clearly addressed to Supercargo Mr. Hall, two addressed to Mr. Hall, Mr. Peach, and Mr. Drummond, the supercargoes of "red-haired company," and still two simply addressed to the supercargoes without mentioning their names. Here in the letters the word "Mister" is transliterated into Chinese as "Weishi," and Richard Hall, Chairman of the Select Committee of the said trade quarter is translated as "Ha." Likewise, Samuel Peach is rendered into Chinese as "Bizhi," James Drummond as "Duolinwen." The letters written in the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801) are addressed to Supercargo Drummond or Mr. Drummond, i.e., James Drummond. All the letters dated the seventh year of the Jiaqing reign (1802) state the addressees clearly, who are either Supercargo Drummond or Mr.

Drummond. Those letters dated the thirteenth year of Jiaqing (1808), all but one written to Supercargo Richard Hall, are all addressed to John William Roberts, the then chairman of the Select Committee, as well as the members including Thomas Charles Pattle, William Bramston, John Fullarton Elphinstone, and William Baring. Here John William Roberts is transliterated into Chinese as "Lafo," Thomas Charles Pattle as "Luolancheng," John Fullarton Elphinstone as "Yihuacheng," and William Baring as "Bolin."

It is necessary to make clear the Chinese and English translations of the names of Hong merchants and supercargoes and other staff over the three years, which will surely provide access to other Chinese and English information more accurately with less confusion.

4.1.3 Semi-official Letters from Hong Merchants to Supercargoes

The early nineteenth century saw Britain and France at the height of conflicts for maritime supremacy. In the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801), the allied forces of France and Spain invaded Portugal. The British, fearing that France would take the opportunity to seize Macao, sent their ships to the Lingding Sea in the following year and attempted to force their way into Macao in the name of "assistance in defense," but to no avail, due to the opposition from both the Portuguese authorities in Macao and the Qing court. In the twelfth year of the Jiaqing reign (1807), France occupied Portugal, this time under the pretext of "helping Westerners in Macao." Britain sent Rear Admiral William O'Brien Drury to lead a fleet eastward from Madras in India. On the second day of the eighth month in the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (21st September 1808), he forcibly landed in Macao and captured the three fortresses. Wu Xiangguang, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, repeatedly ordered the invaders to leave Macao, which fell on deaf ears, and thereupon announced halt of the trade with Britain. Drury refused to obey, and ordered his warships to break through the Humen Fortress, and to go up the Pearl River to Whampoa. On the twenty-third day of the ninth month (11th November), Drury had his ships anchored off the thirteen Hongs outside the city of Guangzhou and asked the Governor-General to petition on his behalf to His Majesty to allow his troops to "reside" in Macao. In face of the harsh defiance of the Qing court and the opposition of British merchants, Drury began to pull out the warships and returned to Macao on the twenty-eighth day of the tenth month (15th December) on the condition that the trade be allowed to resume upon the withdrawal. At the beginning of the fourteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1809), Drury led the British warships out of Macao.

Against the backdrop of Britain and France's struggle for maritime hegemony, and under the pretext of "helping" the Portuguese to protect Macao, Britain actually attempted to seize Chinese territory, during which time the correspondence between

Hong merchants and supercargoes actually opened a channel for China-British negotiation. The bulk of the extant semi-official letters between the two parties were generated around this issue.

The Canton Customs had opposed at all times the British warships sailing into China. In the fourth month of the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (May 1801), the British Cruiser Raleigh arrived off the coast of Guangdong, and the news reached Jishan, Superintendent of Canton Customs or known by foreigners as Hoppo, who thereupon decreed on the twenty-second day (3rd June) that the British warships must return home strictly as per the schedule. On the same day, Pan Qiguan, along with eight other Hong merchants, jointly sent a letter to Supercargo Richard Hall, enclosing the transcript of the decree, urging him to reply to inform of the departure date of the warships, and brought up the previous issue in the postscript, "We haven't received a reply from Supercargo yet, which has caused us great concern. We kindly ask you to notify us of the departure date of the two warships in reply."[11] Mr. Hall sent two response letters from Macao on the twenty-eighth day of the fourth month (9th June) and the fourth day of the fifth month (16th June), saying: Cruiser Raleigh needs stocking up on food, and one of the ships needs repairing and replacing its ropes before they are scheduled to set sail for home on the sixth and seventh days of the first lunar month (16th and 17th June). Puankequa and Mowqua received the two letters on the first day of the fifth month (11th June) and the sixth day (16th June) of the first lunar month, and wrote back to Mr. Hall on the sixth day of the first lunar month, saying: "We have already reported this to Lord Superintendent."[12] On the ninth day of the first lunar month (19th June), the supercargo sent a letter from Macao, informing that Cruiser Raleigh had already set sail on the eighth day of the first lunar month (18th June), and the hurricane caused damages to one of the ships on the second day of the first lunar month (12th June), which would sail out once the repairs were done. No sooner had Puankequa and Mowqua received a letter from the supercargo than they heard from comprador, learning that the said ship had left on the eighteenth day (28th June), so in the letter to the supercargo dated the twenty-fourth day (4th July), they wrote that they had reported this to Superintendent.[13]

On the first day of the ninth month (8th October), Puankequa, together with seven other Hong merchants, jointly sent a letter to Mr. Hall: "Today, Lord Superintendent issued a decree, bidding us to notify Sir Supercargo that his ship must set sail for home immediately…We kindly ask Sir Supercargo to comply with the decree, urging the ship to make the voyage home, and inform us of the departure date in your response letter so that we could use it as a proof to reply to our superior."[14] However, the supercargo's reply letter and subsequent correspondence were lost, and the handling of it remains unknown.

[11] F.O. 233/189, p. 214.
[12] F.O. 233/189, p. 213.
[13] F.O. 233/189, p. 212.
[14] F.O. 233/189, p. 203.

In the seventh year of the Jiaqing reign (1802), as the British warships' attempt to land in Macao created an atmosphere of tension, there was more frequent correspondence between the Hong merchants and the supercargo. The extant letters were mainly written within a month between late April and late May.

On the twenty-seventh day of the fourth month (28th May), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others sent a letter to Supercargo James Drummond to convey the decree of Superintendent, "urging the three ships (names unconfirmed), as well as the cruisers that arrived earlier, to set sail for home as quickly as possible," and enjoining the supercargo to inform of the departure date in reply.[15]

In the letter dated on the second day of the fifth month (1st June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and other Hong merchants relayed to Supercargo James Drummond the decree issued by Superintendent on the first day (31st May) bidding "the ship (name unconfirmed) and others to depart immediately for the bay of Lingding Sea, forbidding any foreign naval personnel to stay overnight ashore to cause trouble, and still restricting the travel of the ships unless permitted by approval," and they also urged the latter to answer their letter as soon as possible.[16]

At nine o'clock in the evening on the third day of the first lunar month (2nd June), Puankequa received a letter from the supercargo in Macao, saying that he "received the letter from the provincial capital in the morning, and would reply on another day."[17]

In the letter dated the fourth day of the first lunar month (3rd June), Puankequa and Mowqua, etc. received the decree of the Provincial Administration Commissioner of Guangdong transferred by the Governor of Guangzhou, they then sent a letter right away to Supercargo James Drummond bidding the latter to urge all the ships to return home and allowing no further lingering for trouble. The letter also says:

> We remember Mr. Robert Money saying not long ago that there were two small cruise ships that had sailed back home on 29th April, but Mr. Money could only call to mind the name of the shipowner, which is inconsistent with the ship name he reported to Canton Customs earlier, and this has caused difficulties for us to report. We hereby kindly ask Sir Supercargo to send someone to find out the names of the said two ships as mentioned in the previous information provided to the Customs, and we are looking forward to your immediate reply, so that we could use it as a proof to report to our superior. And according to Mr. Money, there will be three cruise ships setting sail for home within ten days, which we have reported to Lord Superintendent and Lord Governor-General. Now we heard from Mr. Money again saying that there are still three cruise ships awaiting departure in ten days, and one of the ships is too old, and may need to be sold locally as it is decrepit beyond repair. Will Sir Supercargo kindly reply clearly whether the ship is sold or for sale, and what the two remaining ships are called? So that we could transfer it to Lord Superintendent as well as the lords of the Canton Office.[18]

[15] F.O. 233/189, p. 201.

[16] F.O. 233/189, p. 200.

[17] F.O. 233/189, p. 197.

[18] F.O. 233/189, p. 199.

On the sixth day of the first lunar month (5th June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others received a letter from the supercargo, saying: "The departure date of the warships is still pending, please put in a good word for us in your report back to your superiors."[19]

On the thirteenth day (12th June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others sent a letter to Supercargo Drummond, conveying the order of Canton Customs of the day, bidding the said ship to set sail as per schedule, and enjoining the latter to inform of the departure date in reply.[20]

On the twenty-fifth day (24th June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others sent a letter to Supercargo Drummond, transmitting the decree of Superintendent of the day: "All the overstaying warships must be coerced to set sail and return home as soon as possible, no more lingering is allowed," and hurrying Drummond to reply with the exact date of departure.[21]

On the fifth day of the sixth month (4th July), all British warships headed out of the Chinese waters.

In the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing period (1808), the local governments and Canton Customs had issued multiple decrees (for the decrees, see *Diplomatic History of the Qing Dynasty* of the Jiaqing reign) around each phase of the crisis from the entry of British warships into China, the landing in Macao, to the complete pullout from the Chinese waters, which, as a result, induced the creation of the copious letters and documents to the supercargoes, including Thomas Charles Pattle, William Bramston, John Fullarton Elphinstone, and William Baring, and the content of which is all about expediting the departure of the warships as per the said decrees.

On the twenty-first day of the seventh month (11th September), the British warships under the command of Rear Admiral William O'Brien Drury arrived at the Chicken Neck Sea and contacted by letter the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, expressing the wish to go ashore in order to assist the Westerners in Macao, and also the wish to help annihilate the pirates on behalf of the Heavenly Dynasty. On the first day of the eighth month (20th September), the thirteen Hongs sent a letter to the supercargo to forward the decree rejecting Drury's offer.[22]

On the second day of the eighth month (21st September), the British troops landed in Macao and captured three fortresses, i.e., Guia, Niangmage, and Gaslan. At this, the thirteen Hongs sent another two letters dated the fourth day (23rd September) and the sixth day (25th September) to pass on the decree advising them to back out of Macao.[23]

On a certain day of the tenth month (date unspecified) and on the sixteenth day (3rd December), the thirteen Hongs twice sent letters to the supercargo to pronounce the decree bidding the British troops to withdraw from Whampoa and other matters.[24]

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[19] F.O. 233/189, p. 196.

[20] F.O. 233/189, p. 192.

[21] F.O. 233/189, p. 191.

[22] F.O. 233/189, p. 61.

[23] F.O. 233/189, pp. 58–60.

[24] F.O. 233/189, p. 22, pp. 32–35.

On the second and third day of the twelfth month (17th and 18th January 1809), the British warships withdrew from Macao. The supercargo sent a letter to the Hong merchants to notify, the thirteen Hongs responded to the Supercargo within the same month (no specific date is given), and then followed up with another letter.[25]

The China-British negotiation at that time did not have to rely on the Hong merchants or the supercargo, but to a certain extent, the correspondence channel between the latter two played a role in transmitting information between China and Britain.

Another important part of the semi-official letters from the Hong merchants to the supercargo was pertaining to trade. For instance, in the letter to Supercargo Richard Hall dated the twenty-third day of a certain month in the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801), Chunqua laid out the stipulations on port fees[26]; in the letter to Mr. Hall dated the fifteenth day of the fifth month (25th June) of the same year, Puankequa and Mowqua gave an answer to the question about the hefty charges for the port fees.[27] These two letters can be found in *A Collection of Letter Writings, Appeals and Ordinances*, so they will not be repeated here.

The semi-official letters from the Hong merchants to the supercargo dated the seventh year of the Jiaqing reign (1802) also mention the handling of such things as the reentry into Macao of a wrecked British export merchant ship, and whether British military ships loaded with goods were allowed to enter the port, which could offer us a perspective or a case study on the management of Canton Customs.

On the second day of the fifth month (1st June) of the same year, Puankequa received a letter from the supercargo, saying: "The ship Canada is no longer seaworthy as it incurred damages and leaks in its bottom as a result of the heavy cargo it carried and the huge waves when sailing to the sea outside Wanshan, so now the ship will be moved to Tam Chai bay in Macao where the vessel will be repaired after unloading its cargo." At this, Puankequa "paid a visit to Mr. Money in person to inquire about the details," and sent a letter to Supercargo Drummond:

> The export ship, due to the damages and leaks in its bottom sustained from the wind and waves, was re-routed to Macao for repairs, which is a matter of such importance that it should have been reported to His Lordship Superintendent and awaited his approval before the cargoes could be unloaded and barged, so as not to be reprimanded by His Lordship. It is still unclear whether the ship has been at anchor in Macao Roads, or off Taipa Island, about which your letter does not contain any details and it is therefore not convenient for us to forward it on your behalf. I pray that Sir Supercargo could submit a report at your earliest convenience, giving a detailed account of what has happened, and then entreat the Hongs to forward it on your behalf, requesting permission from His Lordship to unload cargoes in Macao, and sail back to your home country as soon as the ship is repaired. Alternatively, you may write a detailed letter, asking for the Hongs to submit a joint report to His Lordship for approval on your behalf. It is imperative that Sir Supercargo respond and react without delay. Never ever forget it.[28]

[25] F.O. 233/189, p. 24.

[26] F.O. 233/189, p. 227.

[27] F.O. 233/189, p. 213.

[28] F.O. 233/189, p. 199.

At nine o'clock in the evening on the third day of the third month (2nd June), Puankequa received a letter from Macao dated the second day of the fifth month, "I hope to discuss with Robert Money, and whether I can report it to you is up to your brilliant decision." In the response letter to Supercargo Samuel Peach dated the fourth day, Puankequa said:

> Today I received a letter from Sir Supercargo, and I am deeply pleased that you and I have the same opinion. But Mr. Money had led the ships to Macao between 3 to 5 pm, and I, together with my fellow Hong merchants, will have to relay your letter truthfully to the Superintendent, and await His Lordship's instruction. I will take care of everything for you where necessary. I think the Macao military leader has already agreed, and Lord Superintendent has no reason to disapprove. If the petition is approved tomorrow, I will hire a speedboat to deliver the transcripts of the petition and His Lordship's instruction to Macao. If a thing of such nature happens in the future, please kindly state in your ensuing letters that they are meant for all Hong merchants to view so that all of the Hong firms are willing to do a favor for your company....Moreover, please kindly wait for the approval of His Lordship before allowing ships into Macao to pick up goods so as to avoid unnecessary interference from varied parties concerned in the days to come. This is hereby notified.[29]

Between 3 and 5 pm on the sixth day (5th June), Puankequa and Mowqua, along with other Hong merchants, received a letter from the supercargo, explaining like the following:

> The other day, the ship Canada was blown back to Shizimen Bay by the wind, and the damages to the ship became a major concern, leaving us no choice but to beseech the military official to permit the ships to enter Macao to stay pro tempore for unloading and repairing, and then sail for home once the repair is done. I had thought that the problem could be handled by the Procurator of the Macao Senate, and for fear of the time wasted on the trips to and fro for the delivery of letters, I didn't send a petition to Your Lordship to ask for assistance in the first place. At an early hour on the third day of the fifth lunar month, no sooner had the ships dropped their anchors off the Templo de A-Má than they were stopped by the personnel sent by Canton Customs, and the comprador was close to being held under custody. Thinking that this was the company's business and had nothing to do with the comprador, I hereby send him to the provincial capital to deliver a letter to Your Lordship to clarify the matter, and I plead for your fair and bright judgement, praying that you could notify those in Macao to avoid hindering the normal trading of the company or wronging the comprador.
>
> This matter had infringed upon China's rights to manage the customs of Macao. Fortunately, on the fourth day of the first lunar month, the Hong merchants reported it to Superintendent, who then granted the approval for the entry of the ships into Macao on the sixth day of the same month. On the seventh day of the first lunar month (6th June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others received the instruction and then sent a letter to Supercargo Drummond, enclosing the manuscripts of their report to the customs as well as the approval from above. Here below are the notes listed at the end of the letter:

(1) I have asked the comprador to send a decree from His Lordship Superintendent, please have it delivered to the Macao Customs Commissioner and related personnel.
(2) The comprador has also brought a handwritten copy of the approval of the Customs, please give it to the supercargo for safekeeping, and send it back to

[29] F.O. 233/189, p. 197.

Guangzhou and leave it in our care. Should anyone in Macao stand in the way of the comprador, please instantly show him the said Customs approval.

(3) Also enclosed herewith is a handwritten copy of the joint report to His Lordship Superintendent by the eight Hongs. Please place it in the care of the supercargo for his reference.[30]

This letter, as well as the manuscript of an official document, and another document, issued by Superintendent to the Macao Customs, were "all entrusted with the comprador, who then sent a reliable person to deliver them to Macao."[31]

Between 3 and 5 pm on the seventh day of the fifth month (6th June), Puankequa received a letter from the supercargo dated the fifth day (4th June), saying that "the ship Canada was cleared to enter the port of Macao on the fifth day, and would first deposit the sails and ropes in a three-storey western-style building. Then they would straighten out the mess, have the ship repaired, pick up the return cargo before setting sail as per the schedule." In the letter dated the eighth day (7th June), Puankequa wrote back to Mr. Drummond, informing the latter of the content of the letter that was sent yesterday, and urging the other party to sail out right after the repair is done.[32]

On the ninth day of the first lunar month (8th June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others received a letter from the supercargo dated the eighth day (7th June), asking for permission for two British merchant ships loaded with sea sand to enter the port to pick up goods, meanwhile wondering whether Canton Customs would charge 4000 taels for each ship prior to the clearance for their exit of the port. The former responded on the tenth day of the first lunar month (9th June), saying:

> Today we paid another visit to the customs office to discuss the matter. After learning more about His Lordship's view, we found that His Lordship was not intended to refuse to grant the favor, or make things difficult on purpose. It was all because of the fact that the import ships are not allowed entry if they carry no ballast cargo except sea sand. As for the export duties, according to Mr. X (name unconfirmed), the two ships had capacities from about 5000 to 6000 piculs, the items of the cargo are not yet determined, nor is yet decided whether the ships shall carry more or less cargo in the future. In Mr. X's opinion, half of the cargo shall be white lead, the other half white alum, from which a total of 2,200 taels of export duties could be levied. The fees charged to each ship shall be merely 1,100 taels, which is rather low, so Mr. X said he isn't sure if this will be feasible. We have tried hard to get the drift of what His Lordship said and conjecture that His Lordship has always wanted to make sure the export duties remain fixed, i.e., each ship shall pay 4,000 taels of export duties, but if you can make an inventory of the export articles, and then submit the list to His Lordship who might graciously grant approval even if each ship should fall short of the required 4,000 taels, and all of this is uncertain …As for the sea sand, we were told that it is a contraband article, which is not allowed for storing or trading, only those licensed nitrade traders are permitted to do so. However, given the latter's scarce capital and capacity, Sir Supercargo had better plan ahead so as not to be caught in a predicament when the occasion arises. We have discussed the matter with Mr. X and will hereby send a comprador to deliver a response letter to Macao in person.[33]

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[30] F.O. 233/189, pp. 195–196.

[31] F.O. 233/189, p. 194.

[32] Ibid.

[33] F.O. 233/189, p. 193.

On the twelfth day (11th June), Puankequa, Mowqua, and others received a letter from the supercargo from Macao dated the eleventh (10th June), asking them to obtain the permission for two ships to enter the port. At this, the former replied in a letter (undated) saying:

> We have sounded out the opinion of His Lordship, according to whom the export duties are not fixed, but the ships applying for entry have carried nothing except the sea sand, which is not considered cargo, and they need to be loaded to capacity when exiting the customs. If they depart without cargo on board or with just a minute amount of exports, or if they enter as warships which is explicitly prohibited, this might place His Lordship in a tight spot should it incur any objections from the top in the future. Previously we sent business letter No.7, requesting Sir Supercargo to do your best to carry as much export cargo as possible, and saying that if it is impossible to load more goods, you could list out the export articles as well as the exact piculs of each, with which we can submit in person to His Lordship on your behalf to beg for permission for the entry of the two ships, yet all this remains to be seen whether His Lordship would grant the favor. So the No. 7 business letter is of vital importance and it has been delivered by the comprador in person to Macao. Now I am looking forward to your reply as well as the said inventory, and as soon as they arrive, we will put our heads together and pay a visit to the customs office to supplicate His Lordship Superintendent about the matter. We will reply with a separate letter on how it is progressing.[34]

As can be seen here, Canton Customs gave top priority to the revenues collected from the trading ships, be they exporters or importers, and held the port fees as the criterion for approval or disapproval for entry.

4.1.4 Private Letters Addressed to the Supercargoes from the Hong Merchants

The private letters from the Hong merchants to the supercargoes disclose some in-house information about the thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou in the early years of the Jiaqing reign, which can help us to learn better about their roles.

In the sixth year of the Jiaqing reign (1801), Superintendent Jishan slapped a hefty penalty on Pan Changyao, a security merchant, for the smuggling of camlet by British ships, which is a case in point to show the unpredictable risks befalling the Hongs in their business operations.

In that spring, the principal office of Canton Customs seized 48 pieces of contraband camlet. Li Yaer, the carrier, confessed the traders were Feng Shiying and Feng Daying. Following that, Chen Guangda, a shipowner, was arrested. He admitted to having loaded camlet thrice at the home of Feng Shiying in Whampoa, and he also informed against a boat owner Feng Shuxian who had also loaded the foreign ship with camlet twice. Canton Customs identified the ship as Cirencester owned by the EIC, for which Pan Changyao of Liquan Hong provided security. At this, the former

[34] F.O. 233/189, p. 194.

then decided to slap hefty penalty on the security merchant. In addition to the original tariff, the fine was increased by 100 times to swell the public coffers (Xu, 1931: 80–82).

As per established practice, if a foreigner was caught smuggling, the security merchant will be held liable for "a fine of multiple times." There was actually no firm evidence to convict the Cirencester of smuggling, and the penalty that increased 100-fold was very arbitrary. Jishan submitted a memorial to His Majesty on the fourth day of the fourth month (16th May) and on the twenty-second day of the sixth month (1st August), and received the document from the ministry. He thereupon commanded Pan Changyao to pay 479 taels of tariff and a fine of 50,000 taels. To avert the catastrophe, Pan Changyao immediately sent his nephew, Tinqua (Pan Zhengwei, the second son of Pan Youliang, courtesy name Qionghou, style name Meiting) to Macao at the third watch of the night on the twenty-second day to implore the supercargo to file an appeal to the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi. At the second watch of the night of the twenty-seventh day (6th August), Pan sent another letter to Supercargoes Richard Hall, Samuel Peach, and James Drummond to seek for help once more. This letter is also seen in *A Collection of Letter Writings, Appeals and Ordinances*, but the postscript is omitted in the book. The full text is as follows:

> In addition, now all the Hong merchants have heard of the case and said that it is an imperial one, so no one dares to write to the supercargo to inform about it for fear that it would implicate their own Hongs. Although the linguists were found to have walked into the yamen (government office in feudal China) together, they actually had no choice but to go because they had received an order requesting them to press for immediate payment of the fine without delay. I venture to ask Sir Supercargo to find ways to save us immediately, for which we shall be grateful, and through which everyone could admire your savvy in handling business affairs. We are really worried about the occurrence of such smuggling cases again in the future as a penalty of 100,000 taels shall be imposed for smuggling 1,000 taels worth of goods, 200,000 for 2,000. This may pose grave harms to the interests of the Hongs and your business, and therefore calling for earlier planning for it. It is necessary for me to get this across to you once more and I pray for your favorable decision. These are my sincere words and please take no offence. PS. (Pan Changyao)[35]

Here Tongwen refers to Puankhequa (Pan Youdu), a cousin of Pan Changyao. Fearing that he might be dragged into the trouble, Puankhequa was unwilling to help out.

On the twenty-fourth day (3rd August), Tinqua arrived in Macao to report to the supercargo, who then sent a letter to the Hong merchants to discuss how to remedy it. However, in the reply to the supercargo dated the twenty-eighth day (7th August), the Hong merchants said that "it is already a done deal, and seems hard to undo it."[36]

On the seventh day of the seventh month (15th August), Pan Changyao wrote to the supercargo again, saying:

> I reckon you have received my letter dated the twenty-seventh day of last month. On the first day of the seventh month (9th August), the Hong merchants paid a visit to His Lordship

[35] F.O. 233/189, p. 211.

[36] F.O. 233/189, p. 209.

> Governor-General, who was very concerned about it. His Lordship said that the penalty may really hurt Mr. Pan, and also knew about the lopsided memorial of Superintendent Jishan to the court, with which His Lordship was quite displeased. As the memorial has been approved by the court, it seems that at this point a petition made by a foreign party may afford Mr. Pan an iffy chance of being exempt from the penalty. But Superintendent summoned me to the yamen every day and confined me indoors until evening, enjoining me to make full payment of the fine within a month, refusing to give any leniency. Little wonder that other fellow Hong merchants, after having heard that this is an imperial case, dare not come forward to lend a hand. Now I have no choice but to pray to Sir Supercargo to make a trip to Guangzhou for my sake and submit a petition to His Lordship Governor-General pleading for his mercy on my behalf, which might more or less save me from the penalty, and it remains uncertain how it would turn out. This is none other than saving my life, not just me but my family will be grateful for your enormous kindness! It is hard for me to exhaust the words in my heart with the pen, and I respectfully look forward to your gracious presence so that I could tell you the details in person and unbosom myself. The new Superintendent was said to have been promoted from a functionary in Hui'an Revenue Agency, and I have no clue where Superintendent Jishan would take up his new post. I guess he would not leave his post until August and the new Superintendent would assume office also in August. I hereby write this letter to you, and greetings to …[37]

The supercargo realized the gravity of the issue, so he decided to send James Drummond to Canton, and meanwhile prepared a report, which was rendered into Chinese by George Thomas Staunton, and filed an appeal to Superintendent and the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi.[38]

Although ensuing documents are already lost and the final outcome is unknown, the liability of the co-Hongs serving as the ones who offered security for the foreign traders was an obvious threat to the former's business. Superintendent employed this as a tool to extort the Hong merchants, which is among the domestic factors hindering the accumulation of capital for the Hongs.

In the early years of the Jiaqing reign, China's maritime trade became increasingly overshadowed by the rivalry and pressure from the Western maritime powers. Chinese sea merchants were still active in the traditional trade circles in the Southeast Asian waters, and had maintained traditional links with the thirteen Hongs in Canton. The Pan family can trace its ancestry to Tong'an, Fujian Province, and the Hongs in Xiamen engaged in the foreign trade were related to them biologically and geopolitically. In the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1808), the ship Jin Shunyuan sent abroad by Kunhe Hong of Xiamen was wrecked in the waters off Wanli Changsha islets, and was rescued by a British ship, as can be seen in the following documents:

(1) Our ship Jinshunyuan set sail on the seventh day of February in the year of Wuchen (1808), and it was wrecked on the fifteenth night. Fortunately they met two ships on the twenty-first day, and the two shipowners (names unconfirmed) saved the lives of five hundred and sixty-one people. If you come to Xiamen next year, we will repay your great hospitality.

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[37] F.O. 233/189, p. 209.

[38] *A Collection of Letter Writings, Appeals and Ordinances* (Vol. 2), edited by Xu, Dishan. Handcopy, pp. 89–98.

This is addressed to: Kunhebao Hong, Xiamen, Fujian
Chief Li Xilao

(2) Li Xilao, Chief of Xiamen Kunhe Company in Xiamen Port, Fujian Province, sent the ship Jin Shunyuan to Bofan. The ship set sail on the seventh day of the second month in the year of Wuchen (1808), and it was wrecked in the waters off Wanli Shangsha islets on the fifteenth night. Fortunately we met you two honored shipowners, who then dispatched sampans to Shayu to our rescue, saving the lives of five hundred and sixty-one people. On the twenty-ninth day the ships reached Hui'an Port where the shipwreck was reported, and on the sixth day of the third lunar month the officials at Hui'an Port allowed entry of our crew into the port, and up until then, we had stayed on board of your ships for sixteen days. We are grateful to you two for your kindness. Besides, we also own you a huge debt of gratitude for lending us 210 Spanish dollars, which we dare not forget and shall return it back to you when we get to Canton.

This is addressed to: Mr. XX and Mr. XX (names unconfirmed)

(3) This note certifies that Captain Mr. X (name unconfirmed) has lent us 210 Spanish dollars, and when the document arrives in Canton, please kindly grant him the said amount at first. You are truly appreciated.

This is addressed to: Kunbaoquan Hong
His Honor Kunshuishe
Li kuan with high respect[39]

The exporting ships owned by Kunhe Hong of Xiamen borrowed money from the British, who then could get payment against document, which showcased the relationship between Pan Changyao and the businessman in his ancestral place, and indicated the thirteen Hongs' monopoly over the foreign trade in China as well as their roles in the domestic businesses. As little is known of this area before, it is necessary to further tap into the historical materials for study.

In terms of Conseequa's letter to Supercargo Roberts dated on the twenty-third day of the tenth month in the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign, we can see that he had a relative by the name of Yang Deguan, who was doing business in the Philippines. On the twenty-ninth day of the tenth month (16th December), he wrote to the "red-haired" Supercargo and Deputy Supercargo, saying:

> I am writing this letter to Sir Supercargo and Deputy Supercargo to forward a petition to His Honor General, which goes: Previously an armed robbery was committed against the American ship, aboard which up to 200,000 tales in my name were to be shipped home, and the tops of silver chests are printed with the name of "Tang." Against all expectations, the soldiers from a warship stationed in Macao had the temerity to plunder the silver and stowed it elsewhere, and meanwhile hid all the relevant letters and the bill of lading. Now I beseech you, General, to track this down and recover the stolen money. Earlier I had told the supercargoes about this matter and asked them to forward this petition to you, and I would be deeply grateful if you would return the silver back to me. If it is difficult for you to handle, I would leave for Guangzhou right away to report this matter to the officials, who shall act according to law in due time, and the silver shall be recovered from your company, not a penny more, not a penny less. The silver is marked with the name of "Tang," therefore

[39] F.O. 233/189, pp. 1, 12.

allowing no brazen robbery. Once this case is taken to the government, there will be zero tolerance for it, which could bring you and others into disrepute and cause an unnecessary trouble. I pray you could use nice words to pass this message to His Excellency General, making sure that they will not turn a deaf ear and return my silver. I hereby write this letter to you, please take no offence.

This is addressed to

Supercargo, Deputy Supercargo and others

Yours faithfully

Yang Deguan, styled Dun

Twenty-ninth day of the tenth month[40]

The American ship, i.e., Jefferson, was detained by the British warships in Macao, but the "big general," i.e., Drury, did not agree to return the silver belonging to Pan Changyao and Yang Deguan, and regarded the ship as a trophy of the British army, saying: "The laws of England are just and must be respected and observed."[41]

Later, the Canton Customs stepped in to negotiate only to no avail.

Judging from this incident, Liquan Hong also operated in the Philippines through kinship ties. The hijacking of American ships by the British side in the waters of Macao also indirectly harmed the interests of Chinese sea merchants and the thirteen Hongs.

Pan Changyao's private letters to the supercargo involved two cases, which nicely illustrate the plight of the Hongs' business caught between the pressures from home and abroad.

In view of the above analysis, the letters of the thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou are of significant historical value. In the study of the economic history of maritime trade, such commercial documents as account books, contracts, and letters can help recapture the operational scenarios of the maritime trading circle. The further rediscovery of the letters of the thirteen Hongs can steer our research to develop in depth from the institutional elaboration to the reconstruction of management and operation. The collection of scattered folk historical materials and the recovery of overseas historical materials promise a bright future for the study of the economic history of China's maritime society.

[40] F.O. 233/189, p. 188.

[41] *Dongyindu gongsi duihua maoyi biannianshi [The Chronicles of Trade between East India Company and China]* (Chinese version, Vol. 3), p. 81.

4.2 Hong Merchants and Macao: Continued Exploration for the Documents of the Canton Thirteen Hongs

A body of "Chinese papers" (Chapas Sinicas), originally deposited in the Macao Council, gradually found its way into Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais da Torre do Tombo in Portugal.[42] These papers, approximately 1500 in number, apart from some from the civil society, mainly comprise the official documents generated during the negotiations between the local military and political yamens in Guangdong and the Portuguese authorities in Macao in the Qing dynasty. Among them are a very small number of documents of the thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou, which can still disclose some contents pertaining to the Hongs if cross-referenced with some relevant official documents. They merit further utilization and exploration as they have provided us the source material to help clear some blind spots in the research and shed some light on the role of the co-Hongs as the liaisons in the foreign affairs and their relationship with Macao. Previously, I have made a preliminary study on the documents of the thirteen Hongs housed in the Public Record Office of Britain, and here I will make a follow-up study on those from the collection of the Torre do Tombo in Portugal.

4.2.1 Hong Merchants and the Portuguese Authorities in Macao

Guangzhou and Macao under the Canton Trade System in the early Qing dynasty served as the windows for China to connect with the world, and the thirteen Hongs provided us an important perspective on the relationship between China and the world during the dawning of modern times. Since the Qing court restricted foreign trade to the port of Canton only, all foreign trading vessels, including the Portuguese ship "Atlantic," upon arriving at the Chicken Neck waters, had to be first piloted to Whampoa Roads where they needed to announce their arrival to the Hong merchants, who then reported it to Customs to open the cabins for tax inspection, and managed the imports and exports on behalf of the foreign merchant ships. Macao, as a customhouse of Canton Customs, collected port fees only from the specified ships operated by Macao-Portuguese (numbered from No. 1 to No. 25 in the third year of Yongzheng's reign) pursuant to the provincial stipulations regarding foreign vessels, and there were no merchandise taxes levied on them. The Portuguese ships entered Macao via the Shizimen Gateway, and were not subject to customs duties. After the ships dropped anchor at Macao, the goods were first unloaded there and the tax revenue was either fed into the remuneration for the military officers and soldiers of their

[42] These documents were collected in *The Chinese papers of Macao in the Qing Dynasty in Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais da Torre do Tombo in Portugal* (2 volumes), edited by Liu Fang, and proofread by Zhang Qinxiao. Macao Foundation, November 1999.

country, or shipped back home if there was still surplus. But the Hong merchants had to pay taxes at the customs house if they went to Macao to purchase goods.[43]

The Hong merchants dealt with the China-Western trade to and fro between Guangzhou and Macao, and therefore the latter was closely involved in the trading network. However, the expansion of the China-Western trade in Guangdong and Macao gradually exceeded the capacity of the Hong merchants, who could do nothing but fade out of the trade between Guangzhou and Macao. In the spring of the fifty-seventh year of the Qianlong reign (1792), Superintendent Sheng Jia inspected taxation in Macao where the Procurator reported to him, among other things, that "it caused a delay of days to obtain the Grand Chops (permits) for Macao merchandise, which could hinder the proper trading" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 632, No. 1237). It was therefore agreed for the Canton-Macao trade to branch out into a separate field, for which a new co-Hong was established in Macao to inspect the goods going upriver and downriver, and declared taxes on behalf of the thirteen Hongs. In the intercalary fourth month of the same year, Xu Yongqing, a merchant from Tongchang Hong, joined the Macao Hong. But three months later, Xu said "he was willing to resign as the affairs grew too hectic in Tongchang Hong for him to juggle" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 632, No. 1239). He reported to Canton Customs saying:

> I took up my position in the Macao Hong in the intercalary fourth month of this year. As the job was loose and disorganized with regard to the declaration and payment of the duties on the goods flowing up and down between Guangzhou and Macao, I was therefore assigned to serve in the Macao Hong, held responsible for declaring and paying duties with no other purpose than to make the work more organized and undertaken by someone responsible. I have already run a business of my own called Tongchang Hong, and with the current influx of foreign ships, I, all by myself, have been overwhelmed and exhausted by the onerous foreign trading affairs. Now that I have taken on the Hong in Macao, I just think I can't juggle both tasks, and there will definitely be errors that I would not afford in the future. I beseech Your Lordship to permit me to resign so that I could better focus on the foreign trading affairs, which is beneficial to all concerned. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 633, No. 1291)

In the seventh month, Xu Yongchang's resignation was granted, and thus aborting the plan to set up a Hong firm in Macao. Since then, merchants were allowed to do trading in Macao, and declare by themselves the goods going to and fro between Guangzhou and Macao. The Hong merchants were only responsible for the bulk export cargoes going downriver to Macao.

In the seventeenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1812), because the merchants who went to Macao engaged in the illegal trade with a Portuguese ship, the Atlantic, the Hong merchants submitted a petition to Superintendent Deqing, who thereupon slapped a ban on the trading on the nineteenth day of the ninth month (23rd October), and reiterated the precedents of the trade between Guangzhou and Macao. The notice quoted Lu Guanheng, a merchant of Guangli Hong, as saying:

> I have found that the import cargoes of the ships from Macao were purchased on their own in Macao, where the duties were reported and paid at the customs, and the relevant documents

[43] Zhang Zengtao: *Zhiyu Aoyi zhuang* [How foreigners were disciplined in Macao], quoted from Liang, Tingnan, *Yue haiguan zhi* [*Records of Canton Customs*] (Vol. 28) in *Yi shang* [*Foreign Merchants*] (3).

were then forwarded to Canton. As for the export cargoes going downriver to Macao, the Hongs are responsible for the declaration and payment of the duties on large quantities of the exports before issuing the Grand Chops, whereas those small private traders, who can't procure the Grand Chops, are allowed to declare and pay the duties on their own, and then secure their permits to leave. This has been the normal practice for the handling of cargo ships from Macao. As usual, the Atlantic merchant ships to Macao, due to their larger capacity for more cargoes, should be subjected to superintendence of the security merchants because the tax revenue means so much to the nation that someone is held responsible for each of the ships on arrival, and which have been well documented for all the years. Unlike other foreign ships, the Atlantic ones ought to have all their imports and exports handled by the Hongs exclusively given the importance of the issue. Now this Hong merchant is responsible for the No. 10 Atlantic ship, of which all the imports shall be handled by him alone as usual. Its export cargoes shall be carried downriver only after the merchant has obtained the Grand Chop, and the trader of ship is forbidden from backroom deals which will result in the compromising of the regulations. If the Atlantic ships are allowed to purchase and deliver the goods on their own just like other foreign ones, this shall not only result in the fragmentation of cargoes, but also may play into the hands of those who attempt to escape and evade customs inspections and could reduce state revenues, not to mention its failure to comply with the initial intention of the security merchant system. It is only right for me to report the truth. I would be grateful if Your Lordship could give me your instructions. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 423, No. 825)

From this, we can see the role of Hong merchants in the China-Western trade between Macao and Guangzhou in the aftermath of the abortion of the plan to set up a Hong firm in Macao.

After the Hong merchants faded out from the trade between Guangzhou and Macao, they did not sever their ties with Macao. In addition to the trading, the role of the Hong merchants as the middlemen between the Guangdong authorities and foreign traders also acted as a special channel of communication between the Guangdong authorities and the Portuguese authorities in Macao. From the official documents delivered by the former to the latter, we can spot the traces of the Hong merchants acting as a go-between forwarding these documents. For example, in the fifth month of the eleventh year of the Jiaqing reign (1806), the designated Macao ships, No. 12, and No. 14, etc., were found with such goods as tin, foreign cloth, rattan, pepper, cotton, fish maw, and others hidden aboard, and attempted to pay less fees under the excuse of importing the cargo of rice. The Superintendent immediately sent a decree, via the Hong merchants, to the Procurator, enjoining the latter to comply with the stipulations on cargo vessels, urging the said Macao ships to pay as per the port fees charged to Macao vessels (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 213, No. 387). The No. 7 Macao ship attempted to be exempt from tax fees by hiding rattan and peppers amid the import cargo of rice, and the Superintendent notified the Hong merchants to deliver the decree to the Procurator, enjoining that the ship must pay the port fees according to its measurements as per usual.

The most direct evidence are the following two semi-official letters from the Hong merchants to the Procurator.

The first one is a response letter addressed to the Procurator dated the twenty fifth day of the first month of the thirteenth year of the Daoguang reign (16th March 1833). This letter, affixed with 11 signatures of the Hong merchants including Wu Yihe, can

prove the latter's role as an intermediary delivering letters for the Procurator of the Macao Senate.

> Reply respectfully:
>
> I have received your letter and have duly noted its contents. We have been commissioned to undertake foreign affairs, and the protocols of England and other countries are slightly different from those of your country, so if your country has any official business, you can report directly to the local magistrate for a solution. If you'd like us to transmit anything to the superior, we are glad to be at your service. Further to your letter addressed to the Governor-General and the Governor of Guangdong last December regarding the case of…, we have already forwarded it on your behalf. Here is the decree of His Lordship Governor-General relayed by His Lordship Governor: "Since the letter has been submitted to the Governor of Guangdong, who has already given his directive, there is no need to submit to the Governor-General for another instruction, and the letter is hereby ordered to be returned back." It behoves us to follow the official decree, and it is not that we are unwilling to deliver it on your behalf, still less to hinder your business. Now that we have received your letter, we have already submitted it to His Lordship Prefect to await his instructions. As of now the official reply to the report of Procurator enjoins the relative traders to follow the decree, and meanwhile a copy of the reply has been sent to the Macao branch office for the latter to transmit it to the Procurator. Therefore, the onus is on us to tell you the ins and outs of the decree and enclose herewith a copy of the protocol on the submission of reports by foreign traders that has become effective from the eleventh year of the Daoguang reign for your reference, and you could also wait for the reply transmitted from the branch office of Macao.
>
> The response is hereby given and greetings to all.
>
> Addressed to His Honor Procurator
>
> For your review, below is a copy of the statute of the sixteenth year of the Daoguang reign on how the foreign merchants submit their petitions:
>
> The foreign merchants could send petitions in person or by proxy in accordance with the priorities of the issue. The statute should specify circumstances under which the petitions could be submitted via the security merchants or by the foreign merchants themselves in case of confusions and intrusions, and all the English and other foreign merchants should be instructed to comply with the statute. In the future if there is an urgent matter that must be reported to the Governor-General's office, the foreign merchants should hand over the petitions to the chief Hong merchant or security merchants rather than go directly to the city gates to send them on their own. They are allowed to do so only when the chief merchant or security merchants fully refuse to transfer the petitions on their behalf. Only one or two foreigners can be allowed to deliver the petitions so as to avoid unnecessary rumpus. If it is just an inconsequential matter, or if there is no obstruction from the Hong merchants, or if the petition is uncalled for, the foreigner involved shall be suspended from trading for one month and shall not be allowed to purchase or sell goods within the month as a punishment for his transgression. The other ordinary trade issues should be reported to the Canton Customs, and the ordinary local affairs should be handed over to the Subprefectural Magistrate of Macao or the Magistrate or Assistant Magistrate of Xiangshan County as per usual. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 634–635, No. 1243)

In the middle of the original envelope writes: "The correspondence therein is to be delivered to Macao." On the left of the envelope writes: "One thousand taels income." On the right writes: "Bearing the signatures of all the Hong merchants."

The second one is a letter enclosed with an edict issued by the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi. This letter was sent to the Procurator on the fifteenth day of the same year (29th August) by eleven Hong merchants including Wu Yihe:

> I beg to inform you that:
>
> Now I have received an edict from His Lordship Governor-General, who enjoined us to transfer it to you. We have thereby enclosed a copy of the edict for your perusal, so that you could understand His Lordship's ever greater kindness to those from afar. This is hereby notified, and greetings to all. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 636, No. 1244)
>
> To Sir Supercargo Procurator for your review.

In the middle of the original envelope writes: "The correspondence therein is to be delivered to Macao." On the left of the envelope writes: "Bearing the signatures of all the Hong merchants."

Wu Yihe, also known as Howqua V, was a merchant of Yihe Hong. Lu Wenjin was a merchant of Guangli Hong, known by his trading name Mowqua II. Pan Shaoguang was from Tongfu Hong, formerly known as Pan Zhengwei (Puankhequa III). Xie Dihua was a merchant of Dongxing Hong, known by his trading name Gowqua II. Li Yinggui was from Wanyuan Hong, known by his trading name Fatqua. Liang Chengxi was from Tianbao Hong, formerly known as Liang Lunshu (Kingqua II). Yan Qixiang was from Xingtai Hong, formerly known as Yan Huanwen. Pan Wentao, formerly known as Pan Guorong (Mingqua), was a merchant from Zhonghe Hong. Ma Zuoliang was from Shuntai Hong, formerly known as Ma Zhanmou (Saoqua). Pan Wenhai was from Renhe Hong, formerly known as Pan Baoshu (Punhoyqua). Wu Tianyuan was from Tongshun Hong, formerly known as Wu Jianzhang (Samqua). All of the above can be found in Liang Jiabin's *Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton.* According to Zhang Wenqin's textual study, the letter is dated the thirteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1833) (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 635, No. 1234, notes 1 and 2).

The documents formed by the Thirteen Hong foreign merchants passing letters between the Guangdong government and the Macao-Portuguese director are of course not unique in the Daoguang period. Similar letters of this kind may well be extant and are worth further efforts to uncover. This should be a new topic for deeper research on the thirteen Hongs in Canton.

4.2.2 Hong Merchants and the Foreign Merchants Traveling Between Guangzhou and Macao

During the off season, the supercargoes and foreign merchants left Guangzhou and lodged in Macao. The Hong merchants helped handle the formalities for their entry to Macao and served as a liaison, and the Guangdong government would often notify the Procurator of the Macao Senate. Fragments of the letters of the Hong merchants can be uncovered from the official documents preserved in Macao, making up for the loss of the original ones.

The Hong merchants helped the foreign merchants living in Guangzhou to process the latter's trips to Macao to visit their family, to trade or return to their home countries, for which they not only had to apply for the exit permit to leave Guangzhou

issued by the Canton Customs, but also needed to report to the Subprefectural Magistrate of Macao, who then notified the Procurator of the Macao senate. For instance, on the twenty-first day of the fourth month in the nineteenth year of the Qianlong reign (12th May 1754), the Subprefectural Magistrate of Macao issued a permission chop to the Procurator, quoting the report of Mr. Chen Zheng, a merchant from Dafeng Hong, as saying:

> A British merchant Mr. H (name unconfirmed) wants to go to Macao to clear his accounts, and he would lodge with the Procurator and he would have to return to Canton by the end of the fifth month …The foreign merchant Mr. H, with three attendants, three swords, three shotguns as well as luggage. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 731, No. 1415)

On the twentieth day of the fourth month of the same year (10th June), the Subprefectural Magistrate of Macao issued a permission chop to the Procurator, citing the report of Mr. Cai Guohui, a merchant from Jufeng Hong, as saying:

> There is a French merchant who wants to pay a visit to his family in Macao, where he would live in the home of Mr. W (name unconfirmed), a Macao Portuguese, and he has to return to Canton by Mid-August...the chop is also issued to a foreign merchant Mr. L (name unconfirmed) with an attendant, …a foreign sword, 21 catties of peanuts, two cases of foreign wine totaling 120 cans. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 703, No. 1367)

On the twenty-ninth day of the intercalary fourth month of the same year (19th June), he issued a permission chop to the Procurator, citing the report of Mr. Qiu Kun, a merchant from Yifeng Hong, as saying:

> There is a Dutch merchant Mr. L who is waiting for his ship in Canton, and this has already been reported to the Superintendent for permission and recorded in the files. Now this foreigner plans to go to Macao with two attendants, a sword for protection, as well as suitcases and luggage, which, upon the arrival of the ship of his country, has to be reported to the Superintendent for the latter's approval of the licence to travel, and meanwhile should be clearly stated and hopefully transferred by you. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 704, No. 1368)

On the twenty-second day of the third month of the sixtieth year of the Qianlong reign (11th May, 1795), a Dutch tribute envoy arrived in Guangzhou with the plan to travel downriver to Macao, where he would stay and take a merchant ship from his country to return home. Li Deyu, the Subprefectural Magistrate of Macao, sent a letter to the Procurator, citing the report of Cai Shiwen and other Hong merchants as well as Xie Ao, a linguist, saying:

> The said tribute envoy, who has arrived at Canton, now stays in the Dutch house of the Thirteen Hong Factories, where a royal decree granted to his king, as well as the customary present and other stuff are deposited. Now that we have found there is no Dutch ship in Canton, there is no ground in planning so. The envoy, Isaac Titsngh, and others, along with their soldiers and flunkies, are planning to go downriver to Macao on the eleventh day of the fourth month (28th May) where they shall stay and shall catch the Dutch ship home the moment it is available, and the royal decree and other stuff shall continue to be housed in the Dutch factory. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 681, No. 1331)

On the eighteenth day of the fourth month of the tenth year of the Jiaqing reign (24th May 1805), Jin Yuan, Commissioner of Macao Customs, sent a decree to the Procurator, citing the report of the Hong merchants as saying:

> The Danish merchant was issued the Red Permission Chop in early March and returned home with the ship fully loaded with merchandise. However, as it is hard to steer the top-heavy ship on the tempestuous sea, the merchant intended to reduce the weight of the ship by unloading the tea and other items, and then hire vessels and have them delivered to Macao where they would be deposited. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 681, No. 1332)

When foreign merchants went from Macao to Guangzhou to take care of trade affairs, they usually applied for the license from the Procurator, but some of them applied from the Canton Customs. For instance, on the fourth day of the eighth month of the thirty-second year of the Qianlong reign (26th September 1767), the Subprefectural Magistrate of Macao issued a decree to the Procurator, citing the report of Yan Shiying, a Hong merchant (Note: Taihe Hong) as saying:

> As a Danish merchant Mr. G (name unconfirmed) said, because it was too late for his two partners, as well as two attendants to leave before the ship set off, they had to come to Guangzhou with the ship. Now they have taken a ship to Macao, and want to go upriver to Guangzhou for trade affairs. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 678–679, No. 1326)

On the sixteenth day of the eighth month of the tenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1805), Peng Zhaolin, the Magistrate of Xiangshan County, issued a decree to the Procurator, quoting the Hong merchants as saying:

> As Ma Yu and others from Luzon (Spain-ruled Philippines) and a Danish merchant (name unconfirmed) reported saying: (previously) Thanks for issuing the permit for us to live in Macao. Now we need to go upriver to Guangzhou to handle trading (business), I beg you to approve the permit so that it can be used as a proof for inspections along the way. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 712, No. 1386)

In the midst of the rice shortage in Guangdong, Canton Customs had taken tax-free measures to attract foreign ships to carry rice to Guangzhou to mitigate the crisis, and for this purpose, the Hong merchants were often instructed to deliver messages to foreign merchant ships and attract them to Guangdong. Due to the rising prices of rice in eastern Guangdong in the fiftieth (1786) and sixtieth (1795) years of the Qianlong reign, the Hong merchants were decreed to relay messages to the foreign ships, expecting them to carry rice to Guangdong for sale so that they could be exempt from port fees (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 155, No. 269). In the fifty-first year of the Qianlong reign (1786), Cai Shiwen, a merchant from Wanhe Hong, reported saying that "he had hired a foreign ship to go overseas to purchase rice and thus request an exemption from the port fees" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 210, No. 382). Because the ship had already paid the port fees when it arrived in Guangdong as a cargo ship earlier in that year, and after that it was hired to procure rice and sailed back carrying the import cargo of rice to Canton, it was exempt from another charge of the fees. In the spring of the second year of the Jiaqing reign (1797), the Governor of Guangdong and the Superintendent assigned the Hong merchants to recruit merchant ships to go to Luzon to buy rice and return to Guangzhou to alleviate the crisis. Pan Zhixiang and other Hong merchants had on multiple occasions sent semi-official letters to the Luzon Supercargo, and then reported to the government the responses of the supercargo. Xiao Shengyuan, the tax officer of the customhouse of Macao, mentioned the Hong merchants including Pan Zhixiang in an official letter to the

Procurator of the Macao Senate, saying he "had transferred the decree to the Luzon supercargo to write letters back home to recruit merchant ships to transport rice to Canton." Also mentioned in this letter is "the supercargo's petition for the exemption from the taxes on the ballast and a negotiation on the prices of rice" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 155, No. 269). The extant is a response letter dated on the twenty-fourth day of the third month in 1797 (28th April 1797) from Luzon Supercargo and others to the Hong merchants. The full text goes as follows:

> On the twenty-third day of this month, we received the response dated 8th March from you and other Hong merchants, giving a detailed account of His Lordship's decree and related matters, which is a testament to your favor and great kindness to us, and we have learned everything about it. We will write a letter to our supercargo, detailing the ins and outs of His Lordship's decree, and will inform other foreign merchants of the decree, urging them to carry rice to sell in Guangdong in return for His Lordship's kindness and affection.
>
> Besides, as mentioned in our previous letter, we have sent letters back home, but it is hard to predict whether the ships will come in answer to the request. We are not trying to be difficult or deliberately opportunistic; we are really afraid that if we write back with the kind permission of His Lordship telling other merchants the details regarding the detainment at the customs and the petition for exemption from the taxes on the ballast, they still hesitate to come out of suspicion. This would constitute an offence of disrespect on my part, so we would like to let you know earlier so as to abate Your Lordship's chastisement.
>
> Now that we have received Your Lordship's kindness, we have done our best to address the issue with all sincerity. As to when the ship will depart, there will be one sailing back to our home country around 15th April, and we will send a letter back home right away. In the meantime, we are inquiring whether there might be another ship stopping by our country, and if so, we will also send the letter immediately to urge the other merchants in our country to carry rice to sell at an earlier date in return for Your Lordship's enormous kindness to us foreign merchants. The response is hereby given, and best regards also to my good sirs from the co-Hongs.
>
> Supercargo Julian
>
> Luzon
>
> Second Supercargo Ballesteros
>
> The twenty-fourth day of the third month in the second year (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 153–154, No. 267)

The above is a response letter written by the Luzon supercargo, which is a copy of the original one and preserved in Macao's archives probably because the Guangdong government asked the aid of the Procurator of the Macao Senate to notify the Luzon supercargo to write letters back home to solicit merchant ships to China.

In the second month of the eleventh year of the Jiaqing reign (1806), the Governor of Guangdong and the Superintendent "rediscovered and reverted back to old practices allowing the foreign ships to carry rice to Guangdong to supplement the food supply for the people." Superintendent Akedanga proposed:

> If the foreigners are willing to carry rice to Cantonese and come to anchor at Whampoa, and as long as they come full of rice with no other cargo, they shall be exempt from measuring and paying port fees, and shall still be requested to leave the port empty without cargo. As for

> the rice ships coming to anchor at Macao, they are likewise subjected to customs inspection, and only those found without any smuggled imported goods are exempt from the port fees and allowed to leave the port with return cargo. If the ships enter the port with cargo or if some goods are found aboard the Whampoa rice ships, they shall not be exempt from the port fees.

Meanwhile, he also instructed the Macao Customs Commissioner and Pan Zhixiang and other Hong merchants to notify the heads of foreigners and supercargoes of the decree, and tell them that "the said exemption will only apply to those ships that transport rice within the time limit starting from the issuing date of the decree until the end of September. If the rice ships come to Macao outside the permitted time limit, they will have to be measured and charged without exception as cargo ships. No excuses for exemption shall be accepted and no interference with public duties shall be brooked" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 156, No. 270).

On the twenty-eighth day of the first month in the fourth year of the Daoguang reign (27th February 1824), in view of fewer foreign rice ships coming upriver to Canton, the Governor of Guangdong and the Superintendent petitioned His Majesty to bend the rules by allowing the foreign ships to take in their export cargo before they pay the port fees and leave. And the Canton Customs therefore notified the Hong merchants to transfer the new decree to all the foreign ships for the latter to follow. The extant one as shown below is a copy of the decree issued by the Superintendent on the first day of the second month (1st March 1824) to Wu Dunyuan and other Hong merchants:

> From Imperially Appointed Canton Customs Superintendent to Hong merchant Wu Dunyuan, the decree states as follows:
>
> As per the Governor-General's official letter: According to the investigation, I, the Governor-General, together with Guangdong Governor and Superintendent, submitted a memorial on the twenty-eighth day of the first month of the fourth year of the Daoguang period requesting that the foreign ships carrying rice to Guangdong shall receive a discount of 10% on the export duties when they exit the port. When the imperial approval comes, it will be copied and sent to you separately, and meanwhile, I will also ask the secretary of the Governor's Office to transfer this to the Hong merchants for the latter to act in accordance with the decree and to notify them the relevant information, and get it across to the foreign ships who would act accordingly. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the memorial. Above is the Governor-General's letter, which is now forwarded to my office. I concur on this, see to it that the Hong merchants are notified and ask them to inform all the foreign ships instantly to comply with the decree. Do not disobey. It is hereby noticed.
>
> Enclosed herewith is a copy of the memorial.
>
> The first day of the second month of the fourth year of the Daoguang reign. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 159, No. 275)

Although the letters addressed to the foreign ships from varied countries by Wu Dunyuan and others are not found, we can generally tell their contents from the manuscript from above. The surviving documents pertaining to the Hong merchants in Guangdong could be helpful to shed some light on the roles that the Hong merchants had played.

4.2.3 Foreign Merchants and Guangdong Government

The documents generated in the course of foreign negotiations carried out by the Guangdong government with assistance of the Hong merchants, though fragmented, scattered, and unsystematic, are still considered useful historical materials as some of the clues or excerpts from the said documents can be found in the official records deposited in Macao.

In the twelfth month of the second year of the Jiaqing reign (December 1797), three British warships laid anchor at the Chicken Neck Sea. At this, the Guangdong government enjoined the Hong merchants to urge the ships to return home at once. Pan Zhixiang and other Hong merchants reported saying:

> We have transferred the decree to Richard Hall of the country, ordering the ships to set off immediately. It turned out that two of them have already set sail for home. There is still one left due to the wind damages to its hull, and it will depart the moment the repair is done. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 768, No. 1483)

In the late third month of the third year of the Jiaqing reign (mid-May 1798), a British ship (with the shipowner on board) came to the Chicken Neck Sea and sent a letter to the country's supercargo. On the sixth day of the fourth month (21st May), the Guangdong government "enjoined the Hong merchants to transfer its decree to the supercargo of the country, urging the ship to depart for its own country right way and allowing no time for its lingering for possible troubles" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 768, No. 1484).

In the late second month of the seventh year of the Jiaqing reign (late March 1802), British naval soldiers attempted to land in Macao. The British Supercargo James Drummond urged against it for days on end, and the Macao-Portuguese Procurator reported the emergency to Xiangshan County. Xiangshan County Magistrate Xu Nailai arrived in Guangdong late on the tenth day of the third month (11th April), and had an audience with His Lordship Governor-General, reporting to the latter exactly what happened: The British supercargo attempted to arrange for the soldiers to lodge ashore in Macao, and the local Westerners (Portuguese) were afraid that the British would take the occasion to occupy Macao, and besought His Lordship to order the British supercargo to go to Guangzhou and urge the British warship to leave Macao as soon as possible. His Lordship thereupon granted all the requests of the Procurator. Next day, he summoned Pan Zhixiang and other Hong merchants and assigned them to make a trip to Macao immediately to escort the supercargo to Canton. The Hong merchants responded saying: "The supercargo is scheduled to depart from Macao on the ninth day of the first lunar month, and will leave for Guangzhou on the eleventh and second day. The British have no intention of occupying Macao, for which the Hong merchants are willing to sign a letter of guarantee, etc." (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 745, No. 0440). All the letters addressed to the supercargoes by the Hong merchants of the year that are deposited in the Public Record Office are dated beyond April. This piece can just fill the gaps in the records of the activities of the Hong merchants in Guangdong before April.

On the fourth day of the tenth month in the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign (5th November 1804), a country trader violated the stipulation that all private traders must apply for the permit to travel from Macao to Guangzhou by sailing on a private sampan into Whampoa to deliver letters. The Hong merchants were assigned to investigate this matter and their report says:

> We (Hong merchants) have paid a visit to the foreign factory and enquired of the superintendent of the country, named James Drummond, who then claims:
>
> The ship is owned by the country trader, which is not under our control, so please check with the owner of the ship to find out. We, along with the security merchants, then made enquiries with the shipowner, who said: The sampan was actually sent by the country trader from Macao to deliver a letter to the foreigner in Whampoa, and the said sampan sailed shortly back to Macao on the fourth day of the first month, and from then on he (the country trader) would obey the stipulation and would not dare to sail into Whampoa without permission, etc. Also according to what he said, the sampan reported by the Humen customhouse is the one found in Whampoa. Our investigation found that a sampan sailed to Whampoa in the previous month carrying 17 foreigners, who then boarded the N ship (name unconfirmed). Now there is another sampan sent to deliver letters. This is a serious breach of the prohibition on the use of sampans by foreigners to travel freely between Macao and Whampoa. It has been found that only the Procurator of Macao could exert multi-pronged influences and control on the foreigners, but as we have never had any dealings with the Procurator, who would not heed our calls, so could we ask Your Lordship to transfer the edict via the Macao customs authorities to the Procurator, bidding him to strictly prohibit and penalize the said infractions as a warning to other foreigners for the good of business? (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 629, No. 1232)

On the twenty-sixth day of the twelfth month in the tenth year of the Jiaqing reign (14th February 1806), an empty American vessel carrying shipwrecked merchants drifted into A-Ma Temple Bay. In the second month of the following year (March–April), Hu Zhan, Commissioner of Canton Customs, issued a decree to the Procurator, citing the Hong merchants as saying:

> We have made a visit to the foreign factory and made detailed enquiries with an American trader stationed in Canton. According to his account, there was a small vessel from his country. As their own ship sustained damages from winds out at sea, so the distressed foreign crew had to take the said vessel to return to their home country. But due to unfavorable winds, their vessel drifted to Macao, now anchored at Niangmage Bay. There were 15 foreign crew on board, where no cargo was found, and it has been confirmed that the vessel is not a trading ship. It is also found that the vessel merely has a capacity of 100 piculs, which could by no means considered to be a cargo ship. The said foreign crew are willing to rent the vessel out to the foreign traders in Macao to maintain their livelihood, and we shall await the reply of the latter as to whether this small vessel could serve as one of the specified trading ships of Macao. All the 15 foreign crew are now waiting for the American ships in Macao …(unintelligible and missing words below). (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 690, No. 1344)

On the twenty-ninth day of the tenth month of the twelfth year of the Jiaqing reign (28th November 1807), an American merchant ship encountered a storm and took refuge in Macao. On the first day of the eleventh month (29th November), the owner of the ship unloaded more than 200 boxes of copper bars into a warehouse at Macao. Canton Customs ordered the Hong merchant to check and report back, and the report goes: “The ship Derby preferred to have the measurement taken at Macao

and pay fees at the Macao customhouse as per the port fees charged to American ships" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 695, No. 1354).

In the fifth month of the thirteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (June 1808), a Dutch merchant named J. H. Bletterman submitted a plea accusing Feng Jiuguan of owing him a total of 24,304 dollars of foreign silver, and Feng Jiuguan was brought to the case by the Nanhai County as decreed by Junminfu, a coastal defense garrison in Macao. However, as regards the amount of money, Feng's confession did not match what was said in the plea, so Junminfu enjoined Lu Guanheng and other Hong merchants to check with J. H. Bletterman. And Lu's report says:

> According to J.H. Bletterman's claim: Feng Jiuguan had previously owed me 15,313 dollars of silver plus interest, and meanwhile he also owed Antonio Joaquim a debt of 20,154 dollars of silver, and it was originally agreed that he would undertake the purchase of 2571.12 piculs of white lead to cover the latter's debt, but later Feng failed to deliver the said lead. Hence Joaquim demanded full payment of the debt from Feng, who then gave Joaquim two bills of debt signed by Manuel Pereira, totaling 8,400 dollars of silver in value, and the remaining 11,554 dollars was still in arrears irrespective of multiple attempts to recover it. Feng Jiuguan then asked me to vouch for half of the debt he owed to Joaquim, i.e., 5,877 dollars, but who would have thought that, after vouching for him and after many years, he hasn't yet paid back a penny and his debt, plus interest, has grown to a total of 8,971 dollars of silver over a period of 53 months since the second month of the twelfth year, of which the interest has amounted to 3,114 dollars at the rate of one cent per month. Joaquim held me accountable as I was the guarantor, so he tried to collect debt from me once and again by taking the matter to the Procurator, who then remanded me in custody to pursue the payment. The debt plus interests that Feng now owes me has added up to 24,304 dollars, the exact amount that I am demanding to recover from him. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 682, No. 1333)

On the eleventh day of the fifth month of the seventeenth year of the Jiaqing reign (19th June 1812), the "Country Merchant" ships exited from Whampoa Port and sustained serious damage to its mast from a storm when sailing to the open sea outside Wanshan. Following that, it drifted back to Tan Chai Wan bay and dropped anchor there on the twenty-second day of the same month (30th June). Canton Customs enjoined Lu Guanheng and other Hong merchants to check it out and then submit a reply, in which the latter says:

> Prior to the receipt of Your Lordship's edict, we were instructed to investigate the event, and the superintendent of the said country relayed the letter from the country shipowner as saying: the ship had come to Guangzhou for trade, and all the imports and exports had been reported and inspected by the customs. After the payment of the duties, the ship was issued with a Red Permission Chop as usual and then set sail to depart the port. However, an unexpected encounter with a violent storm had wrought damages to the mast of the ship, which then drifted downwind back to the sea of Tanzai outside Macao. Now the mast and hull have been ravaged, making it impossible to sail back home. The ship had no choice but to sail to Macao where they would find workers to have the ship repaired. For this purpose, they plan to unload the cargo at Macao for temporary deposit and will soon load it back onboard for departure as soon as the repairs are done. As this is a matter concerning the safety of lives and goods, we pray for your truthful report to the superior on our behalf. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 766)

On the seventh day of the eighth month of the seventeenth year of the Jiaqing reign (12th September 1812), J. W. Roberts returned to Macao again to take over the post as the Second Supercargo on the Canton Select Committee of the EIC. On the twenty-fourth day of the tenth month (27th November), he took the oath of allegiance in Guangzhou and returned to Macao on the thirtieth day of the eleventh month (2nd January 1813) due to illness. On the second day of the ninth month in 1813 (25th September 1813), Jiang You, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, ordered the deportation of Roberts back to his own country. Supercargo John Fullarton Elphinstone submitted a letter in Chinese, mentioning that "Roberts will continue to serve as the supercargo." Jiang thought that "the letter was not copied after an original in foreign language as in the past, but was translated and submitted by a Hong merchant, which clearly indicates that Roberts colluded with the traitors to fabricate the plea on his own and the Hong merchant feigned ignorance of the matter to stay out of trouble." Jiang then notified the Superintendent to enjoin the Hong merchants to check and verify the facts one by one (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 722, No. 1401).

In the process of assisting the government in foreign affairs, Hong merchants and their subordinates were sometimes assigned to handle tasks in Macao.

On the eighteenth day of the first month of the twelfth year of the Jiaqing reign (24th February 1807), a brawl broke out between the sailors of the British ship "Neptune" and the Chinese in Guangzhou. The Guangdong government enjoined the supercargo strictly to hand over the culprit and interrogated the sailors of the "Neptune," and Lu Guanheng and other Hong merchants tried to mediate and were implicated. On the sixth day of the third month (13th April), the Guangdong government determined that a British sailor named Edward Sheen had injured Liao Yadeng, a resident of Panyu County, which resulted in the latter's death. As per the government's decree, the culprit was imprisoned in the room of Supercargo J. W. Roberts. On the second day of the fourth month (9th May), Mr. Roberts went to Macao with Edward Sheen via Xiangshan County, and lodged in the Company's building there. In May, the Procurator of Macao received an official letter from the authorities of Xiangshan County, ordering the British supercargo to surrender the culprit Edward Sheen and have him escorted to Guangzhou for trial. However, the Procurator responded by replying that "England always comes across in the Western world as very recalcitrant, and it is hard to get them to obey the order." At this, His Honor Judge of Guangdong issued a decree to Nanhai County, "ordering Lu Guanheng, a Hong merchant, to make a trip to Macao in person to urge the supercargo to hand over Edward Sheen immediately before the foreign culprit is escorted to Guangzhou for trial" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 721, No. 1399).

On the sixteenth day of the first month of the eighteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (16th February 1813), the Portuguese ship Atlantic, while making its voyage from its own country to the Mauricia of the Nanyang Islands for trade, sailed to Macao due to headwinds. The Procurator petitioned to use the Atlantic to replace the specified ship No. 2. This obviously contravened the established practice that the ship Atlantic ought to pay the import duties before it could replace a specified Macao ship. At this, Canton Customs therefore "ordered the co-Hongs to send a person in charge to

Macao right away to handle the imports and exports of the ship and collect duties accordingly." But the ship procrastinated on the order, and went so far as to leave the port privately on the twenty-fifth day of the fourth month (25th May), with the intention of sailing out to the Atlantic for trade. The Canton Customs thereupon issued another order to have the ship detained, and "bade the person in charge from the Hongs to deal with the imports and exports of the ship, have the cargoes declared and taxed and, as per the usual, a permission chop or license must be issued before its departure" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 722, No. 1401).

Although what is shown are just "fragments" of historical materials, if combined with the original documents, they could help restore some historical scenes of the thirteen Hongs in Canton.

4.2.4 Hong Merchants and Macao-Portuguese Merchants

There was a certain trade relationship between the thirteen Hong merchants and Portuguese merchants living in Macao, but very little historical information about it could be found. In the Portuguese collection of "Chinese Language" documents pertaining to the thirteen Hongs, only a petition dated the seventh month of the sixteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (August–September 1811) was discovered, and this petition, as shown below, was submitted to Procurator Miguel de Amaga by Mu Shifang, a merchant from Wancheng Hong.

> I, the petitioner, Mu Yuanshen, originally from Cixi County, Ningbo Prefecture, Zhejiang province, wish Your Excellency Procurator myriad blessings and peace. I am writing to petition for your graceful permission to seek damages for fraud:
>
> I run a trading firm called Wancheng Hong. In the seventh month of the thirteenth year, there was an English gallon ship, carrying a cargo of vines and pepper, which was then entrusted by W (name unconfirmed), a merchant from your country, to our firm to sell. The negotiated price was 3,000 dollars. By the end of October, I had paid the said price in full, strictly as per the contract, not a penny less. But when W saw that I was young and inexperienced, he deceived me into believing that taking the goods to sell in Penang would make a good profit. Thus, I gave him a hundred barrels of rock sugar, fifty pieces of premium tea, and ten chests of silver, the cost of which amounted to 2,447 dollars of silver. As the transboundary movement of the capital required a written pledge to avoid any misapprehension, he stated clearly in the document that he would pay back the cost plus interest upon his return to Macao. By the fourteenth year, W returned to Macao safely. When I heard about it in Guangzhou, I went to Macao with my business partner Tan Yongfu to collect the money owed. According to W, the goods had been sold and from there he had purchased pepper, opium, and other items, which would be shipped back by Qiu Atao, to whom he entrusted. Though Tan found it hard to believe, he waited in Guangzhou until the eleventh month of the lunar year and then had an audience with Your Excellency requesting to investigate the case. As per Your Excellency's decree: The money has been found embezzled by Qui Atao, and Tan Yongfu is advised to wait in Guangzhou. And as soon as Atao's ship arrives in Macao this April, the actual amount of money owed shall be recovered from him. Now that Atao's ship has arrived for more than a month, and yesterday I was summoned to confront Atao about this case. According to Atao's confession: W is my hired partner, to whom I pay a salary of 400 dollars per year. And all the consigned goods have been resold through my hands, and I admit that

> all the allegations are true. It is obvious that Atao and W had worked in collusion to pocket the goods, and they are now putting the blame on each other in an attempt to delay it. Don't they know that the goods they have sold belong to me? And W is Atao's partner, how can they pass the buck to each other? In this regard, I would like to ask Your Excellency to track it down promptly for the good of business. If Atao and W are still trying to gloss over and prevaricate on this matter, would Your Excellency please transfer me, Atao and W to the Magistrate of Xiangshan County for justification, for which I would be infinitely grateful. I am submitting the petition to Your Excellency to set it in motion.

This petition is presented in the seventh month of the sixteenth year of the Jiaqing reign. (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 634, No. 1242)

The outcome of the case is unknown, but the revealed facts show that it should not be a singular act for the Hong merchants to conduct foreign trade through Portuguese and Chinese merchants residing in Macao. This appears to have gone the same way as Pan Changyao, a merchant from Liquan Hong, who handled the foreign trade in the Philippines through his kin living there.

Hence it follows that the thirteen Hongs were not just the local traders stationed at Guangzhou Port, but also deeply involved in the traditional commercial network of Chinese maritime merchants by virtue of blood ties, geographical proximity, and business relationship, and part of their capital management bore the marks of maritime commerce. They grew out of the maritime commerce and sustained some of its old traditions even in their capacity as Hong merchants. Their connection with the world was found not only outside the city wall of Guangzhou where foreign factories were located, but also in little-known places overseas.

In the sixteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1811), Xie Ao (formerly named Xie Jiawu, originally from Zhao'an County, Zhangzhou Prefecture, Fujian Province, known in the West as Goqua), a merchant of Dongyu Hong, served as a linguist in his early years, and in the fifty-seventh year of the Qianlong reign (1792), he was sent to Macao by the Superintendent to urge the supercargoes to go upriver to Guangzhou and do the trading, and "the linguist is requested to vouch for the honesty and integrity of all the compradors" (Liu & Zhang, 1999: 706, No. 1372), which is the newly uncovered background material pertaining to the thirteen Hongs. We could also know a thing or two about the origin of the relationship between the Hong merchants and Macao from this. The linguist-turned Hong merchants would by all means tap into his old network of compradors, bridging the communication between Guangzhou and Macao, and between the Hong merchants and supercargoes and foreign merchants. This kind of relationship network is an important precondition for Hong merchants to play an intermediary role, but has remained little known.

As Mr. Liang Jiabin points out in his *Study of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton*, "Scholars often fail to notice the connection between the thirteen Hongs and Macao's trade" (Liang, 1999: 13–14). Hitherto, no systematic treatise on it has emerged for the reason that it is hard to find relevant historical materials. The information gleaned from above on the relationship between the Hong merchants and Macao is merely a "fragment" of the history of the thirteen Hongs, which, combined with the published documents, could not suffice to piece together a complete picture of the history, but somehow could draw our attention to its potentiality for further exploration

and research. Most of the surviving archives in Western and Chinese languages pertaining to Macao, though amounting to 1.5 million to 2 million, are still gathering dust or in disuse due to language barriers. Scholars from across the world who study the China's relationship with the world in the early modern period will surely make new breakthroughs if they can bring into full play their strengths in their own languages and academic fields, and foster mutual cooperation and interaction among themselves.

4.3 Canton Customs and Coastal Trades During the Anti-opium Campaign: Yu Kun's Official Correspondence with Lin Zexu Collected in Britain

On the twenty-fifth day of the first month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (10th March 1839), the arrival of Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu in Guangdong marked the culmination of the anti-smoking campaign. Canton Customs, as a governance body, played an important role in fighting against the smuggling of opium by the foreign merchant ships and maintaining normal international trade. By 16th December when the port was closed to halt British trade, as many as 62 foreign merchant ships bound by their guarantee bond had been searched and no opium was found, and carried aboard these vessels were nearly two million foreign silver dollars to buy goods as well as their merchandise to sell. Due to the absence of the historical files, there is little detail as regards how Canton Customs managed and handled the arrivals and departures of the merchant vessels from within and without Guangdong Province. Shortly after Lin Zexu's arrival in Guangdong, he announced the Anti-opium Stipulations, dictating that all vessels, whether cargo junks, wooden sailboats, ferryboats, dredgers, or shrimpers, be registered and documented if they needed to set out to sea through the middle, eastern, and western ports in Eastern Guangdong Province. In addition, every five vessels were bound together by mutual bond, without which none of the vessels could sail out of the ports. Following that, he decreed that there would be an interim injunction against all the vessels in the coastal jurisdictions where any foreign ship was found intruding. However, these directives of Lin made no mention of Canton Customs' handling of the imports and exports of the merchant vessels from within and without Guangdong Province, nor did any ensuing documents, private or official, contain any useful information about it.

The Public Record Office now houses 10 official letters from Yukun, the Superintendent, to Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu. These documents, dated from May to November of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign, could help fill the gap of this period of history. Their originals, initially included as Chinese-language documents into the series of Chinese Secretary's Office, various Embassies and Consulates, China within Foreign Office Records (F.O. 682), were newly compiled into two divisions, i.e., Opium Trade and the Opium War, 1835–1842, and Central and Local

Administration of China, 1765–1857 at the Kwangtung Provincial Archives. For the convenience of readers, I retrieved the said documents from separate divisions and rearranged them chronologically in the following order: "1, 2, …" each tagged with the reference number in The National Archives, and each text added with the new punctuation marks, and then published them, dividing them into two groups under the headings of May and November, respectively, and providing some simple explanations.

4.3.1 Reopening Inland and Coastal Trade After the Destruction of Opium at Humen

In the fifth month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1839), the world-famous campaign to massively destroy opium at Humen attained full success. On the twenty-third day of the sixth month, Lin Zexu made his final inspection trip to the destruction site, and declared the completion of the total annihilation of the opium on the twenty-fifth day before he headed back to the capital city by boat. The foreign trade was up and running again, with 23 foreign export ships, fully loaded with Chinese goods, nine import ships selling such merchandise as foreign rice, cotton, foreign cloth, black lead, etc. After inspection, no opium was found with the merchant ships, and they carried aboard 150 thousand foreign silver dollars for the purchase of Chinese goods.

The trade in Guangdong, inland and coastal areas, which had been affected by the anti-opium campaign, was also resumed. There are two surviving official documents from Yukun to Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu in the fifth month of the nineteenth year of Daoguang (1839), indicating the situation in the early days when Canton Customs reopened the trade in the inland and coastal areas.

(1) F.O. 931/103

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

> On the thirteenth day of the fifth month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (23rd June), Feng Wanyu, a merchant shipowner from Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, went to the office reporting: "In last October, several of us came to Guangzhou to trade from Ningbo, our native town, with a cargo of medicinal herbs and Shaoxing wine, and it so happened that the ships of Jinguangxing from Tianjin were caught smuggling. Hence, we had to wait for Your Lordship Superintendent to work out new stipulations, which, as a result, impeded the free passage of our ships, as everything must be documented in detail before the permission chop could be issued to us. Then on the twenty-second day of the fourth month (3rd June), we went to Your Lordship's office to plead our case and await the approval from above. We should have bode our time until the decree from the court arrives in Guangdong and then act accordingly. But our ships…[words missing in the original] in early May and then sail back at about the summer solstice when there is south wind, and the truth of the matter is that sailing all depends on the sail and wind, and any delay may endanger life. Our back-hauls was already prepared and done in succession last year and from then till now we have

exhausted all our means as there were so many mouths to feed on our ships, not to mention the rotting of the cargo, and we simply cannot afford waiting any more. Now it's at the turn of the summer solstice and we need to load the ships as soon as possible as it takes no less than ten days or half a month to exit the port. If we have to wait until the arrival of the approval and then start loading, it will take much longer time and will inevitably end up missing the deadline. When the autumn sets in, we will miss another chance to return to Ningbo. In desperation, we have to come to Your Lordship's office again to present the facts of our situation, and we pray that you could take a softer line with us and grant us permission forthwith…load the ships beforehand, so that we can take advantage of the favorable wind to sail back home to find a way out of our crisis, therefore a permission slip is needed." Such is what I (Superintendent) have received. Ergo, after the decree is verified by the competent authority, the ships from Ningbo and Shanghai will be allowed to handle all of the formalities required by following the precedent of Tianjin ships, and this has been documented in the files. Now owing to the Imperial Commissioner's instruction of "awaiting the court decision to notify," the said shipowners are afraid they would have to wait too long and hence miss the sailing season to go home, which is indeed reflective of the actual situation of trading ships. Given that the said shipowners have complied with the new regulations and their request to load their ships beforehand for return does not hinder the smuggling case being processed, I hereby grant them the permission to load and leave to avoid unnecessary waiting and delay, and meanwhile notify by official correspondence the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi for review, and bid Chaofu Hong to comply. Please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send this letter to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. The official correspondence must be presented to the addressee.

This is addressed to:

Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi

This original document is missing a date line. According to *A Critical Guide to the Kwangtung Provincial Archives*, deposited at the Public Record Office of London, it is dated 1839/1840, which is inaccurate.

Note: As described in the document, Feng Wanyu, a merchant vessel owner from Ningbo Prefecture, Zhejiang Province, and others went to the government office to file a report on the thirteenth day of the fifth lunar month (23rd June), when Lin Zexu made his last inspection tour to the destruction site at Humen. This year's summer solstice fell at noon of the twelfth day of the fifth month (22nd June), and it is therefore said in the report that "it coincides with the summer solstice." Sea navigation mainly makes use of the monsoon. After the fifth month, the southwest monsoon would blow, and the merchant ships could sail northward from Guangzhou with the wind. But after the autumn, the northeast monsoon would blow, the headwind would make sailing infeasible. It took about 10–15 days for the merchant boats to load the goods and depart from the port, so on the twenty-second day of the fourth month (3rd June), the merchant boats of Ningbo Prefecture submitted a petition to the office of the Imperial Commissioner. Lin thereupon instructed: "You will be notified once the resolutions arrive in Guangdong from the royal court." The resolutions from the court refer to the stipulations on the opium created at the meetings attended by grand secretaries, grand councilors, etc., i.e., new stipulations on the opium ban. According to Lin Zexu's *Jihai Diary*, on the twenty-sixth day of the fifth month (6th July), he received from the Privy Council the said new stipulations. That being so,

the document sent by Yukun should be dated no later than this day. Lin served as the Imperial Commissioner to Guangdong Province by the order of His Majesty, bearing the title of The Minister of War. On the ninth day of the third month in the second year (22nd April), he was decreed to transfer to the post of the Governor-General of Jiangnan and Jiangxi, and the Guangdong office received a document from the Ministry of Personnel on the sixth day of the fourth month (18th May). Therefore, the official titles of Lin in this document are Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War, and Governor-General of Jiangnan and Jiangxi. On the twenty-second day of the twelfth month (26th January 1840), Lin was appointed as Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, hence it is impossible for this document to have been written in 1840.

(2) F.O. 931/3

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the three-tier Record:

> Further to the correspondence of the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi: "For all the merchant vessels guaranteed and operated by Fuchao Hong, such as those from Tianjin, Jingzhou, Shandong, Fujian, Ningbo, Zapu, and Shanghai, new regulations shall be applied, and old regulations still apply to the local ships from within the province such as Huizhou, Chaozhou, Gaozhou, Lianzhou, Leizhou, and Qiongzhou. It is also decreed that all these ships must register and provide the papers of guarantee, and submit them for inspection." Such is what I have received. Fuchao Hong will be informed and urged to comply accordingly. Upon the submission of the papers by the said merchant, I had them stated clearly in my correspondence to the Governor-General for his review. It is reported that the said merchant Pan Dunhua has had the brown sugar unloaded off the ship, which is then ready to leave for Zhejiang Province, and meanwhile a copy each of the guarantee papers has been submitted and has been forwarded to the Governor-General for review via our customs office. In addition to having informed various departments separately about it by official correspondence, I have ordered Xia Wenhui, the Officer-in-charge of the warehouse, and others to monitor the unloading. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This correspondence must be presented to the addressee.
>
> This is addressed to
>
> Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi
>
> The twenty-eighth day of the fifth month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang Reign (8th July 1839)

This document shows that after receiving the resolution from the court in Beijing, Deng Tingzhen, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, conveyed it to Yukun, the Superintendent: "For all the merchant vessels guaranteed and operated by Fuchao Hong, new stipulations will apply to those from without Guangdong, and old ones to those from within as usual, and it is also decreed that all these ships must register and provide the guarantee bond, and submit them for inspection." The Guangzhou Port has since been reopened, allowing the merchant boats to exit for the external trade. The Ningbo boat mentioned above and the Zhejiang-bound boat

in this document seem to be among the earliest Chinese merchant vessels to sail out for trade.

The documents sent by Yukun between June and October are missing. However, according to the document (F.O. 931/4) sent to Lin on the tenth day of the eleventh month (15th December) by Deng Tingzhen, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, on the twenty-sixth day of the sixth month (5th August), they had inspected six merchant vessels within the borders of Guangdong Province, including Haifeng County No. 7 boat owned by Huang Ruili. These vessels, loaded with medicines, foreign cloth, paper, and other goods, which were affixed with seals, went through inspections in turns by the navy stationed along the way, and were escorted by assigned personnel to the north. On the twelfth day of the seventh month (20th August), the ships were scattered by the wind, and on the twentieth day of the eighth month (27th September), Huang Ruili's ship sailed to Wusongkou for anchorage. In light of another official correspondence (F.O. 931/104) sent to Lin by Guan Tianpei, Provincial Commander of Naval Forces of Guangdong Province, on the eighth day of the eleventh month (13th December), the six merchant vessels escorted by the navy were bound for Tianjin, and the other five ships including Jin Fengtai arrived safely in Tianjin.

Note: On the twenty-third day of the sixth month (2nd August), Lin Zexu, Deng Tingzhen, and Yiliang jointly issued an order, announcing that the inland and coastal residents were prohibited from sailing out to sea to trade with or provide provisions for British ships by stealth because the British Consul Elliott refused to hand over the murderer of Lam Wai Hee, and obstructed the British ships from signing the guarantee bond for their entry permit. It is thus clear that sending the navy forces to escort legitimate merchant boats was recommended in this situation in order to prevent smuggling or aiding the enemy and protect the smooth flow of trade in the inland and coastal regions.

4.3.2 The Policy of Opening up Inland and Coastal Trade Remains Unchanged in the Wake of the Halt of the Trade with the British

On the twenty-ninth day of the seventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (6th September), the British consul Elliott, who fled to sea and refused to hand over the murderer or sign a guarantee bond, provoked the Battle of Kowloon. On the twentieth day of the ninth month (26th October), Elliott officially notified the Chinese side that the suspect of the murder of Lam Wai Hee had been escorted back home to England. On the twenty-eighth day of the ninth month (3rd November), He sent out the British warships Volage and Hyacinth, and opened fire at the Guangdong Navy boat in Chuanbiyang. From the twenty-ninth day of the ninth month (4th November) to the eighth day of the tenth month (13th November), another six armed clashes erupted at Kwun Chung Shan, Kowloon. This further deteriorated the environment

outside the Guangzhou Port where safe navigation for the trading ships was in jeopardy. In response to the new situation, Lin made timely adjustments to the policy. On the twenty-second day of the tenth month (27th November), following consultations with Superintendent Yu Kun, Lin, along with Deng Tingzhen and Yiliang, made a joint announcement that the port would be sealed off on the first day of the eleventh month (6th December), pronouncing a permanent halt of the trade with Britain as per the decree of His Majesty. However, the trade stayed open for those foreign ships of various countries who had signed a bond, including the said British ship.

During this period, opinions from within and without the government differed on whether to allow civil ships to go out to sea or not. For instance, Zhang Yuesong (style name Hanshan), who was taking his bereavement leave back home at the time, sent a letter to Lin Zexu from Qiongzhou on the eighth day of the eighth month (8th September), deeming that the evil of smuggling is particularly harmful, and advocating that, from the tenth month to the first month of the second lunar year, civil ships should be strictly prohibited from exiting the port so as to prevent opium trafficking. However, Lin, Deng, Yiliang, and Yukun still opted for going ahead with opium ban without imposing an embargo on the trade between Guangzhou and inland and coastal regions. In a letter dated the seventh day of the ninth month (13th October), Lin told Yiliang in Humen: "I received another mail from Zhang Hanshan yesterday. He said that the traitors were brought in by foreigners, which had long been a source of trouble without doubt. However, though we decide to forbid them to go out to sea, they may not comply with the ban which may even escalate into a civil unrest. It is necessary to find another long-term effective means to deal with the problem so as to avoid giving up eating for fear of choking or opening the door to thieves." In his another letter to Yiliang dated the ninth day of the first month (15th October), he remarked: "Hanshan's words cannot be put into action, …I discussed this again yesterday in His Honor Yukun's junk, and my humble opinion is that if we can't prevent their exit, why not monitor their entry from without?" There are a total of 8 official letters sent from Yukun to Lin in the wake of the permanent halt of the trade with Britain, these documents, which are now deposited in the Public Record Office, indicate that Canton Customs' policy of allowing trade in the inland and coastal regions remained unchanged, but exercised more stringent control over it.

(3) F.O. 931/5

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

> Further to the official correspondence from the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, and following the administrative review, upon the departure of the Chaozhou-bound merchant vessels, I (Superintendent) will first order the garrison at the Nan'ao Town to have them inspected, and I have sent them the agreed stipulations for their reference. According to the report of Fuchao Hong, a merchant ship called Jinyongli, with a cargo of sweet soup and other goods, arrived on the tenth day of the eleventh month (15th December), awaiting clearance to leave for Chaozhou. The ship, apart from being issued with the red permission chop, will be inspected upon clearance and their documents will be checked at the

Nan'ao garrison. Please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This correspondence must be presented to the addressee.

This is addressed to

Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi

The tenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (15th December 1839)

Note: In this document and the following ones, Yukun is officially titled Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs. According to Lin's *Ji Hai Diary*, on the fifth day of the seventh lunar month (13th August), "I received a letter from Beijing, knowing that Yu Hou'an (Yukun's style name) has been promoted to the rank of Minister of the Royal Stable, and still remains in the post of Canton Customs."

(4) F.O. 931/6

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

Further to the official correspondence from the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, and following the administrative review, upon the departure of the Chaozhou-bound merchant vessels, I (superintendent) will first order the garrison at the Nan'ao Town to have them inspected, and I have sent them the agreed stipulations for their reference. According to the report of Fuchao Hong, a merchant ship owned by Chen Zhencheng, with a cargo of cotton and other goods, arrived at the customs on the twelfth day of this month (17th December), awaiting clearance to leave for Chaozhou. The ship, apart from being issued with the red permission slip, will be inspected upon clearance and their documents will be checked at the Nan'ao garrison by the guards, please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This document must be presented to the addressee.

This is addressed to

Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi

The thirteenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (18th December 1839)

Note: In this document and the above one, the ships were all bound for Chaozhou, and it was Fuchao Hong that submitted the customs declaration and applied for the inspection of the ships when clearing the customs. Canton Customs then issued an order to the battalion stationed at the Nan'ao Town to have the said ships checked. To this end, the corresponding documents were sent to the Imperial Commissioner and others. Upon the departure of the Chaozhou-bound merchant vessels, Canton Customs first ordered the garrison at Nan'ao to have them checked, which was one of the specific measures taken by the Guangdong government to make good on the word "if you can't stop them from going out, you have to monitor their entry." Many of the stipulations mentioned in the document were aimed at this, but unfortunately they cannot be found today.

(5) F.O. 931/7

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

Further to the correspondence of the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi: "For all the merchant vessels guaranteed and operated by Fuchao Hong, such as those from Tianjin, Jingzhou, Shandong, Fujian, Ningbo, Zapu, and Shanghai, new regulations shall be applied, and old regulations still apply to the local ships from within the province (Guangdong) such as Huizhou, Chaozhou, Gaozhou, Lianzhou, Leizhou, and Qiongzhou. It is also decreed that all these ships must register and provide the papers of guarantee, and submit them for inspection." Such is what I have received. Fuchao Hong will be informed and urged to comply accordingly. Upon the submission of the papers by the said merchant, I had them stated clearly in my correspondence to the Governor-General for his review. According to the report from the customs post at Humen (known by foreigners as Bocca Tigris), a licensed merchant ship from Yongning, owned by Deng Shunli, with a cargo of jujube and other goods, arrived on the eleventh day of this month (16th December) awaiting clearance for entry. Meanwhile Fuchao Hong had a copy each of the guarantee papers of the said ship submitted to our customs office, through which they will be forwarded to the Governor-General for review. Apart from a close inspection by Xinrui, the Commissioner of Canton Customs, I am also forwarding the submitted papers to the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi and Commissioner as well as the Governor of Guangdong Province for review, please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This document must be presented to the addressee.

This is addressed to

Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi

The thirteenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (18th December 1839)

(6) F.O. 931/8

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

Further to the correspondence of the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi: "For all the merchant vessels guaranteed and operated by Fuchao Hong, such as those from Tianjin, Jingzhou, Shandong, Fujian, Ningbo, Zapu, and Shanghai, new regulations shall be applied, and old regulations still applies to the local ships from within the province such as Huizhou, Chaozhou, Gaozhou, Lianzhou, Leizhou, and Qiongzhou. It is also decreed that all these ships must register and provide the papers of guarantee, and submit them for inspection." Such is what I have received. Fuchao Hong will be informed and urged to comply accordingly. Upon the submission of the papers by the said merchant, I had them stated clearly in my correspondence to the Governor-General for his review. According to the report from the customs post at Humen (known by foreigners as Bocca Tigris), a licensed merchant ship from Chaozhou, owned by Cai Daxing, with a cargo of beans and other goods loaded at Xiamen, arrived on the sixth day of this month (11th December) awaiting clearance for entry. And meanwhile Fuchao Hong had a copy each of the guarantee papers of the said ship submitted to the customs, through which they will be forwarded to the Governor-General for review. Apart from a close inspection by Xinrui, the Commissioner of Canton Customs, I am also forwarding the submitted guarantee papers to the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi and Commissioner as well as the Governor of Guangdong Province for review,

please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This document must be presented to the addressee.

This is addressed to

Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi

The sixteenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (21st December 1839)

Note: This document together with No. 5 and No. 8 shows the continuous implementation of the stipulations of this May, which specifies that import ships from other provinces shall be handled in accordance with the new stipulations and must be registered and documented, after which, all the relevant documents shall be submitted by Fuchao Hong to Canton Customs, which then notify by official correspondence the office of the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, the Governor of Guangdong Province as well as the Imperial Commissioner for review.

(7) F.O. 931/9

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

According to the report from the customs post at Humen yesterday, a merchant ship, owned by Deng Shunli, with a cargo of jujube and other goods loaded at Tianjin, arrived at the customs awaiting clearance for entry, and meanwhile Fuchao Hong had submitted to the customs the guarantee papers of the said ship, which was then subjected to close inspection by Xinrui, the Commissioner of Canton Customs, the result of which was documented for review. The report of the said Commissioner says as follows: I was sent right away to inspect the said ship cabin by cabin, and found no smuggled opium aboard, and I hereby make a list of the items and quantities of the goods as follows: The ship, owned by Deng Shunli, is 51 feet (Chinese unit) in length, 19 feet in height, with 12 hatches, with a depth of 8 feet, aboard the ship are 20 sailors, 307 pieces, large and small, of such goods as jujube, medicinal materials in bulk, and cinnabar, etc., 7 pieces of raisins, 10 pieces of betel nuts, 90 pieces of melon seeds, 20 pieces of wool, 50 crocks of Chinese wine. Such is what I have received, please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This document must be presented to the addressee.

This is addressed to

Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi

The sixteenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (21st December 1839)

Note: This document, together with No. 9 and No. 10, is the notifications by the Commissioner of Canton Customs concerning the inspection results of the import boats from other provinces. The main objective is to list the types and quantities of cargoes that the vessel carries and to confirm that no opium is aboard. The measurement of the merchant boat is between 15 and 19 feet in height. There are less than 20 sailors, and loaded aboard is the cargo of daily products such as native produce or medicinal materials. The trade of civil daily goods meets the daily economic needs of

ordinary people. If prohibited, it will not only damage the interests of merchant boats, but also affect social stability. The measures taken by Canton Customs Committee to inspect the boat cabin by cabin are consistent with the spirit of "neither giving up food for fear of choking, nor opening the door to thieves."

(8) F.O. 931/10

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

> Further to the correspondence of the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi: " For all the merchant vessels guaranteed and operated by Fuchao Hong, such as those from Tianjin, Jingzhou, Shandong, Fujian, Ningbo, Zapu, and Shanghai, new regulations shall be applied, and old regulations still apply to the local ships from within the province such as Huizhou, Chaozhou, Gaozhou, Lianzhou, Leizhou, and Qiongzhou. It is also decreed that all these ships must register and provide the papers of guarantee, and submit them for inspection." Such is what I have received. Fuchao Hong will be informed and urged to comply accordingly. Upon the submission of the papers by the said merchant, I had them stately clearly in my correspondence to the Governor-General for his review. According to the report from the customs post at Humen (known by foreigners as Bocca Tigris), there are two licensed merchant ship owned by Zhenshun, Cai Zhensheng from Fujian arriving on the thirteenth day of this month (18th December) as well as a licensed ship also from Fujian owned by Cai Zhenguo arriving on the fourteenth (19th December). All the said ships came with a cargo of beans and other goods loaded at Xiamen, and will clear customs for entry. And meanwhile Fuchao Hong had a copy each of the guarantee papers of the said ships submitted to the customs, through which they will be forwarded via our customs office to the Governor-General for review. Apart from a close inspection by Xinrui, the Commissioner of Canton Customs, I am also forwarding the submitted papers to the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi and Commissioner as well as the Governor of Guangdong Province for review, please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This document must be presented to the addressee.
>
> This is addressed to
>
> Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi
>
> The seventeenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (22nd December 1839)

(9) F.O. 931/12

Official correspondence from Yu (Yukun), Imperial Minister of the Royal Stable, Superintendent of Canton Customs, Continued Holder of the Three-tier Record:

> According to the report from the customs post at Humen yesterday, three merchant ships, owned by Jin Zhenshun, Cai Zhenguo and Cai Zhensheng respectively, with the cargoes of beans loaded at Xiamen, arrived awaiting clearance for entry, and meanwhile Fuchao Hong had submitted to the customs the guarantee papers of the said ships, which were then subjected to close inspection by Xinrui, the Commissioner of Canton Customs, and the results were documented for review. The report of the said Commissioner says as follows: I was sent right away to inspect the said three ships cabin by cabin, and found no smuggled opium aboard, and I hereby make a list of the items and quantity of the goods as follows: The ship, owned by Jin Zhenshun, is 15 feet in height, with 12 hatches and 8 holds of beans;

> the ship, owned by Cai Zhenguo, is 16 feet in height, with 14 hatches and 8 holds of beans; the ship owned by Cai Zhensheng, is 16 feet in height, with 12 hatches and 8 holds of beans. Such is the report that I have received, please find herewith the corresponding information. I hereby send the correspondence to the Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General to review and act accordingly. This document must be presented to the addressee.
>
> This is addressed to
>
> Lin, the Imperial Commissioner, Minister of War and Governor-General of Jiangsu and Jiangxi
>
> The nineteenth day of the eleventh month of the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (24th December 1839)

The nine documents shown above mirror Canton Customs' stricter control over the arrivals and departures of the merchant boats guaranteed by the Fuchao Hong. This also proved that Lin did take concrete actions in accordance with what he wrote in his memorial to His Majesty on the twenty-fourth day of the twelfth month (28th January 1840), which goes:

> Right after the closure of the port in the eleventh lunar month, I, Deng Tingzhen, and Yukun enjoined co-Hongs and the foreign merchants from various countries to provide detailed information about their ships entering the port one after another, such as what their names are, which country they belong to, whether the goods are original, and how to identify them. We make sure the information is substantiated and reported before the ships are checked and verified. The export goods should be loaded according to the measurement of the vessel, and overloading is not allowed.
>
> In addition, "those ships sailing in and out of the port must be closely inspected."

4.3.3 Patch Up the Gap in the Historical Memory

Of the official correspondence sent from Yukun, the Superintendent, to the Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu in the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1839), only ten documents have survived to this day; however, given the data concerning Canton Customs and the trade in the coastal and inland areas are scarce, these documents are particularly precious in that they could shed light on a lost fact and fill out the gap in the historical memory.

If viewed from the perspective of economic history, the anti-opium campaign in Guangdong in the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign was intended to tackle the crisis of silver shortage in the Qing Empire. To stop the outflow of silver, it was of vital importance to combat opium smuggling, which would certainly ameliorate the environment for the maritime trade. The measure to bind the import ships to enter into a guarantee bond is actually analogous to the establishment of a kind of protocol for conducting trade in good faith, which would stand those legitimate domestic and foreign merchants in good stead. "Neither give up food for fear of choking nor open the door to invite thieves," this indicates that Lin Zexu, Deng Tingzhen, Yiliang, and Yukun were clear-headed and open-minded, and they were good at using the customs house as a powerful weapon to guard the country's gates. The role of Canton Customs

in banning opium and maintaining normal domestic and overseas trade was positive and cannot be underestimated.

The onset of the Opium War waged by Britain in the following year suspended the anti-opium movement and shifted the attention of the public away from the latter, whose significance was therefore neglected even at that time. In particular, the fact that Canton Customs had protected the inland and coastal trade was nowhere to be found in the historical record. Previous studies have more or less provided some information on the relationship between the opium ban and China-foreign trade, but none on the relationship between the opium ban and the inland and coastal trade. Due to neglect and lack of protection, many of the original records gradually went missing and fell into disuse. This is often the awkward situation that scholars may face in historical studies.

The rediscovery of Yukun's official documents mentioned above has driven a message home to us: The vicissitudes of history have wiped out a large number of original records, but not all historical imprints. Some historical fragments, which may have ended up in private or overseas collections, or have been found buried underground and under the sea, and their reemergence often means the rewriting of history. As you know, being neglected or forgotten takes nothing away from the value of the historical data, which, though not able to restore the historical landscape as it was, may be held by posterity as important evidence when they need to approach history from different lens. This is exactly where the charm of historical research lies.

4.4 Lin Zexu's Maritime View and Hong Kong

Lin Zexu was an intellectual fostered by the traditional Confucian education of the Qing dynasty, and a provincial magnate who entered the political arena via the right track of the imperial examination. His otherwise impossible ascent to the upper political echelon in the mainstream feudal society was attributed to the strict alignment of his thoughts and actions with the then political and moral norms of the traditional society. However, born in the coastal area of Fujian, Lin Zexu lived and worked primarily in the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong before the Opium War. As a result, he was inevitably influenced by China's "minor tradition" of maritime development. This influence is subtle or psychological, and often unconsciously revealed in his behavior and writing. Through just a few words, we can detect some maritime elements in the depths of his thoughts and decipher its hidden cultural connotations. This may offer an alternative perspective on the relationship between Lin Zexu, the Opium War and Hong Kong.

4.4.1 A Nascent Awareness of Marine Economy

The "minor tradition" of China's maritime development refers to the social production and coastal lifestyle generated and developed through direct and indirect maritime activities, which are distinct from those of land activities. The development of Chinese history was predominantly shaped by its robust agricultural civilization, which consequently relegated maritime advancements to a secondary status. As a result, achievements in maritime civilization remained localized and primarily confined to folk culture for an extended period, without gaining entry into the prestigious realm of elite academic discourse. Hence, throughout the traditional era, maritime civilization consistently functioned as a complement to the predominant agricultural tradition. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, when strict sea bans were enforced, these maritime communities were often viewed as "outsiders" and excluded from the social system, compelled to seek survival through "unorthodox" means.

Following the Qing dynasty's reunification of Taiwan, Emperor Kangxi initially opened up maritime activities out of empathy for the coastal communities' livelihoods. However, before long, political security concerns compelled him to implement a policy of retreating from the sea. This policy limited the scope of maritime economic activities, such as marine fisheries, marine shipping, and maritime commerce to the inner sea and imposed strict restrictions on ships, personnel, and equipment. Mainland civil ships were prohibited from trading in the South China Sea, and Chinese people were barred from migrating overseas. During the Qianlong period, adherence to the "ancestral system" further restricted foreign trade, confining it to the single port of Guangzhou. Although the maritime economy experienced a revival, it came across as somewhat misshapen due to these restrictions. It was within this context that Lin Zexu got involved in maritime affairs.

Lin Zexu, while adhering to the principles of the "Heavenly Dynasty System," consistently and diplomatically advocated for the development of maritime economy as a means to improve the nation's livelihood. This stance mirrored his mindset inclined toward the ocean. China's traditional maritime economic pursuits encompass marine fishing, marine transportation, maritime trade, and maritime migration. The Ming and Qing dynasties characterized this maritime economic model as "farming the sea as a field." Fishing and shipping were common aspects of the traditional maritime economy, as well as the fundamental means of sustenance for coastal communities. Lin Zexu was acutely aware of this reality. During his tenure as Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, he opposed the re-implementation of sea ban, asserting:

> Banning civil vessels of any size from venturing out to sea is impractical. The people of Guangdong rely more on the sea than on land for their livelihood, as is evidenced by such sayings like "seven tenths of fishing, three of farming" and "three tenths of mountains and six of seas." An indiscriminate ban on all maritime activities won't last long. It may seem more reasonable to permit fishing within nearby waters, but it is virtually impossible to ascertain the distances the fishers travel given the unpredictable sea winds, let alone who will be able to carry out the enforcement out at the sea. (Lin, 1965: 795)

China opened up the shipping route along the north–south coast at a very early time. However, following the construction of the Jinghang Grand Canal, the north–south commerce primarily relied on river transportation, leading to a decline in shipping along the northern coast. After lifting the sea ban in the early Qing dynasty, coastal civil ships, still restricted by prohibitions on overseas trade, shifted their focus to domestic routes for commodity transportation between the northern and southern seas. As a result, shipping along the northern coast experienced a resurgence. The sea route from Shanghai to Tianjin and Fengtian, via the coast of Shandong, was "thronged with merchant ships in unprecedented numbers." "During this period, the seafaring people there competed against each other to enhance their shipbuilding techniques, boating skills, sailing equipment, as well as the seamanship on how to navigate safely and smoothly on the seas with obstacles such as reefs, so much so that their expertise on them was honed to an ever sharper edge."[44] During the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods, "approximately 3560 sand boats congregated in Shanghai" and "made four to five trips annually" to Guangdong (Northeast China). Each year, "over 10,000 dan (Dan is an ancient Chinese unit of weight: 1 dan is roughly equivalent to 60 kg) of Northeastern beans and wheat were transported to Shanghai,"[45] and this alone was more than double the total volume of the goods shipped through the Grand Canal.

In the fifth year of Daoguang (1825), Lin Zexu, who was supervising the embankment workers in Jiangnan, noticed the increasingly important role of shipping in the economic interactions between the north and the south, and actively advocated hiring merchant ships to transport grain from the south to the north, so as to alleviate the huge pressure of transporting grain by canal. Later, he was sent to Shanghai to supervise maritime transport, but at this time he was seized with malaria, so he failed to complete the mission and was granted sick leave by His Majesty to return to his hometown for recuperation.[46] Fourteen years later, when in Guangdong, he remained firm in his conviction: "The current state of river transportation presents grave challenges, and its future remains uncertain. Although maritime transport offers convenience and speed, it is essential to account for unforeseen factors." He continued, "Sea transport can be utilized through either official or private channels for the shipment or transfer of legally acquired or commercially purchased grain. This still warrants careful consideration and necessitates a long-term view." He was convinced that maritime transport had two key advantages over river transport. Firstly, it could offer a greater load capacity with reduced risk. As he noted, "The annual volume of Guangdong beans and grain transported by sand ships is immense." With thousands of sand ships traversing the Guangdong waters each year, people were becoming increasingly

[44] Xie Zhanren: *Haiyun tiyao xu* [Preface to *The Essentials of Maritime Transportation*], in Qing jingshi wenbian [*Articles in the Qing Dynasty to Be Passed Down to Future Generations*] (Vol. 48).

[45] Qi Yanhuai: *Haiyun nancao yi* [Maritime transportation of grain from the south], in *Qing jingshi wenbian* [*Articles in the Qing Dynasty to Be Passed Down to Future Generations*] (Vol. 48).

[46] Lin Zexu: *He Tao Yunting fubu "Haiyun chufa, fu Wusongkou zhigao haishen, deng paotai zuo" Yuanyun* [Poem responding to the Imperial Inspector Tao Yunting's "First Embarkment, to Worship the Ocean God at Wusongkou on the Fortress"], in *Jimao yihou shigao* [*Manuscripts After the Year of Jimao*].

familiar with the ocean currents and trade winds. By loading each ship with only 60%–70% of its capacity, they could mitigate the risk posed by storms. Secondly, he emphasized the strategic utilization of seasonal winds. By harnessing the south wind for northward travel, ships could complete two transport runs during the spring and summer months. The second advantage he identified was that "if maritime transport proves viable, it should be distinct from river transport." This differentiation lies in the potential elimination of arbitrary tolls and fees imposed at various points along river transport routes. He questioned, "If more tolls were to be levied on the sea route, how would it differ from river transportation?" (Lin, 1965: 722–723). Recognizing the significance of maritime transport, he compiled the maritime affairs of the sixth year of the Daoguang reign (1826) into a twelve-volume collection titled *Complete Cases of Jiangnan Maritime Affairs*, considering it a major financial and economic undertaking.[47]

While Lin Zexu proposed to reform grain transportation, he advocated the inclusion of maritime shipping within the socioeconomic system and advised to use the transfer fees to hire ships so as to serve the interests of sea merchants, which was conducive to the development of the maritime economy.

Maritime trade is the lifeblood of the maritime economy. This importance became increasingly evident by the end of the Tang dynasty, reaching its peak during the Song and Yuan dynasties when the imperial court permitted both Chinese ships to venture overseas and foreign ships to trade in China. In the Ming dynasty, despite an imposed ban on sea trade, the illicit exchanges between Chinese ships and foreign vessels continued unabated. This persistent smuggling activity ultimately led to the opening of Yuegang port. The relocation of the boundaries of the sea ban during the transition period between Ming and Qing dynasties wreaked havoc on the maritime trade. Following the reopening of the seas, the trade system evolved to permit foreign ships to access Guangzhou while still barring Chinese vessels from traveling abroad. Lin Zexu neither questioned nor challenged this system, even echoed His Majesty Daoguang by asserting that "allowing foreigners to trade in the Chinese market is not because China needs foreign goods or seeks to collect taxes. Its original intention is to showcase the emperor's benevolence and grandeur" (Lin, 1965: 794). Nevertheless, in handling specific affairs, Lin Zexu believed that it was unreasonable to sever foreign trade entirely, and it was "indiscriminate and unjustifiable to slap bans on all foreign traders whether they harbor ill will or good one" (Lin, 1965: 705). He proposed to "welcome those law-abiders and reject the lawbreakers," and "treat all foreign traders in this manner." He also cited the talk of town in his memorial as saying: "I have heard many people in our country are so jealous of the foreigners who have reaped substantial profits through trade. Bound by national regulations, the residents of the mainland are unable to engage in trade with other countries, thus allowing foreigners to monopolize these profits" (Lin, 1965: 640). By saying so, he conveyed implicitly the coastal population's desire for open ports and expanded trade opportunities.

[47] Ibid.

Emigration to earn a living overseas was a widespread occurrence in the coastal regions of Fujian and Guangdong, representing another aspect of "farming the sea as a field." Lin Zexu was undoubtedly aware of this. During his term as Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan, he invited Yu Zhengxie to join his advisory panel and collaborate on proofreading *Haiguo Jiwen* (*Documents and Anecdotes of Maritime Countries*), a work dictated by Xie Qinggao and transcribed by Yang Bingnan. Upon arriving in Guangzhou, Lin Zexu wrote a preface to the book, but unfortunately, it was lost. However, he cited the book in a memorial to the emperor, in which he mentioned foreign ships purchasing young Chinese kids and bringing them back to their countries. In his writing, Lin Zexu did not display the prejudices held by the officials at the time, who often slighted overseas emigrants as "traitors" or "foreigners." Instead, he believed them to be "poor unemployed people" or "impoverished individuals" who were "privately recommended" or "employed" with the intention of "going abroad to make a living" and "not selling themselves" (Lin, 1965: 680). Nor did Lin discriminate against those who returned to the mainland; instead, he consulted them for their expertise on foreign affairs. Examples include Rong Lin, a native of Nanping Village in Xiangshan who returned from Britain, and Wen Wenbo, who came back from Bangladesh. Among the translators recruited by Lin Zexu were Ya Meng, who returned to China from Serampore, India, and Yuan Dehui, who returned from Malacca. Their translations of English books and newspapers, along with the global insights they provided, served as valuable sources of information that enabled Lin Zexu to broaden his vision of the world.

As can be seen from the above, Lin Zexu not only showed empathy for the people in coastal areas who lived off the sea by "farming it as fields," but also nurtured a nascent awareness of the importance of cultivating maritime economy.

4.4.2 Devout Faith in Sea Goddess Mazu

The "farming-sea-as-field" way of life was exemplary and manifested in the formation and spread of Mazu faith. Originated on the Meizhou Island in Putian, a coastal area in southeastern Fujian, it spread from the local communities to the entire China's maritime economic sphere where it grew into a major religious faith, which is directly related to the development and transition of maritime economy. The expansion from a folk belief to a "god of public service" reflects the progress of official participation in maritime affairs. The multiple deictic roles that Mazu assumed also showed the interaction and interpenetration of sea and land beliefs.

In Lin Zexu's inner world, the goddess Mazu is undoubtedly one of the spiritual driving forces behind his way of behaving. In his early years as an official in Beijing, he participated in the activities of the Fuzhou Association and presided over the establishment of the new Fuzhou Association. On the twenty-eighth day of the twelfth month in the twenty-first year of the Jiaqing reign (13th February 1817), he "went to the old hall in the morning, and had the statues of deities, including Wenchang, the god of Literacy, Wushen, the god of war, and Thean Hou, the heavenly queen

(another name of Mazu), moved to new shrines at a hall in Fuzhou. Then he offered up sacrifices in the afternoon, and returned home after dinner at the new hall" (Faculty of History at Zhongshan University, 1962: 68). During his term as imperial inspector in Jiangsu, in order to pray for rain, for the trouble-free construction of water conservancy and the safety of waterway, he made multiple visits to the cities and towns of Suzhou, Liuhe, Zhenjiang, Hengzha, Dantu, Baoshan, Wusongkou, Jinshan, and other places to make joss stick offerings and pray in the Thean Hou Temple. On the twenty-eighth day of the sixth month in the tenth year of Daoguang (3rd August 1834), he led the local officials to pay tribute to the newly built Thean Hou Temple in the town of Liuhe, and hung a plaque as well as a couplet (Faculty of History at Zhongshan University, 1962: 146), which says:

> Hallowed by the four seas eight hundred years ago, you attained immortality in thy hometown Meizhou Island, and thy divinity has nourished the religious legacy of nine Chinese clans;
>
> Originated from the forty thousand hectares of Taihu Lake, I am so glad to see Loujiang river newly dredged, thy blessings will baptize the water systems in Three Wus (refers to the regions south of the Yangtze River).[48]

During his tenure as Governor-General of Hubei and Hunan provinces, he visited Thean Hou Temple in Hankou many times to pray for the taming of the great flood of Yangtze River and the safety of the river bank. On the twenty-third day of the third month in the eighteenth year of the Daoguang reign (17th April), the birthday of Thean Hou, the heavenly queen, he crossed the river at dawn and visited the Fujian guildhall in Hanzhen to host the festival. Lin Zexu's handwritten plaque was hung in the hall. The plaque says: "Southern Goddess of Mercy." The couplet says:

> In the island of Meizhou, where thy attainment can still be traced, thy country folks burn joss sticks to communicate with thy holiness;
>
> At the ferry port of Hanzhen, where thy order is highly exalted, we build the dam to bid farewell to the flood flowing off to the sea. (Faculty of History at Zhongshan University, 1962: 282)

When he was leading the anti-opium campaign during his tenure as Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, he visited the Thean Hou Temple in Guangzhou and Humen many times to pay incense tributes and pray for maritime affairs. During the days when he was supervising the seizure of opium from British barges, he lived on the warship "Xinhui No. 1" and offered incense to worship Goddess Thean Hou in the boat. On the first day of the seventh month of the nineteenth year in the Daoguang reign (9th August 1839), he ordered a plaque to be hung in front of the Thean Hou Temple of the Fujian guildhall in Guangzhou in the morning. And the plaque says "Goddess bless the treasure ships from afar" (ibid: 348). On the twenty-sixth day of the eighth month (3rd September), during the tour to Macao, Lin walked through the archway of Cathedral of Saint Paul from the north to the south, made offerings to the Thean Hou Temple, and took a short break there (ibid: 351). On the eleventh

[48] Shen Zumu (ed.): *Yunzuo Shanfang wenchao* [*Yunzuo Shanfang Essays*], handcopy, appendix volume. (Yunzuo Shanfang was the name of the house where Lin Zexu once lived in Fuzhou, a legacy from his father Lin Bin.)

day of the eleventh month (16th December), "an English cargo ship was caught in strong winds at sea and drifted toward Wenchang County in Qiongzhou. Tragically, 17 Englishmen were drowned. Fifteen survivors made it to the shore and were handed over to the provincial government. After breakfast, Lin Zexu visited the Thean Hou Temple with the 15 foreigners, where he comforted them and provided them with food. He then arranged for Ben Juzhou to accompany them to Humen and ensured the return of their vessel" (ibid: 362). On the sixteenth day of the eighth month (10th September 1840) and the ninth day of the ninth month (4th October), Lin Zexu twice visited the Thean Hou Temple in the Fujian guildhall in Guangzhou to pay tributes. After Lin's dismissal from his office, "the residents who came to offer him gifts filled the streets, but Lin Zexu did not accept the boots, umbrellas, incense burners, mirrors and other things that the people gave and returned to them. He kept only a few dozen pairs of plaques and placed them in the Thean Hou Temple" (ibid: 372). During his stint in Yangcheng, on the fourteenth day of the first month in the twenty-first year of the Daoguang reign (5th February 1841), "the Fuzhou fellows launched the offering services in the front yard of the Thean Hou Temple, and at the noon hour they paid respectful homage" (ibid: 381). During his stint in the military camp in Zhenhai, Zhejiang Province, he also visited the Thean Hou Temple in Zhaobao Mountain to pay incense tribute (ibid: 403).

Deep in Lin Zexu's heart, Mazu (Thean Hou) was a goddess of the native land, a goddess of the rivers and seas, and a goddess of maritime businesses rolled into one. This is not only because he was born in Fuzhou that is in the vicinity of the sea, but also because his family was descended from one of the top nine influential clans of China, and his clan originated from Putian and Fuqing. Before Mazu became a goddess, she was a member of the influential Lin clan, and therefore, was a goddess of the family. Although the factors behind his piety toward Mazu were complex, Lin Zexu's family and his own experience of being inextricably linked to the sea were important factors. He understood the meaning of "farming the sea as field" better than the bureaucrats of inland origin, and he clearly had a natural affinity with the maritime civilization gene in Mazu faith.

4.4.3 Viewing Hong Kong from a Maritime Perspective

The opium trade and the Opium Wars were serious challenges posed to China by the Western maritime powers. Although most of what Lin Zexu learned through his quest for the new knowledge about the West was to address the practical needs of the current situation, it also touched on certain aspects of Western maritime social economy.

The maritime era unveiled by the "Great Geographical Discovery" at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was characterized by maritime trade and maritime plunder, overseas colonial expansion, and marked by the rise of the modern maritime economy in the West. The result was the transformation of the agricultural and social structure of Western Europe, the establishment and spread of the capitalist system,

and the subordination of the East to the West and of the agricultural people to the bourgeoisie, with the sea as the stage of history.

On the eve of the Opium War, Britain stood as the most powerful capitalist country and dominant maritime state. Through observation and exploration, Lin Zexu discovered that Britons "did not rely on agriculture to create wealth, but through trade, they became strong," emphasizing that "trade is the lifeblood of the British economy" (Lin, 1965: 676). As he observed, "this country excels in trade. They amass huge profits by selling goods to other countries" (ibid: 796). Lin Zexu cited a Warring States-period proverb to describe Britain: "Just as people with long sleeves are adept at dancing, those with more money excel at trade." These insights reveal that Lin grasped the superficial characteristics of British capitalism, although he did not understand the distinctions between ancient merchants and modern commercial capitalists, or between commercial capital and industrial capital. Nor could he break free from the traditional notion that regarded business as the "least respectable means of acquiring wealth." However, in comparison with most Chinese at the time who generally viewed Britain as a "barbaric island" and knew very little about how the country had become a power, Lin Zexu's understanding was notably superior.

Lin Zexu also had a preliminary understanding of Britain's "art of encroaching on other countries" through colonial plunder. As he pointed out, "it took 70,000 miles by sea to travel from London, the capital of the country, to China, and a strait must be passed through in the middle. The winds and waves at the strait were so sinister that people trembled with fear…. British merchants would like to snatch ports in other people's countries often without the orders of their own lord; they could privately commission warships to capture the ports. Each time a new territory was seized, the person who funded it would be allowed to collect tolls from it for 30 years and then transferred the ownership to their lord. So wherever they traded, they exposed their covetous desires for other people's territory. For example, the so-called new ports such as Singapore were the places they had invaded and occupied for decades, and Singapore was only ten days' voyage away from the sea in Guangdong. Whenever they occupied a place, they governed it according to their rules. Thus, their ambition for territory expansion grew with each passing day" (Lin, 1965: 676–677).

The opium trade, much akin to piracy, plunder, and the slave trade, represented a malicious aspect of the modern Western maritime economy. Britain exploited it as a unique means of gaining access to China. Lin Zexu pointed out that Britain spied on China by "using opium to gradually infiltrate." After the Opium War, he further associated the opium trade with the British invasion of other countries, contending that "Britain imported opium into China with long harbored malicious intentions." He further likened the impact of opium on the inland society to that of a physical ailment: "Just as a canker poisons the body, opium poisons the heart. Canker occurs and will end up festering, while opium turns people into thieves" (Lin, 1965: 884). This understanding formed the foundation of Lin Zexu's differentiation between legitimate and illicit trade, as well as the basis for his concept of coastal defense.

It was precisely by resisting the vicious form of Western maritime economy—the invasion of the opium trade—that Lin Zexu brought the Hong Kong area into his maritime vision. He guarded against Hong Kong as a den for opium smuggling. He

built "Chengying" and "Linchong" forts in Kowloon, investigated and dealt with the Lam Wai Hee murder case in Tsim Sha Tsui Village, attempted to sow discord among the British import traders whose ships were anchored in the area of Tsim Sha Tsui, and fought the "Battle of Kowloon" and the "Battle of Kwun Chung" provoked by Charles Elliot who refused to surrender the criminal and sign a guarantee bond with the Chinese side; after the British army forcibly occupied Hong Kong, he immediately opposed giving up Hong Kong to Britain, which was the inevitable outcome of this ideological logic.

Britain held a dominant position at sea, boasting of a powerful navy that could bolster its thriving maritime economy. Recognizing Britain's superior naval capabilities, Lin Zexu shifted his strategy from defense to "active engagement with the enemies on the sea," advocating for the establishment of a modern, independent naval force to counter the British threat. Faced with the challenges of creating this new naval force, Lin Zexu championed the idea of exploiting civil maritime resources, enlisting fishermen and the Dan people (who lived on boats) as auxiliary forces to supplement the navy. He even permitted these civil forces to engage in combat independently. Later, Lin proposed their full integration into the navy, calling for it on multiple occasions: "There is no time to build warships, and only the civil merchant ships in the three counties of Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Chaozhou can be hired. We must also recruit those who dare to die, as they often risk their lives in the face of danger. If they were employed as scapegoats for the convicts on death row, their chances of survival would be zero. However, if they are handsomely paid and hired as mercenaries to fight the enemy, they would have a fifty-fifty survival rate, and thus would undoubtedly serve with valor" (Yang, 1985: 193). Lin Zexu's proposal to use civil marine forces to withstand the British Navy was based on his calculation of their operational capabilities and determination. This mirrors the then Chinese popular opinion that self-defense against foreign aggressions must come before the development of maritime economy.

While we can no longer fully comprehend Lin Zexu's maritime mindset, it is undeniable that the maritime environment where he was born, bred exerted a subtle influence on him. Recognizing this influence can help us better understand his rise as a national hero and a visionary who confronted China's maritime challenges with a dispassionate and impartial perspective.

4.5 Lin Zexu and Taiwan

Lin Zexu (1785–1850), a prominent official in the Qing dynasty of the Daoguang reign, was a native of Houguan County, which is now part of the city of Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province. As the saying goes, one can just cross the sea on a reed from Fuzhou to Northern Taiwan. Taiwan was open to shipping in the Ming dynasty, one could sail out to sea from the Wuhu Gate of Fuzhou and then cross the Taiwan Strait to Jilong Mountain and Diaoyutai islets, where Taiwan could be seen from a distance. Prior to Spain's theft of Jigong Mountain, trade had already been

established between the residents of both regions. Throughout the Qing dynasty, Taiwan functioned as a part of Fujian province, and the two were considered a unified entity, with their people sharing common culture and language. In 1788, the fifty-third year of the Qianlong reign, a ferry service was established between Bali Chakou (located in Tamsui, Taiwan) and Wuhumen in Fuzhou. Later, in 1824, the fourth year of the Daoguang reign, another ferry route was added, connecting Wushi Port (situated in Kavalan, Taiwan) (Yang, 1985: 193) to Wuhumen, Fuzhou. As the saying goes, "Roosters' crow in Jilong can be heard in Fuzhou." This is a graphic depiction of their close relationship. Born in this environment, Lin Zexu, who had never been to Taiwan, was no stranger to it. He formed his own views on Taiwan based on his personal contacts with people and things related to it, and left us some history-worthy accounts. However, these accounts were not publicly published during his lifetime, and rarely mentioned and exploited by later scholars. It is a real shame that many were lost. Now I have compiled here some of Lin Zexu's poetry, letters, diaries, and a number of fragments of various types from his posthumous manuscripts, so as to provide reference for scholars who study the history of Taiwan in the Qing dynasty.

4.5.1 Oneness of Fujian and Taiwan

Historically, Fujian was known as "Eight-min (short name for Fujian)" due to its eight distinct regions. When Taiwan was incorporated during the early Qing dynasty, it became known as "Nine-min." "The appellation may derive from the fact that we still follow the old institution of the previous dynasty and rule the land by splitting it into eight prefectures. Now with the addition of Taiwan, eight becomes nine" (Huang, 1998: 141). Fujian, with its abundance of mountains and limited arable land, depended on other provinces for its food supply. The development and cultivation of Taiwan significantly bolstered Fujian's resources, greatly impacting the coastal region's economy and the livelihood of the locals. Serving as a crucial lifeline for Fujian's naval defense, Taiwan's rice production played a vital role in the province's costal defense. In the autumn of the eleventh year of the Jiaqing reign (1806), the then twenty-two-year-old Lin Zexu was recruited as a secretary by Fang Yongqing, Subprefectural Magistrate of the Xiamen Coastal Defense. He came to Xiamen and worked for about four or five months.[49] The office of Xiamen Coastal Defense was located in Xunsiding, to the east of Hongshan Temple at Xiamen port. As documented in *Xiamen Chronicle* by Zhou Kai, a contemporary of Lin Zexu, the responsibilities of Xiamen Coastal Defense include "managing the taxation of both domestic and foreign traders and ships entering and exiting the port, overseeing the transportation of rice and grain from Taiwan, supervising the disbursement of soldiers' wages, and adjudicating local legal disputes." Among them, "Taiyun (Taiwan transportation)"

[49] Lin Congyi: *Wenzhong gong nianpu caogao* [*Drafts of Sir Wen Zhong's Chronicle*]. Fujian Library.

was the major mission of the Subprefectural Magistrate of Xiamen Coastal Defense. "Taiyun refers to the transportation of military grain and rice from Taiwan to mainland departments and counties using merchant ships." "The quantity of goods allocated for each shipment was determined by the heights of the ships, which are used as a yardstick for measuring the carrying capacity of the latter." "More than a thousand merchant ships piled between Xiamen and Luermen, Taiwan. They were ordered to ship military grain, Taiwan wood, Taiwan camp horses, soldiers, and food to Taiwan soldiers, officials and prisoners." The Subprefectural Magistrate of Taiwan Defense inspected the transportation and distribution of Taiwan grain to Xiamen, and his counterpart in Xiamen Defense supervised the storing and transferring of the grains from Taiwan. The warehouse of Xiamen Defense stored the grain that was to provide for the five provincial-level naval battalions and the two town-level naval battalions in Kinmen and their families. The grain was from Chiayi County and shipped from Luermen port. Luermen Gate was in charge of Taiwan County's grain for the army and its dependents, which was then to be distributed to the warehouses of Longxi, Tongan, and Pinghe of Fujian. It was also in charge of Fengshan County's military grain which was to be allocated to Fuzhou, Nan'ao, Penghu, and Zhangpu, and Haicheng warehouses and military family grain to Zhangpu and Zhao'an counties' warehouses. As a rule, the grain was shipped by merchant ships of Xiamen port and the Xiamen Coastal Defense was in charge of the shipping transfer (Zhou, 1996: 38, 129, 133, 146–148, 292). The documents handled by Lin Zexu at Xiamen Coastal Defense are no longer available, but this experience gave him a close understanding of the achievements of Taiwan's reclamation and the importance of Taiwan rice to Fujian's livelihood and sea defense, which can be seen from his later statements. During his tenure as an official in Beijing from the eighteenth to the twenty-fifth year of the Jiaqing reign (from 1813 to 1820), Lin Zexu planned and set about writing a book titled *On Water Conservancy in North China*, which was renamed as *Proposal for Jifu Water Conservation System around the Capital* during his term as Governor of Jiangsu from the twelfth to sixteenth year of the Daoguang reign (from 1832 to 1836). In the book he gave high praise for the achievements of Taiwan's paddy field reclamation. In the chapter named "Zhili (now Hebei province) soil is suitable for rice where there is water," he writes:

> Rice is a kind of water grain. The six elements as mentioned in *Yumo* (Emperor Yu's Strategies) begin with water and end with grain, so there is no place in the world with water that is not suitable for rice fields. Inland areas aside, Dihua, though located in the desert, earned its fame by drawing spring water to grow rice. Situated in the heart of the Min Sea, Taiwan is somehow accessible to ample water resources, thus renowned for producing the best rice among all other places. In the past, this region remained uncultivated and undeveloped until our time, and once cultivated and administered, it has now been transformed into a land of bliss.[50]

This is also mirrored in Lin Zexu's poetry. In the spring of the seventh year of the Daoguang reign (1827), he wrote in "Preface to *the Chronicle Booklet of Sun Pinghu*

[50] Lin Zexu: *Jifu shuili yi* [*On the Water Conservation System around the Capital*]. Carving Copy of Sanshan Lin Clan, in the second year of the Guangxu reign (1876).

the Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent (Gongbao, an honorary title) Suppressing Taiwan Rebels," which goes: "After Kavalan and Houlong were pioneered and cultivated, the lands on the island were all rendered arable and taxable. Each year saw the crops harvested thrice, the fertile land here was indeed a paradise."[51]

In the twelfth year of the Daoguang reign (1832), a revolt, led by Zhang Bing, Zhan Tong, Chen Lian, and Huang Fanpo, broke out in Taiwan. At that time, Lin Zexu, as Governor of Jiangsu province, was in charge of facilitating the deployment of Henan troops to Taiwan in order to quell the rebellion. According to his memorial to Emperor Daoguang on the eleventh day of the twelfth month of the year (31th January 1833): "By the seventh day of the twelfth month (27th January), over six hundred Henan soldiers had already passed through Jiangsu, with an addition of two hundred soldiers following on the tenth day. Moreover, two hundred and forty more, who had not departed on the seventh, had also made their way through Jiangning and were expected to be dispatched to Zhejiang within a day" (Lin, 1963: 128). In his private correspondence, Lin Zexu disclosed that providing financial support for the inland soldiers deployed to Taiwan had significantly strained Jiangsu's budget. He also expressed concerns about the implications of Taiwan's unrest on the integration of Fujian and Taiwan, as well as "the broader issue of insufficient rice supply in the mainland." On the ninth day of the eleventh month of this year (10th January 1833), he wrote to Zheng Ruilin, saying:

> Now the most challenging and pressing task is coordinating the deployment of two batches of soldiers across the border. Since the eleventh year of the Jiaqing reign, Jiangsu has been responsible for organizing military dispatches to Taiwan. It wasn't until the third year of the Daoguang period, after conducting an inventory, did we realize exactly how much money we were short of. Now, with a substantial increase in the required funds, a solution must be sought to address this predicament. The person in charge of this in Fujian Province contacted me to discuss the possibility of sending rice from Jiangsu to support them. I've also heard that quelling the rebels in Taiwan is not as challenging as dealing with rice shortage in the mainland (The autumn harvest was so bad this year that Taiwan rice became totally unobtainable.). It would be a great blessing to my hometown if Jiangsu could allocate its official rice reserves to Fujian for military provisions. I'm willing to oversee the rice distribution from Shanghai. However, I hesitate to inform the emperor, fearing accusations of dishonesty and manipulation.[52]

On the twenty-eighth day of the eleventh month in the twelfth year of the Daoguang reign (18th January 1833), he wrote to Zheng Ruilin:

> I've been preoccupied with preparing for and managing the challenging military mission. When it's completed, who knows what the resulting deficit will be like. I received a letter from Fujian learning that the provincial commander of the land forces, and the Kinmen army have arrived in Taiwan. Governor-General Cheng has also traveled from the provincial capital to Xiamen and then crossed over to Taiwan. We should expect good news within the next few days, but there has been no latest postal links across the strait, leaving me both hopeful and concerned. I've heard that, in addition to Henan and Shaanxi, soldiers from Sichuan and Guizhou will be deployed to Taiwan. Transporting troops from such distant locations

[51] Lin Zexu: *Jimao yihou shigao* [*Poetry after the Year of Jimao*]. Originally collected by Lin Jiaqin. Now a collection of the Lin Zexu Memorial House in the city of Fuzhou.

[52] Lin Zexu's original handwritten manuscript, personal collection of Zheng Ruilin's descendants.

places a significant financial strain on the provinces they pass through. Nevertheless, I hope the rebellion can be suppressed soon to bring an end to this situation. The autumn harvest in my hometown has been very poor, and now we can't rely on rice imports from Taiwan. The closure of warehouses and suspension of rice sales have driven market prices up to 5,000 to 6,000 copper coins. Thus, my concerns lie not with Taiwan, but with the mainland.[53]

In the first month of the thirteenth year of the Daoguang reign (February–March 1833), he wrote to Chen Shouqi:

In recent years, I've observed that both officials and the rank and file have become increasingly detached from the principles of gratitude and righteousness. The uprisings led by Chen Lian and Huang Fanpo, etc., for instance, were not entirely unexpected. And this unrest that only occurred in a relatively small overseas location turned out to be the fortunate part out of all misfortunes. The situation in Taiwan is unlikely to persist for long. Initially, I was concerned about the rice supply in the mainland, so I suggested to the person overseeing the matter that the only solution was to redirect rice from Jiangsu and Zhejiang to Fujian. However, the emperor recently decreed that, due to the distance between Jiangsu and Fujian, only 100,000 catties of rice from Zhejiang could be redirected and no rice from Jiangsu should be intercepted.... I am afraid that after the ravages of this war in Taiwan, the agricultural production will be delayed. I have recently received letters from my hometown indicating that rice from Taiwan has been shipped to Fujian. Is this information real or not? Now the new governor has crossed the sea and traveled east to handle the aftermath of the situation. If we cannot find a way to adapt and establish a long-term plan, it may take a considerable amount of time to accomplish our mission. I've heard that the land of Shuishalian is expansive and fertile. It seems like an opportune time to cultivate it while we have a strong military presence in the area. However, I'm uncertain whether there are any obstacles or issues we might encounter during this process. The new governor's impartiality and fortitude in face of favor-currying and muck-raking is indeed commendable. By being more open to others' ideas and suggestions, he could harness collective efforts to achieve the best results. I regret not being able to contribute more to the betterment of my hometown. I wish you all the best, as well as peace and good health.[54]

In the letter to a friend in the autumn of the sixteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1836), he says:

This year, my hometown is experiencing a drought, and I'm unsure about the situation in the southern Zhangzhou area. Will there be additional rice shipments from Taiwan? Can the armed conflicts be scaled back somewhat? It seems that the ocean has become calmer than before, but do merchants still need to be concerned about robbers and thieves during their travels? I've heard that the shipwrights are exhausted and that procuring and replenishing wood parts of the boats washed away by the water has become more challenging. Has the material been supplied as requested? The position of Taiwan Magistrate remains vacant and open for worthy candidates, but I guess it's not really your cup of tea. Earlier, I heard through the grapevine that you might be promoted to the post of the Provincial Judge of Zhejiang, and I hope this hearsay could herald the earlier coming of the glad tidings .[55]

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[53] Duplicate of the original correspondence from Beijing in 1961.

[54] Lin Zexu: *Fu Chen Gongfu shu* [A reply letter to Mr. Chen Gongfu], collected in Shen Zumou's *Yunzuo shanfang wenchao* [*Yunzuo Shanfang Essays*]. Hand-copied version collected in Fujian Library.

[55] Lin Zexu: The original copy was privately collected by Lin Weihe. A photo-copied version was collected in *Lin Zexu shuzha shougao* [*Manuscripts of Lin Zexu's Correspondence*]. Shanghai Classics Publishing House, 1985.

In private correspondence, Lin Zexu disclosed the impact of Taiwan's rice harvest on coastal communities and emphasized the importance of addressing the aftermath of the encroachment of arable land in Shuishalian. His concerns mirrored his aspirations for Taiwan's economic and social stability and development, which he felt even more pressing than those of high-ranking Manchu and Han officials. At that time, like Lin Zexu, most Fujian officials shared their concerns for Taiwan as an integral part of Fujian. Guo Shangxian, Secretary of the Imperial Court of Justice and a native of Putian, was among them. Tragically, on the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth year of the Daoguang reign (18th February 1833), Guo Shangxian passed away in Beijing. Lin Zexu writes in the "Epitaph on Guo Lanshi, Secretary of the Imperial Court of Justice": "In his final hours, he was still concerned about Taiwan. He asked for the Taiwan newsletter, yet there was not a word left for family matters."[56]

One year before Lin Zexu arrived at Xiamen, pirate Cai Qian, who had roamed the southeastern sea, embarked on a "grand maritime expedition." He seized Taiwan's capital, established a provisional government, and declared himself "Mighty King of Sea-taming." Half a year before Lin's arrival in Xiamen, Zhu Ying, a shipowner from Zhangzhou rebelled and joined forces with Cai Qian, leaving the coastal region in peril. This situation inevitably drew Lin Zexu's attention. Three years later, in the seventh month of the fourteenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1809), Lin Zexu, having failed in the metropolitan imperial examination in Beijing, returned to work under Zhang Shicheng. As Zhang Shicheng mobilized the Fujian-Zhejiang naval force to the south and suppress the Cai rebellion, Lin Zexu accompanied him and stayed in Xiamen for over two months, taking on the responsibility of drafting documents related to maritime affairs.[57]

In this battle, Cai Qian was defeated and killed. Subsequently, Zhu Wo and Zhang Baozai surrendered in Fuzhou and Guangdong consecutively, leading to the pacification of the sea. Regrettably, most of these manuscripts have not been preserved. The only surviving document is a memorial to the emperor titled "Thanksgiving for the Promotions and Rewards," which was written by Lin Zexu on behalf of Zhang Shicheng after suppressing the Cai rebellion. This memorial can be found in the third volume of *Yunzuo Shanfang Essays.*

Over Lin Zexu's second visit to Xiamen, he had access to military secrets, which enabled him to learn the ropes of naval warfare. He became acutely aware of the strategic importance of the Taiwan-Penghu coastal defense area. As a result, ten years later, when Zhang Bao was promoted to the position of Deputy General of Penghu, Lin Zexu keenly felt it inappropriate for assigning a surrendered general to be stationed in such a critical location out on the sea. On the twenty-seventh day of the second month in 1820 (9th April 1820), shortly after Lin Zexu became the Investigating Censor of Jiangnan Circuit, he requested His Majesty to transfer him to another post and put a cap on Zhang Bao's promotion, saying:

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[56] Lin (1916).

[57] Liang, Zhangju: *Tui'an shicun* [*Collection of Tui'an*]. In a note to the poem titled "On Shaomu's Coming to the Capital with His Family," Liang noted that the documents of maritime affairs were all drafted by Lin Zexu.

> The Penghu region in Fujian Province, situated far out on the sea, serves as a vital chokepoint on the sea route to and from Taiwan. Although Zhang Bao has not taken the law into his own hands like Zhu Wo, rumor has it that the general still frequently smokes opium, disregards etiquette, and exhibits capricious behavior, which can be attributed to his past as a pirate. Though his talent could be an asset to the naval force, there is actually no shortage of talented individuals among the generals of Fujian and Zhejiang provinces who are qualified for the Penghu position. If experience is prized as the main criterion, Zhang Bao did not join the army in Taiwan. If diligence counts, Zhang Bao's contributions in fighting pirates are minimal, let alone his inadequate qualifications, and his indecent background. With the unstable sentiments of the people in Taiwan, it is challenging to prevent unrest, and it is even more difficult to expect him, a man of ingrained habits, to compromise.[58]

In the first year of the Daoguang reign (1821), he recalled in the "Preface to 'Celebrating the 60th Birthday of Governor Zhang Lanzhu'" that Zhang Shicheng commanded the siege and annihilation of Cai Qian, saying:

> Tumultuous waves lapped the shore of Fujian, as they rolled and surged in the Taiwan Straits. As supercilious as the Black Mountain Army led by Chu Yan (a rebel leader from Eastern Han Dynasty), and as formidable as the White Wave Yellow Turban Army headed by Guo Tai (a rebel leader from Eastern Han Dynasty), the rebels ran riot. At this, His Lordship gave his orders to speedily rally the troops. He ordered to keep watch on the primary and secondary routes, preventing the rebels from calling in reinforcements. He ordered to attack with water and fire, deploying strong armies to besiege the thieves. Mammoth warships gathered like clouds, targeting the rebels' whale and abalone-like vessels. Waving their white flags and scrambling like ants, the rebels surrendered to save their hides. Thanks to General's carrot and stick tactics, we could eventually vanquish all these villains.[59]

In the tenth year of the Daoguang reign (1830), the status of Taiwan was pointed out in the "Preface to 'Celebrating the 60th Birthday of Sun Pingshu the Junior Guardian of Heir Apparent'" as follows: "Southeast China (mainly refers to Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong) is a remote territory bordering the ocean, and Taiwan holds an especially significant position along the maritime frontier."[60]

This sentiment aligns with the author of the geographical chronicle, which writes, "Taiwan is like a protective screen to Southern Fujian," and "Taiwan to Fujian is what lips to teeth, and is what hands and feet to the head and eyes." In the nineteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1839), when Lin Zexu served as the Imperial Commissioner in Guangdong, he organized the translation of English books and newspapers into Chinese, and his attention was also drawn to those with the contents related to Taiwan and Penghu. For instance, the *Macao Newsprint* states in the fourth volume, dated 25th April 1840:

> Recently, there have been discussions about surveying the Yellow Sea and various islands. Although I don't know all the specifics, I will share a few thoughts today.... 2) Taiwan. Few people seem to have ever visited this island. The Chinese have shown little interest in trade on this island since acquiring it. We have heard that the island is quite affluent and of great significance for the provinces on the opposite coast. To the west, there is a port called Tamsui, and to the far north, a bay named Keelung. However, we know little about its eastern regions.

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[58] Military Intelligence Office Copy. First Chinese Historical Archives Collection.

[59] Lin Zexu: *Yunzuo shanfang wenchao* [*Yunzuo Shanfang Essays*] (Vol. 3).

[60] Ibid.

> If our people, who have been sent to investigate the area or have visited the island, could share more details, we could better understand it. Had we drawn our attention to this island earlier in the past, it could have become a major trading hub by now. To the east of Taiwan lies a cluster of small islets called Hechi Gomazhi, where the inhabitants are as gentle as those in the Ryukyu Kingdom. But we are uncertain if there is a port there. Between Taiwan and Fujian, there is an island named Penghu. Its northern land is barren and sparse, yet it has an excellent port and holds strategic importance for Taiwan.[61]

Later, he included this extract in an article titled "On the Use of Troops" in *Macao Monthly*: "The Chinese islands are divided into three parts: …Second, the islands in Fujian. The largest of these is Taiwan. It is an island of plenty with two ports like Tamsui and Keelung. Facing it is Penghu, an island with sparse and barren land, but it holds strategic importance for Taiwan."[62]

In the third month of the twenty-first year of the Daoguang reign (1841), Lin Zexu, who then lodged in Guangzhou after his dismissal, proposed a strategy to Riot-Quelling General Yishan on how to defend Guangdong Province. He recommended hiring hundreds of Cainiao boats (literally translated as strawbirds) from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in Fujian to engage in naval combats. He specifically mentioned the idea of hiring Penghu fishermen for fire attacks. In "Responding to Yishan's Six Articles on the Defense of Guangdong," he says:

> As for those who can stay lurking underwater for long periods, I have heard that there are several such individuals in Gaoliang, Lufeng County and Jingzhou, Raoping County of Guangdong Province, as well as Bazhao, Penghu County of Fujian Province. Many of them can stay underwater for a long time, and can be recruited for our purpose.[63]

The design of the naval battle against the British army in Lin Zexu's anti-British strategy might have been inspired by the examples of Zheng Zhilong and General Zheng Chenggong's battles against the Dutch. However, it is a shame that this cannot be confirmed any more owing to the loss of relevant data.

4.5.2 Lin's Insights into the Turmoil in Taiwan

Lin Zexu's poems which directly recorded the events in Taiwan include the seven classical-style poems written in the spring of the seventh year of the Daoguang period (1827), "Inscription on the *Chronicle Booklet of Quelling Taiwan Uprising by Sun Pingshu the Junior Guardian of Heir Apparent*":

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[61] The original version of *Macao Newsprint* is collected in Nanjing Library. The copied version is collected in *Historical Documents of Macao Issue* (Vol. 1). Microcopy Center of Chinese National Library, 1998.

[62] See Wei Yuan: *Haiguo tuzhi* [*Maps of a Maritime Country*] (Vol. 82). The reprinted version of Pingqing Jinggu Dao Office in the second year of the Guangxu reign.

[63] See Wei Yuan: *Haiguo Tuzhi* [*Maps of a Maritime Country*] (Vol. 80).

To the east lies the vast ocean, and beyond the 36 islands is Pishena (the name given to Taiwan or an island near it in the Song dynasty literature). Zheng (Chenggong) and Zhu (Yigui) eliminated the foreign barbarians and established counties, and they speedily quelled the rebellion in just seven days. Rebel heads Lin (Shuangwen) and Cai (Qian) were also captured, the waves were dyed by the enemy's blood. No one in Kunshen (the current Seven Kunshen, the southern sea port of Taiwan Province) supported the rebels, and the Luermen defenders pledged their loyalty to the government forces. The people's hearts turned toward justice, and the emperor praised the soldiers and citizens of Zhuluo County. Kavalan and Houlong were pioneered and ploughed, the lands on the island were all rendered arable and taxable. Each year saw the crops harvested thrice, the fertile land here was indeed a paradise. Why did the brawls and clashes erupt across the land? They were actually caused by so many displaced people. These people were divided by their places of origin, they assaulted each other just like the ancient feuding clans. They would draw swords at the slightest disagreement, and seek nothing but revenge to vent their resentment. Some people took advantage of the chaotic situation to monger rumors, so there was no end of confusion and gossips. They secretly ganged up with the indigenes and sneaked out of their dens, their dishevelled dancing could even scare the demons. They kidnapped the people into the deep mountains and dense bamboo forests, where they had hoarded poisoned bows and arrows. The beacon fires were lit on the city of Chiqian to signal the perils, and the battle reports were sent to Kinmen and Xiamen like flying shuttles. The garrison troops looked just like a child's play, their morale was reduced to mere hem and haw. The Lord Commander led a fleet across the straits, wielding his scepter with the help of gods. The islanders may seem to be disunited and divided, yet His Lordship made them all equally treated. Even heaven grew tired of war and came to our aid, may the forces be speedily assembled and deployed without delay. The troops traversed the strait about the time after lunch, and the sails remained steady thanks to the white conch (when officials crossing the sea, their ships were usually equipped with the white conch to quell the wind). Armed with a quiver and clad in a short garment, His Lordship had his sword sharpened and the inkstone ground on the shield. Once reaching the other side by braving the winds and waves, the primary objective of His Lordship was to condole the sufferings of the locals. Through the vigorous promotion of morality and law to all, with tears in their eyes, the people there were so grateful. The evil ones were wiped out, and the traitors were also annihilated (those who married local women in Taiwan were called Fan Ge and they were regarded as traitors). Their heads were captured and their followers were appeased, there was never a display of military prowess intended. After the triumph His Lordship strategized about the aftermath, to help the people rehabilitate and alleviate their burdens. The court awarded honors and rewards on the basis of merits, and how glorious His Lordship looked wearing his richly-decorated trappings. Promoted to the rank of assistant advisor to the emperor and deemed comparable to Duke Zhou and Duke Zhao; His Lordship went to thank His Majesty for his kindness, and the jade pendants on his horse tinkled along. From now on in Taiwan there will be no more wars, may the people there long enjoy good health and peace. The grass is not knotted and the mangoes are ripe; the sea monsters have all been tamed as the sea is calmed like a mirror. There is no need to compile any more treaties on coastal defense, just lend your ears to the Wuluo people and their ballads.

This poem, quoted from Lin Zexu's *Poetry After the Year of Jimao*, was initially preserved by his descendant, Lin Jiaqin. It is currently preserved at the Lin Zexu Memorial Hall in the city of Fuzhou.

During the twelfth year of the Guangxu reign (1886), *Yunzuo Shanfang Poetry* was printed and published, featuring this poem in its second volume. The poem was re-titled as "Inscription On the *Poetry Collection of Quelling Taiwan Uprising by Sun (Erzhun) Pingshu the Junior Guardian of Heir Apparent*" and underwent

textual tampering, such as changing "Houlong and Kavalan were pioneered and ploughed" to "Kavalan and Jilong were pioneered and ploughed." The substitution of the place name contradicts the original intent and does not align with historical facts; thus, the handwritten version should be considered more accurate. Echoing with this is another poem written in the tenth year of the Daoguang period (1830), titled "Preface to 'Celebrating the 60th Birthday of Sun Pingshu the Junior Guardian of Heir Apparent.'".

> Ou-Yue is a remote territory bordering the ocean, and Taiwan holds an especially significant position along the maritime frontier. The idlers from the local clans gathered here, making it susceptible to rebellion. Despite numerous warnings, they cannot abandon their frivolous ways. In the past, the local government was at a loss when dealing with petty conflicts, allowing unrest to spread across the counties, which alarmed the royal army. His Lordship navigated the treacherous waters and marched on the perilous path. He enforced strict discipline and dismissed those undisciplined soldiers. With bows and arrows, the rebels' stronghold in Zhuqian was captured. Having apprehended the traitors (those who took local Taiwanese women) and sealed the wanderers' escape routes, he reclaimed land in Shuishalian (present-day Sun Moon Lake) and established a garrison in Kavalan. Adopting Zhao Chongguo's garrison reclamation strategy, he stationed the troops there, following the example of Zhang Renyuan, he fortified the cities to fend off invaders. The rebellion was swiftly suppressed with minimal bloodshed, hence the alarm was deactivated, flutes were played, and the triumphant troops were stationed in Shimose. This military exploit not only alleviated the emperor's concerns but also restored stability for the common people. Military resources were conserved, and local insurrections eliminated. The emperor commended His Lordship's prompt actions. Perhaps the local men and women could provide details about this event. And thanks to His Lordship and his excellent strategy and command, the sea became calm and the remote island was no longer infested by outlaws.[64]

On behalf of the bureaux and circuits of Fujian, he writes:

> Now, without a wise man who foresees in advance, there is no way to establish a strategy for adaptation; without an elder who controls long distances, there is no way to make a plan for stabilizing the frontier. In such a remote county as Taiwan, which is adjacent to the local tribes, the treacherous villains stopped at no evils and fought like ants in armed confrontations. It is difficult to stop the locals from gathering for rebellion even if they have been persuaded to beat swords into ploughs; the rats and hornets wrongly believe they can take advantage of the terrain to fend off government forces. Even if the alarm is frequently sounded, it is often too late to send soldiers in response. The hostiles harbored shady intentions, who can anticipate such a mutinous situation. His Lordship gave his orders to speedily rally the troops and send the warships. When the general led the warships across the strait, the rebels were caught by surprise; the idle soldiers were admonished to act promptly and crisply. In no time, the rebel chieftain found himself apprehended on the rough sea and the villains also fell into the net of justice.[65]

In the fourth month of the sixth year of the Daoguang reign (1826), the Cantonese and Fujianese in Changhua, Taiwan fought and pillaged each other for straying pigs.

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[64] *Sun Pingshu gongbao liushishou xu* [Preface to 'Celebrating the 60th Birthday of Sun Pingshu the Junior Guardian of Heir Apparent'].

[65] Lin Zexu: *Sun Pingshu Gongbao liushishou xu* (*dai Fujian sidao*) [Preface to 'Celebrating the 60th Birthday of Sun Pingshu the Junior Guardian of Heir Apparent' (On behalf of the bureaux and circuits of Fujian)]. *Yunzuo shanfang wenchao* [*Yunzuo Shanfang Essays*] (Vol. 3).

At the instigation of the vagrants, it escalated into an armed conflicts between people from Fujian and Guangdong, and extended to Chiayi and Tamsui. In the fifth month, the Governor of Fujian and Zhejiang, Sun Erzhun (style name Laifu and Pingshu), sent the commander of Kinmen town, Chen Huacheng, with troops into Taiwan to pacify the situation. Lin Zexu, who was on bereavement leave in Fuzhou because of his mother's death, had access to the documents from the Fujian government and heard about the event from officials who had been to Taiwan. For example, Wang Yiqian (style-named as Shouzhi and Zhongshan), a friend of Lin Zexu's, was ordered to escort grain provisions to Taiwan. According to Wang Zengqian's "Epitaph of Brother Wang Zhongshan," when he was escorting grain provisions to Taiwan, "the government ordered the arrest of the remaining criminals. More than 100 people were captured every day, and the prisons were to be filled to capacity." Brother Yu said to the governor: Real bandits have escaped knowing that you are coming. And those who did not escape are good people, and arresting and killing them will counter the will of the heaven. As a result, the governor withdrew the order. In *Biography of Wang Zhongshan, Subprectural Magistrate of Ting Army in Tingzhou,* Zheng Xianfu of Xiangzhou stated that because of this, "there are dozens of families that have survived intact."[66] After Wang Yiqian returned to Fuzhou, he joined Lin Zexu in creating seven regulated poems, "Blessed by the Gods: Perils in Escorting Grain to Taiwan." This poem recounts their harrowing journey from Wuhumen. As the poem narrates, upon nearing Balicha, a sudden gust of wind pushed their vessel adrift for two days and nights before reaching Xiamen. There, they boarded a merchant ship bound for Lugang, only to face multiple typhoons thwarting their progress. Undeterred, they altered course for Luermen, seeking refuge in Penghu when the winds surged once more. Numerous perils were faced before they finally arrived in Taiwan.[67] Lin Zexu may have learned this first-hand information from Wang Yiqian.

The above poems by Lin Zexu, so to speak, reflect to some extent the views of Fujian officials on the west coast of the strait after the incident. "They (the clashes) were actually caused by so many displaced." "These people were divided by their places of origin, they assaulted each other just like the ancient feuding clans." They "seek nothing but revenge to vent their resentment." "Some people took advantage of the chaotic situation to monger rumors, so there was no end of confusion and gossips." In addition, the situation got worse when the traitors colluded with foreigners. For the aftermath policy, Lin Zexu believed that Fujianese and Cantonese should be treated equally and should also be allowed to recuperate from the ravages. This can be shown in his following lines, "The islanders may seem to be disunited and divided, yet His Lordship made them all equally treated." "After the triumph His Lordship strategized about the aftermath, to help the people rehabilitate and alleviate their burdens." As for how to deal with Han and local indigenous relations, Lin Zexu depicts in the "preface to 'Celebrating the 60th Birthday of Sun Pingshu the Junior Guardian of

[66] Both articles are from Wang Yiqian: Preface to *Taihua shanren shicun* [*Collected Poems of Taihua Shanren*]. Engraved Guangzhou copy of the Renxu year of Tongzhi's Reign.

[67] Wang Yiqian: *Taihua shanren shicun* [*Collected Poems of Taihua Shanren*] (Vol. 2) in *Yuhua ji* [*Yuhua Collection*].

Heir Apparent': "Having apprehended the traitors (those who took local Taiwanese women) and sealed the wanderers' escape routes, he reclaimed land in Shuishalian (present-day Sun Moon Lake) and established a garrison in Kavalan. Adopting Zhao Chongguo's garrison reclamation strategy, he stationed the troops there, following the example of Zhang Renyuan, he fortified the cities to fend off invaders."

In the first month of the thirteenth year of the Daoguang reign (February–March 1833), Lin wrote a letter to Chen Shouqi saying: "I've heard that the land of Shuishalian is expansive and fertile. It seems like an opportune time to cultivate it while we have a strong military presence in the area. However, I'm uncertain whether there are any obstacles or issues we might encounter during this process. The new governor's impartiality and fortitude in face of favor-currying and muck-raking is indeed commendable. By being more open to others' ideas and suggestions, he could harness collective efforts to achieve the best results." The aforementioned statements and poetry may serve as valuable additions to the archival records.

The historical figures mentioned by Lin Zexu in his poems include General Zheng Chenggong, Zhu Yigui, Lin Shuangwen, and Cai Qian. "Zheng (Zheng Chenggong) and Zhu (Yigui), having annihilated the foreign barbarians, set up counties in Taiwan." Here the counties refer to Tianxing and Wannian which belonged to the then province of Chengtian prefecture. After the defeat of Zhu Yigui, the Qing court set up the counties of Changhua and Tamsui. "The people's hearts were turned toward the great justice, and the emperor commended the soldiers and people of Zhu Luo County." This line of Lin's verse tells that following Lin Shuangwen's defeat, the Qing court honored Zhu Luo County's Cantonese volunteers for helping in the war effort and changed the name of Zhu Luo County to Chiayi County. The Qing court distinguished the indigenous peoples of Taiwan by the term "Shu Fan" (literary means "acquaintance") and "Sheng Fan (literally means strangers)." In Lin's verses, in addition to using "Fan Li" and "Fan Yi" as generic terms, Lin also used the specific names of the indigenous peoples of Taiwan, and thus preserving the historical traces of the Pingpu and Gaoshan peoples. In "Beyond the 36 islands is Pishena," the 36 islands refer to the Penghu islands. Pishena was called Pisheye in the Song dynasty, and here Lin Zexu used Pishena to refer to Taiwan. Some researchers today think Pisheye referred to the people of Hongya and Xilaya who lived in the area from Yunlin to south Taiwan. And this conforms with Lin Zexu's view. In the line "just lend your ears to the Wuluo people and their ballads," the author uses the Wuluo community, one of the five Fengshan communities of the Makadao tribe in Pingtung County, to refer to the indigenous people of Taiwan. (This was deciphered by Mr. Pan Yinghai, to whom I am grateful.) In "the rebels' stronghold in Zhuqian was captured," Zhuqian was the ancient name of the present Hsinchu County, and was named after the Daokasi tribe's Zhuqian community. In his line "he reclaimed land in Shalian," Shalian is the abbreviation of Shuisalian, which refers to the inner mountain area around Sun Moon Lake, narrowly defined as the present-day Yuchi Township and Puli Township in Nantou County, where the ethnic groups of high mountain Bunun, Taiya, Zou, Shao, and others live. In "Kavalan and Houlong were pioneered and ploughed," Kavalan refers to the present-day Yilan County, and the Kavalan County was established in 1810, named after the Kavalan tribe. Houlong is within

the territory of the present-day Houlong Town, Zhunan Town, and Miaoli city in Miaoli County, and the lower river plain of the Houlong River, the Zhonggang River, and the coastal plain. Houlong was named after the Five Houlong Communities of the Daokasi tribe.

Most of the correspondences between Lin Zexu and his friends were lost, and other discussions on Taiwan are no longer known. However, as we can see from the above-mentioned materials, Lin Zexu's knowledge of Taiwan was in a class by itself at the time among his fellow Qing dynasty officials.

4.5.3 Correspondence with Taiwan and Penghu Scholars and Officials Stationed in Taiwan

Lin Zexu interacted with various officials and scholars from Taiwan. In his early years in the capital, these officials, when visiting the capital, would deliver personal letters to him from his homeland. In Lin Zexu's "Bingzi Diary," he recorded an entry dated the fourteenth day of the third month in the twenty-first year of the Jiaqing reign (11th April 1816) while he was in Beijing. It notes: "The Prefect of Gaoming (Dayong) in Taiwan County arrived in the capital, delivering to me a letter from my family, dated the twenty-first day of the twelfth month, along with correspondences from Li Duiting and Shen Liyun" (Lin, 1963: 40). When Lin Zexu was later assigned to Zhejiang, he asked the newly appointed officials in Taiwan to carry letters and things for him to Fuzhou. On the twelfth day of the seventh month in the second year of the Daoguang reign (28th August 1822), Lin noted in his *Renwu Diary* when in Hangzhou: "Deng Shuyuan, the newly appointed Vice Magistrate of Lugang, Taiwan, paid a visit." On the thirteenth day (29th August), he continued: "I composed and sealed the eleventh family letter, entrusting Vice Magistrate Deng to deliver it to Fujian. Along with the letter, I included a few small items and correspondences for various destinations. Since Sir Deng's boat had already departed, I hastily sent someone to chase after it in a skiff, finally handed over the letter and items to him after catching him up at Wenjiayan" (Lin, 1962: 101–102).

In the twelfth year of Daoguang (1832), Lin Zexu was appointed as Governor of Jiangsu province. Yao Ying, who had previously served as Magistrate of Taiwan County and as Subprefectural Magistrate of the Taiwan Department of Coastal Defense, was transferred to the position of Tongpan in Kavalan. After being dismissed and subsequently reappointed, Yao Ying was sent to Jiangsu, where he became a subordinate of Lin Zexu. On the twenty-fifth day of the six month in the same year (22nd July 1832), Lin Zexu, together with Tao Shu, Governor-General of Jiangnan and Jiangxi, submitted a memorial to the emperor:

> Yao Ying, a 46-year-old Jinshi (title of degree conferred to those who passed the metropolitan level imperial examination) degree holder from Tongcheng County in Anhui Province, was appointed as Magistrate of Pinghe County in Fujian Province. Subsequently, he was transferred to Longxi County in exchange, and then to Taiwan County, where he also served as the Subprefectural Magistrate in charge of Taiwan coastal defense. Later, he was assigned

> to Kavalan as a Vice Prefect but was dismissed due to his implication in a crime. Earlier, Yao Ying successfully apprehended eleven pirates who had murdered officials at sea near Kevalan. He was then recommended by the Ministry of Personnel and granted an audience with Your Majesty, and was allowed to serve at a post two grades below his previous rank. Soon after the second interview, Your Majesty graciously decreed that he would be appointed as usual. In the seventh month of the eleventh year of the Daoguang reign, Yao Ying was sent under the imperial order to Jiangsu to await his next appointment. He arrived at the provincial capital on the twenty-ninth day of the eighth month. He was then highly recommended for his efficient handling of the return passages of the empty military ships, and in return, Your Majesty decreed that Yao Ying should be prioritized for appointment. Yao Ying, an experienced and competent official known for his excellent management of political affairs and personal conduct, is recommended for appointment ahead of others. Having previously served as a County Magistrate in charge of onerous responsibilities in the coastal county of Fujian, he is well-suited to fill any important vacancy in the provincial capital.[68]…I hope Your Majesty could promote Yao Ying from an alternate County Magistrate to the Magistrate of Changzhou County, and he would prove to be not only an asset to the important vacancy he fills, but also a great help to us.

Nonetheless, the emperor did not endorse this recommendation. In the tenth month of the same year, Yao Ying assumed the position of Magistrate in Jintan County. During the fourteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1834), the emperor bade both Chinese and foreign ministers to recommend capable individuals for various roles. At this time, Lin Zexu and Tao Shu, Governor-General of Jiangnan and Jiangxi, once again mentioned Yao Ying's name for consideration (Yao Ying was serving as the Magistrate of Yuanhe County at that time). Lin Zexu also provided a favorable assessment. Grateful for Lin's understanding and trust in him, Yao Ying regarded this occurrence as one of the top ten most fortunate events in his life.[69] Although Lin Zexu recommended Yaoying to the emperor, he was not granted an audience. Yao Ying was later appointed as the Department Magistrate of Gaozhou, but he did not take up the post. In the ninth month of the fourteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1834), Lin Zexu appointed Yao Ying as Assistant Inspector of Huainan. In the late twelfth month of the fifteenth year of the Daoguang reign (February 1836), Yu Deyuan, the Salt Transport Commissioner of the Lianghuai region, had to leave his position due to illness, and Lin Zexu recommended Yao Ying as his successor.

In the eighteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1838), Yao Ying was transferred to the Office of Provincial Military Defence Circuit in Taiwan. With the onset of the Opium War, the British forces made five attempts to invade Taiwan, but failed to achieve any significant gains. They were repelled twice by the local defenders, forced to flee stealthily once, and twice had their ships smashed and many of their troops captured and executed.[70] On the twenty-first day of the tenth month in the eighteenth year of the Daoguang reign (23rd November 1842), Henry Pottinger, the

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[68] Military Intelligence Office Copy. First Chinese Historical Archives Collection.

[69] Yao Ying: *Dongming wen houji* [Postscript collection of Essays on the East Sea] (Vol. 9): *Shixingzhai ji* [*On Shixingzhai*].

[70] Yao Ying: *Dongming zougao* [*East Sea Memorials to the Emperor*] (Vol. 3). Taiwan Literature Series No. 49, pp. 104–106.

British Plenipotentiary to China, submitted a formal request to Yiliang, Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang, demanding punishment on those responsible for the killing of British prisoners in Taiwan. In response, the Qing court complied and ordered Yiliang to travel east to Taiwan to conduct an investigation. Meanwhile, Lin Zexu, then stationed at the remote Yili garrison, followed the situation with great concern. In the fourth month of the twenty-third year of the Daoguang reign (1843), he wrote in his "Letter to Liu Wenshi":

> I know little of the recent situations in Fujian and Guangdong, and I am uncertain about the course of action to take after Governor Yi's crossing over to Taiwan. As I gaze at the sky, I first notice white vapors, followed by a red star. I fear that the military situation may not be quickly resolved, and this fills me with anxiety.[71]

On the fifth day of the fifth month of the twenty-third year of the Daoguang reign (2nd June 1843), he wrote in his diary: "Today, in Deng Linweng's place, I received a letter from my family in Beijing dated the twenty-fifth day of the third month. The correspondence revealed that Dazhen and Yaodao were both arrested and interrogated under the imperial order on the twenty-fourth day of the third month."[72] On the tenth day of the sixth month (7th July), he again noted in his diary: "In the evening the general sent over military reports, asking again about the cases that occurred in the towns and circuits of Taiwan and the latest changes in government personnel within and without."[73]

He requested his wife and son, who were residing in Xi'an, to send copies of the relevant news. Lin Zexu's extant diary from Yili, titled *Miscellaneous Records of Yazhai*, contains the full text of the memorial to the emperor titled "A Further Report from Yiliang, Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang on Taiwan's Battles Against the Barbarians," as well as the corresponding imperial edict.[74]

Cai Tinglan, also known as Xiangzu, was a native of Penghu. In the tenth month of the fifteenth year of the Daoguang reign (1835), he journeyed to Fuzhou to take part in the provincial-level imperial examination. While returning to Penghu from Kinmen, he encountered a storm that left him adrift and ultimately landed him in Vietnam. In the third month of the following year, he made his way back to Fujian by land and eventually returned to Penghu in May and authored the work *Miscellaneous Writings on Hainan.*

In the seventeenth year of the Daoguang reign (1837), Cai Tinglan successfully passed the provincial-level imperial examination, earning the degree of Juren (a title of degree conferred to those who passed the provincial imperial examination). He subsequently took up a teaching post at the esteemed Chongwen Academy while also working part-time at both the Yixin and Wenshi academies. In 1844, Cai Tinglan furthered his accomplishments by passing the metropolitan imperial examination,

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[71] *Lin Wenzhong gong chidu* [*Documents of Mr. Lin Wenzhong*]. Photocopy of the original, Beijing Yiwenzhai, 1919.

[72] Original copy, *Collection of the Institute of Modern History*. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Lin Zexu: *Yazhai zalu* [*Miscellaneous Records of Yazhai*]. The copy used to be Lin Bingru's personal collection, now collected in Lin Zexu Memorial Hall in Fuzhou.

attaining the prestigious Jinshi degree title. Right after that, he was appointed as a County Magistrate in Jiangxi province.

In the twenty-ninth year of the Daoguang reign (1849), Cai Tinglan was assigned as a County Magistrate to Xiashan County to fill a vacant position. During the autumn of that year, Lin Zexu retired from his post as Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces and retreated to his hometown. He celebrated the New Year in Nanchang before returning to Fuzhou in the third month of the following year. Seeking guidance, Cai Tinglan sent his work, *Miscellaneous Writings on Hainan*, to Lin Zexu. In the summer of the thirtieth year of the Daoguang reign (1850), Lin Zexu inscribed six heptasyllabic quatrains upon reading Magistrate Cai Xiangzu's (style name Tinglan) *Miscellaneous Writings on Hainan*, in which he expressed appreciation for Cai's daring exploits in Vietnam:

> You live near the sea and are familiar with the waves and wind, little wonder you could survive the ordeal with pride.
>
> It might be God's will to spread your literary fame abroad, and you put pen to paper to tell your tale right after the shock.
>
> The people there could trace their culture back to ancient South China, and the language barrier hindered not a bit their appreciation for your style.
>
> Your presence as a Chinese literatus added to the prestige of the region, and your improvised verses jazzed up the drinking session.
>
> The local Chinese people were eager to greet you and to versify to reciprocate, your understanding of the customs and people of Jiaozhi (Vietnam) also increased.
>
> Looking back at the journey from Bohai to this place, you had spent eighty-three days.
>
> The friendship of the people in the foreign land was so earnest, but you refused their gifts of money and returned with an empty pocket.
>
> Your righteousness could even rectify the stones in Vietnam, and in no way would you covet the generous gift that Lu Jia received in the olden time.
>
> When you came back, you went straight to China along the post road, passing through Guilin and Tengzhou all the way to the old sod.
>
> Happily you found your family still safe and sound, they had performed necromancy to conjure your spirit thinking you were already dead.
>
> Only then did I believe that the middle kingdom was surrounded by the sea, and man must live in this world by virtue of loyalty and honesty.
>
> There will be a time when the sea will be calm and clear, and a long-term strategy will pacify the southern tribes living far from here.

The poem was collected into Volume 8 of the *Anthology of Yunzuo Shanfang*, but was not included in Cai Tinglan's *Miscellaneous Writings on Hainan*.

Lin Shumei, also known as Shou Yun, Shi Fu, Xiao Yun, Xiao Yun Zi, and Tie Disheng, was a native of Kinmen. He was the adopted son of Lin Tingfu, the deputy commander of Taiwan. When he was 14 years old, he followed his foster father to Fujian, Zhejiang, Taiwan, and Penghu, and became a staff member of Fengshan County in Taiwan in 1836. After the Opium War, he lived in Xiamen and wrote several books including *Coastal Illustrations*, *Warship Survey*, and *Collection of Xiaoyun Poetry and Prose*. In the thirtieth year of the Daoguang reign (1850), he resigned

and returned home. Lin Zexu recruited him as a staff member and consulted him on matters of naval defense. They two got along very well. Before Lin Zexu was ordered to supervise military affairs in the west of Guangdong, He dedicated two poems to Shumei, titled "Another Two Verses Inscribed for the *Collected Notes of Xiaoyun*":

> The war in Guangdong and Guangxi has not stopped,
> and now in a shortage of military supplies we are mired.
> Why are you, an erstwhile mover and shaker,
> secluding yourself in this island as a writer?
> Pillowed on raging waves in your three humble cottages you are living,
> how can you unbosom your lofty feelings merely by singing and boozing?
> How I wish I could explore the otherworldly Fanghu and Yuanqiao,
> Where I would ride the six mystic turtles with none but thou.

Lin Shumei's "Collected Notes of Xiaoyun" was lost and not found today.

In the concluding note of Lin Zexu's poem, he mentioned that the "record is very detailed about the sea country," i.e., Taiwan and other islands. The poem conveys his desire to venture out to sea to explore Yuanqiao and Fanghu (ancient mythological sea mountains, symbolizing Taiwan and other islands) together with Lin Shumei. The original handwritten copy of this poem is preserved in the private collection of He Bingzhong, who works at Xiamen Memorial Hall of General Zheng Chenggong. This poem is the last surviving piece by Lin Zexu. Not long after, Lin Zexu fell ill and traveled to Guangdong, where he eventually passed away in an official abode in Puning County. Lin Shumei, deeply affected by his love, wrote a poem in memory of Lin Zexu, soon succumbed to depression and also passed away.

Taiwan was considered by Lin Zexu as one of the nine Mins, signifying its integral role as part of his homeland. His deep concern for his hometown naturally extended to Taiwan. Despite being far from home, even in the frozen land covered with snow and ice, Lin Zexu never forgot his roots. On the first day of the sixth month of the twenty-fifth year of Daoguang (5th July 1845), in Kuche, he noted in his "Yisi Dairy": I reviewed the name list of the candidates for the metropolitan level examination, of whom a total of 212 passed the exam, among whom eight were from Fujian, and one from Taiwan, Shi Qiongfang, ranked 163rd.[75] Lin Zexu's meticulous efforts to record the names of scholars from Fujian and Taiwan mirrored his deep attachment to his homeland. Drawing from diverse sources, including official documents and local hearsay, Lin's understanding of Taiwan continually deepened, offering valuable insights for historical research. It's important to recognize that many events in Taiwan's civil society during the Qing dynasty were documented in Fujian, therefore it is not enough to search for the historical information from Taiwan alone. The public and private archives of the Fujian people are nothing but a treasure trove for the study of Taiwan's history during the Qing dynasty, waiting to be fully tapped into and utilized.

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[75] Lin Zexu: *Yishi riji* [*Yishi Diary*]. Original handcopy, collected by Lin Jixi, Lin Zexu's cousin.

4.6 The Changes of Trade Between China and the Western World During the Reign of Emperor Daoguang and Their Implications

The Daoguang reign (1821–1850) of the Qing dynasty witnessed drastic changes in the Chinese society and it was also the critical period when a fundamental paradigm shift had occurred in the China-Western trade. This great change in the trade between China and the West over a period of 30 years had far-reaching implications for Chinese society and China-Western relations. This is one of the economic root causes of the unprecedented change in the millennia-old China. To grasp the major changes of China-Western trade in the Daoguang reign and analyze its influence on Chinese society is not only an important topic in the research of the economic history of Qing dynasty, but also a significant effort to delve into the whys and wherefores of the Opium War.

4.6.1 The Changes of China-Western Trade in the Early Years of the Daoguang Reign

After the lifting of the sea ban in the early Qing dynasty, the Qing government imposed restrictions and strict stipulations on foreign traders with respect to treaty ports, export commodities, trade forms and scope of activities, etc. After the 22 year of the Qianlong reign (1757), the Chinese side had long persisted with the foreign trade system making Guangzhou the only port opened to foreign commerce, which was subject to the monopolist Cohong guilds. As a major trade rival, Britain also managed to retain the monopoly of the EIC on the trade with China. The progress of the trade was slow and China had enjoyed the status of trade surplus. After entering into the Daoguang period, the continuous buildup of the economic power of Britain and the United States and the expansion of market in the Orient had sent powerful shock waves to the traditional trade structure. A series of profound changes began to unfold in the early years of the Daoguang reign (before the Opium War).

(1) In view of trade relations, the trade between British and Indian private traders and non-Hong merchants grew exponentially, which radically changed the monopoly of the thirteen Hongs and the EIC over the trade

Until the middle of the eighteenth century, all the China-British trade dealings, without exception, happened between the thirteen Hongs and the EIC. It was not until the 1770s that there emerged the first group of "private English traders" (Greenberg, 1951: 20) in China. At the outset, the so-called country traders were merely commissioned private merchants, who dealt in small volume of merchandises and subordinated themselves to the oversight of the Supervisory Committee, the governing body of the EIC's business in China. What with the EIC's "reliance on them to fill the trade gap and its dependence on them to transport the money back to Briton,"

the EIC often fell into conflict with the country traders, yet in the meantime had to encourage private trade dealings. With the termination of the monopoly of the EIC over trade in 1813, the private traders achieved faster progress. In 1815, there were 29 British firms in Calcutta and Mumbai; by 1820, the number went up to 51. These people were "mostly nouveau riche, fully intent on laying their hands on the miraculous Chinese trade." Since the dawn of the Daoguang reign, the growth of the country traders' dealings led to a significant increase of the number of private English merchants, which reached 66 in 1833, and up to 156 in 1837. From 1817 to 1819, the total annual exports of the private traders to China accounted for an average of 60.3% of the sum of that of the EIC plus the former, and the total annual imports and exports of the private traders were almost on a par with that of the EIC, hitting 49.3% of the sum of the two. The Daoguang period saw their percentages climbing even higher, with the total annual exports reaching 78% of the sum in 1822 and over 80% in 1829, and the total annual imports and exports moving up from 50% to over 69% in 1829 (calculated based on Greenberg, 1951: 217, 218). As budding capitalists, the private traders not only inherited their pirate predecessors' brutality and adventurous spirit, but also manifested the greed and audacity of capitalists when seeking maximum profits. The influx of them had a great impact on China's original trade system, causing significant changes to the China-Western trade relations. In the trade of that time, the EIC dealt exclusively with Hong merchants, while the private traders had the vast majority of their dealings with those non-Hong merchants at the open waters; even in Guangzhou, their engagements with the small businesses were also a familiar sight. At that time, the Hong merchants were the exclusive legal brokers in China's foreign trade, and the outside "small shops" were initially purveyors under the security of the Hong merchants to provide small quantities of complementary merchandise. Through tax evasion and other means, they enjoyed lighter financial burden and their goods were priced lower. Thus, the trade, in which the public houses were not involved, boomed. In his diary, the great opium merchant William Chatterton admitted that in the early 1820s he "bought more goods from the private traders than from the Hong merchants." James Matheson also admitted that he did "buy a lot of things from small, unlicensed stores in Canton." "It was the Americans who dealt 'very extensively' with the outside merchants" (Greenberg, 1951: 54). Although the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi and the Superintendent took measures from time to time to suppress the "illicit acts of breaking the legal monopoly of the Co-Hong," the British and American private traders had already evolved into a force to be reckoned with and vehemently opposed such restrictions and exerted pressure on the Guangdong government. As a result, the sums of the foreign trade on the part of the "small stores" increased in volume in the early years of the Daoguang reign (around 1824) (Greenberg, 1951: 58). By the eighth year of the Daoguang reign (1828), the Guangdong government had to back down and issued the "Regulations on the Trade Operation of Small Businesses" on the fourteenth of the seven month in the name of the Governor-General of the two provinces and the supervisor of the Canton Customs, which modified some of the original stipulations vesting in the Hong merchants the complete monopoly over foreign trade. "The Hong merchants retained their monopoly on the vast majority of the major items in

foreign trade." The non-Hong traders, except for the "24 kinds of export commodities and 52 kinds of import commodities from abroad, …were allowed to trade in all other items including two major ones: Chinese silk and imported white (cotton) textiles, which was viewed as a concession to these small businesses."[76] Thus, the trade without the involvement of the Co-Hong changed from initially illegal to semi-legal. The development of the trade between the non-Hong traders in Guangdong and British-Indian private traders, which gained semi-legal status by 1828, meant a shift in China-Western trade relations from the initial dominant roles played by the Hong merchants and the EIC to the ones by the non-Hong traders on the Chinese side and private traders on the British and Indian side.

(2) Changes to the composition of trade merchandise

As for export commodities, the big change was the Nanjing native cloth (purple-figured cloth), which gradually lost its initial competitive edge in the early Daoguang period. Chinese native cloth began to be exported to England and the United States in the 1830s, and evolved over time. The annual total volume of exports during 1820–1824 was 1,328,227 pieces on average. During 1825–1829, the average annual volume was 1,102,880 pieces (Yan, 1955a: 33). "The total volume of the native cloth exported to Europe and the US was the third highest in the maritime trade in Guangzhou, ranking behind only tea and silk" (Yan, 1955a: 32). Before the 1830s, as the cotton textile industry in the United States had not yet been developed, "American merchants sailed to China to deal in the native cloth, which was also the first and foremost item of trade for them, who not only sold the cloth to the United States, but also shipped it to Central and South America and even to Western Europe" (Yan, 1955a: 31). On top of that, "the color and quality of the cloth spun in China was still superior to that of English products." (Yao, 1962: 1331) So "in the eighteenth century and even in the 1820s, the foreign trade in Chinese cotton was just the opposite of what happened afterwards, and at that time the cotton flowed from China to the West" (Yan, 1955a: 31). Up until the eleventh year of the Daoguang reign (1831), China still enjoyed the position of trade surplus in the China-British cotton and textile trade, with China's trade surplus still amounting to more than 140,000 taels from 1830 to 1831. With the development of the British cotton textile industry, the cotton goods exported to China from Britain exceeded that exported from China for the first time in the twelfth year of the Daoguang reign (1832), and China's import surplus exceeded 240,000 taels (Yan, 1955a: 33), and since then China had been left at a disadvantageous position in the cotton textile trade.

The change to the composition of the trade commodities was mainly shown in the imports. This was first manifested in the advent of cotton textiles. Woolen products had always constituted the part and parcel of the imports and of the imports in the early years of the Daoguang reign, "woolen textiles still accounted for more than 90%." Around the first year of the Daoguang period (1821), cotton fabrics began to

[76] The "Notification" was fully published in *The Canton Register* on 2nd August 1823. *The Canton Register* was the first newspaper run by a British opium trafficker, Sir James William Matheson (1796–1878).

appear in bulk in the Chinese market. "This cannot simply be seen as an increase in the usual goods, which is well worthy of note because it marked the dawning of a new era" (Yao, 1962: 269). Thenceforward the amount of cotton textiles skyrocketed from 162,000 dollars in 1823 to upwards of 1,060,000 dollars in 1832 (Yao, 1962: 278). After the mid-1830s, "the total value of woolen fabrics dropped sharply" (Yan, 1955a: 256–257), while that of cotton fabrics increased substantially with the years, and the British machine-made plain-weave cotton fabric shipped to China amounted to about five million yards in 1833–1834, increasing to more than 10 million yards in 1835–1837, and in 1838–1841, it exceeded 20 million yards, peaking at 23.06 million yards in 1838. The Cotton yarn exported to China weighed 900,000 pounds in 1834, and from 1835 to 1842, it reached an average of more than 2.81 million yards per year, the highest hitting 4.49 million pounds in 1842 (Yan, 1955a: 58). The change to the imported goods was also mirrored in the viral spread of opium smuggling, which gradually took over from cotton and leaped to the top in the cargoes shipped to China. Before 1820, the imports of cotton to China were the British merchants' top concern …which was taken as "the foundation of their early prosperity" (Greenberg, 1951: 88). Later, with the development of China's coastal shipping industry and lower shipping costs of cotton, the cotton in Guangzhou and Nanjing "was sold at 15 taels instead of 25 taels and 30 taels" (Greenberg, 1951: 92), and the India-made cotton had lost its initial competitive edge in price. Moreover, due to the impact of the British cotton textiles, "from about 1819 for a decade, the Guangzhou market for Indian cotton had been bogged down in a turbulent and prolonged slump, for India cotton was one of acute and chronic depression" (Greenberg, 1951: 88). The import value of cotton was over 8,184,000 dollars in 1817, reduced to 3,240,000 dollars in 1820, dropped to 2,995,000 dollars in 1822 (the second year of the Daoguang reign), and remained at the level of more than five million dollars in general over the years until 1832, with the exception of 1825 and 1826, when the poor cotton harvests in the Nanjing region brought some achievements to the slump (Yao, 1962: 256–257). The sharp decline in cotton exports to China put Britain at an even greater disadvantage in the China-Britain trade, and for this reason they were hell-bent on scaling up the smuggling of opium in order to reap huge profits and reverse their trade deficit in the normal trade. That being so, the most significant and important result of the slump in the cotton market was the opium smuggling by foreign traders at full throttle. In 1817, the import value of cotton was nearly twice as much as that of opium, but by 1820 (the last year of the Jiaqing reign) opium imports were worth 7.25 million dollars more than cotton, and since then opium had ranked top in terms of import value. Beginning in the first year of the Daoguang reign, the growth of opium smuggling "accelerated dramatically" (Yao, 1962: 271) and even skyrocketed following 1825. More than 5000 chests of opium were smuggled into China in 1821–1822, increasing to 26,000 chests in 1835–1836, and even climbing to 35,000 chests between 1838 and 1839. The total value of the opium smuggled over the decade of the 1830s had reached 163,384,000 dollars (Li et al., 1980.) Likewise, "in the last decade before 1842, opium alone constituted about two-thirds of the value of all British imports into China" (Greenberg, 1951: 50). The illegal opium trade assumed the dominant position in the China-Western trade, so much so that "the bill of lading for opium

had become a kind of temporary currency, equating to a certain amount of money" (Yao, 1962: 406), and serving as a medium of circulation.

It should be pointed out that the rapid expansion of opium smuggling had much to do with the change in the EIC's policy on operating the opium trade around 1832. Opium was comprised of big paste (Gongban paste and Laban paste) and small paste (white paste and golden flower paste). Before 1831, the EIC attempted to rein in the shipment of white paste by various means, but small paste was cheaper than big paste, it was a kind of opium preferred by many Chinese except the wealthy,[77] and therefore had a wider market. From 1832 onward, the EIC changed its policy regarding the small paste, from the initial one restricting its production and charging high prices to the one having it produced on a ridiculously massive scale in British India and the princely states." This led to "an enormous expansion in the opium trade" (Greenberg, 1951: 131), and ever since then the cheap opium (small paste) flooded into China in even greater quantities, plaguing the country farther and wider and causing greater harm.

(3) In the mode of trade, illegitimate smuggling gradually edged out the legitimate dealings

The growth of private traders and the sudden boom in illegal import of opium shook the foundation of the legitimate trade and caused a dramatic change in the way Chinese and Western trade was conducted. From the early Daoguang years, illegal activities and smuggling grew rapidly; initially, smuggling activities moved from the mouth of Whampoa to Lingding Bay, and then extended to the southeast coast in the 1830s. In the first year of the Daoguang reign (1821), the Qing dynasty launched a relatively harsh anti-smoking campaign in Guangzhou, with some success in suppressing the opium trade at the Whampoa port, which could have been a good thing. However, what with the limited strength of the Chinese navy and the corruption of the Qing officials, as well as the private traders, bribery went rampant and everybody was ready to evade the rightful tariffs of the Qing government by the most baneful and wholesale smuggling (Wright, 1966: 12). This led to "the flourishing of large-scale illegal trades at the mooring sites out on the open sea after 1821." Illegal opium smuggling "increased more than fivefold in just over a decade." In the early Daoguang period, the seas off Lingding Island, Jinxingmen, and other places had become the brokering depots for opium and the haven of tax evasion for other goods, "all the trade items restricted by China could be found there." For example, the export of metals was prohibited by the Qing dynasty, and foreign traders used to smuggle these commodities at great risks, but "after 1821, Chinese people would readily deliver the silver bullion (sycee) to the barges at Islands of Lingding as long as they got paid for it. These transactions were less hazardous and more extensive" (Greenberg, 1951: 49). Imported articles such as "foreign tweeds and feather goods were heavily taxed, and were also sold privately on the decks of the barges."[78] As

[77] Reported by Matheson on 6th February 1824 (source unspecified).

[78] Liang Tingnan: *Yue Haiguan Zhi* [*Records of Canton Customs*] (Vol. 27), *Foreign Merchants* (2), p. 32. The original was compiled during the Daoguang period.

a consequence, for several years before the Opium War, "all the calico was from smuggling," and "the national coffers did not receive even a single silver tael of tax proceeds from such goods as camlet, calico, cinnamon and many other" (Yao, 1962: 395). This can also be seen in the correspondences of Matheson regarding daily routines, with "legal articles of export and import being smuggled via Lingding to avoid the duties payable at Canton" (Greenberg, 1951: 50). By the 1830s, the scope of smuggling activities was further spread out to the coastal regions, where trade was developed. As early as 1823, Matheson sent a tentative expedition to open smuggling trade routes along the east coast of China, but later due to bad timing and other reasons, he soon halted this business (Greenberg, 1951: 96). After 1833, with the increase in the number of British trading houses in Guangdong and the sudden influx of opium, they felt strongly the need to expand their market, and Chatterton believed that "it was time to make the coastal trade a 'regular route.'" To scale up the coastal trade, Matheson "had a fleet of a dozen vessels of every description" by 1836, and in the previous year other Guangzhou agents had already begun to compete in the coastal trade (Greenberg, 1951: 141). Therefore, in the early Daoguang period, "foreign trade extended along the shoreline from the Yuejiang River all the way to Northeast China."[79] By developing the coastal trade, foreigners not only broadened trade routes for their goods, but also evaded tariffs and expanded opium smuggling to a wider area. The flourishing of the illegal smuggling activities, which changed the trajectory of the normal trade, meant the decline of the long-held status of legal trade between China and the West.

(4) As a result, the changes mentioned above effected further changes in the mode of exchange and the fundamental content of trade

As stipulated by the Qing court at that time, all the normal trades between China and the West were conducted in the form of barter, and "foreign money" was used only to make up the difference. Back then, not only did the EIC use the imports from Britain and India as barter for tea, the private traders also often resorted to barter in their dealings with the Hong merchants in the Indian cotton (Greenberg, 1951: 68); nevertheless, opium was always transacted by cash in advance (Morse, 1917). In this fashion, the smuggled opium increased proportionately among the import articles, which inevitably brought about a change in the mode of exchange, i.e., shifting from the original barter-based transactions to the ones based on silver cash. The trade at that time included legitimate dealings and illicit smugglings, two of which were as different as chalk and cheese. In the early Daoguang period, while normal transactions advanced in waves, illicit opium smugglings skyrocketed and dominated the trade. In 1817, of the goods imported into Guangzhou, the legal trade amounted to 14.52 million dollars, accounting for 78.6% of the total value of imports (excluding silver). Although the total value of imported goods increased year by year after that, the highest being over 27.3 million dollars in 1832, the value of legitimate dealings decreased, mostly ranging between 11 and 12 million dollars, with the lowest being 8.49 million dollars in 1820. Hence only opium was on the increase

[79] *Collection of Correspondence about China, 1840*, p. 154.

among the imported goods, and its proportion of the total imports grew incrementally, reaching an average of 44% from 1821 to 1828, and up to 53% after 1829 (calculated based on the table in Yao, 1962: 256–257). On the eve of the Opium War, China's average annual import value was 25 million dollars, of which opium amounted to 13.79 million dollars, constituting about 55.2% of the total (calculated based on the table in Yao, 1962: 259–260). This expansion of the illegitimate opium smuggling shook the foundation of the normal development of trade between China and the West, and essentially the China-Western trade was no longer the foreign trade in the general sense, but drug trafficking perpetrated by reckless merchants was already running amok.

To sum up, the major changes in trade between China and the West started in the early Daoguang period, especially after the 1830s. The two most marked changes in the early years of the Daoguang reign were as follows: One was people, i.e., the increase of private merchants and their massive influx into China; the other was the sharp rise in opium smuggling, and the two were closely intertwined. The private merchants were backed up by the great East India Houses, which were important firms in London, with age-old and strong branches in India (Greenberg, 1951: 37). They also "found allies in manufacturing towns of England" (Greenberg, 1951: 74). It can be seen that the private traders at this time were the representatives of the British and American bourgeoisie who had launched an economic aggression against China, and what they had done epitomized the eagerness of the British and American bourgeoisie to amass capital and to open up the Chinese market. Opium, however, was a special commodity used by the British and American merchants to balance the trade deficit, reverse the flow of silver, and plunder China's wealth, which turned out to be the most important reason for the changes in China-Western trade in the early Daoguang period. It stood to reason that they could have expanded the import of other legitimate goods after China's ban on opium, but the problem was that "there was rarely an import article that could readily recoup its costs, and there was not a single export article that could be hopefully used as collateral for remittance."[80] Under these circumstances, the increase of private traders and the expansion of the trade with China were inseparable from opium smuggling. Little wonder that Britain tried desperately to sustain the opium trade, even at the cost of resorting to armed force. It was clear that opium smuggling had become essential to the trade between China and the West, had been a bone of contention between China and the West at that time and the root cause of the outbreak of the Opium War.

[80] *Collection of Correspondence to India*, 26th April 1828.

4.6.2 The Impact of the Changes in China-Western Trade Relations in the Early Years of the Daoguang Period on the Chinese Society and Economy

The early Daoguang period witnessed various changes in the trade between China and the West, which had a growing impact on China's social economy and China-Western relations with the passage of time.

(1) China's foreign trade management system was hugely impacted, and the normal trade order was severely disrupted

The corruption of the old trade system was mirrored in one aspect in the change of the Cohong system and the roles of Hong merchants. The Cohong system was originally a "masterpiece" of the Qing government's control over China's foreign trade, but it gradually lost its monopoly due to a surge in the number of non-Cohong traders, especially after the Qing government had to acknowledge the semi-legitimate status of non-Cohong trade in 1828. From then on, foreign traders could bypass Cohong's monopoly and worked more openly hand in glove with lawless Chinese merchants in various illicit dealings. Initially, Hong merchants served as agents responsible for the management of foreign trade on behalf of the Qing government, their responsibilities including managing foreign traders, conducting trade, declaring and paying custom duties, and transmitting correspondence between Chinese and foreign parties, etc. They acted as intermediaries between foreign traders and the Qing authorities, and mainly represented the interests of the Qing court and acted on the orders of the government. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, especially from the first year of the Daoguang reign onward, the economic power of foreign traders gained more strength, and they attracted the Hong merchants by exerting economic and commercial leverages.

First of all, foreign traders gradually took control of the Hong firms by lending large sums of money to the latter. As early as 1817, seven junior Hongists owed "just under one million taels," and as recorded in William Chatterton's private correspondence, up until around 1829, Manhop owed his foreign creditors over a million dollars and Chanqua was also "over half a million" in debt; even Mowqua, the second senior Hong merchant, "was embarrassed and had to be assisted …by Magniac & Co." (P.L.B. 15.6.1832, qtd from Greenberg, 1951: 63). The growing imports of opium and the massive outflow of silver "led in the 30s to an exceptional shortage of cash at Canton …thus leading to the tightening monetary conditions in Guangzhou" (Greenberg, 1951: 156), and a lack of means of circulation and a rise in the price of silver. The liabilities of the Hongs went from bad to worse, as Jardine wrote in a private letter in February 1837: "Not one of the recently made Hongs are free from debt …except Howqua and Puankequa"(P.L.B. W.J. 4.2.1837, qtd from Greenberg, 1951: 190). "At a rough estimate, the total of insolvent debts over the eighty-two years in which the Cohong operated amounted to over 16.5 million dollars" (Greenberg, 1951: 63). This debt-ridden situation forced the defaulting Hong firms to place

their assets in the custody of foreigners,[81] and most of the Hong merchants were under the supervision of foreign trustees. This pathetic economic status determined the helpless situation where the Hong firms gradually lost their independence.

Secondly, they profited from the intrinsic drawbacks of the Cohong system and the chaos in the trade. In view of foreign trade relations, the Cohong guild was an institution holding a monopoly over foreign trade, but was actually very loosely organized underneath the veneer of unity. "It had no joint stock: each merchant traded on his own account for his own Hong or firm, on his own capital, for his own profits. It rarely (never in its dealings with the foreign private merchants) followed a policy of corporate bargaining" (Greenberg, 1951: 51–52). Even Jardine believed that "the Hong merchants cannot trust each other in any combination" (P.L.B. 22.10.1 837, qtd from Greenberg, 1951: 52). Foreign merchants capitalized on these conflicts between Hong merchants and attracted the latter with the baits of trade shares and prices (Greenberg, 1951: 53). To seek their own profits and expand their own business, each Hong firm disregarded the interests of the state and the Cohong guild, and colluded with foreigners to engage in illicit dealings in spite of the prohibitions imposed by the government. In addition, most of the then Hong firms were run by a bunch of corrupt and incompetent merchants, who, in the old times, were known for their greed and venality, and susceptible to the bribery of dishonest foreign merchants, as a result, these Hong merchants were brought to heel by the latter and mostly in the service of the latter's interests, thus starting to take on some of the characteristics of Chinese compradors. The change in the status of the Hong merchants at the time was evident in their attitude toward the import of opium. They contravened the Qing government's strict opium ban beneath the veneer of docility and even had a hand in it. In the first year of the Daoguang reign (1821), Wu Dunyuan, the leader of the Hong merchants, was stripped of his insignia of official rank as he "sought only to curry the favor of the foreigners," "colluded with other Hong firms and concealed the acts of violations," and "had never reported a single case of opium smuggling over the years."[82] An EIC ship, the Essex, was discovered carrying opium to Guangzhou, Guan Chengfa, the ship's "security" merchant, was able to buy off the Qing officials with a bribe of 6000 dollars (Greenberg, 1951: 120). According to a report from the Select Committee of the UN House of Commons in 1830, Mowqua also had "a share in a large opium concern at Guangzhou" (Greenberg, 1951: 60). It can be seen from above that the nature of the Hong merchants had already changed prior to the Opium War, and they took an active part in the illicit activities of smuggling and tax evasion, and went further to violate various prohibitions imposed by the Qing government in cahoots with the foreigner traders. In time, the Hong merchants gradually shed their independent status and began to metamorphose into ones with dual roles of being

[81] *Europe Letter Book,* dated 1st January 1815.

[82] Ruan Yuan (viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi): Memorial proposing removal of Wu Dunyuan the foreign merchant from the official position because of his illicit permission for foreign ships to carry opium and to ask for stringent prohibition (the fourteenth day of the tenth month in the Daoguang reign), in *Series of Materials on Modern Chinese History: Opium Wars* (hereinafter shortened to *Opium Wars*) (Vol. 1), p. 138.

both a feudal merchant and a comprador, acting as willing accomplices of illicit foreign traders in breaking open the doors of China.

The collapse of the old trade system was also reflected in the change in the modus operandi restricting foreign trade to the port of Canton, especially since the early years of the Daoguang reign. Foreign traders had long tried to break the restraints in order to scale up their trade. Since the first year of Daoguang, the establishment of smuggling depots at the Lingding Bay and the rapid development of illicit trade rendered a greater part of the China-Western trade outside the control of the Canton Customs. As mentioned earlier, there was not only the smuggling of contraband such as opium and metals, and also tax evasion on legitimate imports and exports. According to General Shengjing's report in June 1838, "three or four out of ten ships declared to pay duties, and the other six or seven would bribe to pass the customs unchecked."[83] By the 1830s, the development of illegal trade along the coast was more of a counteraction against trade restrictions. Hence, by the early Daoguang period, such restrictions had become null and void.

As can be seen from the analysis above, "a very large proportion of the British trade had, after 1821, surpassed the bounds of the Canton System" (Greenberg, 1951: 50). The two main parts of the old trade system of the Qing dynasty had been severely sabotaged, and illegal activities including smuggling and tax evasion further undermined China's tariffs and interfered with its normal foreign trade. The gate of China's foreign trade had in fact been flung open, and the old system of regulating trade was no longer functioning properly and was left in a state of semi-paralysis. However, the Qing government failed to adapt to the changing circumstances to adopt new or alternative ways to manage, but to remain unchanged in response to myriad changes until the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing.

(2) Changes in the structure of trade articles impinged heavily on China's social economy

The development of normal trade between China and foreign countries somehow contributed to a certain degree the expansion of China's market and the growth of its commodity economy. This period witnessed varying degrees of progress in such trade items as tea and silk, ranked first and second, textile industries, respectively, based on native cloth and silk, as well as porcelain industry. Around 1830, "certain groups, especially the tea cultivators in Fukien, the silk producers in the Nanking district and the craftsmen of Canton, together with their middlemen, had come to depend on foreign trade" (Greenberg, 1951: 44). Prior to 1820, Indian cotton once occupied the first place of the imports, and since then, the annual import remained about 5 million, which was largely attributed to the light textile industry in Guangdong and other places producing purple-figured cloth for export at that time (see Peng, 1983a for detail). Unfortunately, however, legal imports remained largely unchanged in the

[83] Baoxing's Memorial proposing regulations on opium prohibition (the fifth month of the eighteenth year in the Daoguang reign), in *Series of Materials on Modern Chinese History: The Beginning and End of Running Foreign Affairs* (hereinafter shortened to *Beginning and End* (Vol. 2). Zhonghua Book Company, 1964, p. 39.

early Daoguang period, while illegal opium smuggling grew fast and furious. This trade, mainly based on drugs, was devastating to the Chinese economy.

First of all, the sudden surge in opium imports changed the balance of trade between China and the West and caused a massive outflow of silver. Up until the mid-1820s, what with the enormous demand of Western countries for Chinese tea and silk, and the inability of Western products to open up the Chinese market for the time being, China maintained its momentum of trade surplus and inward flow of silver in the China-Western trade. After the mid-1820s, in spite of a huge trade surplus in the normal trade, China suffered an unfavorable trade balance due to the rapid proliferation of opium. This led to a reversal of the flow of silver, most of which drained away through smuggling, so it is impossible to puzzle out the precise figures. By calculating China's trade balance alone, the outflow of silver in 1826–1827 was more than 3.5 million taels (Yan, 1955b: 36), and the average annual outflow of silver in the 1830s was 5–6 million taels (Li et al., 1980). Before the Opium War, "the constant drain on silver wrought by the import of opium began to sabotage the imperial treasury and currency circulation of the dynasty" (Marx, cited from the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 1972a, 1972b: 28). In particular, it caused the appreciation of silver and depreciation of copper coins, and the exchange rate between the two rose by 30% in the early Daoguang period (Yan, 1955b: 38). This sent huge shock waves to the economic life of China.

Secondly, it stimulated the lopsided development of the businesses and services around opium smuggling in Chinese society. The pernicious growth of the opium trade led to a spike in the number of professions pertaining to opium smuggling and an exponential expansion of the ranks of those who profited from the opium. Take Guangdong for example. There were those who undertook all the resales of opium—yaokou, and the operators of these yaokous were "mostly grandees and big shots who invested heavily, held the monopoly of the sales and then distributed the drugs in all directions."[84] They owned ample funds, "varying from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands at the least to upwards of one million at the most."[85] The money then poured into opium smuggling on a massive scale, for instance, in just one deal of opium trafficking uncovered in Guangdong in March 1834, Yao Jiu and others paid "as much as 36,000 taels of silver" at one go,[86] At that time, "there were many such stores in the streets of the thirteen Hongs and Lianxing" in Guangzhou. In addition to the big yaokous, there were also those private ones, set up by "villains in collusion with the corrupted officials, called small yaokous." These small stores "popped up in every nooks and corners of the cities and towns."[87] The vast majority of the shops selling foreign products in Guangdong and other provinces were actually no different

[84] Urgong'e: Memorial proposing regulations of opium prohibition (sixth month of the eighteenth year in the Daoguang reign), in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 3), p. 83.

[85] Liang Zhangju: Memorial proposing regulations on opium prohibition (the seventh month of the eighteenth year in the Daoguang reign), in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 4), p. 98.

[86] Hafunggaa and others: Memorial (the ninth month of the fourteenth year in the Daoguang reign, in *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), p. 129.

[87] An imperial edict on the twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of the eleventh year of the Daoguang reign, in *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), p. 170.

from yaokous as they were engaged in drug dealing under the disguise of the sales of foreign commodities. This was the case with a foreign goods store called Yongchang caught smuggling in the seventeenth year of the Daoguang reign (1837).[88] From these yaokous, big and small, opium was distributed to local opium dens and trafficked to various provinces, poisoning the whole nation. At that time, there were opium dens throughout the country, and their operators were all "crooked and cunning officers and flunkeys who were in cahoots with the bad lot of the big old families, and these swashbuckling profligates would gather together to consume the drugs within the depth of lanes and walls."[89] Out at sea, there were armed smuggling vessels called "fast crabs" (also known as Palongs [scrambling dragons]), which undertook all the transport of the opium, "delivering the contraband to varied yaokous," and in 1831 such boats were numbered "as many as one to two hundred."[90] In addition, there were "many more varieties of smuggling vessels," such as "Xiasi (shrimp traps)," "Tuofeng (drag wind)," and others for opium trafficking, "also involved were various civil boats, lurking at the coastal entryway ready to pick up the contraband."[91] In 1836, more than 14,000 pounds of opium paste were seized aboard Liang Xianye's junk after caught red-handed,[92] indicative of the staggering quantity of opium carried in each junk. There was a time when foreign "barges were moored out on the open sea, and all their daily needs were solely supplied by the inland." The reason why they could live off the coast for a long time was that there was a type of boats called "purveying dinghies," loaded with victuals and utensils. They were passed off as fishing boats to sell the provisions to the foreign ships sub rosa."[93] At that time, smuggling was very severe in the coastal areas of Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and other provinces, shoreline counties such as Jinjiang, Hui'an, Nan'an, Zhangzhou, Zhao'an. In Fujian Province, towns like Nankou, Shenhu, Chen Dai, and other townships under Jinjiang County were known for their contacts with foreigners and their livelihood largely depended on the opium trade. Take another example, "among the most prominent were the opium dealers from the villages under Jinjiang County such as Dong'an, Shitou, Xicen, Xibian, Xibian, Shuitou, Liandai, Cendou, Yongning, Gaocuo etc., and the ones under Hui'an County such as Taku, Chengbian, Xiakou, Yuntou, Baiqi etc., …where the largest groups of dealers could be found." These smuggling rings were

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[88] A confidential letter sent to the court on the twentieth day of the six month in the Daoguang reign, in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 1), p. 20.

[89] Huang Juezi: Memorial proposing stringent blocking measure for leakage so as to consolidate the country's fundamentals, in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 2), page unspecified.

[90] Feng Zanxun, the imperial censor: Memorial proposing for stringent opium prohibition (the fifth month of the eleventh year of the Daoguang reign), in *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), p. 434.

[91] Deng Tingzhen and others: Memorial informing that command has been issued to the British Envoy on their barges' return home and prohibitions of Yaokou smuggling (the ninth month of the seventeenth year of the Daoguang reign), in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 1), p. 24.

[92] Xu Naiji: Memorial on how to change the regulations related to the issue of more stringent prohibition leading to greater problems, in *Opium Wars* (1), p. 472.

[93] Deng Tingzhen and others: Memorial aiming to dispel barges and arrest Yaokou smugglers and other bandits (the first month of the eighteenth year of the Daoguang reign), in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 2), p. 30.

equipped with their own or rented sea-going merchant ships, and as highly-organized smugglers, "they either set up shops somewhere, traded in foreign commodities, undertook the delivery of goods," or purveyed "water and food" for foreign smuggling vessels.[94] The peddlers who sold opium to inland areas " used boats or carts to carry the boxes and chests loaded to full capacity with goods,"[95] and there were even hordes of drug rings in such provinces of Hubei, Hunan, and Jiangxi, where "droves of drug dealers, often numbered by tens and hundreds, struck one as very well-equipped smugglers."[96] The people of Fujian, whether they were the wealthiest merchants or the lowlife fishermen, man-slaughterers, or thieves, all ventured in to seek colossal gains, and there were no less than hundreds of thousands of them involved."[97]

As the drug went viral, the industry of opium-smoking sets also emerged and developed rapidly, "overly ingenious contrivances and devices became all the rage, their manufacturing remained active though punished as illegal acts." This industry was largely concentrated in the workshops producing opium pipes, which involved manual workers from varied trades including gold, silver, copper, tin, bamboo, wood, ivory, lacquer, etc., who had fabricated all sorts of spirit lamps, pipes, opium paste containers and the like. With the vice of opium spreading far and wide, "the industry attracted more workers in these days and showcased ever-better craftsmanship. The head of the pipe was encrusted by gold, silver, copper, and tin, the muzzle of the pipe was also decorated with gold and jade horn and ivory, …in case the pipe was prone to crack due to repeated burning, it was also coated in silver and tin, and each one, decorated in blue and green, boasts of superb craftsmanship. Should the pipe get clogged through overuse, an iron rod, as well as other items like knives or awls, came in different shapes and sizes." The manufacturers of the smoking sets could be found everywhere, Fujian and Guangdong were more famous for the production of smoking pipes, known as "cane gun," "of the pipes from Guangdong, the ones made with foreign porcelain were the best, and the ones made in Yixing were rated the finest at home."[98] There were also a wide choice of spirit lamp makers, the ones from Taigu County, Shanxi Province, were deemed to be the best, known as "Taigu lamp." The ones from Jiaozhou, Shandong Province were named Jiaozhou lamp. They were all exquisitely made and handy, … In Guangzhou there was also a kind of Guangzhou lamps. During the period of the opium ban, manufacturers racked their brains to invent a variety of opium-smoking items, such as "hollowed-out soles" and "boots with compartments" where opium could be hidden, as well as various smoking devices that were customized for the official exam candidates so that the

[94] Huang Juezi: Suggestions on checking opium smuggling at Haikou. In *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), pp. 497–498.

[95] Funiyang'a: Memorial proposing regulations on opium prohibition, in *Beginning and End* (Vol.3), p. 64.

[96] Zhou Tianjue: Memorial proposing regulations on opium prohibition, in *Beginning and End* (Vol.3), p. 66.

[97] Xu Ji: Collection of essays written in Tuimi Room, in *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), p. 512.

[98] Lin Zexu: Memorial proposing opium prohibition (the fifth month of the eighteenth year of the Daoguang reign), in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 2), pp. 48–49.

latter could sneak them into the examination halls.[99] The abnormal development of trading, services, and handicrafts revolving around opium smuggling irrevocably jeopardized China's daily economic lives and hampered the development of other conventional industries and businesses. The expansion of the opium trade took away a large portion of the market for daily goods, weakening China's purchasing power for both the foreign goods and opium, or for the domestic commodities (Marx, cited from the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 1972a, 1972b: 24). Lin Zexu made covert visits to the more developed cities such as Suzhou, Hankow, and other places, and found that before the Opium War, "about 20 to 30 years ago, some products could rake in huge profits, but now their trading volume was halved, the other half, in so many words, went to the opium, if you ask."[100] The slump in the trade also inevitably impinged on the development of the handicrafts suppliers.

The formation of drug trafficking networks and the marketing networks for foreign goods mirrored the deformed development of the trade. Opium traffickers from Britain and the United States shipped opium from India and Türkiye to the waters of Guangdong, where the cargo of opium was then transferred to the barges that had laid at anchor in the Lingding Bay for years. According to the memorial to the throne submitted by Deng Tingzhen, Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi, in 1838, "the ships lying at anchor for a long time numbered 25 to be exact, and most of them belonged to the British country merchants."[101] It was Chinese opium traffickers who sold the drug across the country. They obtained the goods from Laowanshan at Lingding Bay, Whampoa River, Macao (central passage), Nanao (eastern passage), and Qiongzhou (western passage), and through the three passages the opium was sneaked into the inland via Guangdong by land; or transported from Lingding Bay, Nanao, and other places by sea to "seaports of Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangnan, Shandong, Tianjin and Guangdong, where the professionals in charge collected and resold the cargo,"[102] which was then transferred from the coastal seaports to inland provinces all over China. In the early Daoguang period, this drug trafficking system was widespread throughout the country, as can be seen in the memorials to the throne submitted by the provincial governors regarding opium trafficking. For example, in 1831, the local enforcers in Hunan Province "arrested more than 150 opium dealers consecutively, such as Zhou Chaozuo."[103] In Shandong Province, "Zhang Qiyu and others were arrested for opium trafficking, …their proceeds amounted to several thousand taels."[104] In addition, "thirteen opium dealers were captured in

[99] Lei Jin: Anecdotes in Rongcheng (edition unspecified), pp. 25, 31.

[100] Lin Zexu: A passage on stringent prohibition of opium smoking without regard to money affairs, in *Opium Wars* (Vol. 2), p. 140.

[101] Deng Tingzhen and others: Memorial about aiming to dispel barges and arrest smugglers and other bandits, in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 1), p. 29.

[102] Funiyang'a: Memorial proposing the regulations on opium prohibition, in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 3), p. 64.

[103] Wu Rongguang: Memorial about no opium was found, in *Opium Wars* (1), p. 442.

[104] Na'er Jing'e: Memorial proposing discussions on the regulations for opium prohibition, in *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), p. 443.

Xiangfu County, Henan Province."[105] Likewise, the same opium-busting operations also took place in other provinces such as Shaanxi, Shanxi, Zhili, and Guizhou. At that time, opium trade was strictly forbidden, and the dealers often cunningly used other merchandise as a cover for opium smuggling. "Such trade items as foreign tweed and feathers etc., from the East of Guangdong Province were transported for sale in all the provinces, …nowadays upwards of several thousand peddlers trekked across provinces under the pretense of retailing the said foreign goods carried over their shoulders, but beneath the cover they were actually opium dealers, forming bands and gangs, trafficking opium everywhere."[106] For instance, the Guangdong and Fujian merchants in Shanghai "purchased miscellaneous goods such as tweed and feathers as well as opium from the foreign ships anchored outside the ports of Guangdong, and transshipped them by sea to the entrance of Shanghai County, and then redistributed them to Suzhou and other regions such as Taicang and Tongzhou. The lion share went to Suzhou, where the cargo was distributed all over the province and neighboring provinces of Anhui, Shandong, and Zhejiang."[107] In this manner, a wide array of foreign goods, riding on the coattails of the booming opium trade, were shipped to many parts of the country, paving the way for the expedition of the sale of foreign goods deeper into the mainland in the days to come. It can be seen that the vicious development of opium smuggling had a serious impact on Chinese society and economy, and in time captured the attention of Chinese from all social strata.

(3) With the continuous expansion of the trade between China and other countries, especially in the context of the upsurge of smuggling, drug trafficking, and tax evasion, there emerged the incipient cohort of crooked traders who served the interests of foreign merchants

Those who pocketed a cut of the profit directly from the illegal foreign merchants included the crooked traders transporting opium to and from China and India, the linguists and shroffs serving on the foreign opium-smuggling ships, the compradors and servants serving in the foreign factories at China's ports, engaging in the dealings of opium and others; those who clinched a share of the profit from the opium smuggling comprised of various types of big and small opium dealers, including the personnel working on the smuggling boats such as "fast crabs," the Hong merchants engaged in the foreign trade, the owners of the big and small opium yaokous, private banks for exchanging silver, the opium resellers from the inland, as well as the opium peddlers carrying the goods with a shoulder stick and winding their way through the country. These two groups of people were widely distributed and large in number, especially the majority of the first group grew to be the mainstay of the ranks of compradors in later days.

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[105] *Opium Wars* (Vol. 1), p. 464.

[106] Gui Liang: Response memorial after reviewing the opium prohibition regulations, in *Beginning and End* (Vol. 3), p. 71.

[107] Addendum to *Beginning and End* (Vol. 4), in the Daoguang period, pp. 945–946.

It can be seen from the above that the changes in the trade between China and the West during the Daoguang period sent huge shock waves to the Chinese economy. Although the Qing dynasty continued to follow the policy of restrictions, a bunch of British and American daredevil private merchants, aided and abetted by the illegal traders from within China, stormed open China's gate of trade. This had long been recognized by Western scholars: "The private merchants, it is clear, had, long before new ports were forced open by Treaty in 1842, nullified in a large measure the Chinese restriction of foreign trade to Canton" (Greenberg, 1951: 50). At that time, the Qing government did not beef up its regulatory institutions, nor did it have any advanced management skills. As a result, tariff evasion worsened, opium smuggling ran rampant, opium finally rolled into China through its old gate and pervaded the country for a decade or two. Opium not only poisons the bodies and minds of the Chinese people, but also drained the reserve of silver, jeopardized the normal development of the Chinese economy, and further corroded the Chinese government and its ruling apparatus. This catalyzed the anti-smoking movement of the Chinese people to protect the interests and dignity of the nation.

4.6.3 The Shift in Trade Order Between China and the West in the Late Daoguang Period and Its Impact on China

It was in the late Daoguang period when China lost all its political and economic privileges after the signing of the first unequal treaties that China conducted its trade with the West. The foreign invaders not only legalized the various trade rights they had seized in the early Daoguang period, but also further expanded the gains. This brought about a turning point in the China-Western trade and had a tremendous impact on the Chinese society and economy. The major manifestations are listed as follows:

(1) China was forced to change the old trade system and began to lose its independent administrative power over foreign trade

Article V of the Treaty of Nanking stipulates: "The government of China, having compelled the British merchants trading at Guangzhou to deal exclusively with certain Chinese merchants called Hong merchants (or Cohongs) who had been licensed by the Chinese government for that purpose, …agrees to abolish that practice in future at all ports where British merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please" (Wang, 1957).[108] This means the abolition of the long-standing system of Cohong's monopoly over foreign trade, and also means that China was forced to accept the "free trade" imposed by the West, discontinue the practice of restricting foreign trade to the port of Guangzhou only and open up five treaty ports, namely Guangzhou,

[108] Wang (1957). Unequal treaties hereinafter are all quoted from this book.

Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai. The tariff-setting power and the administrative power of customs were the two most important elements in foreign trade management, both of which underwent fundamental changes in the late Daoguang period.

First of all, China's tariff was turned from an autonomous one to an unequal one that was to be regulated through negotiation, and the rates of import and export goods had been greatly reduced. In the early Daoguang period, China had full power to determine the tax rate of import and export goods, which was the sacrosanct sovereignty of any independent country, without having to negotiate with foreign countries, let alone foreign interference. However, after the signing of the *Treaty of Nanking*, it was stipulated that the British merchants "shall pay the tariff of imports and exports and other port fees which ought to be fair and regular," which for the first time deprived China of its tariff autonomy and established the agreement on tariffs. Thus, China no longer had the right to set its own tariff rates, and following that the first agreement on tariffs in Chinese history was signed—the *General Regulations of Trade with Britain and China.* Before China and Britain signed the agreement, the British side first drafted a new tariff system, which even led the British plenipotentiary Henry Pottinger into thinking that "the proposed scale of import duties …is even more favorable than what the merchants shall venture to set forth. The same is true for the exporters of…." Therefore, Pottinger "feared that the Chinese government might oppose it because it was far too favorable for foreign importers." Hence he authorized the British delegates at the negotiating table to "sanction reasonable increases" should any objections be raised from the Qing delegation (F.O. 228/24, 19th July 1843; qtd from Wright, 1966: 14). There were those who proposed to use tariffs to swell revenue, and those who used them to facilitate the implementation of commercial policies. For the Qing dynasty, which had long pursued the policy of bolstering agriculture and belittling commerce, and closing the country to the outside world, the tariff could not be associated with the protection of the national economy, or at most it was viewed as a means to address the issues of fiscal revenue, and some even thought that the Heavenly Empire's grace reaches the remotest corners of the earth, and the mercantile taxes are merely petty profits (Liu, 2000). Influenced by such thinking, the Qing delegates fully agreed to the unilateral "authorized tariff and duties" of Britain during the taxation negotiations (Wright, 1966: 8). The statute specified 64 categories of tax-deductible foreign goods, and the tax rates on most of the major imports were reduced by 58%–79% (see the table at Yan, 1955b: 59). With the exception of tea, the tax rates on nearly all the other exported goods were set at "almost below the level of five percent" (Wright, 1966: 11). Even the British merchants in Guangdong had to admit: "[W]e are not aware that a much more liberal one exists in any country in the world" (F.O. 17/276, 23rd November 1857; qtd from Wright, 1966: 62).

Second, the emergence of the so-called consular customs declaration system undermined the independent exercise of the authority of China's customs. Before the Opium War, China's customs administration was entirely in the hands of the Qing court, which had established the post of the Superintendent of customs or Superintendent in Guangdong and basically exercised the powers of customs administration

in its entirety. Until well into the late Daoguang period, the British and American consuls seized great power to interfere with Chinese customs administration under the umbrella of unequal treaties, and the administrative power of China's customs was seriously compromised. *The Treaty of Nanking* stipulated that the British consuls stationed at the treaty ports were vested with the main responsibility for the "payments of taxes, port fees, etc. by the British merchants." The *Statement of Foreign Trade with China* and the *Treaties of Humen* further specified how the consulate processed the payments of taxes and port fees by the British merchants. Such further provisions can be found in the ensuing *Treaties of Wangxia* and *Treaties of Whampoa.* According to the relevant provisions of the unequal treaties, foreign merchant ships could enter the port without asking for permission from the customs, and the tonnage of their ships and the quantity of their cargoes were notified in written documents to Chinese customs by the foreign consuls, who would "inspect the goods together" with Chinese customs and "negotiate the prices of the goods" before the latter could levy duties or taxes. Article VII of the *Statement of Foreign Trade with China* provided that the consul could intervene if there was a dispute over the inspection or valuation of the goods, and the same provision can be found in Article XI of the *Treaty of Wangxia* and Article XVI of the *Treaty of Whampoa.* This is known as the consular declaration system. As for the smuggling and tax evasion activities, it was stipulated that the foreign consuls should inspect the smuggling ships seized in the ports that were not open to foreigners, and the customs was not entitled to take any action without the consent of the foreign consuls. Under the shield of these treaties, foreign merchants could openly smuggle and evade taxes without fear. The foreign consuls connived at the illegal activities of their own merchants, and most of them, when they saw with their own eyes the sordid acts of smuggling by their fellow countrymen, feigned ignorance of the facts, and never tried to clamp down on the vices (Wright, 1966: 192). That being so, the foreign merchants, believing themselves placed under the protective umbrella of those behind them, felt free to trade wherever they wished and by whatever means they pleased (Wright, 1966: 104). Due to the loss and corruption of the two most important leverages for China to manage its foreign trade, the role of the Chinese customs was fundamentally changed, losing its initial independence and its function of counteracting foreign competition and shepherding the growth of the national economy, thus becoming reduced to a potent tool for foreign countries to dump their goods, plunder raw materials and capture the Chinese market.

(2) Smuggling and tax evasion ran rampant and grew serious, jeopardizing China's finances and normal foreign trade

With the ratification of consular intervention in China's foreign trade and consular jurisdiction, illegal foreign traders felt emboldened to perpetrate smuggling and tax evasion. Due to an insufficient recognition of the importance of the customs office, and lack of modern experience and ability to run one on the part of the Qing government, not to mention the venal customs officials still at the helm, the early Daoguang period witnessed corruption, abuse of law and the condoning of smuggling in the Canton Customs, which, in time, spread from the port of Guangzhou to four other treaty ports. In spite of the very low tax rate at that time, tax evasion ran rampant

among both Chinese and foreign merchants when the opportunity arose. The customs officials, from the Circuit Intendent down, colluded with dishonest merchants who evaded the state taxes, and benefited from them by acting in collusion with dishonest traders to defraud the revenue.[109] Foreign trade was demoralized and converted into a game of hazard and overreaching."[110] They would have "two bundles of the raw silk tightly tied into one and declared as one bundle" for inspection, and "the white foreign cloth could pass off as the undyed cloth upon declaration." According to statistics, over the four-month period in Shanghai, "only 850 pieces of figured cloth went through the import declaration, but during the same period, as many as 25,000 pieces of figured cloth were sold out," and even those declared piece goods were "passed off as colored cloth or lace fabric, and the customs duty charged was 0.1 tael instead of 0.28 tael." This massive smuggling did not only happen in Guangdong and Shanghai, "at Amoy, it is well known that scarcely one half of the imports are reported" (F.O. 228/151, dated 9th August 1853; qtd from Wright, 1966: 57). Quanzhou and Kinmen, within the network of Amoy Customs, became "smuggling stations for camphor, crockeryware and other articles of the legal trade, which is thus diminished at Amoy" (F.O. 228/65, dated 9th March 1847; qtd from Wright, 1966: 73). "The extent of smuggling at Foochow and Ningpo was restricted only by the opportunities offered" (Wright, 1966: 57). As for illegal opium smuggling, which was committed in broad daylight in the late Daoguang period, the ships were free to travel all along the coast, and smugglers established residences on shores.[111] In Shanghai, "opium was cleared through the customs under the eyes of the customs officers, and was the only imports not subject to inspection." "Likewise in Ningbo, Fuzhou and Shantou, the opium trade was conducted openly" (Yao, 1962: 422). Even among those whose trade operations were supposed to be supervised by the consul, many did not hesitate to seize every opportunity to evade customs duties, or to pay less than the amount stipulated in the agreement by means of false declarations or reconciliations (Wright, 1966: 107). To top it all, even those consuls exploited their consular authority to engage in commercial activities and were more or less implicated in tax-evasion smugglings (F.O. 228/149, dated 10th January 1853; Qtd from Wright, 1966: 191). As can be seen from the above, the bribery and collusion of illegal Chinese merchants and foreign merchants, as well as the umbrella of unequal treaties, contributed to the further expansion of smuggling and tax-evasion activities in the late Daoguang period, so much so that "the customs duty had actually lost its proper role" (Bruce, the British Envoy, qtd from Yan, 1955a: 64) and "foreign trade at that time had become so corrupted and turned into acts of daringness and

[109] British Parliament Papers (B.P.P.) *Further papers relating to the Rebellion in China* 1863; p. 174, qtd from Wright (1966: 55).

[110] B.P.P. *Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan* 1857–1859; p. 56; qtd from Wright (1966: 56).

[111] B.P.P. *Papers Relating to the Opium Trade in China, 1842–1856*, correspondence dated 25th February 1846, p. 24; qtd from Wright (1966: 72).

deception."[112] All of this seriously undermined China's customs, affected China's tax revenues, and jeopardized the normal operation of China's foreign trade.

(3) The changes and implications of the import and export trade

In the late Daoguang period, the opening of the five treaty ports expanded the market, leading to the development of the import and export trade to various degrees. Relatively speaking, the export trade grew faster, tea and silk remained the top exports of China. Due to the proximity of the newly established treaty ports in the wake of the Opium War to the production areas of tea and silk, which were adjoined to the most affluent southeastern region of China, the export increased substantially in volume. The tea increased from 17.73 million pounds in 1843 to 10.12 million pounds in 1853, or 5.7 times the amount a decade earlier (Morse, 1917). Silk grew even faster, from 1,787 packages in 1845 to 62,894 packages in 1853, 35.2-fold the volume of a decade earlier. More notably, the prices of export goods continued to drop during this period, with "the price of silk falling by 35% in four years" (Yao, 1962: 509). Take Shanghai for example, the price of tea per picul in 1845–1846 was 37 taels, which dropped to 29.2 taels in 1846–1847, and was only worth 19.5 taels per picul in 1849–1850 (Yao, 1962: 582). In 1844, Jili silk was charged 390–480 dollars per package, but in 1845 the price dropped to 330–420 dollars, and further reduced to 210–380 dollars in 1847; Yuanhua silk was priced 280–470 dollars in 1844, in 1846 it was 170–275 dollars, and in 1847 it was worth only 150–250 dollars. In 1844, it was 280–470 dollars, in 1846 it was 170–275 dollars, and in 1847 it was only worth 150–250 dollars (Yao, 1962: 579). Thence the foreign invaders began to achieve their ends of plundering the goods exported from China at cheap prices. Due to the boom of the export trade, there was an inward flow of silver at the end of the Daoguang period, a situation not seen for decades, "but since 1850, due to the surge in the export of local goods, silver flew into China once more." In 1850, China raked in a total of 245,000 oz of silver from Britain (Yao, 1962: 515). It was estimated that the silver shipped from England to China "amounted to about 3,000,000 pounds per year between 1851 and 1860, while only 2,000,000 pounds per year were shipped from China to India between 1841 and 1860" (Yao, 1962: 529). The growth of exports, to a certain extent, propelled the silk and tea production, transportation, and other industries in the Yangtze River basin and other related provinces, which also, in actuality, invigorated the commodity economy in these areas.

The growth of imports to China remained sluggish with the exception of the opium trade. In the late Daoguang period, opium smuggling continued its expansion, with an average of 21,500 chests imported each year from 1840 to 1844, increasing to 39,000 chests in 1845–1849, and up to 53,500 chests in 1850–1854 (Yao, 1962: 514). In the first few years of the late Daoguang period, there was a significant increase in British goods exported to China, from more than 969,000 pounds in 1842 to 2,395,000 pounds in 1845, an increase of 2.4 times. In the first few years of the late Daoguang period, the British goods exported to China grew substantially, from more than 969,000 pounds in 1842 to 2,395,000 pounds in 1845, a 2.4-fold

[112] See Footnote 110.

increase (Yao, 1962: 511). This situation caused the continued imbalance in trade between China and the West as well as a large outflow of silver over a span of seven years in the aftermath of the Opium Wars. "The imports were roughly offset by the exports at the five treaty ports, but the payments for opium were made in silver, amounting to 20 to 30 million taels of silver flowing out each year, leading to a spike in silver prices."[113] On top of that, Britain's direct pillages plus its claims for a huge indemnity further increased silver prices and decreased the value of copper coins from the early Daoguang period onward, which, as a social phenomenon, spread out across the country. The silver prices in many places rose by 90% compared with the early Daoguang period when a tael was worth as many as 1600 copper coins, "in circa 1850, a tael could be exchanged for around 2,000 copper coins," "and at its peak, a tale could be converted to 2,700 to 3,000 copper coins" (Peng, 1983b: 29). The rise of silver prices not only brought chaos to China's financial market, and had a serious impact on the proper development of the trade, but also led to a more onerous burden upon the people and made their lives more miserable, so much so that taxes could not enrich the imperial treasury, affecting the revenue of the Qing government.

The British and American capitalists increased the export of their machine-made products to China in the first few years of the Daoguang period, but taken as a whole, they could not realize their dream of turning China into a vast market for their goods in the short term. British exports to China began to decline from the peak in 1845 and remained between 1.4 and 1.5 million pounds by the end of the Daoguang period. In the following six or seven years, they even failed to reach the level of 1845, except for a few years (Yao, 1962: 511). US exports of goods to China totaled US$1.44 million in 1842, increased to US$2.27 million in 1845, but dropped to more than US$1.6 million in 1850 (Yao, 1962: 654). British and American machine-made products, especially cotton textiles, encountered poor sales in the Chinese market as a consequence of the structure of Chinese economy and the influx of opium, and another additional element that has to be taken into account is that their products, as a commodity, were inevitably influenced by the law of value. The most crucial factor here was price, which was based on the value of goods, closely related to the socially necessary labor time, and dependent on the level of technology and equipment. By the end of the 1830s, although Britain had basically completed the process of replacing handwoven textiles with machine-made ones, it was still in its infancy. The number of factories in Lancashire, the then hub of the British textile industry, increased by only 4% between 1839 and 1850, and grew faster between 1850 and 1856, reaching 19% before hitting 33% between 1856 and 1862 (Marx, cited from the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 1972a, 1972b). Therefore, the British cotton textile industry witnessed its mammoth expansion in the 1860s, but still could not rival the local textiles of China as early as the Daoguang period. Moreover, the cost and prices of foreign trade goods were closely correlated to the progress of transportation industry, while technological innovations in British heavy

[113] Feng Guifen: *Yongqian bu feiyin yi* [On using money without wasting silver], in Xian Zhitang gao [*Manuscripts from Xianzhi Mansion*] (Vol. 11), p. 30.

industry and transportation did not come to fruition until the late 1830s and early 1940s. Up until the early 1850s, those who attempted to market their cotton goods in China still faced the question of whether "the cost of their textiles that were produced and then shipped all the way to the doorsteps of China from 20,000 miles away was any less than that of China's homemade ones" (Peng, 1957: 502). The technological progress in the United States was even slower, and it was not until the 1840s that the steam engine was more widely used in industry than hydraulic power. Therefore, the fruits of the industrial revolution could not be fully displayed in the Chinese and foreign trade at that time, and foreign goods, especially cotton textiles, were still not able to gain compelling price advantage over local ones.

In addition to the role of price, there was also the issue of grasping the market information and making forecasts about it. After the signing of the *Treaty of Nanking*, "the foreign merchants were so carried away by the imagined rosy prospect of China's market that they made incorrect estimates of the latter, so much so that their poor little knowledge of the Chinese customs, income levels, consumption habits, and consumer psychology resulted in the blind allocation of goods, for instance, unaware of whether the Chinese used nightcaps. They imagined that if each Chinese needed only one cotton night cap, then the demand would have already exceeded the supply capacity of all the factories in England" (Peng, 1957: 497). Chinese people ate with chopsticks, but the foreign traders shipped loads of knives and forks to them, "as a result, the sales of the knives and forks could not cover the shipping costs …the unsold cutleries lined up like swords and spears in an arsenal." There was even a large shipment of pianos to China, which was based on the assumption that "at least one out of 200 women must be willing to learn to play the piano given that China had a female population of 200 million" (Peng, 1957: 632). At that time, although a small number of foreign traders knew that Chinese consumers preferred "the top-class cotton, linen and calico with bright colors, …few realized that the patterns had to be floral, and that Chinese people did not like those patterns of houses and animals, or the ones of dull columns,"[114] and the vast majority of British and American traders and industrial capitalists in their home country were "totally ignorant of the needs and habits of the Chinese people" (Peng, 1957: 503).

The influx of foreign goods in the late Daoguang period affected the sales of Chinese handicrafts and phased out the local production, causing bankruptcy and unemployment among crafters and producers in these regions due to the dwindling sales of clay yarn and cloth. The manual textile industries in the southeastern coast areas around the treaty ports bore the brunt of the impact, such as foreign merchants in Xiamen, "they not only engaged in the sales and transportation of the foreign goods, but also undertook the shipping of foreign textiles and foreign cotton. As a result, their cargoes filled up the warehouses at the port of Xiamen," so much so that "the cotton of Jiangsu and Zhejiang no longer sold well, and the local merchants almost discontinued their trading. And the locally produced cloth and cotton in Fujian became harder to sell." "The local production in Ningbo had been severely affected, …and the import of the foreign textiles of similar textures had brought many of

[114] A *Collection of Correspondence to India*, dated 3rd October 1829.

the local looms to a halt" (Peng, 1957: 1356–1357). The twill cloth was initially produced in Shunde County, Guangdong, but due to the "waxing of foreign looms" and the "waning of local looms," gone were the days when "the local women weavers were found everywhere in the county" and the influx of foreign cloth caused "almost half of them to be laid-off." The shock waves also hit the areas of Songjiang and Taicang in Jiangsu Province, "cutting the sales of their locally produced textiles by a greater part." This can also be seen in a report by foreign merchants in 1847 saying that "as a result of our textiles taking the place of theirs [Chinese], their weaving industry has declined rapidly" (Peng, 1957: 495–496). Some other local industries had also been affected to varying degrees. But taken as a whole, it should be said that the damages to the Chinese handicraft industry and the impact of foreign goods on the natural economy during the Daoguang period were still in the preliminary stage, and were mainly limited to the local areas around the treaty ports.

(4) The center of China's foreign trade shifted from Guangzhou to Shanghai

The greatest effect of the opening of the five treaty ports and the coastal trade boom on China's modern society and economy was the shift of the foreign trade center. "Agreeing to open five new ports to foreigners did not create five new commercial centers, but gradually shifted the center of the trade from Guangzhou to Shanghai" (Marx, cited from the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 1972a, 1972b: 33). Located in the middle of China's coastline, Shanghai was connected domestically to the Yangtze River, canals and other transportation arteries, easily accessible by transport, and close to the production areas of silk and tea, extending its vast commercial network to the hinterland. Foreign merchants learned of Shanghai before it was opened to foreign traders as "the price of the best green tea in Shanghai was 24% lower than that in Canton, and the prices of the silk, raw or wrought, were also cheaper than those in Canton, and even the rhubarb was at least priced lower than that in Canton." And in Shanghai you could buy, at lower prices, such goods as "cotton textiles, various porcelain wares of the finest quality, poria, camphor …" (Yao, 1962: 560). Therefore, since the opening of Shanghai in November 1843, foreign merchants came in droves, and in 1844, there were as many as 44 foreign ships carrying 8584 tons of cargo that had entered the port of Shanghai. The number grew to 133 ships, carrying 52,547 tons in 1849 and 184 ships carrying 781,650 tons in September 1852 (Morse, 1917). The value of its import and export trade rose sharply, and by the end of the Daoguang reign (1850), the value of its exports to Britain was close to that of Guangdong, and by 1852 it had surpassed the latter. In 1853, the total value of Shanghai's import and export was already 6.7 million dollars more than that of Guangzhou (Marx, cited from the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 1972a, 1972b: 34), making it to the top in the country from then on. In view of the major import and export goods in China at that time, in the third year after the opening of Shanghai (1845), its exports of silk were close to that of Guangdong, accounting for 48.7% of the total. In 1846, the figure surpassed that of Guangdong, accounting for 81% of the total exports of raw silk (Peng, 1957: 489), and thereafter Shanghai had almost held a monopoly over the exports of raw silk in the country. Tea exports comprised one-seventh of the

whole country in 1846, and soon soared to one-third by 1851 (Morse, 1917), and the volume of tea exported from Shanghai surpassed that of Guangzhou from 1852. It was clear that Shanghai gradually took over the role of Guangzhou as the hub of China's foreign trade and metamorphosed into the most prosperous commercial city in the country from the late Daoguang period.

Since the Ming dynasty, Guangzhou had been an important port for China's foreign trade, and since 1757, it had been made the only port opened to foreign commerce. The long-term economic activity gave birth to a set of rules for the import and export services. The tea, silk, and other large quantities of goods for export were "transported from their origin via Meiguan (also known as Meiling Pass) at the border of Guangdong and Jiangxi." The transport routes fed a population of workers as many as "hundreds of thousands in total" (Peng, 1957: 541), linking many areas in Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, and other provinces. Busy traffic of goods and frequent trading activities fostered the boom of the transportation industry and its attendant commercial and service industries, which sustained the livelihood of nearly one million people. In the late Daoguang period, the increase in the number of treaty ports allowed direct exports from the coastal provinces, and the goods for export from along the Yangtze River were shipped downstream and gathered in Shanghai; as for the imported goods, they went upstream to be distributed and sold all over the places along the Yangtze River. As a result, this seismic change in the order of traditional activities that had lasted for hundreds of years impinged on the lives of nearly a million people, and some industries also needed to adjust to the changes, which would inevitably send shocking waves to the society and economy at that time. The port lay close to the origin of the goods for export, which means lower costs for shipping and others and less wear and tear on the cargo over long-distance shipments. "Take raw silk for example, the distance between its production area and Guangdong was ten times that between the former and Shanghai, and the increased shipping costs and lost interest, according to the British Consul in Shanghai in the twenty-seventh year of the Daoguang period (1847), were estimated at about 30%-45%" (Peng, 1957: 535). As for the tea, the shipping costs in Guangdong were over 20% more than that in Shanghai. However, this change brought more benefits to foreign merchants rather than China.

In a word, the China-Western trade in the early Daoguang period gradually underwent marked changes, and these changes even turned qualitative in the late Daoguang period. In the early Daoguang period, the trade relationship between the EIC and the thirteen Hongs of Guangzhou was expanded to include British and American private traders and those on the Chinese side in Guangzhou; and free trade became the order of the day in the late Daoguang period. The early 1820s saw the foreign trade happening mainly within the confines of Guangzhou and Whampoa Roads, but the trade was relocated to the Lingding Sea in the twenties and thirties, and especially in the thirties, illegal trade activities along the coast emerged and developed. In the late Daoguang period, a new era of five treaty ports began. In terms of trade patterns, the illegal smuggling took over the normal trade in the early period, tax evasion went rampant and became worse in the later period. The nature of the trade changed predominantly from normal trade in the twenties to smuggling in the thirties; and the

late Daoguang period saw the trade morphing into the semi-colonial one. All these changes came under the looming shadow of the opium, and the upsurge of the opium smuggling decisively led to the various changes in the trade between China and the West.

The various changes in trade between China and the West had profound impact on the Chinese society and economy. The illegal activities of British and American merchants undermined China's trade management system, disrupted the normal trade between China and the West, and China plunged into a chaotic situation in foreign trade where smuggling and drug trafficking ran rampant and tax evasion went viral. The exponential growth of the opium trade in the early Daoguang period not only undermined the foundation of the normal trade between China and the West, but also brought endless disasters to China, which led to the anti-smoking movement of the Chinese people aiming for the salvation of their nation, and also became an apple of discord between China and the West during the reign of Emperor Daoguang and the root cause of the outbreak of the Opium War. The economic invasion of the Western capitalism created the conditions for the emergence of the class of Chinese compradors and ushered in new changes in class relations in China. The signing of various unequal treaties in the late Daoguang period paved the ground for the Western capitalists to promote the products and plunder the resources of China, and the opening of the five treaty ports caused a shift away from the trade center of yesteryear and prompted a sea change in the order of China's foreign trade. There is no denying that the normal commodity trade during the pre-Daoguang period had propelled the development of some related handicrafts and rural productions in China. But in the late Daoguang period, on the one hand, the import of foreign goods dealt a blow to the local traditional Chinese handicraft industry and sabotaged the Chinese market; on the other hand, the plunder of low-priced Chinese goods objectively incentivized the production of certain goods in the relevant coastal areas.

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